JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form c: 4/2 6/20 1 Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10145-10424 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 55-06-18 Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM: CIA TO TITLE: Eleased under the John . Kennedy Assassinat ion Recorda Collection Act of 1992 (?44 USC DATE: 02/03/1978 21o? Note] . 53:13:: PAGES 4 SEE: 05?05?2017 SUBJECTS SNYDER, RICHARD E., 201 FILE CIA, FILES DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 18 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/31/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 31 Page 1 1 10 I 7 IL 5?0. i6 21" 7W r? 52,4 5?7) #3 . . . X?rzz [7353 M624 20% 02007193 ,w gas/{,ea; - 3;?5 . Page 2 WM 5. . aim/495% 2 155/555 . (f 4&5 56) -5 ?0355?. LL 7 77 345(525% {arm (?g/0271473535 i (Igor/155, m) HH Page 3 - .?ssyinIV-IIJ? . .-1 .s . g. 18?.Jrayw 510$ M439 X5742 - . (CA. (756?) 11H . Page 5 (2 {911, 9?3) E.- H<2o 15(- may (27 Mm 59 JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form Date: 4/26/201 Agency Information AGENCY HSCA i RECORD NUMBER: 180-10145?10428 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION I I AGENCY FILE NUMBER 55-06-22 Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA i ROM CIA I TO TITLE Eleased under the John . DATE 11/06/1978 :22: :Enm 1011 PAGES: 7 I i Collection Act of . 1992 USC 210? SUBJECTS Hate] . Case#:N1uI CIA, 201 FILES 53:38:: Date: DEFECTORS 7 5?05?2 1? CIA, FILES . I DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 01/01/2003' OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS - Box 31 wl NH 53030 Page 1 - TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT. . . Office?of Legislative Counsel I 'l mu amt-orLARSF, CE: 15444? r? 42?; '57 11112577 5 1:5, 1.1: 1115 1/ WM 1 memag ?on/aa?iaf. 55555555555 MUD kw. Wag 5HH Page 2? MW a My MW #33; R?s-cm ,9 ,42&>34f7 ,4233349??zMA- /423?c45f3n7 cfz> z??zL diEsW? 42-f7 g. 23 - '7 ASS.- SS. ASS.- .SAS - SS SASS - - - .- SS-S. . . SS ASS . ASS SHSS .. AX.- SASSN A.SS. M. . ..SNASS SS. SSAVWSSASK SS.- ..ASA SESS- .SASSASS mu?- \1 -1 E-- -1- A -W.M . . . . .SAS M. . SS. .S. Sn ASSN-N-- . MAwwmmug - Sam manna; SASHA MANHASAA- Swan mm 3? Pat?1'3 3P. 7 - WM ?My? A: F. .M ?m 4% mp?fSA va_ Mer/m? ,5 . 5161.; A, 4W 45/044077 We: ?41% MM 196@515 [kc ?ax56?? m} 141M MV A ?qq'7_ wv?kWL i a W. - A Cfazm?gmw . 5 RH Page 31 JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form Date: 4/26/201 Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10145-10431 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION 1 AGENCY FILE NUMBER: I 55-06-25 Document Information QRIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: CIA TO TITLE: under the John Kennedy Records ellectien Act of 1992 DATE: 11/07/1978 [?14 USC Nate] . PAGES: 5 53080 Date: SUBJECTS LAWSON, JOHN HOWARD, 201 FILE CIA, FILES DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES . CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 13 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/31/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 31 WI HH EBDBD Page 1 TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT - TO: ??rhy, FROM: Office Of Legislative Counsel 55537333.? ?373. CT: .1353 3.331.191? 3735 Central Intelligence Agency Hf Room 7 35 Washington, DEC. 20505 0 73 DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDEO FOR: INFORMATION ACTION RETENTION LOAN CONTROL NUMBER Doc. DATE SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred) CLASS. NOTES 0? BETSY HOLF . 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B99 1959' 1913) 99999229 199}. 911919 - .. 5 19 991.5} {19% 9199M. 29119; 133294199124? M1911 979.1%191/ .9 99111119 9911599 9.191% 1911. .19 11999 95 .. . --. w. .E 9..-.- 51?? .5. C?cgss??w?@m. 5~ W, for 1 from CIchontrolled diocumenfs.?) I . go: 1337 - - - . w? Mo 11m, - ?01: ,iwoo om 77:11 mm 11o, woofer/o0 1W 9?!sz #2 111mm omzo ow Moz goo 11o?; Ego: Memo/? I i hwy/LS??Jz?t 1911 Ag Mia 22? ggmdomg 02511. Marrow Moon?2?1 3, 1. 5 I 111126 derivation Lywo_ JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Formt Date: 4/26/20] Agency Information HSCA AGENCY RECORD NUMBER 180-10146- 10033 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 56-05-2AQ . Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM: CIA TO under the Jenn Kennedy . elleetien Act of 1992 DATE: 01/30/1978 [411 USC 21le Nete] . PAGES: 5 53080 Date: 5?05-2017 SUBJECTS WC CIA, FILES DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 1B CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/31/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 32 WI NH 53030 Page 1 i? . I I gig/.55L, (macaw-2 (/mA?zttq3.Lrw-u.? - . ?17: (a I I I in 114 avid- I 5 A W?V.?j?rr a. -.-I ,0 I 9?va .ri?un?wfk I I I i . . lib-I?m?e I - -. i 393P?ilgI: 2 . . . "mi. 4 .. :32; 044 F441: ,4 l; a/j/WK M-hv?f (41 UN Muck 4417a44-444-4444_ 1 i - M1 1 me_m4 Wkwarn?u ?plum?_mww -vnm Mack)? 2y? Ff! r3~26626w C/l/Jrv H11 pair? 63:- 3 1L4, A LJLAPQ Lila ?3 A ?9&9 (J a V. 167? (p 9?53?3/7f?v 21)} -. f? ?513mum?"art: 33 3 Ltd/v.93; rig/M?L?w 3 .- LL i 99 .. - -.. ..4 .. . .u .. .L. ..-. . .. .. .. .-.- H.-. . . .xi?? LAGAIVL .. . I _t L?vtk its; fL-m.Q( f? it. fr,fffax/CC Lav-9337M A ff?? L- L-.. kk?jfjii?; Nf?i a 03L- Leathd?awv/aa (153w mW/m . ?Laue/?/Q/ovx/L,L . mfg-Km?) LEA mf? lam - A (/14 )4 Wit?) it!? a . .. -3 32..--.. .-. AA AmHairiaia?ix?ni; Ragga; . put. I 7 . .E (id-?6 ., If?? Lg/ Yr 9:1( ..-- - fw?? A . If} Jay/p3 52760/3 .5 - W355 ?9:51: 5* 'ng 3 5-3334 {3333' (/5175: El (/03er EM Affii -- EE 39/. Ewe:77 wat??aN '7 (ij? fix? M14 ZM/r/?Eoer?A- on?wwqw 55555 55515552255511 JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form Date: 4/27/20} Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10146-10046 RECORD-SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY-FILE NUMBER 56-05-15 Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM: CIA TO TITLE - Eleased under the John DATE 00/00/0000 Re 1111a :13: PAGES: 3 ssaasinatinn Records allectiun Act of 1992 SUBEKHSI, [44 USC 210? Nate]. CIA, FILES 53080 Date: VEGA, MANUEL PEREZ 5'05'3 '3 17' CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed a RESTRICTIONS 13 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/31/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 32 v9.1 HF Page 1 'l I will .. if}; :33? 3 {wage/Mg; g; 9 5g; a; park?Q 5 1 - gig41:133.; ?Maggi (2629?; IMEEJ . 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JFK Assassination System Date: 4/27/201 Identi?cation Form Agency Inforinati on AGENCYJ HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10147?10024 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 58-08-09 Document Information ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: BLAKEY, G. ROBERT TO BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT under the John Kennedy elleetien Act of 1992 DATE: 07H9H978 - [44 USC 210? Note]. PAGES: 1 aneo Date: SUBJECTS: CIA, FILES DOCUMENT TYPE LETTER CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 1B I CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 32 v9.1 . 1 NH 53030 Page 1 NH 53030 30* ?s?as??ixmh?sn?? A (202) 225-4594 . 31:29. 10011559: of - I 3342 HOUSE. OFFICE BUILDING. ANNEX 2 20515 - 972/ =July 19,-1978 NW Mr. Scott Breckinridge Principal Coordinator/HSCA Office of Legislative Counsel Central IntelligenCe Agency, Washington, D. C. Dear Mr; Breckinridge: This letter is written to follow-up the conversation that Chairman Stokes had with Admiral Turner. The following are those individuals that the Committee would appreciate the assistance of the Agency in arranging' interviews with in Mexico next week: June Cobb Sharp Henry P. Lopez Edward G. Tichborn Gen. Jose Jesus Clark Flores Manuel Calvillo Al Witrich (spzy? Luis Alberu Suoto Consuelo Esperon, Noe Palomares Ramon Joseph Alvarez Durant LIONION I If additional identifying data is required, I'will be glad to provide it orally. 7 Because information referring to some of the people listed above may be of a sensitive or classified nature, this letter may require appropriate classification. Sincerely, G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director CQEEMTXEE Page 2 JFK Assassination System . Identi?cation Form Date: 4/27/20] Agency Inform ati on AGENCY I HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 130-1014740191 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 61-10?05 Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM TO TITLE STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO DATE 2 03/ 12/1 979 PAGES 2 101 SUBJECTS Eleased under: the John . ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES Selle-:Eiin Act of 199211 :44 a -US DEE . ESE ORGANIZED CRIME 338313;: DEB-mini CIA, FILES CIA, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE 2 REPORT CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS: 18 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW I 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA 2 COMMENTS Box 34 32273546 Page 1 7) .HH 53333- 32223546 ..-.- 1? A. 1" 011 11:11.? . 11,11,113 1111*?111311 A 11;; 1:.11-: . .31 141.1?- 1 2111..- .11 34? i .?701111.11 com-12 1 155gm": i? rad-,1-1151 i I 91:: as 1. 11:. Introduction .The attempt of the United States government to assassinate Cuban premier.Fidel Castro as well "as other Iforei.gn leaders during the turbule?nt deCade of the 19608 shocked and disgusted the American citizen.41When sources disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency intentionally . solicited and received the assistance of various .members of organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in thefurtherance of such plots, more outrage prevailed. 1 Civilized society simply did. not an does not condone.1ld such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy.m There is no excuse; no rationalization. - The effect and influence of these actions did not stop, howeVer, with invoking the di sdain of the American public and world. These assa_3sinati0n- attempts gave birth to the haunting theory th at Fidel Castro orchestrated the aSsassination_of President John F. Kennedy in defensive retaliation 'for_the plots on his life.: 2/qu Page ?.1119?I'Vconclusions. HHIEBDEDI Dunfd:322?354? In-its Final Report_pUblished in April, I976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen-tal - Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereinafter responded to this theory. In this Report, the SSC focused On two operations . of the CIA which may have provoked Cas tro into retaliation.' First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and eXtent of the CIA AMLASH operation._ _The SSC concluded its analysis with the statement that "/t/he Committee _believes the investigation_should continue in certain-' areas, and for that reason does not reach any final This_analeis is_an attempt to make such ?.conc1usions. It is not the purpose of the remainder.- as: of this material to g?faf" review detail$ of the CIA?Mafia'plotsgor of the AMLASH operation, to resolve all.of the conflicting viewpoints of the .SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the- various operations, or to subject anyone to moral. .tongue?l?ashing.2 Instead, this material first seeks' Page .3 -7- sausu 1m .4 1.. .. 'to present a comprehensive reView of_the CIA ?Jfoperation AMLASH and Of the inyolvement or potential 32253546 certain Tags 4 1 . .6 ,1 inVolvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during l960? 1963 From this review A and conclusions are then drawn Concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of these operations..% BACKGROUND MATERIAL SUMMARY A. CIA?Mafia Plots The genesis of the utilisation of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to-attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the? Inspector General as occurring dur-ing a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard BiSsell, '3 and .the1 Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards. \vte These plots extended fromAl960 until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages.4 The first stage occurred from August, 1960 until April, 1961, and can best be termed as Phase I or theNpre? Bay of Pigs 5- - . period. From April, l961 until late 1961 ,_the CIA takes the position that the plots were dOrmant. 19/ In late 1961 the CIA decided to renew. the CIAnMafia plots, theIn' creating Phase II, and kept them active until late l9_62 or early 1963.7 IDuring the initial stages of Phase I, Edwards? assigned the specific task of locating the proper LA 'persons to assassinate Castro to - I Chief of the Operational Support 8- Division of the Office of Secu-rity. Both men padrfw. agreed that shouPld contact Robert A Maheu, whom the CIA had previously used in several Covert Operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. 9 . 10 Maheu subsequently contacted Roselli, who in turn reersate??two persons 1nitiall?*5nowg to- mLAICVuvixan?akism?Pg?i Ctueaf ll . a "Sam Gold" and "Joe." IG?Cea?Eil.says: he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities} of these persons to Ibe Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, I 2 . 1 "er: respectively. . . 1 A a. After meeting several times in Miami and deciding_ upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the 1967 IG Report cgj?ends that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assaSSination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips. 2194' 721- . - 7., .. HH Dncl? 322T354?m .w-m Page 5 13 he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. This contact' was Cuban official who held a position close to Castro.l4 The 1967 IG Report then states that Rose11i -passed the pills to Trafficante.15 Roselli subsequently 'b?p told Connell th th? pills were delivered te-ee?me 5? 16 in Cuba Q?Ee-apparently retained the pills for -a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable 11 .to fulfill any no longer in aT position to k111 Castro because he had lost his Cuban t. - ?\41 - . a With Gabe unable to perfo1mmthe4 dicate . val-$2 LWQ looked 'elsewhere. Roselli next tolda 6? sometime during early 1961, that_ Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job, 19 - 11., - After receiving approval, Tra?ficante mu: CLEDH 911W - approached veEe?a about assassinating Castro and . ?9111??, A 20 'reported that rece tive2.6 The 1967 IG ?wr?aw 1n distributed pills awe. Report states that which eventually reachedV . IThis activity concluded the pre?Bay of Pigs phase of the plots.' The does not I - I I I document an ymattempt to Uri: f;g administethhe pills to Castro. The 1967 IGR relates that after a period 22 - of apparent dormancy, Bissell directed William Harvey in approximatel November of 1961 to 2 3W0 Hf?? reactivate the CIA?Mafia plots. -therefore 24 ?Iintroduced Harvey to Roselli. so During this phase} the CIA decided against using Giancanaior'Trafficante; inStead, a person referred to as W??*?owlentered the ,plot as the person who would help provide CastroI_' 25 contacts. In addition, the plots still utilized. Em av}? - the services of . Even though the plots no longer i neluded \qu sf' -Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admi tedI that 9 unlik?ly that Castro izm?gs?? Onigoing .gi?k?hmnw, ., 3., 1. I .f I ?62tvi -affiliated in any way?with the identified-the AMLASH'operation,, however, as being "clearly different" from the underu . (63.. world plots. The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that it? Icould clearly be traced to the CIA, and that proposal for a.ad been endorsed by the CIA, n?~64_ the initial step being the assassination of Castro.: . The SSC cautioned, however, that.it saw "no-evidenced athat Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Ken nedy? assassination in retaliation 65179 for U. S. operations against Cuba." As related in the IntrOduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it 7"?66 - believed additiOnal investigation needed to occur. ?rent Foecsf J. The CIA 1977 Stung by the Senate criticism and the effect that Book caused in the media, the CIA . lq7/ . prepared a comprehensive report in to Ir, at least within the CIA, the critical questions postul_ated in the SSC Final Report. Page 13 . -. 53030 322T354E Gil . - The a principal theme of Book as the possibility that Castro retaliated- -against the United States for attempts on his life .and that the CIA operations may have specifiCally 71 caused any such actions by Castro. In responding to'this theory the CIA decided to perform?the? I followingconduct a ftilg review of information - and operations the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate -to the assassination of President Kennedy, and - to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassina- tion of President - 1g fare thoroughly '.The details of the "related in this material-because no source has previously publicly released them. 1.1 Syndicate operations I s??_ff . Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related new Considerations- -pertaining to they TFK syndicate operations. The BERLIefers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975. In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini,_ was known as Sturgis, allegedly ?121: 11?. Wm?? i?i?s 9119,43 9515" "filial" T1 ?5 3' HH.EBDBD 25' :1 I . 1W2-- . recruited Marie Lorenz to spy on Castro. and and planned to use him 7{ 193? . II Ia how Sturgis knew . in a bombing assassination of Castro. Mesk ill ass-erted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operatffi>for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeoyer.194*iz' In another article on June 13,1976, Meskill. related the claim of Marie Lorenz 'that_ in the fail of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her ton capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle. 19- in- some food or drink Iof Castro-1 :1 TFEL The writersof the quite conCerned +hmn, with thee: assertions because Smea?s name Ihad publicly surfaced/in connection with a Castro assassina? rc'xc?tt?ruvx Iss F93 tion plot before the SSC aaevtw' I organized crime plots; 6,111?" ??nrdi?HHX?E?ftasewtr?tasfro- iwho inter -Igstew?:iThe possibility that-Beta was involved ',in assassination plots other than the CIA operation" 5 -also attracted the attention oIf the Page ED I . I 1 i NH 5303!] 322T354E "In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he' ?had been a hired operator for the CIA for a decade 0. Mthe asserted that "he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. The $38 recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly have known Sets, and alsoIraises the question of whether Sturgislmay have been a source- of information to Castro regarding participation ?198 - - .in any assassination plot. In reference to the Lorenz? Sturgis poison pill II guru?V? FRI: ?23" I plot, the Emir . noted the similarity of this plot chora-nMn-y 01. air 9: .199 to the details in the 18 October 1960 FBI ma?cb??3' The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA Syndicate operations and that therefore - 2:12. the syndicate may have been acting independently. ?.The CIA also concluded that the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations, may have already been active in plots? 89 with the Mafia when the CIA approached him Page 21 ?a .. . rm 1? Cited two FBI memorandum as support. 1 ,inirst,?a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for Some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report at wg?oga was one of the Cubans receiving 94 . . Vsupport, The CIAfrurtheryacknowledgedfthat although the.operation with the-Mafia5Was suspended after the Bay of Pigs,-it appeared to still be in progress . - eff I when re~activated in April,.1962. 3 71:11 . summarized its position concerning_ -non?CIA sponsored Syndicate operations in/the?following?? passage: 'It is possible that CIA simply-found"jr ?itself involved.in providing additional resourCes for independent operations that the syndicate already had I/n" a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on i the syndicate and in addition to its material H. 'contribution was also supplying an-aura of; official sanction. - 2. AMLASH - .g The 3E3 states the SSC suggests that AMLASH ?was possibly a Castro.agent aSsigned a provecation~~w.nig' NH 530301 Page 22 NH 53930 We? 'Jn- Ch. amission'which would then justify retaliation,.or,' in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security. irisk'through which detaiIls of the 'surfaced to Castro thus providing the impetus for JVE6 Q?t? provocation. Additionally, the Cites the SSC as holding that in either case,- AMLASH should_ . have been reported_ to the Warren Commission. I- LI1. The _E??.contendsI neither theory is correct stating that the relationship between the CIA and IAMLASH before the death of President Kennedy .was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no asis for to feel that he had. any tangible- 89v40 CIA Support -for plotting against Castro. I In support the ?g;-proceeds to narrate the j'Agency' 5 understanding of .the operation.I On August 17, '719-62,7 the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "/has/I no intention /of giving physical elimination mission as rquuirement but recognize this /as7 something he Could or might try to carry 5991 . out on his own initiation? .Headquarters replied DucId:322T354? Page 23 x2 the next day, ?Strongly concur that no physical 91PL elimination mission be given From Au_gust 29,1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states - 9-232' _2 it did not have any contact with AMLASH On September 7, 1963 _the CIA received the: following cabletn AMLASH still feels there onlv two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize . latter out of question. According AMWHIP, -AMLASH still awggting for S. reveal plan of aetion. Themgga notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job"_ as referring to an operation against Castro he concerning however, says it refers to a general 251 - how to.effect change.%5j The 15%: also States that at this point BOok saYS "characterizat ion of this pha se ?93, . - of the AMLASH operation is disputed? 'The CIA. Mal-M?? - - . contends that -any dispute only exasts in the eyes of the . ?967?17 1 - . .SSC. A .. . - ?f47*" '7 - The .163 next comments on an interview of. PP Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that Ianti? ?Castro terrorists had the support of . 1 .1- 1 ,1 s1? -.- 1wu-uw-c- .. ?w . 7 _na sauna Dueln?32213546 Page 24 TM CQ FE.- 0g kavgeie? ?my w'guL? [h Cit-14 TVS K: EVIL mn/l" SSH ?Elm; All; . WLHL an; '1 <6 'zC- 35w MSIM 71?4; A 35K p7) mm/?C? u/Lf 6.0. (i344 - (h 224? We?; 6?5? SA- 11 MM Lawn 014 MisquL (75K tea/L KW AVPWI VLL. Q?L?a?c ?m 7 chTil-?x?m 9633-5. TLQ \9'77 T155 1?4 va4g #1me brew/bk rm; (Aw LT Wig? 3 ?Ni (3 Mam Main) Wm( :hW-w. PMKM Icy-??g 1% ?9?th I 5L /1 \umj L?k NXQ vai 6/19 M7 3% A W35 l?ft? mam 3,4439% lz?c?re?r?cgg/ ?3 avg? Aa?s?d hawa?k?m Th: khaki? 43/ KM Qwal Mmk? 41(- AM-g/arm/m new: ?m max ?Mp/t7 any My \rdolQ/L . turme?pox/tMce? NH 5303i] Page 25 ?n "absellgci L01 5r Wu Mam udhl??a . . I (ac; LY ru 391' ?em hull?, was QLP EL- (?3&Ar??fgaa7? 013*? 197'? 73% ?Lam/Vi Mt?- - a; Ammlr/l?; ems?(Wm was 'Wkum ?Ll mg 5mg? Wt e? gf?(WP 7C (mod/K NFL 3(?4 NH 5303i] Page 26 7?What the.SSC.characterized as assassination plots. U. S. leaders. states that the Book VI 46: implies that may have.reported to Castro 35 - . - .. - ?98 The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to by CIA officers as they propos-ed nothing and undertook nothing. {05" -I II CGuinI On October-ll, 1963 the case officer 0. headquarters and said that claimed to have . the neCessary people and equipment to overthrow 190 1~n? Castro without U. S. assistance. f. On October . ?10-1 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met in Paris..w At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald rejeCted 5 request for an assassination weapbng specifically, a high powered rifle with a telesCopic Area 11: lens.:3" vThe contends that at this point itI Vwas clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U. S. assistance until after the 'is contrary to the SSC Statement in Book to the effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted . ~403 the put-off by Fitzgerald. 134 Bi?ixov Aa? Mi - N?tLVl?wv? {at NM AWL-MWTM. 90+" - an: . a. Qwiwwis AW Wuimmw I Avatar-sci - air s?cr??g .1C?ba/l?fwm. W's/l" . Ni? dew. I I L0H ?in/L rad-v.4. wet A: Hail?16 A. m?ftuuavmmr-I1f?ka-mu??u mm.w-m.: . . - aim-ma: - ?1 1-. . .J 'd On November I9, 1963, Fitzgerald approved I 3' . informing that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high? ?powered rifle with a . 10-4 scope' would be included upon request.11.1. 