Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 1 of 11 PageID 815 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION JANE DOE NO. 1, JANE DOE NO. 2, AND JANE DOE NO. 3 Plaintiffs, v. TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, DR. DIANE SNOW, DR. ANDREW SCHOOLMASTER, DR. ROB GARNETT, DR. DARRON TURNER, RUSSELL MACK, J.D., LEIGH HOLLAND AND AARON CHIMBEL, Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00106-M DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT George C. Haratsis Texas Bar No. 08941000 gch@mcdonaldlaw.com Rory Divin Texas Bar No. 05902800 rd@mcdonaldlaw.com Jennifer Littman Texas Bar No. 00786142 jnl@mcdonaldlaw.com McDONALD SANDERS, a Professional Corporation 777 Main Street, Suite 2700 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 (817) 336-8651 (817) 334-0271 Fax ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 2 of 11 PageID 816 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND........................................................................................................... 2 A. Summary of Doe No. 1’s Allegations ................................................................ 2 B. Doe No. 1’s Pleaded Claims Against Holland ................................................... 3 III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. 3 A. Doe No. 1 has not pleaded a plausible substantive claim against Holland. ...... 3 1. Doe No. 1’s negligence claim should be dismissed ......................................... 4 IV. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL ..................................................................................... 7 DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE i Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 3 of 11 PageID 817 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698 (2009) ............................................................ 3, 4, 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ................................................. 3, 4 Boyd v. Tex. Christian Univ., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) ............................................................................................................... 6 Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601–602 (Tex. 1993) ................................................... 7 Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) ....................... 5 Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) .................................................................................................................. 6 Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781–83 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................... 6 Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996) ...................................................... 4 Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013)...................... 7 Pagayon v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2017) ....................................... 5 Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).................. 3 Thapar v. Zekulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1999) ..................................................... 4 Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 2005) ............................................................... 4 DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE ii Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 4 of 11 PageID 818 TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Leigh Holland (“Holland”) respectfully files this motion to dismiss (“Motion”) all of the claims of Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 1 (“Doe No. 1”) against Holland in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [Doc. 19], and brief in support. I. INTRODUCTION This is a suit brought by Doe No. 1, a student at Texas Christian University (“TCU”), against TCU, Holland, Dr. Diane Snow (“Snow”), Russell Mack (“Mack”), Aaron Chimbel (“Chimbel”), Dr. Rob Garnett (“Garnett”), and Dr. Darron Turner (“Turner”), after she was sanctioned for academic conduct, i.e., plagiarism, following a four week TCU Honors Exploration program in Washington, D.C. entitled “How Washington D.C. Works.” [Compl. ¶ 90-91, 126, 169-173-.] 1 Doe No. 1 does not deny that she submitted plagiarized assignments during the course or allege that she was falsely accused of plagiarism. As a result of the academic misconduct, Doe No. 1 received no-credit (NC) for the pass/fail course. After Doe No. 1 was confronted with the plagiarism, she proceeded to file a Title IX complaint with TCU’s Title IX Office, alleging mistreatment by Snow during the Washington, D.C. program. [Compl. ¶ 130.] Doe No. 1 also appealed the NC grade, and her appeal was denied. [Compl. ¶ 170, 173.] Before the internal Title IX complaint was resolved, Doe No. 1 sued TCU and several of the individual defendants. 2 [Compl. ¶ 130.] 1 References in this Motion to [Compl. ¶ ____.] are to paragraphs in Doe No. 1’s First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”). For example, a reference to [Compl. ¶ 90.] is a reference to paragraph 90 of her Complaint. 2 Doe No. 1 added Holland as a defendant when she filed the First Amended Complaint. DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 1 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 5 of 11 PageID 819 Doe No. 1 alleges Holland was negligent in the handling of her Title IX complaint. Holland asks this Court to dismiss her claims against her. II. BACKGROUND A. Summary of Doe No. 1’s Allegations Individual defendants Mack, Chimbel, and Snow each facilitated one week of the four-week program in Washington, D.C., from July 7, 2019 through August 3, 2019. 3 Near the end of the program, it was determined that Doe No. 1 had plagiarized written assignments submitted during the program. As a sanction for the academic misconduct, Doe No. 1 received a grade of No Credit for the pass/fail course. Doe No. 1 appealed the decision to co-defendant Garnett, Associate Dean of the Honors College, but he upheld the decision and denied Doe No. 1’s appeal. Around the same time, Doe No. 1 raised allegations of mistreatment during the Washington, D.C. trip. After Doe No. 1 returned to TCU, Doe No. 1 proceeded to file a Title IX complaint over her perceived treatment during the Washington, D.C. program. [Compl. ¶ 130.] The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action are described in the 106-page Complaint, but specific allegations against Holland are minimal. In summary, Plaintiff alleges: • On July 31, 2019, Holland contacted Doe No. 1 concerning an “incident in D.C.” [Compl. ¶ 131.] 3 Dr. Frederick Gooding (“Gooding”) also led one week of the four-week program. Doe No. 1 dismissed her claims against Gooding when she filed the First Amended Complaint. DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 2 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 • Page 6 of 11 PageID 820 On or about August 26, 2019, Doe No. 1 spoke with Holland and co-defendant Turner and emailed them a written Title IX statement and list of witnesses. [Compl. ¶ 130.] 