Case 1:19-cr-00304-LMB Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 1 of 8 PageID# 19 FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOP TRF." TNOPENCqURT_ EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division 2019 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA Criminal No. l:19-CR-304(LMB) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Count One: 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) V. Willful Transmission of National Defense Information HENRY KYLE FRESE Count Two: 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) Defendant. Willful Transmission of National Defense Information UNDER SEAL INDICTMENT OCTOBER 2019 TERM - At Alexandria THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT: At all times material to this Indictment, except as otherwise indicated: General Allegations The Defendant 1. Defendant Henry Kyle Frese("FRESE")resided in the Eastern District of Virginia. 2. FRESE was an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), located in the Eastern District of Virginia. Classified Information 3. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 signed on April 17, 1995, as amended by Executive Order 13292 on March 25, 2003, and Executive Order 13526 on December 29, 2009, national security information was classified as "TOP SECRET," "SECRET," or Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 2 of 8 Page D# 20 National security information was information owned by, produced by, produced for, and under the control of the United States government that was classi?ed as follows-:7 a. Information was classi?ed as TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classi?cation authority was able to identify and describe. b. Information was classi?ed as SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classi?cation authority was able to identify and describe. 0. Information was classi?ed as CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized disclosure of that information reasonably could be expected to . cause damage to the national Security that the original classi?cation authority- . was able to identify and describe. 4. Access to national security information classi?ed at any level could be further restricted through compartmentation in Sensitive Compartmented Information categories. Only individuals with the appropriate security clearance and additional SCI permissions could have authorized access to such classi?ed national security information. 5. Classi?ed information, including SCI, wasmarked according to its classi?cation and applicable SCI compartments, following standard formats for different types of media, including headers and footers stating the highest classi?cation level and SCI compartments of information a document contained and individual classi?cations markings for each paragraph. 6. Infonnation classi?ed at any level could only be lawfully accessed by persons determined by an appropriate United States goveMent of?cial to. be eligible for access to classi?ed information, who had signed an approved non-disclosure agreement, Who received a security clearance, and who had a ?need to know.? the classi?ed information. ?Classi?ed information could only be stored in an approved facility and container. Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 3 of 8 Page D# 21 Access to Classi?ed National Defense Information 7. From in or about January 2017 until in or about February 2018, FRESE was a contract employee with DIA, assigned to a facility in the Eastern District of Virginia, and held a Top Secret// Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance. 8. From in or about February 2018 through in or about October 2019, FRESE was employed by DIA, assigned to a facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. In connection with his employment, FRESE held a TOP SCI security clearance. 9. FRESE received training regarding classi?ed information, including the de?nitions of classi?ed information, the levels of classi?cation,and SCI, as well as the proper handling, marking, transportation, and storage of classi?ed materials. FRESE received training on his duty to protect classi?ed materials from unauthorized disclosure, which included complying with handling, transportation, and storage requirements. FRESE knew that unauthorized transmission of classi?ed National Defense Information could endanger the national security of the United States and the safety of its citizens. In particular, FRESE had been advised that unauthorized disclosure of TOP SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; - unauthorized disclosure of SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security of the United States; and that violation of rules goveming the handling of classi?ed information could result in criminal prosecution. Transmission of National Defense Information 10. Because FRESE held a security clearance andgwas assigned ?rst as a contractor to and then an employee of DIA, the United States government entrusted FRESE with access to sensitive government materials, including information relating to the national defense that was closely held by the government (?National Defense Information? or and classi?ed documents and materials. Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 4 of 8 Page D# 22 11. In or about mid-April to early May 2018, FRESE accessed an intelligence report unrelated to his job duties on multiple occasions, which contained NDI classi?ed at the TOP level, which related to a certain foreign cOuntry?s weapons systems (?Intelligence Report 12. A week after FRESE accessed Intelligence Report 1 for the second time, FRESE received an April 27, 2018 Twitter Direct Message from a journalist (?Journalist with a certain news outlet (?News Outlet Journalist I asked whether FRESE would be willing to speak with a second journalist (?Journalist who worked with a second news outlet (?News Outletl2?). FRESE stated that he was ?down? to help Journalist 2 if it helped Journalist 1 because he wanted to see Journalist 1 ?progress.? 