15.3,: 03,413? November 20 the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested. This meeting ocCurred on November 22.;0? The summarized the significance of these IcontaCts.with AMLASH as related to the Contentions .fin Book in the folloWing passage: -Whatever the relationship with following the death of President.Kennedy, there is every indication that during. . President Kennedy's life had no 'basis for believing that he had CIA support? for much of anything. -Were he-a provocateur greporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had nO' factual basis for leaking or reporting angs actual CIA plot directed against I rFinally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commissiodn s? request for all possible rele_v ant information, the observed: RH EBDBD _Dqud:322T354? Page 23 While one can understand day why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of inv stigationh it .would have served to re? nform the.credibility of its effort had it taken a broader View1 of the matter. CIA, too; could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms the possibility of Soviet or Cuban 5 involvement in the assassination (JFK) becausegQii of tensions of the The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then,_as well;" K. 'Recent Andersoanrti les September 197-6? and October, 1978,3Anaersen- again published articles which propounded the retaliation 1 - . -. - . theory.it0"In addition, for the first time Anderson_ publicly revealedjthat John Roselli served as his source 9 ?for the retaliation theory in all of the articles 7 ?publish ed through the years. The September 7, l976 article appearing'inr the Washington Post contains all components of the retaliation theory. This states: Mafia mobster John Reselli mayx have taken the secret of the-John F. LKennedy assassination with him to his . death. He was brutally murdered a . _few weeks ago, his hacked up body Stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami 5 Biscayne Bay. Before he died, Roselli hinted to' associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier "?Fidel Castro. - . By Roselli' acCount, Castro learned the identity of the underworld NH 5303]] Page 29? .51.. W, . ?contacts in Havana who had been trying -to knoCk_him off. He believed, not . altogether Without basis, that President 'Kennedy.was behind the'plot.? The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and uSe the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's . assassination according to Roselliis scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger. Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. 'It was also difficult to-assess whether he knew what he was talking .about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli' - story. But there are enough curiOus circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the facinating highlights. . A The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underWOrld Contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no 'authority, however, over the_ underworld elements in Havana. 7They were under the lodse control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. . His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. .In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a .?Cuban jail, an indignity that didn' endear -Castro to him. After Trafficante made it back to his 7 Florida haunts, he left part of his organization_' 'behind in Havana. Some of his.henchmen even [managed to deVelop contacts in Castro' 3 inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted . g: '.to use to knock off Castro. .But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the neCessary_ arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Same (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante. As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements. Once GianCana and Traffi cante set it up, --Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot . Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro?s food.. The pills_would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, _snipers we_re dispatched to a_ Havana rooftop. They were caught. The word reached Roselli that some of the plotte-rs ?had been tortured and that -Castro had learned about -the whole operation. The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro. -In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he k_new about the attempts On hi 'life and warned that U. .S. leaders also Hw_?suah Page 31 might not be safe. 'That was Sept. 1963. According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly? ?Iwere Cubans from the old-Trafficante organiza~ .tion. Working with Cuban intelligence-, they allegedly lined up an ex Marine sharpshooter,_ Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro? Castro movement. . According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have Shot Kennedy or may have acted as a. decoy while Others ambushed him from closer_ range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would' have brought a massive U. S. crackdown on the mafia. - 7- So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate OSwald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against . the President' 3 killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.7 Several key CIA officials believed that Castro _.was behind the Kennedy assassination.f - It has also been established that Jack Ruby, "indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA_cable, - dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby? had visited TraffiCante_ in his Cuban prison. I . Ii - HH Sansu .?unIae32213546 Page?s: ISSUE ANALYSIS rPreface I - 'Ther?:: investigated this material to determine what concluSions can be-aScertained concerning the naturer scope, and remifications of these operations. In this regard, various issues arepresented.in the following sections, subjected to analySis, and then resolved accOrdingp-I? to available euidence, probableynotiuations and the mOSt I 'u 7 To fulfill this process, the reviewed material from numerous goVernmental sources that pertained-to the persons and operations relevant I Ito the investigation. These persons indluded: John Rosellir 7 VII principal in CIA-?ficg - . . I operation vkv?{ 2.IISanto Trafficante I?-?Iprincipal in - - operation i Antonio de Verona ~7'principal I'operationf I 4. ?Sam Giancana --. Iin 5. Robert Maheu '1 principal operation. RH 32213545 Page'ss I 3:321'3? - . .3353Michael-McLaney - j? - . qu?t.- 5 2" c; . . 351? . . . A I ,Nin: . .7- Samuel Benton .57.: l, ?1 ?arm .65- vi: If: 1&4. kg. 8. Norman Rothman . .- John Martlno - Viv?"xx F. - - _10. Edward P. Morgan . 11. Edward K. Moss 12. Dino Cellini 13: Richard Cain . I. I 14. Charles Tourine .- . k. 15. Rafael "Macho" Gener16.. Evelio Duque Miyar - f? . o. .- ,ii?-ff; it ~?Ij-l Jorge Alonso Pnjol ?y 4' r7; pa?g?'vl ?1 .- .43. . .3 g" r~ shit?: _18. ?Joseph Shimon .19. AngelogBruno . - 1 . . . 51:31 .o . 1. 5? 5:4" . . a} I 20. Sam Mannarlno.~' re?ll {ahal?xl l? 21. Kelly Mannarino 22.. Edward Browder' ~3Pist-Qiiqmi 2 3 Joseph Merola 2 0-1; . anti. air" 3 - ?r 24. Arthur Balletti . - ngp(tgt La." 25. Dominick Bartone 52.;ggn f: ?aw: 1 _.inmt?WMW 26. Richard Helms ?27. ?413 . . . a-z . .. 28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla 'f11's: 1. In.? - 2 9 I I ADELASH . . - A {1 I . - - 30- Alexandel Mergan i? tr?wi.w (41:5 CE. ll-L-?Iz31' J??fh?H?ia QLancu' bcar?tag *9 F?s? 32. Jack Anderson . . ?if 33. "Frank Sturgis 4mgg?g~Linanw LiSfa-J 34,- Fidel Castro - 9.. '31(Roselli attorneys). either interviewed or deposed these persons or A?subpoenaed?them to give testimony before Committee :members.'l- I _The government sources where the requested-and reviewed material were: Central Intelligence Agency. '2.l Federal Bureaa of InveStigation . 3. Drug Enforcement Agency?; - - '47 Deoartment of Defense 5. 'Department of State 6. ?Department of_nlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 7.c United States Customs Service.' 8.. Immigrationand Naturalization Service United States Senate Committee on Intelligence C10. 'United States Secret Service I 11, ?Chicago Crime Commission '12. ,Chicago Police Department if l3.i,Nem YorE Police'Department' 14.' Public Safety Department; Organized_Crime. ?Bureau,?Dade County, Florida 15. Cuban Government In the majority of instances, review '1 of any material at these sources and any statements -from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly dyed the CrimeI en the AMLASH operations. Further, almost.all relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General For this reason the following analeis represents conclusions I was principally derived from information substantively the same as that the SSC and CIA prev1ously Imn?w? 10:? Ce; 7 Consequently, the ?5EA'investigation - Hi,? resulted in additionalncorroboration of this informed . . tion from a diversity of sources. IWhat remained} - to be drawnI are the conclusions. ?ww- arm?- considered. B."Issues Pertaining to the AMLASH Operation - gw If? IThe Committee-found no evidence that the 3 AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate 1 1. . I L/President Kennedy in retaliation.. RH 5303p DunI?:322?3516' Page 3? O?fk'sg? if F1 - A 7? cw" The Committee has received equally persuasive _evidence and therefore cannot state whether thef? operation prior to the death of President MMKennedy can be characterized as an assass1nation 7 - .V 1 . 7 -Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, ?in his testimony before this Committee stated that the AMLASH operation was net designed to be i??kr ., an assassinatidn plot. ?4 As already indicated, 1?r3{< the i?ddrf?? concluded that AMLASH had "no factual -basis for leaking or VrepOrting? any ?actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy' 5 -- Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting View to the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the Q?H%Ldf?r- 'Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff which was responsible for the AMLASH operation. 'In an affidavit to the Committee, Longosch recalled that: scc. v? 53030 Page 33 '1 .13 is? p4 .gA-h ZE/he AMLASH operation prior to the assasSination of President Kennedy was _characterized by the Special Affairs 'staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination A operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA lOSe . . .efnih as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware 0f AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his Iconclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure I was available to senior level CIA officials, including l0--8f 1- . ?Desmond FitzGer_ald. In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA n? 1 at. pseudonym) L. Pollockl?su_ Polloc "servedft? as Executive Officer for?Desmond F_itz Gerald during - the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs and- discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." Pollock speci fical]y contested the assertions of Langosch stating: To the best of my knowledge, Mr.: FitzGerald considered the AMLASH, .operation to be a political action mi 53030 DucId:322T3?4? Page 35,; . {an 1251 51:35:: 2211' 111.15: 15-. gas: He also stated: 3V1. I activity with the objectign of organizing a group under to overthrow Castro and the uCastro regime by means of a coup d' etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. -Mr. 'FitzGerald- stated within my hearing On several occasions his awareness that coup d' etat often involves loss of '1ife_108g if:- I-Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize' _the AMLASH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other . branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with.a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy' s: ?death. AMLASH rejected the pen with -disdain. -108h . i f" :f sun;rrw. 1%53221?3546 Page 4D 3 Kr. AsSuming that AMLASH was not an assassination. plot during the-life of President Kennedy and-that W,f?3? Castro uncovered its existence and scope, the Committee 5* -.., . . . z- - ?believes?that Castfotwould ?at have been prOVOked 1.0 in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation. . . - - A Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination ?33 a, plot during the life of President Kennedy and that . Castro- uncovered its existenoe and scope, the Committee pl; {41 3 \v @3331? still believes? athat Castro would mw# have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in . retaliation. In his interview with the Committee, Premier Castro set forth some reasons supporting this Contention._ The Committee agrees with the reasoning in his statements. .Castro said in part: That was insane. From the ideological ipoint of View it was insane; And from the politiCal point of View, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell? you here that nobody, nobody ever had the? 'idea of such things. What would it do? ?We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed_ to that idea would have been judged ?absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor --even speculate about a measure of that sort,- because who could think of the idea of "my. 51. -so- 1? ur- .1 JV, 221354?gypage 41 organizing the death of the ?resident of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for-the United States to invade?our country which is what I have.tried_to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States -would lose nothing. -The destruction would Castro ithe spe through have as Premier have been here.:20 A also added: I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the_ system. It has never done that.iz; .- In this interview Castro also commented on.? ech of September 7,1963 which has been cited out the years as an indication that Castro may sassinated President Kennedy in retaliation. Castro aeserted: So, I said something like those plots -if at present, the same would happen under Page? 4.2.: . I w. 1? . am;- - start to set a very bad precedent. A . very serious one that that could become a boomerang against the authors Of those I did not mean to _threaten by that.' I did not mean even that.. .not in the rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting :of other countries would be a very bad very negative. And, i h- the same circumstances, I would have no .doubt in saying the same as I said (theny because I didn' mean a threat by that. didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures similar measures'? like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation - came about very casually, you know; but would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the.everyday life.;11 .Some reasdning, which Committee pcaution's is speculative, may be of some It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled ?reference to assa351nat1ng?Amer1can leaders in .retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually aF planning oevContemplati ng such acts. he would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display 1 his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance. . Consequently, together with an absence 0f any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, the Committee bel_ieves I (If! t? . - j? v. 4.. ErrJ?ffaj" r" - .4- Lil-12?: 2* ?k - I 2/ \owr . - - .that this inCident, while displaying Castro's I _displeasure at American aetivities, does not implicate Castro in the assassinatiOn. The Comnittee believes there are additional reasons to discount anv involvement of Castro in- the assassination which are also compelling.' The Committee cautions that these reasons, whilepersuasive,_ .are necessarily speculative. First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to thei United States Delegation to the United Nations, was?i involved in diplomatic efforts t0 establish _a frame- . work for detente during the fall of l963i13AtWOod?I Itold the SCC that McGeorge Berndy, an advisor_ to Pres ident; Kennedy, told him that PreSident Kennedy was in fever: of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba? to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normalr." 'AtWOod also arranged for a French jonrnalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled . 12> trip by Daniel to see Castro.' Daniel and Kennedy? NH 53030 -DunId:322?354?? Page 44_: NH 53030 unaid;32213515-_ . Daniel to see_him after visiting Castroe discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States- -Cuba relations and Kennedy asked lib The Committee believes that such efforts to establish a peaceful coexistence between the. United States and Cuba would have hampered any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. IJ in Qwh~gzl$dvb? ?in; (Lt- indie.- Second, t+ Cam 'cI leaders ofI the United States ?President - dam?: Kennedy supported a less hestile attitude and position ?f Itoward CubaI; Even if Castro felt the relations between" Cuba Iand the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspectI they would have been worse under any other administration ?Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic- relations in- the air and Ithe knowledge that. Kennedy ?possessed a more favorable attitude toward ICuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have- Rage 45 I HE 53530 had every reason to hope that- Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, the Committee does not ,'pbelieve that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily 322T354E {a have favorably altered the United States' operations and ties toward Cuba. rIn addition, the Committee .does not believe Castro would have'assassinated President.Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United Stat?s_theIeXcuse to [destroy Cuba; The risk would-not have been Worth it, Issues Pertaining to the CIA~Organized Crime Plots :Scope and Nature of Plots Analysi.s a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Spons rship cm 0 ?wn WM limes?Q.Ca?ggl4 info ed the Committee_i' ?that Maheu told Pcseldathe represented an international I??hlli? group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu - ,1 to].d him from the beginning that.S?Geanel; was With 513 - We . - fail" the CIA. Van? Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC. 7Ma heu also Stated in a deposition to he Committee that \wap CW- 'Giancana knew at the time that QaCanaal; was with the. . i??z CIA..24 Further, Trafficante testified to the Page 46 A I 4 I 7.lit-g af?x"? :{mll' 1, "u'g NH 53030 Eagle . LI 3 Committee infOrmed him that he, 23? '?ll3~ operating as an agent of the The weight of the evidence indicates that' Roselli, and thus Giancana and_Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination_plots at an 'early stage. _This recOgnition of CIA initiation is shows that Giancana and Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly becam involved With the CIA. Discovery of True Identitiesv. Roselli arranged for the entrance oI_ 'GianCana and Trafficante into the plots. and introduced ?Ms I "13% 7 them to "Sam Gold? and "Joe.' 33% contends he learned the true identities of these? persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an artiCle in one of the Sunday diff 1:12 Sections of the Miami newspaper. ?This article7 supposedly pertained to Organized crime in the United States and centained pictures of top hoodlums, including . _Same Giancana and Santo In the NH 5303i] .DunId:322?3?4?' .4: 7. I I. .1967 IGR eh??ggng 1-stated that the article 117 '~Came frOm the Parade magazine;3? in the Miami Times. Ma heu also Contends that he did not know the true id.entit1es of Sam Gold and Joe until this article mm? :1 a stated that this incident in? appeared.gi~ occurred after the "we were up to our ears" in the operations and consequently the CIA ecided to ?1-9 progress forward.:3n The SSC Conducted a search of supplements" to all Miami newspapers for the reque.s ite time ?tgd period and could not 1oCate any such art icle.?3/ The Committee Consequently se arched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of?i62 the years which spanned the_ entire operation. The Committee learned that on Januar 21,1962, Parade I . published an article entitled, *?ur~government? craCk60wn on organized crime," written.by Jacki, Anderson, which Contains a'listing of the top ten hoodlums in the country as well as several phot ographs' 4am, of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante.t5 Ther 1 article focuses on the efforts of Attorney General P-EFHE 43.. 1? Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized H'crime and mentions both Giancana and Trafficante.i 1' Although this Parade aaticleappears - .- . to correspond with and Maheu's description, it is'bver One year past the beginning months Of the operation. Indeed, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. . Additionally;' neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in'A Parade magazine or the supplements of any ?iami newspaper for the alleged time period; I 9.91;; ll! Phi! MAI It appears and Maheu are lying in:- -an attempt to look-for-an ex post facto reason for -continuing the operation after the introduction o_f two of the- top organized crime figures in the Uni ted ?States.g Implicit in their contention is that while.5 --the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to .7 assassinate Castro; it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the topeechelon go:awk;a' "1'22'3' ?g organized Crime.?? Additionally, .Queom?% NH 5303i] Page 49 statement that "we were up to our ears in it" isI even more difficult to fathom since according to the, 7.1967 IGR the operation was in its embryonic stage -in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered- until approximately February or March of L?4mwwWithout additional support, the Cow?ittee does not believe the contentions of Maheu and 2 I CIIA plot to assassinate Castro was Inecessarily thighly volatile and seeret operation. Once Roselli introduced additional contacts intoIthe - scene it is not logical that the CIA would have-V neglected to verify the identities of such principIals.? On- the contrary, it is more believable and moIre - I probable Ithat the CIA ascertained theI true identities of_"Sam Gold" apd"Joe" at an early stage and I consciously progressed forward in confident that theSe two persons; in the wordsh attributed toIColonel Shef?ield EdWards,IwereHii individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. c) 'Roles of Principals 1) Phase One yColonel Sheffield Edwards assigned .. 0L, ?l the taskn findilg someone to assassinate 1 "$23 tk?ma ?~11 Castro.l% Edwards?and bOth decided to utilize Maheu as someone to recruit persons to I24 effectuate the operation.e?% also ,described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would .475 procee through him to the Agency. In addition, a @?said0 he acted as a "babysitter" to Roselli;' that is, remaining with him to occupy his time to: A??k insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. ?Tq' There is a discrepancy over who suggested . Roselli for the operation, ?35 but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections withs i%&K persons who could handle the assignment. Conflict arises over the role 0? Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a '"back? up" man. ?if It should be not ed that Giancana was murdered four days before Roselli made this_ statement. .Mahue, however,-described Giancana 451 as having a key.role and characterized his-job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who esc~ ~could ac_complish the assassination. Joseph Shimon, a clOSe?friend cf Roselli who had knowledge of the plots-at the time, stated that Roselli contactedGiancana to provide Cuban contacts.??J? Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active? +34} 1539 - participant. The most sound analysis is that Giancana Eglel;::. . served as a person Roselli could approach who cOuld .1. 'then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain,- specifically Santo Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI I files indicate represented Giancana' 5 interest 1h? prawn): Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, woulddnot directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and Southern Florida area without first. contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any I necessary arrangements. Both Giancana_and?Trafficante, 7 being bosses of two_organized crime domains, would: have the means, power, and stature to arrange fOr- the assassination?j After contacting Trafficante,_- -- 1 who have the influence to recruit the necessary perform.the assasSination, . -Giancana probably was not an?active participant in' the process of poisoning pills or actually arranging 1133145; the assassination. The role of Trafficante, the onlyiliuing major organized crime figure involved in the plot5{ 'is a major Source of conflict.' The 1967 IGR contains -_several references to Trafficante which characterise. his function.? In discussing how poison pills c0uld_ Ibe given to Castro} it-states that "TraffiCante i?Joe,T the courier?) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a 'h wort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castr. Later the report states that "Ro selli: passed the pills to Tr fficante." and that WRosellip mJ .- Cuba. After-Q?ta lost his position averted Mwe?miijf that pills had been de?lii'rere'd" to in the Cuban gpvernment and could no longe 5Lpass any pills, the "Roselli told that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile - +36? -. movement who might do the job. Roselli identified NEE DDEI?5322?3?i?smE?g?s??1. '29 W. m1- ??531 ujmyf?z 7: 1537, ?wdg leaky i3; him as dchCIJna. The following Wm passage further confirms Trafficante' rol-e: Tra-fficante approached ?green and 'told him that he had clients who Wanted to do aWay with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. _V??ena?is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own shi?8_, arms and communications equipment.k155 Trafficante testified in public to the-Committee that Roselli asked him tof??igi?ragfvas an interpretorva' -?ih between the American Operations and the Cuban contacts.? Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills . - I . I+1f5 used in the operation, denied recruiting Veaema? #559 +425 and denied recruiting Green 1 In his Senate testimony,? Roselli confirmed Trafficant' role as that of a trans- 'lCa/ - big? 6&1in e"m, however, informed the Committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubahs in -l43~ Giancana partially confirmed this in the IGR by identifying Joe as a man "who would serve as a cofrierk to Cuba and make arrangements there. 4 z? ?w?mRmR"lF also confirmed that he was the only CIA . conduit and that if the-$33? IGR states Trafficante mi 53m . .PsHa-Esi. . contacted oriprocured-the?assassin then it' accurately reflects the information .the ?144 received. It is interesting that the 1915 and 1978 Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante Corroborate each other but remain centrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The m" Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active.participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential_assassins. This is important in dramatizing 'the deep inyolvement of organized crime with the CIA -iin these plots. One can understand why Trafficante Itoday wishes to_ downplay his role; the facts; however, dyeimply do not support his assertions.g The Committee" The Committee also heard testimony from CHM \Ezur '-wetated that he is not aware of any_ believes the CIA-IGR. CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied [Ga 7- .- involvement in their operati ons.? .is obviously lying.j The Committee does not feel, however, that a - 7 43wa xiv? prosecution for perjuryg?if possible, would aserst - Amy .. . the.1nvest1gatmon.Icimvlg NH. 5(3an 10:11:32213546?sausa?? 2) Phase Two . 3:145? ?s role. Mb Giancana and Trafficante were" 146 no longer involved in the 61 gm Phast Two William Harvey assumed a ?g IGR states that Roselli remained aS?a prominent figure and worked _"directly with the Cuban exile community and directly on behalf of the (if Although the IGR does reqeest that. Trafficante ~l39- was not involved in Phase II ,g?iit contains this caution:'7 _Trafficante was one of the principals Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation. ~He presumably was not involved in Phase Two ,under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that.?, After all, Trafficante was the man who brought Verona into the operation late in-Phase One, and Verona was one of the main players during~ Phase Two. :70 It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept ;3 both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the ?-operation' 5 progress. Delivery of the Pills Neither the ?35; I or the SSC. pinpoints. . . the date on delpivered the pills to Roselli during Phase One of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. "The subsequent sings 'Dunld;322?ssgs_ Page 55__ steps ri?ain a mystery but Roselli reported to ?ag $3 1 that the pills had been delivered to l7; aiaw? Cuba in late February or early March, l96l. 1 Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the) Fontainbleu in March} 1961, to witness the Patterson- 'JOhansson there Maheu informed him L- ?of the plot to assassinate Castroi?iai Shimon also?{ 'says that during this tririlmaattended a meeting wh ere a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination i5li . was passed. Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson' 5 ?column of January 19, 19-711' which fixes the date of they Ipassage of the poison at- the Fontainbleu as March 13, 196l1 I In any event, it appears certain that the EIA did not pass any pills, poison? orassassinationi' weapons before February of 1961.9 The fall segment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any Operational activities. NH 53039 ?nucia;322?3516 gage 'Location of Trafficante To support the description of Trafficante 'as a courier} the IGR states that that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between ~?f?bf73 Miami and Havana on syndicate busineSsr" The Committee has obtained some evidence which_indicates that Trafficante was not travelling: to Cuba during this period. No?records'available toi?'l the Committee from INS, -State Department, or the FBI reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this: time, the FBI maintained physicaI surveillance on Trafficante. Trafficante testifiegd' before the. Committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after 9 1" h;i' his release from the Trescornia prisogffg Augus t; 1959; and that these trips occurred within two to three I V'months of this release. f?fAdd1tionally, -considering Trafficante' reputed top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would? send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being detained by Castro aviarw?lmgz-y ?nin-Z-z-r?z?az wah war-1r: _Hw.?ausuy Dania:322?s?1s If Trafficante was actually travelling ?between Miami Iand Havana, the implications are _interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again Or had acquired assurances from the Cuban government regarding his safety. -In any event the presenCe of Trafficante during the fall? of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a hnoEC, augmea relationship between himself and the Cuban government Such-a .relationship during the period when Trafficante was scheming to. assassinate Castro invites the theory that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular return for such information, TraffiIcan.te could Ihavenaequired lost gambling operations as well as sup port and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contIraband into the United States. The Committee reali-zes the enormous ramifications of Isuch a theory and cautionIs Ithat it Ihas not IreceivedI 1 any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and 'Havana although the Committee re cognizes that Trafficante-could make such trips and not disrupt his normal routine in-Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance. f) W's Other Contacts CUM W?u @144? As previously related, the FBI _forwarded 1 to the CIA a memorandum an 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketerrs were making efforts to finance antiHCastro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum en 18 January 1961 which associated Verona with those schemes. a _ther sources were alSo providing assistance to ma 2. ?ne-7 - to conduct aeti? Castro operations. At the time Iof his introduction into the CIA?Organized crimeii - <1;ch plots, the CIA Was funding through. the Revolutionarym Democ atic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary h?i. 13% Council111? veesna informed the Committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from-an agreement with?;' ?w A nonin:322135??, Rag; FD . VII: 511'; aid/um." the American government to invade Cuba.and "1?53 (festablish democratic control of the i?sland_ weir: this: Adding to the support for ?e?eaa were the promotional efforts of IDino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were w.orking through a Washington, D. C. "public relations firm, Edward Moss ag? AssoCiates. Moss had previous CIA associations and?was supposedly. acting as a conduit for funds supplied hy the Cellini ibrothers with the understanding that this grOup would' i receive privileged treatment in theI Cuba of the ass? 4/ Ifuture. In his testimony before the Committee Verona LL also deScribed a meeting with Jorge Alonzo P1 jol and Meyer Lansky in Lansky' home-in Miami in the summer I960. m1 Lansky said he had business interests in.- V_Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro,fi destroy Castro, and try and estahliSh a democratic 4:59? ?11" 35;. government. - The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, Organized Crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all Settled' HE Espan' DhaId:322T3545 _ngg HE'Sa?au 3225'354?6 7 :Paue 52 who had the potential of uniIting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, reported contacts with Organized cri?eI ?.391 "939?? 'raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before the? evolution of the CIA?organized crime plots. If this was the _case, then Trafficante' recruitment of ??re?a into the CIA operation would result in.providing official . sanction to an already IeXisting independent operation. The CIA recognized this in Stating "it is possible We. \m . that Verena already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 196l to Carry out the Castro Assa531nation/rgf. (see yellow page . . 96) Introduction of "Joe"-and "Gold" and ?1 Related Events I The timing of _the introduction of Giancana ("Gold") and Trafficante is important to the .analysis of the true role oIf organized crime in the - Castro assassination plots.1 This introduction, together with other related events,.furthe? suggestsi 'Iethe thesis that the-CIA found itself involved in providing additional resoUrces for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced According to the bg?? IGR, the entrance of Giancana. and Roselli occurred. during the week of ISeptember 25 1960. if? In contrast; the SSC did not .assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 2967 IGR and Maheu 7?5 Senate testimony which Set the date after November,_l960: The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was.involved' in the operation during October because of the Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, -and because of the October_ l?g-196O FBI memorandUm which revealed Giancana had told several people of . . . his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. Although these t?o events which the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during 'October, they also invite speculation of independent organized?crime operations. TheOctober l?:l960; IFBI memorandum is particularly appliCableQ This states: _/uring a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro NH 53030 nhnid:322?3546 Page 53- was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the?would? be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that_ the assassin had_arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a in some drink or food_of - poison pills, which the CIA prepared at Giancanals request, were noth? Hiready for delivery until late February or early 'March, 1961, it is extremely doubtful that Giancana' November, 1960, of the_'? CIA operation. Rather it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using_ 1a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the' CIA fartuitously entered the scene._ Organized w? crime then occupied a perfect position; If their "*private plot succeeded, they then would possess?? ?far?reaching blackmail potentiaI against the CIA which they could exercise at an Opportune moment, _If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing 5 I the directiVes of the government/Ha} genie [05w A 7 31-11}? 1 ?an?i. :n Cue-mysi- \3 i" urn-KL; prqs??u DucId:32213516 Page h) Richard Cain 43114 - that Giancana refers to in INVOW id the October 18 memo may Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top_Echelon 'Criminal Enforcement Program, informed'the FBI of his criminal activities and close association 'with Giancana admitted that he had covertly worked for Giancana and been 'on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956fl960, director 5? a private detective agency from l960~62, and Chief Investigator_ County Sheriff's Office from l962~l?64. 30 I I 'Seweral of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together With his- past experienCe, support': the proposition that if Giancana was involved inv:r any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro. independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him. HE Dunl?:322?35i?_ Page (See yellow 104). NH 53030 ?DucId:322T354?_ pama??i . . ?duo?C. M-u?m a. .4-.- First, Cain maintained a record of voluntarily (- ?1 providing informatiotho the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. -In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated '4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following informa? tion in his first contact with the 1) that in 1950?52 while in Miami, Florida, he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William' ?Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government 2) 'that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, '_then operating out of New York City, met with Cain_at O'Hare Airport and 'offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro pvto install telephone. taps on various iCubans, and that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a - former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July . movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro Army officers i.n the use of poly~ graphs. 433? - . -It seems more than coincidental that Cain' approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred Isimultaneously with Giancana' 5 meeting with Roselli_ and Maheu. 'Cain subsequently volunteered informationl to the CIA during 1961~63. Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montijo,-the former head of the July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th Of July Movement and former cOunsel in the United States lqax -. . ?1 .- for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who ?wished to get news stores and photographs out of - yai?h Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story Hand was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chica.go columnist, and? Bob Ajamian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this a .. 1 I. ?venture. 1a? Third, on November 2, '1960, the FBI interviewed - Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach. -Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective. *lJJa-iqb . Laboratories, - Life magazine, and sixty four - l98? 1 other newspapers. {9?After providing information on the? Amilitary armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the RH 5303n_ DucId:322T354? ,Paga y, i; )sHi-j c.1149 NH DunIa:322?354?. ,even more suspect. The wiretap assignment_ and the Resistence movement had eight hundred men-fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity- to parachute into the. Escambrays '3 17916? 3. - 1 to take photos for Life. Cain said that Antonio de Verona gave him the information on.the Cuban A related issue is whether ?phases" actually If?; existed or whether the operations to_kill Castro encompassed a continuous time period. Rs previously 6 indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was If, _dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumedhf3 Leg: 5 direction in the spring of 1962- Both Harvey andfaf??zg?fx I Key Qu?enmedl stated, however, that Harvey "took oVerig? ?pri - a gOing operation." 1 Considering that Roselli was: :g '1 \rableltominmedi?g?lyImobilize his forces in lQ?liiaa I I response to Harvey 8 request and IGR characterizes Macco as Roselli' 5 man, it is more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited .all the Cuban personnel previously in the .attempts and who -maintained the most complete network individuaIl.' If this spec_ulation is accurate, then it displays Trafficante _again performing a direct role .0- 1\ U-iduring Phase II, a'function every source has denied?wince - . Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this digij'?tm?a/ - . .. rm 51m- he 31 During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two rf"v?ha3"?mewa undramatically and In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the A a? seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA tocorrdborate'I pie any information from Roselli all converge to posit the theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting to aSSassinate Castro after following the solidification jof Soviet influence- in the Castro regime. Trafficante, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized by the mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana I had laid its last egg,'and_ that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, hiStory shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas; Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic,;hd burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from _the influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized crime? may have determined that the new Justice Department crackdown would probably not have permitted the 7 "wide open" Cuba of the pre? Kennedy era even if the United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban_ regime. Consequently, while the United States 53m. Dunne-32211546 Page government, specifically the CIA, still poSsessed a . viable interest in'assassinating Castro, organized ?crime did not; 2. Motivation of Organized Crime to be involved in Plots - Despite the reasons just presented to discontinueI. attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had ?3 -11 'stroninncentive' to.string the CIA along.I Specifically, Ithis incentive was to establish a relationship with the ICIA for subsequent uSe in thwarting prosecution for I ffenses and thus blunting any Justice Department preceedings against organized crime. The Committee believes that Organized crime,: hwhile always recognizing the benefits of e-stablishing a relationship with the CIA, {seriously interested in assassinating Castro to re.gain lost territory. As already indicated, the Committee believes this desire ebbed with the solidification _of Sovier?influence and other factors just mentioned. After this occurrence it appears organized crime may only have put forth- the "appearance" of involvement 3iand good faith in the plots to further define a NH 53030 Dqud:322?3545' Page EEC: 11? IpI,w - 4 .-- . r. cf ?'relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA varevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident WOuld have given Maheu, Roselli .and Giancana _confirmation of the value of 'such a relationship and impetus forcontinuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative._ IiThe actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly id -Roselli Iin the years following these plots suppert A this theory. As related in Section II, these f' individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation.? and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder 'law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. The success of some of their efforts verifies the I tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. I As I - .Sam Papich, the liaison to the CIA, commented ins May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over. la barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about eitherII Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous . ans} activities" with the CIA. :1?7 It is Clear that at- least one group benefited from the failure of the assassination plots. 1? 3., Retaliation Theory . The Committee-found no evidence that these. Hw-?auan unclaiizzi??a?i Page 34; .. operations provoked Premier Castro toassassinate :President Kennedy in retaliation. The ICommittee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities: or even knew of their existence prior to the death _of President Kennedy. Emma 11 Castro did discover their existence} however, the Committee does not In an article in the-WashingtOn Post on I September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex? 'agent William Harvey, attorney Edward- Morgan,. ?and reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources. fThe Committee has determined that John Roselli was the. person who informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source,? . may ana??e' . r._q A??muv EXT 95%" KNEW 0N5 .ECE WARN. Ar WC.) ENE ma??Qw. EENNANN E. ANANSENKN GAN. SF EFS ANFNN 38) ESNAANKMN OJ. REPS . NA) SAN. .stm . ..- PNE) 3.) SAN) SN ANN. . NO SNANS Qg. \?NxhboAK. EN QNEN ONN .ANNCN .KNRW .NNQ RANK . . ?Nygr AH PNXANN. .. RAN) AWN ES. NE. KNEW NW N): . .. Q9. NANNVN . ?rmww ANNA NO A.) . :1 Huang mm w_nm 1 Ewen'assuming that_Castro did ascertain the existence.0f the CIA?organized crime plots and ?.that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the Committee?s -belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, the Committee still believes it is unlikely that, i ICastro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the issue AnalysissectionL? Specifically; these reasons are: A l) Ithe prospect of exposing Cuba to invasiOn and destruction would not have been worth the risk; 2) Vthe act of changing a leader does not -. necessarily change the system; zit-ow b? dengue Castro may have reCOgnized that 2mgn?5 - the leaders of the United States Kennedy 1 maintained the least hostile approach 'towards Cuba; and 4) the growing prospect of detente between . Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an American official - Related Organized Crime Activities The Committee reviewedAevidence that raises the possibility that various organized crime0?L?y[} were - Egg 3.. figureSAinvolved in attempts to assassinate Castro4were unrelated to the CIA. NH 53930 un- To ascertain more information about organized Crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots,? itthe Committee investigated Norman Rothmanjwho was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime.v I h-At various times, Rothman served as manager of . the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs.in Cuba represehting. .See_yello p. l49h'. the interests of the Mannarino_brothers of Fittsburgh.9? :1 files on indiCate that a'proposal to kill Castro Was made to Rochman _as a "quid pro guo? Lin which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for a 2a 1960 gun running an FBI interview, ?Rothman stated that he had been in "personal Contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorney General John Liegenthaler, both 5 of and members of the Kennedy Rae Administration. In a deposition to the Committee taken in h'Miami on April l6, 1978, Rothman expanded on the- - theme to include a series of teriOus telegrams sommoning him to the White House for a Series of two_? or three meetings which_began in Attorney General RH sauna DucIdr32213?i?: Rage an Kennedy's office with members of his staff and [continued in a conference room where_Rothman's aSSistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was. g2? explored. At the last-meeting Rothman says that: "one of them happened to discuss /the' "assassination of Castro7with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a - casual way. That is about it. I cannot - - for the moment remember it word for word. See yellow p. .because it is too far i The evidence suggesting Such Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in lightI of the Justice Department crac k? down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely .- doubtful that any meeting wi th RoIthman on this topic. would have occurred-at the White House. the Committee believes it highly unlikely that such av' eVent occurred. 1 I i The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicatesI that organized'crime may have been aware ofcv the AMLASH operation during its existence.. The identified three name links betweenI 'theI AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation. v+ne ??Mt7b The IGR did not sufficiently analsze, however,?that the common denominator in two of the links was-Santo? Trafficante. 1m 51min. .1 2:41 a? Link.0ne In March, 1961, the CIA received information _that a high?ranking military figure in the Castro . ?18? 13W Gliding? . "~regime,and a fermeeapersenar?seeseearywof Castro. both wished to defect. The'military Offippn?was. I: I Si As already -1 revealed . indicated, the documents/that Trafficanten re- akij o! cruited weir-straw The Committee has determined that other than - . (Jinx. the coincidence of both ?res and AMLASH _seeking ex infiltration at the same time there _is nothing to .sugges a relationship between the two men in attemptingi?