4 • On March 23, 2020, Doe No. 1 received a Title IX Decision Letter authorized by Holland which stated TCU received Doe No. 1’s Title IX complaint on August 26, 2019 5 and which concluded Dr. Snow did not violate TCU’s policy on Prohibited Discrimination, Harassment and Related Conduct.” [Compl. ¶ 131.] B. Doe No. 1’s Pleaded Claims Against Holland Plaintiff asserts a negligence causes of action against Holland. III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. Doe No. 1 has not pleaded a plausible substantive claim against Holland. A plaintiff’s complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Courts “do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Although “a court must accept as true all of the Absent from this Complaint are the names of a single witness to any of the acts alleged to have occurred. Doe No. 1 acknowledges she submitted her written statement and list of witnesses on August 26, 2019. [Compl. ¶ 130.] 4 5 DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 3 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 7 of 11 PageID 821 allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (2009). The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.) If “the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.) Holland moves the Court to dismiss each of Doe No. 1’s case against her for failure to state a claim. 1. Doe No. 1’s negligence claim should be dismissed. Doe No. 1’s negligence claim fails as a matter of law. To state a negligence claim, she must allege facts showing (1) Holland owed her a legal duty, (2) Holland breached that duty, and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. Thapar v. Zekulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1999). To be liable for negligence under Texas law, an individual acting as an agent or employee must have an independent duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, separate from the employer's duty. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 2005) (citing Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)). Doe has not alleged a single fact that would indicate Holland was acting outside the scope of his employment with TCU in handling Doe’s Title IX complaint. In fact, Doe alleges that at all relevant times, TCU’s agents – which includes Holland - were acting within the course and scope of their employment and/or at the direction and under the control of TCU. [Compl. ¶ 231.] Therefore, to state a claim of negligence against Holland individually, Doe No. 1 must plead sufficient facts DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 4 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 8 of 11 PageID 822 to establish Holland owed her a legal duty independent of any duty owed by TCU. Doe No. 1’s Complaint fails in that regard. The existence of a legal duty is a question of law and the threshold inquiry of the court. Pagayon v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2017) (citing Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)). Texas courts have not imposed a general duty on university faculty members and administrators to act with reasonable care towards their adult students. “When a duty has not been recognized in particular circumstances, the question is whether one should be.” Pagayon, 536 S.W.3d at 504. When analyzing whether a common law duty exists, courts consider the risk, foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Id.; Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525. According to Doe No. 1, Holland reached out to her on July 31, 2019 about the “incident in D.C.” [Compl. ¶ 131.], she talked to Doe No. 1 on August 26, 2019 [Compl. ¶ 130.], and Holland authored the letter which advised Doe No. 1 that Snow had not violated TCU’s policy. Viewing these allegations in a light most favorable to Doe No. 1, the utility of Holland’s actions, the burden of guarding against injury to Doe No. 1, and the consequence of placing that burden on Holland far outweighs any potential for risk, foreseeability or likelihood of injury to Doe No. 1, and the Court should decline to impose an independent duty on Holland. In addition to applying the risk-utility test, courts also consider whether there was a special relationship between the parties. Doe No. 1 asserts Holland owed her a legal duty because she had a special relationship with [Doe No. 1] as a designated point-person DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 5 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 9 of 11 PageID 823 for discrimination complaints.” [Compl. ¶ 237.] But the relationship between a university faculty member or administrator and his or her adult student is not a special relationship. See Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied); see also Boyd v. Tex. Christian Univ., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781–83 (5th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the Court should not find a duty exists because of a special relationship. Assuming, for purposes of this Motion, Holland owed Doe No. an independent duty, she has failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating Holland breached any duty. Doe No. 1’s conclusory statement that “the act and omissions detailed herein constitute breaches of said duties” is insufficient. According to the Complaint, the only thing Holland did was communicate with Doe No. 1 on a couple of occasions and author the letter finding Snow did not violate TCU’s policy on harassment and discrimination. The fact that Doe No. 1 disagrees with the outcome is insufficient to allege breach of a duty. Additionally, Doe No. 1’s allegation that Holland “proximately caused” her injuries [Compl. ¶ 237] is nothing more than a recital of one of the necessary elements of a negligence cause of action, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697. Doe No. 1 has failed to allege any facts supporting how Holland’s handling of her Title IX complaint proximately caused Doe No. 1’s damages. As a result of the alleged negligence, Doe No. 1 also alleges she suffered “psychological and physiological injury.” [Compl. ¶ 237.] Doe No. 1 has failed to allege any injuries, other than emotional harm, and she cannot recover under a negligence DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 6 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 10 of 11 PageID 824 theory for mental anguish or emotional distress damages alone. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601–602 (Tex. 1993). Because Doe No. 1’s allegations fail to nudge her claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, her negligence claims should be dismissed. Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013). IV. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL For the reasons set forth above, Defendant, Leigh Holland, requests that the Court enter an order dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims against her with prejudice and without leave to amend. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Jennifer N. Littman George C. Haratsis Texas Bar No. 08941000 gch@mcdonaldlaw.com Rory Divin Texas Bar No. 05902800 rd@mcdonaldlaw.com Jennifer Littman Texas Bar No. 00786142 jnl@mcdonaldlaw.com McDONALD SANDERS, A Professional Corporation 777 Main Street, Suite 2700 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 (817) 336-8651 (817) 334-0271 Fax ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 7 Case 3:20-cv-00106-M Document 35 Filed 05/20/20 Page 11 of 11 PageID 825 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned counsel certifies that the above and foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Defendant Leigh Holland is being served by electronic mail on all counsel of record receiving electronic notice from the court’s ECF notification system on May 20, 2020. /s/ Jennifer N. Littman Jennifer N. Littman I:\09300\0102\14J8988.DOCX DEFENDANT LEIGH HOLLAND’S MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS OF JANE DOE NO. 1 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 8