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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JANE DOE NO. 1, JANE DOE NO. 2,
AND JANE DOE NO. 3
Plaintiffs,
v.
TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, DR.
DIANE SNOW, DR. ANDREW
SCHOOLMASTER, DR. ROB
GARNETT, DR. DARRON TURNER,
RUSSELL MACK, J.D., LEIGH
HOLLAND AND AARON CHIMBEL,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00106-M

DEFENDANT DR. DARRON TURNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE
DOE NO. 3 FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
George C. Haratsis
Texas Bar No. 08941000
gch@mcdonaldlaw.com
Rory Divin
Texas Bar No. 05902800
rd@mcdonaldlaw.com
Jennifer Littman
Texas Bar No. 00786142
jnl@mcdonaldlaw.com
McDONALD SANDERS,
a Professional Corporation
777 Main Street, Suite 2700
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
(817) 336-8651
(817) 334-0271 Fax
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
DR. DARRON TURNER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND....................................................................... 1
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. 1
A. Doe No. 3 has not pleaded plausible substantive claims against Turner. ......... 1
1.

Doe No. 3’s negligence claim should be dismissed ......................................... 2

III. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL ..................................................................................... 6

DEFENDANT DR. DARRON TURNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 3 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698 (2009) ............................................................ 1, 2, 5
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ................................................. 1, 2
Boyd v. Tex. Christian Univ., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1999, no pet.) ............................................................................................................... 5
Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601–602 (Tex. 1993) ................................................... 5
Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) ....................... 3
Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998,
pet. denied) .................................................................................................................. 4
Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781–83 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................... 5
Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996) ...................................................... 2
Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013)...................... 6
Pagayon v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2017) ....................................... 3
Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).................. 1
Thapar v. Zekulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1999) ..................................................... 2
Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 2005) ............................................................... 2

DEFENDANT DR. DARRON TURNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 3 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

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TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Dr.
Darron Turner (“Turner”) respectfully files this motion to dismiss (“Motion”) all of the claims
of Jane Doe No. 3, (“Doe No. 3”) against Turner in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
[Doc. 19], and brief in support.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Doe No. 3 1 enrolled at TCU in the fall of 2016 and graduated from TCU’s Honors
College in May 2020. 2 Although she publicly praised TCU as offering a welcoming and
caring environment, she has now sued TCU alleging race and disability discrimination
and other claims. She also alleges Turner was negligent as TCU’s Title IX Coordinator.
Turner asks the Court to dismiss Doe No. 3’s claim against him.
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A.

Doe No. 3 has not pleaded plausible substantive claims against Turner.
A plaintiff’s complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts “do not accept as true
conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Plotkin v.
IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations.”). Although “a court must accept as true all of the
Doe No. 3, along with Jane Doe No. 2, has joined this lawsuit that was initially filed by Jane Doe No. 1.
Doe No. 3 has graduated from TCU as of May 2020, but TCU’s Spring 2020 graduation commencement
ceremony has been postponed until August due to the Coronavirus pandemic.
1
2

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allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (2009). The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) If “the plaintiffs
have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint
must be dismissed.” (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.) Turner moves the Court to dismiss
Doe No. 3’s case for failure to state a claim.
1.

Doe No. 3’s negligence claim should be dismissed

Doe No. 3’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law. To state a negligence claim,
Doe No. 3 must allege facts showing (1) Turner owed her a legal duty, (2) Turner
breached that duty, and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. Thapar v.
Zekulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1999).
To be liable for negligence under Texas law, an individual acting as an agent or
employee must have an independent duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, separate
from the employer's duty. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 2005) (citing Leitch v.
Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)). Doe No. 3 alleges she sent Turner a ninepage written report on June 6, 2019 “detailing some of her harrowing experiences . . . and
the injuries that resulted.” [Compl. ¶ 165.] She has not alleged a single fact indicating
Turner was acting outside the scope of his employment with TCU in handling Doe No. 3’s
written report or any facts that would otherwise impose a separate, independent duty of
care on Turner in his individual capacity. To the contrary, Doe No. 3 acknowledges the
report was sent to Turner as TCU’s Title IX Coordinator and she complains she has

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received no response from TCU (not Turner). [Compl. ¶ 165.]

In fact, Doe No. 3

acknowledges that at all relevant times, TCU agents - which includes Turner - were acting
within the course and scope of their employment and/or at the direction and under the
control of TCU. [Compl. ¶ 231.] Therefore, to state a claim of negligence against Turner
individually, Doe No. 3 must plead sufficient facts to establish he owed her a legal duty
independent of any duty owed by TCU. Doe No. 3’s Complaint fails in that regard.
The existence of a legal duty is a question of law and the threshold inquiry of the
court. Pagayon v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2017) (citing Greater Hous.
Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)). Texas courts have not imposed
a duty on university administrators to act with reasonable care towards their adult
students. “When a duty has not been recognized in particular circumstances, the question
is whether one should be.” Pagayon, 536 S.W.3d at 504. When analyzing whether a
common law duty exists, courts consider the risk, foreseeability and likelihood of injury
weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the burden of guarding against
the injury and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Id.; Phillips,
801 S.W.2d at 525.
According to Doe No. 3, she sent Turner, TCU’s Title IX Coordinator, a nine-page
report in the summer of 2019. [Compl. ¶ 165.] While she contends the report detailed
“some of her harrowing experiences” and the alleged injuries that resulted, she fails to
allege what experiences were included in the report. Doe No. 3 did not include a copy of
her “detailed” report with the Complaint, nor does she specify which, if any, of her current
allegations were included as part of the report. [Compl. ¶ 165.] Therefore, it is impossible
to determine from the Complaint whether the report to Turner included the allegations