- to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator withvf Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana or any other members of the American gambling syndicate. This link is ex? $3 i; .. thereforeminsignificant, b} Link Two- In mid? March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongoi a noted' Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious ?position?of Minister of Sports_in Cuba, contacted CIA HH.5??aui 1.151;: station personnel in.Madrid.to inform the agency? ,that fhe was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 7 I.G. Report, It quickly became clear to . . . remployees that Bongo's reference the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt~ - - :1:ij 41,. TF3 ing to depOse Castro. Although the Met,ng alt" . are silent _aeQ . - attitude toWard Bongo? 5 man" I information, it must be assumed that ?aw? did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operatiOn was in progress at the time and Artime was_in the process_f of.delivering arms caches to within Cuba. Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency rep *mm personnel as a lawyerrEm? the Capri Hotel and Casino, .- 3? in Havanaiwho had been jailed 1\_July l975 for a? period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal -for a 9 representing Santo Traff1cante%%.Bongo utilization-- of the short prison term to establish is "bona fides" ?is questionable as_ Trafficante was in jail during August)l959._ For the Cuban government to wait for Ejartkr years to exaCt retribution for that representation makes [rid?Ht mg sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching 1m Quin i NH 53030 'DunId:32213546 station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency Athat ?he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p. It quickly became clear to a . employees that Bongo's reference was to eubbrg'and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt? 326m 44; TFK. ing to depose Castro. Although the ra??-and (teamiwa Repeats are silent a ?4 5 attitude toward Bongo' 5 ?came information, it must be assumed that may? did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process of delivering arms caches to me? 1 people within Cuba. Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency'- r6113 personnel as a lawyertfm? the Capri H_otel and Casino 2 in Havanaiwho had been jailed in July l975 for a? period of 75 days, allegedly as?a reprisal for representing Santo TraffiCant??b Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August)l959. For the Cuban government to wait for giautk. years to exact retribution for that repreSentation makes. [[+Lt6 my sense. Possibly; Bongo was involved in approaching Page 92 11 :the Castro government in 1962 on frafficante's. 'behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino. I IBongo's'trip-to-Madrid apparently involyed more 'than a contact with the CIA for he wasarrested for counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo WJ Mtp?ymrh?m?k Trafficante, arrived with a v: . . 7 - _to obta1n h1s releasep?'Presumably, Bongo was paroled' back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date; where he died. I One aspect of the Bongo? ?Trafficante relationship in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is doubtful that anything more than supposition can result "from further exploration. :As_ already indicated, it ?ha been reported by Jack Anderson that _secret source until his death John Roselli; had reason to speculate that ecruited1-by Santo Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around"sand sent back to the United States where they were directly rinvolved in the assassination of President Kennedy.- If this line of hypothecation is adapted, then the i trip to Madrid by Bongo could assume? some sinister. implications such as-the possibility that Bongo? 5 NH gagsu' ?nEIdr322T354?yr?agEh93 real purpose in contadting the'Madrid Station_was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining a?fthe nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. - Castroly certainly became aware of the Artime meetings with Cube?apin the fall of I964 since the list of charges ?upon which Gub?T?lwent to trial in 1966 began with these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his suSpicions of role with the CIA during late 1964 or early it is likely that he would lhave begun cOunter?intelligence measures to confirm his - fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo ?Ff?is 1-3-4 v1 a - fkfi) f" - .. to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Tra??aeante+sr .--. I . 7? if! "g gg?g; it can be postulated that - [0259!?- 5:TrafficanteawaSvaware. of Bongo' 8 true mission prior Libarture or became knowled eable when he bailed him out of jail in Madrid. vt>d uu?zr A, 9-- ?raw z?du'w'r? - also could have receiVed. news of AAL. A ties _with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobreg?s who was described by Gorge Criie in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) .- as "having worked with the CIA, was in ?a?eia?s Student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close""? 'to Trafficante." 539??. -ACtually,'given the extent Of Trafficante's high-levelcontacts within the exile community and the low?level security in the CIA ekile operations, it is extremely logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some part or all of the AMLASH plot. .The question becomes: what? 'Short Of being ablefto blackmail .the government about the modus operendi of the l960? 62 events, the Significance of mob knowledge of AMLASHI is not readily apparent. I I kgufm?T . . y- I??Trafficante was a double age nt, working fOr .theHCIA.but actually Supplying information to Castro,7 1? then_another scenario emerges."It isthen'lOgical 'Ito assume that Castro knew of the AMLASIH and yorganizedI crime operatiOns from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material, Traffic ante Ii could have received a sanctuary and assistance in I Ismuggling contraband for such information. As ?1501 discussed earlier, hoWever, the Committee believes? that even if Castro had knowIledge of CIA sponsorship of plots against his 1ife, that this would not haVe provoked him to IkilIl President Kennedy.' The banefit of contemporaneous knowledge of the ploIts .wOuld be HH Bags s5: rialitha; to neutralize their effect. Consequently, the Committee believes that any contacts between - do met 336 $ka 1' AMLASH and nouxeffect the un-tenability of the retaliation theory. C). Link three - The SSC noted that information contained in the . from A, raised-? the possibility that a link existed between the AMLASH operations and the 1960- 62 CIA plots to 3? aesassinate Castro using underworld contacts. :E?ae?i A review of the tE??hEmG. report does not sustain the Senate' 8 conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest that had knowledge of, or involvement with, any?of the syndicate or Cuban :exiles who participated in Phase I or II of theia CIA- -Mafia assassination plots during 1960? 62. I'What Book did was to seize upon the l967' tentative identification of name links? between the l960? 62 organized operation and AMLASH RH ?aqap Dunla:32213546 the amorphus nature of those "name links," which. included into a theory that was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeablei of both the AMLASH operation and the-initial CIA Iefforts to eliminate - The only solid factual basis for Book V's tie~ in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June?July 1963; which Book examined. 'MOreoveryj files contained at least some FBI reports-on 5the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting I explosives to New Orleans in 1963 These reports detail- his involvement with anti? Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training _camp in New Orleans in July 1963. I ?The "underworld figures" reference relates to Michael and William McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnelr?(See profile) 'Again, however, no evidence fron any source places Mohaney into the early-I? -- CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation." review of the June? July l963 activities of MCLaney .and Victor Espi nosa leads only to the inference that . .. \ne. (swat ?(3%de .. \ioww?m m. 5W:Auc&e ?their operation was-a private limited venture? with no agency or syndicate support and very little tilchance ot_success. - 9 Moreover, the link between McLaney; Espinosa and the organized crime principals connected to the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in order to make a judgment as to the likelihood of .the SSC speculation that _the syndiCate held "inside9 information on Agency opera-tions in l960? 65. . Since the Senate did not attempt to interview either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in -l975 nor ask principals of the 1960? 62 plots of their 9 'knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the_h_ Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge '?of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a ?minimum of hard data and a maximum of free? ?wheeling Conjecture. - - A The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized crime figures consists of his admission to being hfriends with "Cappy" Rothman, Normaanothman's son, Fand a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned- from his Student days of visiting the Havana casinos. nun1a11321354?; Page 93?. HH ?s?sn DucId:322T35?? As indicated earlier, Page 39 . ties to organized crime have' Mike Mg? Va: y/Zdy -within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante,;RoselliIor Giancana, ASince McLaney has been most frequently mentioned as a "Lanskf man.? 'To place a witting I McLaney into the 1960-62 plots,' it requires a series 3 gaaispeculative hurdles which include: cam?. Meyer Lansky was a plotter with . Trafficante, McLaney was "action"_man; and ithe various underworld figures acted- in concert in promoting anti? ?Castro operations. . - Aareneasil supportable with facts and consequently does not place any- significance in the Victor_ sp inosa link 7 . a both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered; .Sam Ciancana was shot in the basement- of his home in Chicago in June,' 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before?: the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots, . John Roselli's_butchered body was found inside _an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne- Bay, Florida in August, 1976 which was shortly I A after his testimony before the SSC regarding the organized crime plots.- I Various theories have surfaced concerning. why the? were killed and who was'responsible.: one Itheoryrelevant to this investigation is that Giancana- ??and Roselli were killed because of their part1c1pat1on';l in the Castro assa331nat1on plots and the SSC attempts_ 'to elicit_ information?on the plots. .In thier regard Trafficante has most often been the person _assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee 'that it believes that organized crime performed?theiil murderS?and that the reaSOns were unrelated to the organize crime plots.'in I i - I The Justice Department is still investigating- both murders. The Committee has_n0t uncovered evidenced: ;relevant to solving these murderer iThe Committee does believe, however, that a variety of_motiwations inspired the deaths; internal mob-conflict,especially in the case off ?Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the NH 53030 Dunld:322?354?? Page 1gp organized crime plots. The Committee considers it? probable that Trafficante approved of and liiassisted in the murderg ofi?tuie??taqohn Roselli. Trafficante's motivation-mggi? have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the plots and to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations? 'and activities which an investigation of the plots might Uncover. The Committee does not believe that such activities_were necessarily connected to the: .assasSination of President kennedy.? For instance, Trafficante may have had a covert relationship with Castro which may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States? . EBQBD Page 101 cmp' 1 i?ww**Consequently, although the deaths of Roselli?, GLR: ?rmf? and Gianoana related the CIAnorg?aniZed- crime operations, the Committee neCC?-n firth I . - does not believe that they are?related the assassination of President Kennedy. Iv. CONCLUSIONS . The Committee makes the following conclusions: A. AMLASH OPERATION I .THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE A AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO. TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. 2. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION. PRIOR TO THE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT..- 3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, .h COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY - THAT CASTRO BEEN PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. ?1 HAS SUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND g] ;7 SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STI BE LIEVES IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RETALIATION. A 7 THE COMMITTEE THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME.FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD.NOT ALTER THE -CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. NH EBIDBD .. NH 53030 DucId:322?354? ..- A CRIME PLOTS Edge 103 - THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED CASTRO TO - ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE THE COMMITTEE Te? ?a BELIEVESTHAT WOULD HAVE THE CIA - - 14%Hribu+c4 ASSUMING THAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT THAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME . WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO. INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS. THE COMMITTEE EELIEVES THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE- PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS- FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD . SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONE OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES. INVOLVED IN THE THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT JOHN ROSELLI USED THE FACTS OF THE CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS PREVENT IN LEGAL MATTERS. a JFK Assassination System Date: 4/27/201 Identi?cation Form . Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10147-10196? RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 61-1 1-02A Document Informati on ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM CIA TO under the Jehn . Kennedy - elleetien Act of 1992 [44 USC 210? Note]. DATE- 00/00/000 53080 Date: PAGES: 5 5?05?2017 SUBJECTS DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL CIA, FILES DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 1B CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 35 v9.1 - 1 NH 53030 DueId:322T3551 Page 1 .sem?w .aewwr raga? . . Ciessi?cmion: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClAuconfrolled documents. 3 '3 1' Footnotes: Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) 1. CIA/Office of Security, DRE file, Name Trace 11/9/67; Ibid. 7 A 3.5 Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, by Fonzi/Gonzales, 2/7/78, JFK Document #005259 . . 4. ICIA/Deputy DireCtor Operations (DDO), Juan Manuel Salvat _}31 - Roque, undated news article, "Red Terrorism Rules at -Havana University" by Hal Hendrix, Miami News._ .5. Opcite JFK #005259. .5. ON I ?Opcite. Juan Manuel Salvat Roque. 4 7. Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, Cable to Director from 1, MASH, 9/13/60. . .8. Interview with Ross Crozier_re: DRE, by Fonzi/Gonzales, 1/16/78, JFK Document #004721.Ibid. pp. \1 . Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, Cable to Director from MASH, 11/4/60. '11._.Ibid. . Ar; . -. 4.2" . .13. Juan Manuel salvat Roque, PRQ Form, Part II, 11/1/61- 14. -FBI Report from San Francisco, 5/26/64, Warren Commission Document #1085 1. . . . 15. VIbid.? 16.? Opcite CIA Salvatt PRQ form j17. Opcite FBI report from San Francisco '18. Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, Cable to Bell from 5/9/61. 19. Ibid. . . C?nssi?kco?en: Clo?sified by derivation: - #Nib-1:914--. 20. 21._ l?124. Ciessi?cmion: (This form is to be used for'mcterioi extracted from CIA?~controlied documents.) Footnotes ?'page 23 -0pcite JFK Document #005259, p. 1. Interview with Isidro Borja by Fonzi/Gonzales, 2/21/78, p. JFK Document #005765 . "Ibid. Ibid. . 7 Opcite CIA Salvat PRQ form, Part II. Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 2. DRE Volume I, Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W. ?27. *28. 29. '30. .31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 39. 40. from Subject: AMSPELL Progress Report for November DRE Volume II, Dispatch from ?-to Chief, Special Affairs Staff, 11/8/63. Ibid. Ibid- ?OpCite. JFK #005765, p. Ibid. 'Ibid. Ibid. p. 3. IIbid.? .Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.? Ibid. Ibid.? . Ciussii?mi?en: Classified by derivation: .iw '3 3 C?ossi?cm?an: j: (This form is to be used for material extracted from _CIA??-?con?rrolled documents.) 1% DRE FootnOtes page 3 I #9 41.- DRE voluma I,Letter signed Lu 8 Ferhandez Rocha, 2/21/63. - .. DRE Volume 11, from to :Chief, Special Affairs Staff, 11/3/63. 3 . .43. FBI #105? 85440- 28, Correlation Summary, 8/11/67, ,3 - . JFK Document #012383, p. 2. ?44. DRE Volume-II, Cable 6/13/64. I 45. DRE Volume IV, Memo to CS from PW/Monestier, 1/3/67. . . 4/46. Opcite. 47. "The Bayo- Pawley Affair" by Robert K. Brown and Miguel - -Acoca, Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18? 48. Opcite. JFK #005765,_p. T49. JFK Document .1, attachment p. 3 g; 50. Ibid., attachment p. 9. I - a 51. 1616. a - . g. '52. Ibid., pp. I . 53. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid. _y 55. Ibid., pp. 10?11. 3' ?56. Ibid., p. 11. i j} 57. Ibid., Cover memo. :1 - 58. "Ibid.? l? . .59.. Ibid. 60. CIA/Inspector General's Report 1977. 61.. Ibid. Cicassi?cai?om . I VCiossified by derivationi :.-A.- - A A- A ?mug? . man. "w Ciessi?co?on: (This form isllto be used for ?moteriol exfrocfed' I from CIA?controlled documents.) DRE Footnotes page 4. -62. 63B. .64. 365; 66.. 68.' 69. :70- 771. .72. 73. 74. 75L '76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.' '82. V.Ibid. .Ibid. ?Ibid. AOpCite. JFK #00_5259, Ibid. p. Ibid. Ibid. DepOsition of Carlos Bringuie r, May 12, #009084_ 63A. Contact Report 12/l3/78, 1-.11? 13 See Also, HSCA final section on Carlos.Bringuier Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, JFK Document #009394. p. 41. Opcite, JFK #005765. Ibid. p. 4. 'Ibid. Ibid. p. 3. 'Ibid. p. 4, 1978, pp. 11, 12, Interview with Jose Antonio Lanusa by Fonzi/Gonzales,- 4/22/78, p. JFK Document #007463. Ibid. Ibid. p. 2. ?Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 3; C?essi?cciien: Classified by derivo?on: JFK DoCument #013678. 1978 Document Warren Commission Volume K,j ?g .v . . m: 4 I'Af?filix? . . . .115- C?oss?im?ion; (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClAmconfrolled documents.) DRE Footnotes page 5 83. .84. '85. 86. 87.. i 88.- 89.7 _90. ?91. 292. 93. ?Ibid. Ibid. p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. Opcite. JFK #009084, p. 23. ?Ibid. pp. 15?16. Interview of Celso "Maoario" Hernandes, by Brown, 2/14/78, JFK Document #007486. Contact report, Carlos Bringuier, 12/2/78, JFK Document #013420. Ibid. _Ibid. See Also, Warren Report pp. 407 08, 728? 29; Warren' Commission Volume Lee Exhibits. . . Ciassified by derivation: JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form Date: 4/28/201 Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10147-10207 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 61-11-09A Document Information ORIGINATOR: - HSCA - FROM: CIA TO Eleased under the John TITLE: Kenn-2 :13: Eaassinatinn Recurda allectinn Act of 1992 I44 USE 210? Note]. DATEF IZHIU978 53080 Date: 5 SUBJECTS ARTI-ME, MANUEL DRE CIA . BAY OF PIGS DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS 1B CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 35 WI NH 53030 Pagell .. x. NH 53030 [us-L" ?24? I 124?"? am canon: . (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA?convened documents.) Footnotes: Directorio .Revclucionario Estudiantil (DRE) 1 5. 6. 7; 11, 12. .13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. DucId:322T3562 Page 2 Name Trace 11/9/67. Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, by Fonzi/Gonzales, 2/7/78, JFK Document #005259. - Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, undated news article, "Red Terrorism Rules at - Havana University" by Hal Hendrix, Miami News. ege?te JFK #005259. 0t Juan Manuel Salvat Roque. Cable to Director from MASH, 9/13/60. Interview i _by Fonzi/Gonzales, 1/16/78, JFK Document #004721. - . - 9 _Ibid. pp. 2-3. anue1TSaTvatwRequev Cable to Director from 11/1/61. FBI Report from San Francisco, 5/26/64, Warren Commission Document #1085 Ibid. . In C3) Opcite CIA, ?weam? Opcite FBI report from San Francisco Cable from JMWAVE, 5/9/61. Ibid. Classi?cc?on: Classified by derivation: 9-H if: 1&557' human-nu .- i NH 5303i] DupId:322?3562 Page 3 7 353:? 2.. 3 i :i Classification: (This fofm is to be used for rnoferidl?extrc'cfed from ClA?xonfrolled documents.) DRE'Footnotes - page 2 C.t; 20. .Dgaite JFK Document #005299, p. . gpMni?WJ - 21. Interview with: by Eonzi/Gonzales, 2/21/78, p. 2, JFK Document #00-5765. 22. Ibid. 22A. Ibid. c: wk? 23. og?lqe CIA . ~m - 2.1- 24. 1te. JFK #005765, p. 2. . . w??u ah., Dispatch 1/4/63. - DiSpatCh W12395 11/8/63. 27. ?28. Ibid. 29. Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 2. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. p. 3. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. - ?35. ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibidf 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. Classified by derivation: x. .. . . I.- tun-v-v-I-v- Ciassi?co?on: - i (This form is to be used for material eIxfrocted from CIA?{ontmiied documents.) i DRE Footnotes page 3 41. CIA - rRa?ha =2 2 Datuwt- D,g_ 3175--.. . . 5., -- .., . - 11/3/63. evil-non u' -- 'i 43. FBI #105? 85440? 28, Correlation Summary, 8/11/67, - JFK Document #012383, p. 2. 44. Cable 45. Memo 1/3/67. ?were. . . NM "1 Jan-uh. 46. Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 3. 47. "The Bayo- Pawley Affair" by Robert K. Brown and Miguel Acoca, Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18- -19. 48. opcite. JFK #005765, p. 4.I - 3 249. JFK Documeot attachment p. 50. Ibid., attachment if Jig: 51. Ibid.' 7 I - ?Ff 53. 52. Ibid.,Ipp. 9-10. 7 7? ??iI 53. Ibid., p. 10. I I I?I?x?w? 54. Ibid. . - 55. Ibid., pp. 10?11.; 3 56. Ibid., p. 11. i 57. Ibid., Cover memo. 58. ?Ibid. 59. Ibid. 'v6o. QAJS Report 1977. 61. Ibid. Classmcohon: i Classified by derivation: ~?far pager 'zeaer lager .xaear ,reayr NH 5303i] Page 4 Wham Wm V?rmm ?ry, 11-4: .1 rm, Classification: '33 (This form is to be used for material exfrocfed from CIA?controlled documents.) DRE Footnotes page 4 i 162.. Ibid. . i I Ibid. 63A. Co?tact Report 12/13/78, JFK Document #013678. 638. Ibid. 64. .Opcite. JFK #005259, 9. 1.. 5 65. Ibid. p. 2. I 66.. Ibid. 67. Ibid. . - p. 13, 3 68. DepOsition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, Document .J -.. #009084 . 09. ?igg, HSCA fihai section on Carlos Bringuier I 70. Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, pp. 11, 12, 15, JFK Document #009394, also, Warren Comm1331on Volume X. '71. 55633;, JFK #005765. _72. Ibid. p. 4. 73. Ibid. 3 74. Ibid. p. 3. I 75. Ibid. p. 4. 76. Interview with Jose Antopio Lanusa by Fonzi/Gonzales, 4/22/78, p. 1., JFK Document #007463. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. p. 2. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81.. Ibid. 82. Ibid. p. 3. ?7 Clossifico?on: I .2.) i Classified by derivation: ;erev - ga?ar Jamar seesr isasr- '.Aeear NH 53030 Page 5 mm mm?" Vi? 711?4' mem. vwmm. DRE Footnotes page j, 83. Ibid. . 84. Ibid. p. 4- "r 85. Ibid. 3 86. Ibid.? ,2 87. Opcite. JFK #009084, p. 23. 88. Ibid. pp. 15?16. - 89. Interview of Celso "Macario" Hernandes, by Brown, 2/14/78,' JFK Document #007486. '3 90. Contact report, Carlos Bringuier, 12/2/78, JFK Document #013420. 