1 13. During the same April 27, 2018 Twitter exchange, Journalist 1 also indicated that a certain Umt' ed States milita_ry of?cial told Journalist 2 that the of?cial was not aware of the stated subject matter of a story Journalist 1 was working on, the subject matter being the topic of Intelligence Report 1. FRESE characterized the of?cial?s denial as ?weird? and commented on the source of information contained within Intelligence Report 1. 14. Several days after the April 27 Twitter exchange, FRESE searched on a classi?ed United States government computer system for terms related to the topics contained in Intelligence Report 1. . 15. A few hours after searching for terms related to the topic of Intelligence Report 1, FRESE Spoke by Several hours later, FRESE spoke by telephone with Journalist 2 for over half an hour. Immediately after the call with Journalist 2, Journalist 1 called FRESE. Approximately half an hour after FRESE spoke with the two journalists, Journalistl ublished article which contained NDI from Intelligence Report 1 classi?ed at the TOP level. Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 5 of -8 Page D# 23 16. Journalist 1 later Tweeted a link to Article 1. FRESE subsequently re~Tweeted . Journalist 1?s Tweet of Article 1. .17. Pursuant. to court-authorized- Title interception of wire and electronic 1 communicationsito and from. cellular telephone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation intercepted certain portions of text messages and telephone calls. 18. On September 11, 2019, the FBI intercepted a call between FRESE and Journalist 1 during which. Journalistl discussed Journalist 2Iand Journalist 2?s assignments at" work. . Journalist I asked FRESE if he wanted ?to meet [Journalist actually have you' met her in FRESE replied, haven?t, yeah that sounds good.? 41? 9. On or about September 24, 2019, FRESE. accessed two additional intelligence reports (?Intelligence Report and ?Intelligence Report collectively with Intelligence. Report 1 referred to as the ?intelligence reporting?), both classi?ed at the SECRET level. I 20. .On September 24, 2(119, after FRESE had accessed Intelligence Report 2 and Intelligence Report 3, the FBI intercepted a text message from FRESE to Journalist asking Journalist 2 .to call FRESE. Approximately one minute later, the FBI intercepted a call made to RESE from ournalist-2 in which FRESE unlawfully transmitted: certain NDI, classi?ed at the SECRET level, from Intelligence Report 2 and Intelligence Report 3 to Journalist 2. During the September 24, 2019 call, Journalist 2 asked FRESE ?what?s going on atwork?? FRESE responded, ?Uh, well it?s nothingto do' with, like what I cover, per usual but urn, it?s, so, it?s about, [topic of Intelligence Reports 2- and 3] And I don?t know if anyone?s really .lcommented on this but'I saw a report, it?s a few days old at this point, um, that basically from Intelligence Reports 2 and 3 that was classi?ed at the SECRET level] 21. The intelligence reporting that FRESE viewed, and the content of which he transmitted, ,bore standard markings indicating that it contained highly classi?ed information of . Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 6 of 8 Page D# 24 the United States, including information at the SECRET and TOP SECRET levels, as well as SCI. With respect to this information: a. FRESE knew? that. the intelligence reporting contained classi?ed information that related to the national defense. FRESE was never authorized to transmit the intelligence reporting. FRESE knew that he was not authorized to transmit the intelligence reporting. - I The NeWs Outlets to which FRESE transmitted the intelligence reporting were not entitled to receive or possess it. FRESE knew that the News Outlets were not entitled to receive or possess the intelligence reporting. Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 7 of 8 Page D# 25 mm 18 U.S.C. 793(d) (Willful Transmission of National Defense Information) 22. Paragraphs 1-16 and 21 of this Indictment are incorporated by reference and realleged as if set forth fully herein. 23. Beginning on or about April 12, 2018, and continuing until on or about a date unknown but no later than May 3, 2018, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the defendant, HENRY KYLE FRESE, lawfully having possession of, access to, and control over a document containing information relating to the national defense, willfully transmitted information to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation: to wit, FRESE'transmitted TOP SECRET information from Intelligence Report 1 to Journalist 1. All in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(d). Case Document 1 Filed 10/08/19 Page 8 of 8 Page D# 26 18 U.S.C. 793(d) (Willful Transmission of National Defense Information) 24. Paragraphs 1-21 of this Indictment are incorporated by reference and realleged as if set forth fully herein. 25. On or about September 24, 2019, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the defendant, HENRY KYLE FRESE, lawfully having possession of, access to, and control over a document containing information- relating to the national defense, willfully transmitted information to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation: to Wit, FRESE transmitted SECRET information from Intelligence Report 2 and Intelligence Report 3 to Journalist 2. All in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(d). A 1lg?liirl?il?aristgi0t E-Government Act, The original of this page has been filed under seal in the Clerk's Office FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY G. Zachary Terwilliger United St tes Attorney By: ElanyagAtiyeh yunifeiJKennedy Gellie Assistan United States Attorney Trial Attorney National Security Division United States Department of Justice