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that a campus minister told Doe No. 3 her dog was racist. [Compl. ¶ 159.], the allegations
about Doe No. 3’s faculty mentor [Compl. ¶ 160.], the allegations about the April 26, 2019
event [Compl. ¶ 161.], the allegations about Chancellor Boschini [Compl. ¶ 163.], or the
allegations about Laurel Cunningham with TCU’s Student Disability Services [Compl.
¶ 164.]. Further, Doe No. 3 has not alleged whether her report requested Turner to take
any action in response to the report, whether she requested complete confidentiality, or
whether she was willing for her name to be used as part of an investigation. Considering
the risk-utility factors against the scant allegations that Doe No. 3 submitted a report to
Turner and has not received a response from TCU, the utility of Turner’s actions, the
burden of guarding against risks, and the consequences of placing such burden on
Turner, far outweighs any potential risk or injury to Doe No. 3. Additionally, the conclusory
statements that Turner, while discussing the complaint process, emphasized the
investigation “as though it would be a hassle” and moved to another topic “in an attempt
to discourage [Doe No. 3] from reporting discriminatory treatment” are conclusory with no
factual support and are insufficient to impose an independent duty.
In deciding whether a legal duty exists, in addition to applying the risk-utility test,
courts also consider whether there was a special relationship between the parties when
deciding whether a legal duty exists. Doe No. 3 asserts Turner owed her a legal duty
because [he] had a special relationship with [Doe No. 3] as a designated point-person for
discrimination complaints. [Compl. ¶ 237.] But the relationship between a university
administrator and his or her adult student is not a special relationship. See Ho v. Univ. of
Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied); see also
Boyd v. Tex. Christian Univ., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no

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pet.); Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781–83 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the
Court should not find a duty exists based on a special relationship.
Assuming for purposes of this Motion that Turner owed Doe No. 3 an independent
legal duty, she has failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating Turner breached a duty.
Doe No. 3’s conclusory statement that “the act and omissions detailed herein constitute
breaches of said duties” is insufficient. Because Doe No. 3 has left the Court to guess
what was actually included in her report to the Title IX Office, it is impossible to know what
action, if any, could have or should have been taken. For example, if Doe No. 3 requested
confidentiality, the scope of any investigation would be limited. Similarly, if Doe No. 3
reported in June 2019 that in the fall of 2016, unidentified white students used racial slurs
in the Honors College dorm, it would likely be impossible to investigate such an allegation.
The limited factual allegations about the contents of the report are insufficient to indicate
a potential breach of duty.
Additionally, Doe No. 3’s allegation that Turner “proximately caused” her injuries
[Compl. ¶ 237] is nothing more than a recital of one of the necessary elements of a
negligence cause of action, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 697. Doe No. 3 has failed to allege any facts supporting how Turner’s handling of her
nine-page report proximately caused her damages.
Doe No. 3 also alleges she suffered “psychological and physiological injury” as a
result of Turner’s alleged negligence. [Compl. ¶ 237.] Doe No. 3 has failed to allege any
injuries, other than emotional harm, and she cannot recover under a negligence theory
for mental anguish or emotional distress damages alone. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d
593, 601–602 (Tex. 1993).

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Because Doe No. 3’s allegations fail to nudge her claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, her negligence claims should be dismissed. Lutz v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013).
III. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant, Dr. Darron Turner, requests that the
Court enter an order dismissing all of Doe No. 3’s claims against him with prejudice and
without leave to amend.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jennifer N. Littman
George C. Haratsis
Texas Bar No. 08941000
gch@mcdonaldlaw.com
Rory Divin
Texas Bar No. 05902800
rd@mcdonaldlaw.com
Jennifer Littman
Texas Bar No. 00786142
jnl@mcdonaldlaw.com
McDONALD SANDERS,
A Professional Corporation
777 Main Street, Suite 2700
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
(817) 336-8651
(817) 334-0271 Fax
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
DR. DARRON TURNER

DEFENDANT DR. DARRON TURNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 3 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned counsel certifies that the above and foregoing Motion to Dismiss
and Brief in Support of Defendant Dr. Darron Turner is being served by electronic mail on
all counsel of record receiving electronic notice from the court’s ECF notification system
on May 20, 2020.
/s/ Jennifer N. Littman
Jennifer N. Littman
I:\09300\0102\14K0071.DOCX

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