91. Ibid; ?92. Ibid. 93. See Also, Warren Report pp. 407?08, 728?29; Warren Commission Volume X, PP. 87-90,94; V.T. Lee Exhibits. i i ., 3 a Classi?cation: Classified by derivation: Ciossificciion: (This form is to be used for materio} exfrocted from CIA?controlled documents.) NH 5303i] Page WHEN. ?5116'!sz 1313-" mm. mm v-r- - JFK Assassination System Identi?cation Form Date: 4/28/201 Agency Information AGENCY HSCA - RECORD NUMBER: 189?1014740219 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILENUMBER: 61-11717A Document Information ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: CIA TO under the John Kennedy Records elleetien Act of 1992 DATE: 12/11/1978 [44 USC 21le Note] . PAGES: 6 ESDBIZI Date: 5?05?2017 SUBJECTS DRE ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE NOTES CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS IB CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 35 W1 NH 53030 Page 1 .ga??r ?55357 :guiny J?i??r Cicssifico?on: (This form is to be used for material exfrocfed from CIA?controlled documents.) 2 Footnotes: Directorio .Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) 0 1. Name Trace 11/9/67. 5 3 . i 3. Interview with Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, by Fonzi/Gonzales, 3' 1 2/7/78, JFK Document #005259. i 4. - - . we, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque, undated news article, "Red Terrorism Rules at Havana University" by Hal Hendrix, Miami News. 0 Ci" 7 5. JFK #005259. . C?t' . . 7 6. egoseer-eaaraee, Juan Manuel Salvat Roque. - \mrui 7. Cable to Director from MASH, 9/13/60. he-? 8. Interview --. s' 1 1/16/78, JFK Document #004721. ;by Fonzi/Gonzales, 9. Ibid. pp. 10. -, . MASH, 11/4/60. -, Cable to Director from i 11.. Ibid. 12.- Ib.id. 1 . DanquA/f' .13. - 11/1/61. 4. l4. FBI Report from San Francisco, 5/26/64, Warren Commission 33 Document #1085 l. 15. Ibid., 5 1 d3) 16. Opcite CIA Sag-ne-??i??iomm . l7. Opcite FBI report from San Francisco 18. Cable tc??ilt from war?. V0100 JMWAVE, 5/9/61. 19. Ibid. Ciassifico?on: Classified by derivation: NH 5303i] Page 2 .. ,3 i NH 53030 dues? iaasr izanr Clossi?cai?ion: (This fofm is to be used for moteridl-extrotfed from CIA??onfrolled documents.) DRE Footnotes - page 2 .Ogaite JFK Document #00525 p. 20. 21. 22. 22A. 23. 24. 27. >28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. .35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 0C.?d km 01- by Fonzi/Gonzales, 2/21/78 p. 2, Interview with JFK Document #005765; Ibid. ga?gte CIA OgEite. JFK #005765 p. 2. ?mem x: no. Dlspatch #?i?ir1 Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ciossifico?on: 11/8/63. Dunld:322?3514 Page 3 Classified by derivation: . my . . . .1. .I?M-?hwd- . NH 5303i] Ciossi?ca?on: (This form is to be USed for material extracted from ClA-?onfrolled documents.) DRE Footnotes - page 3 acuw 41. Letter 2/21/63. D?euwtr' Dr; 15?? ?1?391? 42. CIA . - 6- 11/3/63. 43. FBI #105? 85440- 28, Correlation Summary, 8/11/67, JFK Document #012383, p. 2.. 44. CIAW Cable W. 6/13/64. 45 . Memo vr-wie-eawmpesr-a-?g-t 1/3/57. 46. Opcite. JFK #005765, p. 3. 47. "The Bayo-Pawley Affair" by Robert K. Brown and Miguel Acoca, Soldier of Fortune, 1975, pp. 18? 19. 48. Opcite. JFK #005765, p. $49. JFK DOCument attachment p. "?gnwr 50. Ibid. attachment 9. - '3 50S) 51. Ibid. - .1: 52. Ibid., pp. 9-10. . 7 2 it 530 Ibido pt 10. My? 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 56. Ibid., p. 11. 57. Ibid., Cover memo. 58. 'Ibid. 59. Ibid. Parse . 60. Report 1977. 61. Ibid.? i Gassified by derivation: ??137 53557 zeear' Aegar A5357 .xeear rzemr gees? xeemr DunIu:322?3514 Page 4 vnm. WM warm. V?mm. V??mm ?memn V??gh 565%. I A - - A lM?u gaag.? :3 A . Ciossificc?on: . (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA?controlled documents.) DRE Footnotes page 4 -62. 63B. 64. 765. 66. 67. 68.? 69.. 70. '71. .72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. .80. 81. 82. 3 763.7. Ibid. Ibid. 63A. Contact Report 12/13/78, JFK Document #013678. Ibid. - . .Opcite. JFK #005259, p. 1.. Ibid. p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. . P- 13: . DepOsition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, Document #009084_' 0 See.Also, HSCA-final section on Carlos Bringuier Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, pp. 11, 12, 15, Document #009394, Warren Commission Volume X, o. 41. Opcite, JFK #005765. Ibid. p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. p. 3. ?Ibid. p. 4. Interview with-Jose-Antonio Lanusa by Fonzi/Gonzales, 4/22/78, p. 1., JFK Document #007463. Ibid. Ibid. p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.'l Ibid. p. 3. Ciassificc'iion: i Classified by derivation: A . . 83. '1 .84790111'! 5303.07 15"an ?31::1 -- . Ciossi?caiion: (This form is to be used for material ex?rrocted from CIA?controlled documents.) . DRE Footnotes - page 5 Ibia. Ibid. p. 4. 'Ibid. Ibid.? Opcite. JFK #009084, p. 23. Ibid. pp. 15-16. interview of Celso "Macario? Hernandes, by Brown, 2/14/78,. JFK Document #007486. Contact report, Carlos Bringuier, 12/2/78, JFK Document #013420. - . - Ibid; ibid. See-Also, Warren Report pp. 407-08, 728-29; Warren Commission Volume X, PP. 87-90,94; Lee Classification: Classified by derivation: ?g?h 11?} ?a ".va an ??03 3 .. 1' .h?Lkri ?at: JFK Assassination System Date: 4/28/20] Identi?cation Form Agency Information AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10147-10240 I RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 63-01-02 Document Information ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM CIA TO TITLE ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS DATE 03/00/1979 PAGES: 293 Eleased under the SUBJECTS: - 3:83:33 $333213?? HID ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CIA, FILES OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE NEW ORLEANS FERRIE, DAVID DOCUMENT TYPE REPORT CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS: 18 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 06/04/1998 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 36 th'l?aono DunIn:32213595 Page 1 1 Ann-?k held until further instructions are received f0 Ciel-ssh: (This form is '10 be used for materiel extracted from CiA?controiled documents.) REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Cover Sheet The attached package of paper is the property of the House Select Committee on Assassinations,.and is on loan to CIA under an agreement whereby CIA is not to reproduce or copy the draft or any portion thereof. Notes may be taken on materials in this package, and rough notes may be prepared as a basis for informal and oral exchanges with HSCA representatives. These notes, however, are to be held as though.contr011ed and are.to be destroyed under agreed conditions with HSCA. They are not to be copied or excerpted and are to be eventual disposal. These papers have been numbered for accountability and receipted accordingly. They are to be handled.on a secure basis as though constituting sensitive papers on a need-to?know basis. REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Copy {3 0f e* 1., a. V: 3.71% Classified by derivation: HH 5303i] Page 2 - - ace-2:433; {yd-4:333! A Lq Q?Qii?h'l'ld4 Lee Mummy ogwadet ram; at}? ASTAFF OF THE SELECT ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESS SECOND SESSION v-uv- mun?rt! :ga:rr- a: 1 -- inations For sale bv @1le 4 1' '11 Government Printing 0mm: -?Wash1ngton, D.C. 20402?Stock No. 05240705171W?mqw?l . 5303i] Page 3 (347) - (om) - i [1000 aimou .3 my - ?Lm jag.) i waw _Wm- NH 5303i] Page 4 A75..- ..- - . - ..-- 53030 DucId:322T3595. Page 5 .. (1) de'primary reasons prompted the Committee to investigate anti-Castro activists and organizations. First, the Committee ascertained that as a consequence of the fai1ure and eventua1 unwi11ingness of the Kennedy AdminiStration to 1.iberate Cuba from Castro these persons and 10c ated primari1y in the United States)ag%f%igh1y militaristic in natureggpossessed _the means, motive, and opportunity to-assassinate the President. SeCOnd, the Committee fe1t that Lee Harvey Oswa1d' verified association with anti?Castro j~ Cabs. whi1e 1iving in New Or1eans during 1963, "together with his possib1e contaCts with ofher anti- Castro g?g??gs further enhanced the of the invo1vement?0f anti-Castro e1ements inthe assassination. For these reasons, the Committee thorOUgh1y investigated numerous anti-Castro organizations and operatives and 1iving~ianew 0r1eans to determine their connection if any, to the assassination. ?j . The Committee initiated its investigation by area-m? 1 ?1 ., se1ecting the most active anti?CaStro groups and their key 1eaders from among the more than 100 anti-Castro organizations in existence in November 1963. 'These groups inc1uded A1pha 66, JURE, Commandos L, the -Directorio?Revo1utionario Estudiantia1 (DRE), the Cuban Revo1utionary which i_nc1udes the Frente Revo1ucianario De mocratico (FRD), the Junta Gobierno de' - 'Cuba in Exi1o (JG CE), the 30 th of November, the _InternatiOna1 Penetration ForCes (InterPen), Revo1ut10nary Recovery Movement (NRR), and EIC531130 Page 6 .1: I 1 I :w-rzz?n-gmh?uw?rm ., I. r? - NH 53030 .-..The1r seTect1on evolved both from the comm1ttee '1ndependent f1e1d-1nvest1gat1on and the exam1nat1on of the f11es and records ma1nta1ned.by the federal and Toca1 agenc1es then mon1t0r1ng-Cuban exiTe vact1v1ty. These agenc1es 1ncTuded?TocaT pol1ce departments, the'FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Serv1ce, the Imm1grat10n and NaturaTizat1on Serv1ce, and the Department of Defense. ?nu? These groups can be desor1bed as ?act1on groups." These were the move ments most act1ve on both the m111tary and propaganda . fronts, the not onTy taTked about ant15Castro operat1ons, but actuaTTy carried out 1nf11trat10ns and ra1ds 1nto Cuba, conducted ?Castro assassination attempts, part1c1pated 1n a, mu1t1p11c1ty of arms dea11ngs and possessed the most vociferous and aggress1ve Teader51 These were the, groups and 1nd1v1duaTs who received the crux of the Kennedy Adm1nistrat1on's crackdown on anti-Castro operat1ons f0110w1ng the Cuban m1ss11e cr1sis. "These ,were also the ones who, 1n the end, were the most . 1 fear! .b1tter at Pres1dent Kennedy and felt the most .{131, 1.5c.4e: the Committee foc sed -k 3 1M 6- 1?36 on "Wes cam-mi ,the key members 1n each group and concentrated on uncover1ng T1n ks to Lee Harvey OswaTd The Comm1tteep found ev1dence of contactgbetween Oswald and ?nouxn: 1nd1v1dualsnassoc1ated w1th ant1-Castro groups. These persons were JURE member S11v1a Od1o, Alpha 66 leader Antonio Vec1ana, CRC designate Frank Bartes, and DRE member CarTos Br1ngu1er. ?Oswald encountered rboth Bartes and Br1ngu1er in New OrTeans during the 1, as." .. umme nr-rlDucId:322T3595 Page . . . . mama Hanna ETA ?ixnr?xwr?ma?lvln .ll?l ll . 1n . . .II. rl ?Skull? 1 .I- NH 5303i] Page, .9 nigh.? .. Ht NIH 5303i] Page Team 3 7 . o??saae4ecr' Fonzi Qiis - THC- ?iwereebceyd?x?s OP . ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN ?%)Was the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy involving anti- Castro Cuban exiles? There were at ,5-3 ?Elsi least two signifiCant factors which-led the Committee to consider that m. question: m_ the Warren Commission's decision notgtorfurther)investigatgy?he 'issue despite the urging of staff counsels involved . - and ln that area Of eVldence 23?: 2 371:; apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had the means, motivation and opportunity to be involved in the aesassination. ,Qy the area of possible Cuban exile' _involvement was _one in which the Warren Commission was not provided with an adequate investigative- background. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; WWle i (Z) "Despite knowledge of Oswald's apparent interest' in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level awareness of certain CIA assassination plots; the ?FBI.;.made no special investigative effort into, NH 53030 Pagerl'l lo questiOns of possible Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswald investigation. There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or of Sources within the Cuban exile community."l . I 62%) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of evidence that was available'to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Cdmmission speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture ,as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investiga4 tion of that possibility, Assistant Counsels William Colemand and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to QNKW the Commission (%V_The evidence here could lead to an anti- Castro involvement in the assass?igtion . on some sort of basis as this: 0 ald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro.' He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized - that law enforcement authorities were' also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of Second, someone in the anti-Castro ore ganization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for these facts, it is pos- sible that some sort of deception was NH 53030 Page 12 used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas.-.. The motive of this would, of course, . be the expectation t-hat after the Presi- dent was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then blame_the assassina? tion on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be . GEE: 64) in considering the possi- bility of a-nti- -Cas.tro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy ?dudcpw historical awareness of the_ waves of political and emotional impulses which coursed through the Cuban exile communities in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas while Kennedy was President._ The,Background; - 13. 61': 6'64 Coat/said to have a_beginning, the anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the early morning hours of New Year's Day, 1959, when a DC-4 lifted from the.fog?shrouded Camp Columbia air? field in Havana.3 Aboard the plane was Fulgencio (pko LA beau Batista, the military dictator of_ ibm+kr9muwuo?x??w? Cuba. Batista Was fleeing the country, his regimer long beset by forces from within and without, now crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping down from the mountains. When dawn came,_the_bells NH 53030 Page 13 NH 53030 tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Euz began his triumphal march to the capital.5 For seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels moved down Cuba's Central Highway while thousands ,1 - 6 'cheered and threw flowers in their path. Castro finally arrived in Havana on January 8th and character- istically gave a speech. Clad in his green.fatigue runiform while three white doves, which someone had dramatically released,circled above him, Castro boldly proclaimed: "There is no longer an enemy!" He was wrong, of course, and knew it. A hard core of Batistianos had fled the country early,_ many long befdre their leader, and were already Con- cocting counter-revolutionary-plots from their refnges in the UnitedStates, the Deminican Republic_ and elsewhere. - And it was not very long after Castro tOOk power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among those who had once been his strongest supporters.9 As each day went by it-became more apparent that Castrols Revolution was, as one chrOnicler noted, "leading inexorably.toward an institutionalized dictatorship in which individnals were contemptuously shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with charges of treasonable conduct, counter-revolutionary, activity or worse."10 Then too,-there was a large DucId:322T3595 Page 14 EH 53030 ,number of public executions.? Within two weeks of his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials,ll Within three months, there were at least 506 execu? tions.- - 62$? The disillusionment for many Cubans deepened when it became obvious that the form of Castro's rule was turning toward Communism and that Castro's . attitude toward the United_States was engendering a' hostile relationship. The publiShing of Castro's Agrarian Reform Law in May, 1959, was a Significant sign.13 It was far more radical than had been ex? pected and was obviously designed to strip both Cuban firms of their_im-V mensely valuable cane land-s.l4 -A few weeks later- the Chief of Castrols Air Force, Major Pedro Diaz- Lanz,resigned, charging was Communist in- fluence in the armed forces and Government."15 Then, when Castro's own.hand?picked President, Manuel Urrutia, announced at a press conference that he rejected the support of the Communists and said i believe that any-real Cuban revolutionary should reject it openly,? Castro immediately forCed him to resign and accused him of actions "bordering on ?treason."- (13) And so, after the broken pledges of free, DucId:322T3595 Page 15 NH 5303i] 7 elections and a free press, the mass trials and eXecutions, the assumption of unlimited power and the bellicose threats against the United States, it lewly began to.dawn on many Cubans that Fidel Castro was not the political savior they had ex- pected.EgC?Then, on October 19, 1959, there occurred' an incident which precipitated the formation of the 'first organized anti~Castro opposition within Cuba.r 'Major Huber Matos, one of Castro's highesteranking "officers and'considered by most Cubans to be one of therey heroes of the Revolution, resigned from the Army in protest against the increasing favoritism 18 . . shown-to known Communists. The next day Matos was 'arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried 'and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Shortly .afterwards, Castro himself called a secret meeting of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within three years.19 There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were cone firmed. WI realized," Artime later said, "that I was a democratic infiltratOr in a Communist govern- ment."20 Page 16 GdO-Artime returned to Oriente and began or? ganizing students and peasantsto fight_against Castro and Communism;' By.early November each proe vincein Cuba had an element of Artime's new under- ground movement.~ It was called the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). It was the first vanti-Castro action group originating from within castro's own ranks. A I . - Cad) By the summer of 1960, ithad become ob- vious both within and outside of Cuba that the founda- tion for an eventual confrontation between Castro and anti-Castro forces had been laid; The Eisenhower Administration had cancelled.the Cuban sugar quota..22 _Mikoyan had visitedeavana and Raul CaStrO'had gone to Moscow.23 Ernesto "Che" Guevara had proclaimed publicly that the Revolution was on the road set by Mar39and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence 5 Agency had said in a speech that Communism had per- verted Castro's'revolution.24 -JHIB By then,rcastro had seized more than $700 million in U1 S. property . On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhowerv authorized the CIA to.organize, train, and equip Cuban . . . 26 refugees as a guerilla force to overthrow Castro. NH 53030 Page NH 53030 Soon it became Common knowledge within Cuba that a liberation army was being formed and that a political structure in exile had been created.27 As the flight from Cuba increased in size and fervor, the exile community in the United States grew in spirit and confidence. -One historian captured the special characteristics of the new arrivals; They were new types of_refugees. Instead of a home, they were seeking temporary asylum. They found it along the sandy beaches and curring coastline of Florida. They arrived by the thousands, in small fishing.boats, in planes, chartered or 'stolen, and crowded into Miami. Along the boulevards, under the palms, and in hotel lobbies, they gathered and plotted their counter-revolution. Miami began to take on the air of a Cuban city, Even its voice was changing, Stores and cafes began advertising in Spanish and English.,.Everyone talked of home only one hundred miles away. And everyone talked about the great liberation army being formed inzghe secret camps somee where far away. (guy By April, 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled Castro's Revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. They had been buoyed in that hope A by public pronounCements of support from the United States Government. In his State of the Union address, -Presidenthennedy had spoken of ?the Communist base DunId:322T3595 Page 13 NH 53030 established 90 miles from the United States," and said that domination in this hemi- sphere can never be negotiated."29 In addition, the Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost totally funded by agencies of the U. 3. Government, 30 principally the CIA. egg) From an historical perspective, in light of; its later radioal change, the attitude of the Cuban exiles toward the U. S. GoVernment prior to the Bay of Pigs is especially significant. 'Author Haynes 'Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion, 7collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including Brigade civilian chief Manuel Artime, described that attitude in detail: From the beginning, the Cuban counter- reVolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no" exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans 7- or wanted so desper- ately to believe that they never ques- tioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans. Lookinghback on. it, they.agree now?that.their naivet? was partly genuine and partly reluctance to turn down any offer of help in liberat- ing their country. In fact, they had little choice; there was no other place to turn. Some, of course, were driven by other motives: political power and personal ambition were involved.? Even DucId:322T3595 Page 19 ?10 more important was the traditional Cuban attitude toward America and Americans. To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the North, for the two countries were.bound closely by attitudes, by hiStory,.by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba?s friend. One really didn?t question such a belief. It was a fact; eVeryone knew 'it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief.3l~ Gig) This "blind trust" by the Cuban exiles in the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs wasr specifically noted by the military commander-of the 2506 Brigade, Jos? San-Roman: "Most _of the Cubans were there," he said, "because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because the United States.was backing them.?32 gr? The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only 7 a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles but also a painful shattering of their confidence in the U. S. Government. The exile leaders claimed that the failure of the invasion was a result of the lack Page 2D- HE 53030 . . .. a! sclear that the invaSion.was a disaster.2?Verona?re- - ll' of promised air support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy.33 Particularly galling' to them was Kennedy's public declaration to Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the.height of the invasion, when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the Swamps of Bahia de Cochinos: repeat now that the United States intends no armed intervention in Cuba."34 I (2167 Even those exile leaders who were willing- to rationalize the extent of Kennedy's responsibility Were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel .nJ-Wuh 2 my a? Ewan-Like 5235. 6a.: 4g?ntonio de Veronafgin hisAtestimony before the Com- mittee, told of the President gathering the Council members together at the White House when it became . called: "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with any? thing; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he didn't have any direct knowledge of the problem, and we knew that he was not in charge of the military effects directly; Nevertheless, President Kennedy, to finish the.talks, told us.he was the one -- the "35 pnly one responsible. few days after that DunId:322T3595 Page 21 HH 53030 meeting, the White House issued a public statement declaring that President Kennedy assumed "sole re- .SpOnsibility" for the U. S. role in the action against Cuba. (59) The adceptance of responsibility did not cut the bitter disappointment the Cuban exiles felt _toward the U- S. Government and President Kennedy. Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade Commander San Roman revealed.the depth of his re? action at the failure of the invasion: hated the United States," he said, "and I felt that I had been betrayed. Eyery day it became worse and then-I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the U. 8.937 (Ea) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote a. book caUStically titled Dagger In the Heart.38 ("The Bay Of P-igs defeat was wholly self- inflicted -: nu i_n Washington," Lazo wrote. Kennedy told the truth when he- publicly accepted heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade_had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel im- .prisonment for the rest. The cuban vpeople and the Latin American nations, bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties of race and culture, were left with feelings of astonishment and disillusion? ment, and in many cases despair. They DucId:322T3595 Page 22 13 'had'always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous -- but'where' was its sense of honor and the capacity= ?of its leaders? - A ?The_mistake of the Cuban fighters, for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it not let them down. But it ?30 President Kennedy.was well aware of the bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle. It is not now possible to document the changes in Kennedy's personal attitude brought about by the military defeat, but the firming of U. S. policy toWard Cuba and.the massive infusion of U. S. aidby to clandestine_anti-Castro operations in the wake? was of-the Bay of-Pigs 4O as "the Kennedy vendetta." What can be documented is the pattern of U. S. policy between the period of the Bay of Pigs failure in April, l96l and the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. That pattern, replete with both overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect on the re-shaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when it was abruptly reversed, f? have provided the motivation for involvement in-the assassination of President Kennedy. 11H 53030 Page 23 v?-14 In retrospect, the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered the high water mark of anti-Castro activity, almost every manifestation of the U. S. policy providing a reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause- As a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particu- larly hard-line address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the implications of Communism .in Cuba. :"Cuba must not be abandoned to the Com- munists," he declared. In appealing for support from Latin America, he indicated that the United States would expe?t more from the nations of the hemisphere with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United ?States would not allow the doctrine of non-interven- tion to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, restraint_is not spoke of Cuba in the context of the ?new and deeperstruggle."41 When Castro, in a May Day speech, declared .Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department retorted that Cuba was a full-fledged member of the Communist bloc.42 6&9 Another U. S. response.was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively NH 53030 Page 24 les little attention to Latin America's economic and social needs.43 President Kennedy gave the Alliance mcm?v 62. A bk. concept a=a launching in a speech in March, neaeemanteae 1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of. 'social and economic development in Latin America through democratic means and, at the same time, pledged substantial financial and political support.44 - While the campaign to broaden its Cuban policy base was being pursued, the United States f? proceeding on another course. _In one of the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from its allies, the United States in September, 1961 an- nounced it would stop assistance to any country that assisted Cuba; In December, Kennedy extended the denial of Cuba's sugar quota through the first half of 1962.45 <33)_Meanwhile, the secret policy aimed at removing Castro through assassination continued as FBI chie? Edgar-Hoover informed Attorney General Robert Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in "clandestine efforts" against Castro.46 In that month, poison pills to be used in a plot to kill CaStro were passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia-figure. In November, 1961, the CIA initiated Operation NH 53030 Page 25 NH 53030 "x7416 MONGOOSE, designed to enlist 2000 Cuban exiles and -dissidents inside Cuba to overthrow Castro. . (369 the bitter aftertaste of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile com- munity, those who remained.active in the fight against Castro came to realize that these subsequent actions of the Kennedy Administration were manifesta- tions of its determination to reverse the defeat. a What Kennedy has euphemistically termed "a new and deeper strUggle" (supra) became, in actuality, a secret war: . new President apparently' .- perCeived the defeat as an affront to his -pride. Within a matter of weeks he com? mitted the United States to a secret war .against Cuba that eventually required the. 'services of several thousand men and cost -as much as $100 million a entrusted its direction to the CIA, which an operation that could be described either as a large?scale vendetta or-a small crusade.?4 The fact that the agency of the U. S. Governe ment_the anti-Castro exiles had most dealt with and relied on prior-to the Bay of Pigs became, after the invasion failure, the controlling force of the "secret war" was another indication to the Cuban exiles that the Kennedy Administration was, indeed, still .sincere about overthrowing Castro. Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA curiously and inexplicably began to grow, .to branch out, to gather more and more responsibility for the?Cuban problem'. DucId:322T3595 Page 26 NH 53030 v?17 The Company was given authority to help monitor Cuba's wireless traffic; to ob- serve its weather; to follow the Castro government?s purchases abroad and its currency transactions; to move extra? ordinary numbers of clandestine field operatives in and out of Cuba; to ac- quire a support fleet of ships and air- craft in order?to facilitate these secret agent movements; to advise, train, and help reorganize the police and? security establishments of Latin countries which felt threatened by Castro guerrilla politics; to take a hand in overflights and sea?air ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing Cuban coastal~defense communications on special devices; to sums into political operations thg?ght to be helpful in containing Castro;.. (g?a The nerve center of the United States? "new and deeper struggle" against Castro was estab- .lished in the heartland of exile activity, Miami. There, on a secluded, heavily-wooded 157l-acre tract that was part of the University of Miami's South Campus, the CIA set up a front operation, an elec? tronics firm called Zenith Technological Services.51 .Its code name was and it soon beCame the largest CIA installation anywhere in the world outside of its headquarters in Langley, Virginia.52 6%7 :The station had, at the height of its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 300 - - . 53 i . Americans, mostly case officers. Each case officer- DucId:322T3595 Page 2? V418 employed from four to ten Cuban "principal agents" who, in turn, would each be responsible for between 54 In addition, the CIA 10 and 30 regular agents. set up 54 front fdrporations boat shops, real estate firms, detective agencies, traVel companies, gun shops -- to provide ostensible employment for the case officers and agents operating outside of headquarters.55 It also maintained hundreds of pieces ?of real estate, from small apartments to palatial homes, as "safe houses" in which to hold secret meetings.56 As a result of its oepration, 00? of: the CIA became amongeagg?glorida' largest employers. It was the ,gffieers, which and?an?mest?cases-fundedvthe anti? ?Castro groups. 58 It was responsible for the great upsurge in anti-. 57 Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban - exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely through the training camps and guerrilla bases spotted around South Florida.59 Anti?Castro raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys were given the_"green light" by agents of the station.60 The result of it all was that there grew in the Cuban exile community a re- newed confidence in the U. S. Government's sincerity- and loyalty to its cause. NH 53030 Page 23 v-'-19r (43) Then came the Cuban missile crisis. The more fervent Cuban eriles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis might provoke a final showdown with Castro.61 For several months prior there was increasing pressure on President lKennedy to take strong measures against the build? up of the SCViet preSence in Cuba, which was becoming daily more blatant. In a report issued at the end of March, 1962 the State Department said that Cuba 'had received from the SOviet Union $100 million in military aid for the training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had provided from 50 to 75 MIG fighters as well as tons. of modern weapons for Cuba's ground forces. 62 For?. tifying the Cuban exileis hope for action was the fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons moving into Cuba became the dominant issue in the news in the succeeding months, leading to Congres~ Vsional calls for action and a series cf hard-line responses from President Kennedy.63 In September, Kennedy declared that the United States would-use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force" against "any part of the . . . 4 Western Hemisphere."6 NH 53030 Page 29 NH 53030 V420 644 The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles -- that the Cuban missile crisis would ultimately result in the United States smashing the Castro regime was shattered by the manner in which President Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was rele? gated to a minor role as tough negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, 'specifically through communication between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. The crisis ended art when President Kennedy announced that all bombers were being withdrawn by the SoViets and progress was being made On the withdrawal of offensive missiles and other weapons from Cuba. In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a 6 "no invasion" pledge. If Kennedy's actions at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of the Cuban exiles about the President's sincerity and determination to - bring about the fall of Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy's agreement With Khrushchev was termed "a violation" of the pledge he had made three daYs after the Bay A of Pigs invasion that the United States would never - 67 abandon Cuba to Communism. Wrote one prominent exile: "For the friendly Cuban people, allies of the United States, and for hundreds of thousands of DunId:322T3595 Page 3U - 21 exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their native land, it was a soul-shattering blow."68 I bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions the United States Government took to implement the President's "no invasion" pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown ion the very training camps and guerrilla baSes whiCh 'had been originally established and funded by the United States and the exile raids which once had the Government's "green light" were now disavowed'and condemned. I On March 31, 1963 a group of anti-Castro- raiders were arrested by British police at a train-p ing site in the Bahamas.69? The U. S. State Depart- ment admitted it had given the British the informa- - tion about the existence of the camp.70 That same night another exile raiding boat was seized in Miami harbor.71 On April 3rd, the Soviet Union charged that the United States "encourages and _bears full responsibility" for two recent.attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti-Castro exile commandos.72 The United States responded that it_ was "taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or equipped from U. S. territory."73 On April 5th,.the Coast Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships NH 53030 Page 31 NH 53030 - 22 land men into its effort to pOlice the straits of . 74 Florida against anti-Castro raiders. As a result of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that their movement to rid their homeland of Communism had been dealt 1a crippling blow" and that they had lost a vital supply link with antifCastro fighters inside Cuba. I ff?) There were numerous other indications of the U. S. on anti-Castro'activity-following the missile crisis, The Customs Service raided what had long been a secret training-camp in the Florida Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training .there.75 The FBI seized a major cache of'explosives at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana.76 'Just weeks later, the U. S. Coast Guard cooperated with the British Navy which had captured another group of Cuban.exiles in the Bahamas.77 In September, the Federal Aviation Administration issued "strOng warnings" to six American civilian pilots who had been flying raids oVer Cuba.78 Shortly afterwards, the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency destined for rebel forces inside Cuba.79 In October, the Coast Guard seized four exile ships and arrested 22 DucId; 322T3595 Page 32 Hw'ssusu V423 anti?Castro raiders who claimed they were moving their operations out of the U. S. The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers outside their_community, as well as by Kennedy's _pOlitical Opponents. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, aSSerted: "The Kennedy Administration has committed the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its Order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom fighters to liberate their nation from Communism."81 Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of ?doing everything in his power" to keep the flag of Cuban exiles "from ever flying over Cuba again."82 Richard Nixon urged the end of what he called the "quarantine? of Cuban exiles.83 i Of course, the most strident reactions came from within the anti?Castro community itself.v Follow? ing the U. S. Government's notification that it would discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, its president, Jos? Mir6 Cardona, announced his resignation from the Council in protest against U. S. policy.84 The Cuban exile leader acCused? President Kennedy of "breaking promises and . 85' to_support-another invasion of Cuba. Cardona DunId:322T3595 Page 33 v424- said the change in American policy reflected the fact that Kennedy had becOme "the victim of a master play by the Russians."86 (k1) The extent of the deterioration of relation- ships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy Admin- istration is indicated in the State Department's reply to Cagfbna's charges. It labeled them "a gro?s distortion of recent ?Against the pattern of United States crack? _down on Cuban exile activity during this period, however, emerges a counter-grain of incidents which may have sOme bearing on an examination of the . Kennedy assassination. These incidents involve some very significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro operations which took place, despite the crackdown,? between the time of the missile crisis and the assas- sination of the President. In fact, in the midst of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban grOups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua, killing about twenty defenders, including Russians.88 On October 15th, the same group sunk a Cuban patrol~ boat.89 On October 3lst, the day after the blockade . . 0 . was lifted, it struck again.9 . Immediately after the criSis ended in November, a spokesman for the NH 53030 Page 34 - 25 group pledged new raids.91 During this groupsaremained active. In April, a group calling itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing an oil refinery outside Havana.92 In May, the cuban government confirmed carried out a "pirate" raid on a militia camp near Havana-despite U. S. take measures to 93 Later tha?/month, the anti-7 prevent such attacks." Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary Unity reported it had formed amilitary jun?:a in Cuba to serve as "provisional government of Cuba in arms." Shortly afterWards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank-a gunboat and killed "many" of Castro's soldiers.94 It is not known exactly how many incidents took place during this period, but in April of 1963 one anti- Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the United States Government knew of eleven raids-on Cuba since the missile crisis and did nothing.95 6539 . One analyst, reviewing that period of U. 8.- Cuban relations, noted: "The U. S. Government's policy toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsis? 96 NH 53030 Page 35 NH 53030 - 26 It cannot be determined to what extent, if any, the military activities of the anti?Cabtro exile groups were sanctioned or supported by the. at bo?a. Kennedy Administration in Jr by the CIAA At a press conference in May, 1963, in response to a question as to whether or not the U. S. as giving aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: ?We may well none that I am familiar 97 I don't think as of today that we are." And it at least one Cuban exile group, what was termed an "autonymous operations" concept.98 6539 In retrospect, this much is clear: With or- withoUt U. S. Government support and whether or not in blatant defiance of Kennedy Administration policy, there were a number of anti-Castro action groups which were determined to continue -- and, in fact, did continue -- their operations. The resignation 'of Mird Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolution- ary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter hdispute among the exile factions._99 The more moderate contended that without U. 8. support there was little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles should concentrate their efforts in mounting political DucId:322T3595 Page 36 NH 53030 v-27' pressure to reverse Washington's shift in policy.100 'Other exile groups announced their determination to continue the war against Castro and, if necessary, to violently resist curtailment of their paramilitary activities in the Kennedy Administration.101 In New Orleans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the local leader of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, proclaimed, in the wake of the Miro Cardonaresignation, that his group "would con- tinue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the U. S. to stop raids originating from U. S. soil.?102 (57) I seeds of defiance of the Kennedy Administration may- 111: EU iluLCf?J?m? Ehe have been planted with the exiles even prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his history of the invasion, Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly before the invasion, "Frank Bender," the CIA director of the invasion preparations, assembled the erile leaders together at the CIA's Guatemala training camp: It was now early in April and Artime was in the camp as.the civilian representative of the Revolutionary Council._ Frank called Pepe (San Roman) and (Erneido). Oliva again. This time he had startling information. There were forces in the administration trying to.block the in- _vasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank?s next DucId:322T3595 Page 3? NH 53030 v-?28 words this way: 'If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your Frank then laughed and said: 'In the end we will win.? 0 6?39 That, then, is the context in which the ?Committee approached the question of whether or not the John F. Kennedy assassiantion was a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Also kept in mind was the testimony of the CIA's chief of its Miami station in 1963, who noted: sassination' was part of the ambiance of that In this section is detailed the result of the Committee's examination of the most active anti- Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These groups were specifically seleCted from the more than 100 exile organizations in existence at the time of 105 a, the Kennedy assass?a?tion. Their selection was- Ithe result of both independent field investigation by the Committee and the Committee's examination of the files and records maintained by those federal and local agencies monitorinnguban exile activity at the time. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotids DucId:322T3595 Page 33 v-4 29 and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA),the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Defense. (6C9 The groups selected can be termed the "action groups." These were the ones most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones which not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually planned and carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, were involved in a multi?iplicity of arms dealings and had the most vociferous and aggreSSive leaders. These were also the groups and individuals 'who took the brunt of the Kennedy Administrationis crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it came after the-Cuban missile crisis. These were the ones, who, in the end, were most bitter at President ?nal-15; Kennedy, the ones who felt the most betrayed. yuv these were the groups and individuals who had the means and motivation to be involVed in the assassina- tion of the President. (256) The Committee, however, found no hard evi- dence that any anti-Castro Cuban group or individual was involved in Kennedy's assassination. NH 53030 Page 39 . . . .. A . .-.. .. - 30 that there was some kind of association between Lee Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at k; least two of the groups; .4- HH 53030 Page ?FonZi The Odio Incident Within the question of a;possiBTet anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee examined one incident which, over the years, has particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission?s - investigation. It has become known as "the Odio incident," the principal person involved being a young Cuban exile named Silvia Odio. (6i? Here, in part, is how the Warren Commission detailed the incident and its conclusions in-its final Report: The Commission investigated ?Mrs. Odio's] statements in connection with its consideration of the testimony of several witnesses suggesting-that Oswald may have been . 35k seen in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or - 5 ?Lgiq Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in Havana in /Y/f7 and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that {Erff?/ xboth of her parents are political prisoners of the Castro regime- Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro organiZation. She testified that late in September 1963, three men came to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help - i _them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE-activities. She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity with-her imprisoned father, asked her if she were "working km: vmm- we NH 53030 Page 41 NH 53030 .t .4. qua..-. - .- 3 testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they also had some characteristics that she 5 associated with Mexicans. Those two men did not state their full names, but identified themselveS' only by their fictitious underground "war names." Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans as ?Leopoldo.f The third man, an American, allegedly was introduced to Mrs. Odio as ?Leon Oswald," and she was told that he was very much interested in the Cuban cause.' Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they ham-m - - had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. ?Mrs. Odio testified that the 3 next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and told her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground "because he is great, he is kind wg.? of nuts." Leopoldo also said that the American had been in the Marine Corps and was an excellent shot, and that the American said the Cubans "don't have any President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans shOuld have done that, because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually." Although Mrs. Odio suggested doubts that the men - .. air. 12:! - - raw-4,3,5: were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that the American who was introduced to her as Lech OSwald Pag? 42 3 in the underground," and she replied that she was not. She d: 31-0le - A. .. .. was Lee Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men, and who stated that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Dee Harvey Oswald. By referring to the date on which she moved from her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit on the ThurSday or Friday 43?; immediatelypreceding that date, September 26 or fig} 5 27. She was positive that the visit cocurred prior 5y i to October 1. ng During the course of its investigation, however, the Commission concluded that OSwald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of either September 26gor 27, 1963. It also developed considerable evidenCe that he was not in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September 1 and October 3, In Spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony. The Commission considered the problems raised by that testimony, as important in view of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico. The Commission speCifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated NH 53030 Page 43 were with the man she thought was On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Mn.? Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been identified as a participant in numerous anti-Castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti?Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. 1H 5x02 "3 5 EV Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican- s; . tag 5 American from East Los Angeles and one William Seymour a . from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not i yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has - 5 concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's (1.) ~emaJ? _apartment in September of 1963. 7 The unequivocality of the Warren Commission's conclusions was not supported by the-evidence. The Commission had based its dafinite conclusion on two points: One was ii I the "considerable" evidence that Oswald could-not have been in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleges she saw him;(2) NH 53030 Page 44 NH 53030, 5 - Odio the other was the FBI's report of Loran Eugene Hallfs speculation that Odio misidentified his companion, William Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswald.13) (79) Although the Warren_Commission Report states that Odio "fixed" the date of the alleged Oswald visit on September 26 or September 27, she actually told the FBI that she was not at all.positive about the exact date.(4) Shemsa?d it might have been as early as September 25,(5) <7?d)The Warren Commission assertedthat Oswald left New Orleans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on (6) September 25. Yet there was no documentary evidence tofsubstantiateatha?, and neither the bus driver nor any passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus.(7) tIn fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald 2(8) when a neighbor saw (9) left New Orleans on September 24, him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases. Rankin pointed out in his letter to J. Edgar Hoover that "Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told . her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day following her departure on September 23, 1963. She has also indicated that-he told her an unemployment check . . . would be forwarded to Mrs; Rah Paine's address in IrVing DucId:322T3595 Page 45 6.. Oc?to from his post office box in New It also seems impos? sible to us that Oswald would have gone all the way back to the Winn?Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash the unemployment check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of $332 I ?4 Co the Post Officeg when he could have cashed it at Martin's Restau? rant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks and one unemployment Check. _That is particularly true if he received ?Hub . 'the check on September 25, 1963, as previously thought, and had left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before.?lg/ FBI never came up With any evidence which resolved the questions raised in Rankin's request. In sum, the Warren Com- mission developed no hard evidence?whieh?could substantiate the I tact that Oswald was or was not in Dallas during the time period Odio said she saw him. C7?c) Although the Warren Commission stated that the FBI had not yet completed its investigation at the time its report went to press,ll/ it was only two days after its September l6, 1964, interview of Loran EUgene Hall that the FBI interviewed William SeymOur, who denied he ever had any contact with Silvia Odio and that he had been in Dallas with Hall in September, 1953.l3/ The FBI subsequently confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in ~i _Florida during 0n NH 53030 Page 46 NH 53030 7 Odio September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall's (14) other associate, Lawrence Howard. Howard also denied he had ever contacted Silvia Odio.(ls) TheyFBI?then went back and re-interviewed Hall who then said that he had been accompanied on his trip to Dallas not by Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as "Wahito" and that he no longer recalled any contact with Odio.(16) The FBI determined that "Wahito" was Celio Sergio Castro(l7) who, when intervieWed, said he had never heard of or met (18) Silvia Odio. On October 1, 1964, the FBI showed Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour, (19? She examined Lawrence Howard and Celio Sergio Castro. the photOgraphs and said that none of the individuals were identical to any of the three men who had come to her apartment door in Dallas.(20) (Egg In view of the prematurity of the Warren Commission's conclusion based on the impeached Loren Hall allegation and the unresolved question of Oswald's whereabouts at.the time, the Committee considered the Odio incident one of the lingering enigmas in the original assassination investi- gation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes it, from an investigative standpoint, particularly suscept- ible to the erosive effects of time. The canvassing, for instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami in search of descriptive DunId:322T3595 Page 4? ?1 ml 4 Odiomw" similarities to the men who visitedOdio might have been fruitful at the time: today it would be inappropriate. The construction of a compostie sketch of the individuals when their features were still fresh in Odio's memory might have provided productive evidence 15 years 3585 today it would be. of-questionable value considering-the natural adulteration of recall over that period of time.? A search for the car :zgg?yn the men were driving might have been very productive at the time; today it would be useless. The Committee waspthereforeb handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation and the paucity of-evidence developed. The valid investigative? approaches remaining were distreSsingly limited. Nevertheless, because of the potential significance of the Odio incident to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee-decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive- leads it possibly could, it would also attempt to verify the record regarding Silvia Cdio's credibility and the details of her allegations. .(313) Also of interest to the Committee, of course, were. the initial assertions of Loren Hall that he and two associates, William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had (21) visited Odio in September. All three had been actively involved in anti-Castro activity and were members of a group of? (22) soldiers of fortune called Interpen. The group was arrested at No Name Key, Florida, in December, 1962 as part of the Kennedy (23) That Administration?s crackdown on anti-Castro operations. policy, which highly incensed the anti?Castro and right-wing faCtions, was the reSult of an agreement Kennedy had made with? NH 53030 Du?Id:322?3595' Page 43 (24) Khrushchev and Castro. Those factions considered the agreement_a "betrayal". (25) C7?a Loran Hall provided.sworn testimony to the Committee at an Executive_SeSsion on October 5, 1977. 'Here is?an?? excerpt from that testimony: .. i . ?hame?gm?mw_? Q: Did there come a time when the FBI spoke to to you about whether or not you visited Silvia Odio in September, 1963? Hall: Yes, there was. ?Who spoke to you? Hall: An FBI agent. Q: At that time were you advisedehy you were being questiOned about Silvia OdiQ? Hall: really don't recall. He stated as I recall, he stated something to the effect that were you ever in Dallas, Texas, and I said yes. He said do you know a Mrs. Odio, and I said I don't recall knowing a . 7 Mrs. Odio. I think I knew a Professor Odio, who Was a professor at Texas, some univerity in Texas, just outside of Dallas, as I recall. He asked me anyway about the apartment building on Magellan, and I said it is possible, I don?t know. I said do you have a picture of her and he- said no, I do not have. ?And I said, it is possible I met her but I don't recall. 'He then asked me who was with me and I_told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like maybe a month or two.. And you told him you were there with Howard andrAlba? NH 53030 Page 49 lO Odio 'Hall: Yes.- Q: On the first trip? A Hall: Yes. both read the same FBI report. You know it is directly contradictory to what I am saying. Q: So it is your testimony that at no time did 3 C?n% ?you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied_ . 5 by Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, is that your 3 testimony? Hall: That is true. 5 Q: Were you ever directly or indirectly involved i with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti;' i\Castro raids? . 26 7' Hall: No, I was not.( if 1 1' (V?AConunittee i - w._interviewed Lawrence Howard on May 23, 1978. HOward stated he has never met Silvia Odio.(27) ACommittee also interviewed William Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with Hall and Howard but did not recall any detailsof a trip to Dallas, including meeting any Cubans there.(28) The Committee felt it important early in its in- vestigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations as well as their credibility. One of 'the problems'faCed by the Committee Was Odio's-negative attitude toward a governmental investigation of the Ken- nedy assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result, (29) of her relationship wiuithe Warren Commission. . She NH 53030 Page NH 53030 American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal. ll-- Odio expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission and said that it was obvious to her that the Commission did not want to believe her story.(30) A Committee in- vestigator noted that her whole demeanor was ?one of sharp distrust of the government's motives; She claims she feels she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own ends and she does not want to be put in the same Nevertheless, after contact was established by the Com- mittee Odio's cooperation with the Committee was excellent and she voluntarily submitted to interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony. . amid/um WW - that Odio's story remainediconsistent with her Warren Commission . . Jrzm. testimony. There are, however, details conCerning Odio, her background and certain points of her story developed by the Committee)which should be noted. 73? Silvia Odio was one of ten children of Amador and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their parents began taking an active part in'a counter-revolu- tionary movement shortly after Castro took power;(32) Amador Odio was among Cuba's wealthy aristocracy, the personal friend of diplomats and ambassadors, including, during the last days of the_United States' presence there, (33) Odio was owner of the country's largest trucking business and was once DucId:322T3595 Page 51 aL,r 12.- Odio described in Time Magazine as the "transport tycoon" of (34) Latin America. Yet, from their youth, both he and his wife were active, front-line fighters against the . {v - succesSion of tyrants who ruled Cuba. During the reign i?xrw of General Gerardo Machado in the '30s, Sarah Odio was ?Vf captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were - 35 broken.( Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their (36) . revolutionary activity. Amador Odio's trucks were ?the main supply line for the weapons and ammunition which kept Castro's hopes alive in the mountains; _Yet when the Odios decided that Castro had "betrayed the they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray, of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups, 38 the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo .r (7g? Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro 1 on October 26, Their arrest was the result of- -the capture of MRP.national:COOrdinator Reynald Gonzales in hiding on their country estate.(40) ?lronically, the Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro's sisters on the very estate, a large, resort?like retreat (41) Later, Castro would in El Ca?o, outside of Havana. turn it into a national women's prison and Sarah Odio would spend eight years incarcerated there, while her NH 53030 Page 52 NH 53030. 13.- Odio 42 husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos?a( Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro that had been organized by Antonio Veciana.(43) Silvia was the oldest of the Odios' ten children.(44) She had been sent fer her early education to a private girls' school near Philadelphia and later returned to ,1 ~*3Law/School there.(4 .f Cuba and attended When her parents were arrested, Silvia Odio was 24 years old, living in Puerto Rico with her husband and four young children.(46) The next year her husband, sent to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working, (47) Destitute and alone, (48) deserted her and the children. she began having emotional problems. By that time, Silvia's younger sisters, Annie and Sarita,.were settled . - 2 in Dallas.(49) Sarita, a student at the University of Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell, the leader of a women's club at a local Episcopal church who had organized a club program to provide financial and social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center.(50) Connell also happened to be very active in the Mental Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a had personally acquired an intereSt in mental health problems. When Sarita told Connell of her sister Silvia's plight, Connell made arrangements to have Silvia move to Dallas and to also receive DunId:322T3595 Page 53 HH ?snau l3 Odio treatment for her emotional problems at the Southwestern Medical School.(52) (8&9 According to Connell, who for a period was Silvia's closest confidante, Silvia's emotional problems, brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four young children, her parents being imprisoned and her life? style abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of consciousness "when reality got too painful to Connell said she personally witnessed Odio suffer these attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but with treatment their frequency subsided and they subsequently endedL-e until the Kennedy assassination.(54) 'Silvia Odio had moved toggllas in March of 1963.(55) By September of 1963 she was well?established in the com- munity, had a decent income from a good job, had her emotional problems under control and was doing well enough (56) to be planning a move into a better apartment. - She was scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday.(57) The week before, she recalled, she had done some packing in preparation for the move and there were bOxes scattered across her living room floor which she.had to jump over urmM?an- dmdl'WMA 58 to get to the door. Her sister Annie, who was then 17, - 4 had come to the apartment to help her and babysit with her DunId:322T3595 Page 54 NH 53030 l4-f (liio (59) children. When the doorbell rang early one evening in that last week of September, it was Annie who went to the door to answer it.(60) 3 . The complex in which Silvia Odio lived at 1084 Magellan Circle in Dallas was a series of garden?type rental apartments, two?story units with four apartments (61) to each unit. -The lower units had front doors which faced a common inner vestibule which, in turn, bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps above the ground level.(62) Both the vestibule and porch (63) had overhead lights. Silvia Odio lived in Apartment (64) A'of the 1084 unit, a first flOor apartment. (EBA) Amnie Odio provided the Committee with a sworn (65) statement of her independent recollection. She re~ membered the evening when three men came to the door of Silvia's apartment in One of the men asked (67) He initially spoke English?but .v-r-w to speak to Sarita. when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also spoke Spanish.(68) Annie told him that Sarita didn't live there.(69) 'Then, according to Annie'srecollection: "He said something, I don'treCall eXactly?N?h perhaps- something about her being married, which made me think that they really wanted my sister Silvia. I recall putting egg; the chain on the door after I told them to wait while a I went to get Silvia. I don't exactly recall but they 5 may have also said something about belonging to JURE, DucId:322T3595 Page 55 NH 53030 Odie 1/ {?53 anti-Castro movement. DucId (35b) Annie aiso recaHed that Siivia was initiaHy reluctant to taik with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed to-go out. But she remembers Silvia coming out in her bathrobe to go to the door.Zl/r Annie said that she couid oniy recaii what one of the two Latin men iooked Tike; but it is not a specific recoiiection, oniy that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair combed back and "iooked Mexican.?1?/ 73/ She said ?the one in the middle was American. (85f) In testimony to the Committee, independent of her sister?s, Siivia 0dio aiso recaiied that it was early evening and that she was getting dressed to go out when the three men came to the door.Z?/ She recaiied that it was a weekday because she worked that day.l?/ She said the men identified themseives as members of JURE, spoke of both its founder, Manoia Ray, and her father, who had worked closeiy with Ray.l?/ 'Odio said that aimost a1] the conversation she had was With oniy one of the men, the one who identified himseif as ?Leopoldo.?Zl/ I positive in her recoiiection of the name ?Leo- poido?l?/ but said that the men admitted to her they wer giving her n13/ aiiases or "war names. She is iess certain of the other Latin's name, but beiieves it :32213595 'Page 55 NH 53030 ?the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald. 'available more than adequate. l6.- Odio might have been "Angelo" or She described him, as her sister did, as being stocky, with black hair (81) and looking"more,Mexican than anything else." The third visitor, the "American," ;was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald.3%83) She said "Leon Oswald" acknowledged the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in idiomatic spanish,(84) but she later concluded that he could not understand Spanish because of his lack of re- action to her Spanish conversation with Silvia Odio has been relatively consistent in her testimony to the Warren Commission and to the Committee . . . . . . 86 in her spec1fic descriptions of the three ViSitors.( Her descriptiOn 6E "Leopoldo" is especially noteworthy because he has certain very distinct features, including an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed on the 2 Her description of "Leon bswald" is, of course, similar to (88) There is absolutely no doubt in her own mind that her visitor was, (89) She points out that she in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation with the three men lasting more than twenty minutes, her viewing distance being only about three feet and the light (90) She also recalls, but H., not very clearly, that "Leopoldo" may have told her that DucId:322T3595 Page 5? l7.? Odio (91) they had just come from New Orleans. ($329 Odio told the Committee, as she did the Warren 92 Commission,( that the reason the men came to her was to get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from (93) local businessmen. She said: "He (Leopoldo) told me that he would like for me to write them in English, very nice letters, and perhaps we could get some hat is not inconsistent with the vague recollection of her sister Annie, who was in the apartment at the time ?:the conversation was being conducted through the open door in the vestibule. She recalled that the men came because "they wanted something According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with "Leopoldo" ended without her giving him any commitment to do anything, but he gave her the impression he would (96) -contact her again. The visit ended without "Leon" or "Angelo" having any conversation with her aside from (97). After the men left, (98) a brief greeting word or two. Odio decided to go to the window and watch them. She saw them get into a red car that was parked in the drive- (99) way in front of the apartment. She said she could not see who was driving the car, but did see ?Angelo" on the passenger side of the car.(l00) ?The cloudiest part of Odio'S'recollection con- cerns the telephone call She later received from NH 53030 Page 53 HH-ESDBD 18'- Odio It could have occurred, she said, the 102) day after the visit or two days after the visit.( She thinks it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember.(103) She thinks it was on a Saturday, when she wasn't working, but is not certain.(104) She is, however, relatively clear in her recollection of the gist of what "Leopoldo" told her when he called her on the telephone and that, too, is cOnsistent with her testimony before the Warren Commis? ,sion.(105) She said that "Leopoldo? told her that "the . Gringo" had been a Marine, that he was an eXpert marksman "(106) She recalled: "He and that he was "kind of loco; said that the Cubans, we did not have'any guts because we should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated, Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the news. "As soon as we got back to the office, every- body had their radios on and everybody was listening to it, ?By the time the news came that the President was dead, the president of the company told us ?that we could go home, I started going back to I was very'frightened and very started moving across the warehouse towards the parking lot where we keptour carsQ..I think next I had passed_out. My mind was going around in I During her testimony before the Committee, Odio was asked if, when she heard that Kennedy was assassinated, DunId:322T3595 Page 59 l9.? Odio she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment almost two months prior. Her reply: "Oh, very definitely, very definitely."( She added: had put them out "(111) of my mind, but they came back that day. .an9 The next thing she remembered after blacking out was regaining consciousneSs later in a hospital room.zllz) She recalled that her sister Annie had justwahkedmtna(ll3) She remembered watching the first image of Oswald she saw coming across the television screen in the hospital room: "Annie and I sort of looked at One another and sort of 'gasped. She said, 'Do you recognize him?? said yes, and I said, 'Do you recognize him?? 'She said, 'It is the same guy, isn't it?? I said, 'Yes, but-do not say any- thing. I (114) (FLB This is an excerpt from the independent sworn statement given to the Committee by Annie Odio: On the day of the assasSination of President Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie Matlock, and some other friends to a place where we could see the President's motorcade pass by. I don't remember where it was, only that it was quite a distance from downtown Dallas and Dealey Plaza. After the motorcade passed by we went to a drive?in restaurant_ for some hamburgers. When we were coming out of the drive?in we heard that Kennedy was shot. 'When I first heard that Kennedy. was shot I did not make any connection be? tween the shooting and the men who came to Silvia's door. Later in the afternoon I was by myself in the Mathck home when I first saw Oswald on television.? My first thought NH 53030 Page El] 5 i NH 53030 20.- Odio was, 'My God, I know this guy and I don't know from where! But I'm not going to tell anybody because they're going to think I'm crazy.? But I kept thinking, 'Where have I seen this guy?? Then my Sister Sarita called and told me that Silvia had fainted at work and that she was sending her boyfriend Jim, who is now her husband to pick me up and take me to the hospital to see Silvia. Sarita. did not tell me then why Silvia had faint? ed. I remember that it was getting dark when Jim picked me up and that we had to drive by Dealey Plaza. I don?t remember Jim coming up to the room in the hospital with me when I saw Silvia. don't re? member anyone else in the room, but it was hospital and that she kept saying that (as; for their Because they were extremely frightened, concerned a very small room. Silvia was in bed.? The first thing I remember When I walked into the room was that Silvia started crying and crying. I don't remember her saying anything. I think that I told her: 'You know this guy on TV who shot Presi- dent Kennedy? I think I know him.? And she said: 'You don't remember where you know him from?? I said: 'No, I cannot re? call, but I know I've seen him before.? And then she told me: 'Do you remember . those three guys who came to the house?? And that's when I realized I had seen Oswald befOre. And then when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then she told me everything, including the fact that one of the men had called back, that she called him 'Leon,? that he said he wanted to be called 'Leon,? and that he said something like the Cubans should kill Kennedy because of what he did with the Bay of Pigs. Silvia also told me A that when she first heard that President Kennedy was shot,_she started saying: 'Leon did it! Leon did it!? I remember that Silvia was very excited at the she knew that Leon was going to do it.(115) M.. brothers and sisters and their own safety, worried DucId:322T3595 Page 61 21,- Odio about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three men?s visit, Silvia and Annie-Odio decided not to reveal (116) the incident. And it was, in fact, only circuit- ously that the FBI came to learn of it. (Qsj According to Silvia Odio's close friend, Lucille 'Connell, she received a call from Silvia's sister Sarita who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the 1;?17) hospita Sarita also told her why Silvia had fainted and the fact that Silvia had met OsWald and that (118) he had come to her apartment. Connell cannot recall exactly when Sarita called; she said it was either the day of the assassination or the day after. 119) HOWeverr~that Sanday, Connell said; she was speaking on the telephone to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then Working as a receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they.both saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their teleyision sets.(lzo) Connell recalled: "And she said to me, 'Oh my goodness, Ruby was in our office last week and had power of attorney . drawn for his COnnell said that later that same day she happened 'to be speaking with another friend, Marcella Insua, the daughter of the head of the-Dallas Cuban Relief\gommittee. Connell mentioned to Insua what her other friend had said (122) -about Ruby being in her law office. -Insua, Connell said, happened to have a class of American children to NH 5303i] Page 62 ilv NH 53030 22 Odio, (123) whom she was teaching Spanish. In that class, she got into a discussion of the Kennedy assassination and mentioned that she knew someone who knew.someone who had . . 2 - some dealings w1th Ruby.(1 4) It also happened that (125) there was a son of a local FBI agent in Insua' 5 class. That?g.howpmsubsequently, the FBI came to contact Connell 12 6 and learn about the Odio incident.(' (97) Odio's credibility is evidence which indicates that she 42A factor in judging told someone prior to the Kennedy assassiantion that three men visited her, that-one of them was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald," and that she was told that this "Leon" had suggested assassinating President Kennedy. 67%) Silvia Odio told the Committee that immediately after the visit of the three men, she wrote to her father in prison in Cuba to ask him if he knew who Amador Odio, who was released from prison in 1969 and is now living in Miami, told Committee inveStigators that he received Silvia's letter and replied to it.(128) He did not recall when he received the letter, but his reply, dated December 19, 1963, indicates it was very likely in late October or early November, 1963. (129) He wrote: "Tell me who this is who says he is my friend -- be careful. I do not have any friend who might be here, through Dallas, . 130 so reject his friendship until you give me his name."( DucId:322T3595 Page 63 NH 53030 23,- Odio Silvia Odio told the Committee she recalled, although her recollection is "not very strong," that she also told Lucille Connell prior to the Kennedy assassina- tion that three men had visited her apartment.(l3l) She said it had to have been before the assassination because she did not see Connell after the assassination as the result of a falling out between them.(l32) Prior to that, however, Odio said, she was frequently at Connell's house and she specifically_recalled a dinner party, "which may have had something to do with the Mental Health Associa~ tion or been given in honor of some doctor'or at which, during a conversation in the library, She men- (133)' tioned the visit of the three men. She said it would have been very likely that she told Connell because "she was the type who was a very curious person about the - 3 details of your life. 'She always asked a lot of questions about my life and what I was (QCZL) LuCille Connell told the Committee she does not recall Silvia Odio specifically telling her about Oswald (135) at any time, befOre or after the assassination. She does not recall talking with Odio at a dinner party prior to the assassination, although, she said, she may have.(l36) She said her contact with Silvia Odio had not been frequent ?(137) N.m within the months prior to the assassination. {3295) The one person that Silvia Odio is most positive in her recollection of telling prior to the assassination DucId:322T3595 Page 64 24'? Odio about the visit of the three men was her at (138) the time, Dr. Burton C. Einspruch. At the time of the Kennedy assassination, Odio had been seeing Einspruch (139)? usually on a weekly basis (140) for about seven months, and occasionally more frequently. She was suffering 'from what Einspruch described as "a situational life problem. She had a large family, she was semi-impoverished, she was an immigrant, her parents were had all the difficulties one might anticipate a displaced person would (yea) Both the FBI and the Warren Commission staff pi questioned Einspruch after the assassination.(l42) The FBI report noted that Einspruch believed Odio "is telling the trut The Warren Commission staff report noted that "Dr. Einspruch stated that he had great faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Neither report indicated that Einspruch had been questioned about the specific details of Odio's allegations, whether he had been asked if Odio told him about the visit of the three men and, if She did, when she did.(145) (Gugg) In sworn testimony to the Committee, Einspruch reiterated his judgement of Odio as a "truthful" person.?l46) He said he no longer had any files available to document ?his reCollection, but he believes that Odio's visits to NH 53030 Page 65 NH 53030 .did "in a sort of histrionic way" connect the visit of the 25,? Odio him had been scheduled at around the time of the assaSSina- tion, on Wednesdays.(l47) 41? - 6/5?19 Einspruch specifically recalled that Odio had told him, during the normal course of the "format" of the sessions with her in which she related what happened (148) during the previous week, _that she had been visited (149) by three men. He recalled that she told him of the (150) He is definite visit-prior to the assassination. that she told him that two of the Visitors were "Cubans or Latins" and that the third was an He is not sure she mentioned the name "Leon" at his session with her prior to the assassinationr(152)' He did remember that when he telephoned Odio on the day of or the day after the assassination, she.did mention "Leon" and she three men to the Kennedy assassination and did recognize "(153) ~Einspruch could not re- one of those men as "Leon. call, however, that Odio told him prior to the assassina- tion that "Leopoldo" had telephoned her and spoke of ?Leon" suggesting Kennedy be asSassinated.(lS4) . As noted earlier the Committee's ability to ?investigate the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations was severely restricted not only by the time that has elapsed ?since?they were originally made but also-by the lack of material available in the basic investigative files. Both DunId:322T3595 Page 66 HH 53030 26'- Odio the Warren Commission and the FBI were lax in the purSuit of investigative leads when those leads still held.a potential for development. The description provided by Odio of at least one of the Latin visitors, for instance, was detailed enough to justify a thorough canvassing of both the anti-Castro and pro?Castro militant Cuban com- munities in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami for individuals with similar striking characteristics. That, in conjunc- tion with a search for the specifically described car the men were seen driving, might have been fruitful. Committee reviews of Warren Commission files and FBI reports reveal no such investigative approach. The focus, instead,_was on attempting to determine the possibility of Oswald' being in Dallas when Odio reported she saw him. That? approach proved inconclusive. (Katy? Nevertheless, there were other points ?Hr-?a fro/L mitteea?ag?lcould be examined in attempting to determine the identity of the Silvia Odio visitors. The fact, for instance, that the men claimed to know her father and have knowledge of his activities appeared to be of possible fi?? investigatory significance. discovered, however, that a front-page article in the Dallas News on May 5, 1962, could have provided a source of background information on Odio' parents.(155) The article featured a large photo of Annie and Sarita Odio and detailed the plight of their.parents in prison as well as their back- DucId:322T3595 Page NH 53030 Odio (1563' grounds. It also could be related to the fact that "Leopoldo" initially asked for Sarita when Annie Odio answered the door.(157) (323;) Although the Committee considered the possibility that the Odio viSitors were being deceptive in claiming an association-with the anti-Castro organization JURE, it nevertheless attempted to determine if they were, in fact, members of that group. The Committee conducted (158) extensive interviews with Amador Odio, who was very active with JURE in Cuba prior to his imprisonment, and made an attempt to contact remaining members of the Dallas (159). chapter of JURE. Although the results of the Commit? tee's efforts must be viewed in terms of the period of time that had elapsed, no present recollection of JURE members active in 1963 who used the war names of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" or fitted dznuz? bt (160) the deScriptions provided by Silvia Odioh 6?5h?y In addition, the Committee also interviewed the founder and leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now living in (161) Ray said he had been questioned by the PuertO'Rico. FBI about the Odio incident some time after the Kennedy assassination, but he was asked only about Silvia Odio's (162) "They told me that reliability and credibility. she had met Oswald,? Ray said. don't remember them telling me that the men who came to her said they were DucId:322T3595 Page 63 28,- Odio (163) members of Ray told the Committee that he knew of no members of JURE traveling through Dallas in 4 September of 1963 in search of money or arms.(16 He does not recall anyone by the name of "Leopoldo? or (165) "Angelo" associated with JURE at the time. He said he had no American contacts in Dallas, nor did he receive . . . (166) any major finanCial support from anyone there. I In addition to these attempts to identify the Odio visitors, the Committee asked Silvia Odio to review some 300 photographs of Cuban activists, both pro?Castro and anti-Castro, and individuals who had or may have had some association with Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.(l67) She could not identity any of the individuals in the photographs as being the two who came to her apartment with "Leon Oswald." I Finally, the Committee requested the CIA to new check on all individuals who used the "war names" of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo" during the period (168) of interest. The CIA comply resulted in the photo?- graphs of three individuals who might have been in Dallas (169) in September of 1963. The photographs were shown to Silvia Odio with negative results.(l70) CONCLUSIONS MafiaWS rim- that Silvia Odio's testimony (by! is essentially credible. From the evidence provided in (the sworn testimony of corroborating witnesses, there is, no doubt that three men came to her apartment in Dallas NH 53030 Page 69 NH 53030 29'- Odio prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified them- 7' selves as members of an anti-Castro Cuban organization. _From the credibility of both Silvia and _{?nnie Odio, it must be concluded that there is a strong probability that one of the men was or appeared to be Lee Harvey Oswald. rwr- was i.asew> cad conclusion as to the significance of that visi 9 wart crammed? possibilit?m? Oswald actually haa?eg some association with JURE, the anti- Castro group headed by Manolo Ray, and that Oswald wanted it to appear that he had that association in order ?to implicate the group, politically a lefteof-center Cuban organization, in the Kennedy assassination. Civic? m? "u -u no definite be warm-?: conclusion on the specific date of the visitA The possi- bility that it could have been as early as September 24th, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, exists. The visit was more likely on the 25th, 26th, or 27th of September. If it Were, then Oswald, judging from ?evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and this Committee, had to have had access to private transporta- ?-{muhC tion, a situation which almost mandates a conspiratorial involvement. DuoId:322T3595 Page TD NH 53030 3o'~ Odio (33a3> the scope of its investiga- L085 'tion in the Odio incident/1..? as a "Manon result of the inadequate investigation performed by the FBI.and the Warren Commission at the time. The lack significance of immediate recognition of the of the Odio incident produced a far from comprehensive investigation at the oan time a comprehensive and, the Warren Commission?s Eirhaps,.fruitful invesitgation would have been possible. l' . . .. - mgr-w 1 .e . idefinithe co gar-J?gi which it reached investigative reports were was erroneous and, in its assumption, appallingly . . .. . DucId:322T3595 Page T1 I . 15%?wm?k . Amman) VECIANA Bil/Ania? J'?lq? On March 2, 1976, a staff investigator from the I Utah-Q5: Salas PA) offic?of Senator Richard S. Schweikerninterviewed Antonio Veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of Alpha 66, in his home in Miami.1 At the time, Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and CyChairman of the Subcommittee on the John F. Kennedy?Assassination.2 The staff investigator told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships between U. S. GOvernment agencies and Cuban exile groups; he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy assassination.3 During the course of that interview, Veciana revealed that from about mid-1960 through mid- 1973 he had been directed and advised in his anti~Castro and anti~Communist activities by an American he knew as Maurice Bishop.4 Veciana said that Bishopxguided him in planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop?nJ - directed him to organize Alpha 66 in-l962; and that Bishop, when breaking their relationship in 1973,:paidhim $253,000 in cash for his services over the years I juxm?f? {E?if Veciana-rye; 1evea1ednthat at one meeting with if 1 ~ff . if Bishop in Dallas in late August or September, 1963if: {71mg with him a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey .?t?yv 6- 1 a Oswald. - . ,p NH 53030 Page T2 NH 53030 Veciana 2 ,r . . . Ve01ana told Senator Schweiker's investigator that he had not previously disclosed that information 7 [Ar Inn to anyone- (5WD ?not? L-vuu?anw pegthe Veciana allegations. From Senator Schweikerjit . obtained the cogplete files of his office's investigation; i+ E??zEemmettee also conducted additional interviews with Veciana and other witnesses who might have had know~ ledge of Veciana ?g?gor Bishop. April 25 and 26, 1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the Com- mittee in Executive Session. 7776554 5060?,de My A ,u .27 general details of the relationship between Veciana and the American he knew aa?y-as Maurice Bishop: me' A2 To the best of MW 4ihm (h ?5 first approached . .,nwi At the time, Veciana was employed in 1960, the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the "Sugar lO Veciana himself well- King" of Cuba. knownpas president of the professional accountant's asSociation. rj?Tuf Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a business card which indicated he was with_a construction 12 firm headquartered in Belgium. _Although Veciana ini- tially assumed he was a new bank customer, Bishop's DucId:322T3595 Page T3 NH 53030 -Veciana - 3 conversation with him soon focused on the Castro Revo- lution. "He also made me aware of his concern regard- ing the Cuban government leaning towards Communism and tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation," 13 Veciana recalled. Bishop then invited Veciana to lunch and during that and subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work against the Castro Government. Veciana admittedly did not need much convincing because he himself had concluded only thirty.days after the Revolutibn that Castro was a Communist.14 Veciana said he did ask Bishop during their first meeting if he worked for the United States Govern? ment. "He told me at the time,? Veciana testified, "that he was in no position to let me know for whom he was working or for which agency he was doing this." Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or not it was Julio Lobo who suggested he Contact him. ?Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with the United States Government,? Veciana pointed out.16 Veciana, suspected that it might have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez?Fresquet, who-pg: Bishop ento him.l7 Lopez-Fresquet, although 1then Castro's Minister of Finance, was a covert anti? 1 I .ALLJ Castroite, i ?44?L5v ,{rceauxi&$ DucId:322T3595 Page T4 NH 53030 Veciana - 4 as a liaison with the Castro Government. 1: Once Veciana agreed to work with Bishop on anti-Castro activity, he was put into a "training program.?19 Veciana described this as a "two to three week" program which consisted of lectures. He was the only one in the program, which was conducted by a man he knew only as "Mr. Melton." The lectures were held in an office in a building which Veciana could re? call as being on El Vedado, a commerdial thoroughfare. He also remembered the building housed the offices of a mining company "with an American name" and, on the first floor, a branch of the Berlitz School of Languages. ii:L%3Although Veciana said he was given some train? ing in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques, most of the program consisted of lesSons in propaganda and warfare. "Bishop told me several warfare could help more than I hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers,? Veciana testified.;2l Veciana salb said: "The main purpose was to train me to be an organizer soil was supposed to initiate a type of action and other people would be the ones who would really carry it out.?22 if (yigv?j Following the training, Veciana?worked with Bishop on Several very effective warfare DucId:322T3595 Page T5 NH 53030 Veciana - 5 operations, including a program in the destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation . . . 23 . . of public distrust in its value. Meanwhile, VeCiana also became_chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revo- e. lucionario del Pueblo an anti?Castro group headed I 24 by Manele Ray. Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed in January, 1961, Bishop suggested to Veciana that he ?C+Mnth?? contact certain officials tgg?e for help in his anti~ Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by Bishop were "Smith," ?Sam Rail" and "Joe D'Acosta." Said Veciana: "Maurice Bishop suggested the names of these individuals because we needed specific weapons to carry out the jobs and he-told me that these were the people that could help me."25 veciana, however, also said that Bishop asked him not to reVeal his name to these people.26 CHILE) Veciana 4 has never assumed that Maurice Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which Bishop had in his Open briefcase. Examining it when . . the r055? VeCiana made a quick note of it on a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of paper and showed it to Senator Schweiker's investigator. DucId:322T3595 Page TE NH 53030 Veciana - 6 The name on the paper was "Frigault".27 A few months after the failure of the Bay of K. Pigs invasion in April, 1961, Bishop called Veciana to a meeting. According to Veciana: "At that time Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was . 2 to have an attempt on Castro's life." 8 Although Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he recruited the action men and organized the operation, including renting the apartment from which the shot 29 z? was to be fired. ,Howeverq the day before the actual bane/?7?5 . . attempt,nVeCiana escaped from Cuba by boat With his mother?in?law, in whose name the apartment had been d.30 His wife and children had left a few months rente prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop who urged him to leave because, he said,Castro's agents were becoming suspicious of Veciana's activities. (i291) Shortly after he settled in Miami, Veciana testified, Bishop again contacted him.32 Veciana said it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the 33 The re? close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami. sult of their nyesu??i?uhg contact eventually led to the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana, was Bishop's brainchild. ?Bishop's main thesis was that Cuba had to be'liberated by Cubans,? Veciana testified.34 Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and principal fund?raiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the former head of the Second National Front of the DucId:322T3595 Page NH 53030 Veciana 7 Escambre (SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military chief.35 Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could be trusted. Besides, he said, "if he did not work "36 -Veciana said out-right we could get rid of_him. that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice Bishop. Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the anti~Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, re- cruiting and training commandos and conducting numerous raids on Cuba.37 At one point, Veciana proclaimed a war chest of $100,000 and announced that all the major exile organizations were backing Alpha 66's efforts. He also publicly said that all the planning was being done by leaders don?t even know."38' Li33) .According to Veciana, the man behind all of Alpha 66's strategy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12? year period of their association, Veciana estimates he met with Bishop more than 100 times.39? Veciana, however, ?claims he had-no way of getting in touch with Bishop and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a procedure Bishop established early in their relationship. To set up a meeting, Bishop would call Veciana by tele? phone or, if Veciana was out of town, call a third person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew DucId:322T3595 Page TB NH 53030 Veciana - 8 Ms \omK?um . .1 41 Veciana said that this third person never met Bishop but ?knew that Bishop and I were partners in this fight beCause this person shared my anti-Communist feelings.?42 1?3 1 Gk . a Lfgikj Enuaddition?to contacts with Bishop in Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him in Dallas, Washington, Las Vegas and Puerto Rico and in Caracas, Lima and La Paz in South America. VeCiana specifically recalled some meetings with Bishop because of their special nature. For in- stance, shortly after re?establishing contact with him in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in_the Pan American Bank Building in the downtown section of the city.44 Veciana does not recall_the exact floor of the building nor if there was any name on the office door.45 Bishop unlocked the office with a key?agea?a?ai sgd?hiand in the presence of two men who-were in the office asked him to sign a piece of_paper and take 46 "It was like a part inia ?commitment" ceremony. pledge of my loyalty, a Secret pledge," Veciana . testified. thin?they wanted to impress on me my re? sponsibility and my COmmitment to the cause." Veciana could not identify the two men who were present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor does he re- call'if he was introduced to them. "They were like . 48 spectators,? he said. DunId:322T3595 Page T9 a NH 53030 ?relationship with Bishop. Veciana - 9 ?3 '5 .111 - (EQLU From August, 1968 untilJ?ne, 1972, Veciana "1 worked in La BOliViZg as'a banking advisor to Bolivia's Central Bank. His contracts-were financed by the 8. Agency for International Development,50 and his office was located in the passport division of the American Embassy.51 Veciana believes that Bishop was instrumental in his getting the AID job, because he himself was surprised that the Agency would hire a known "terrorist" and anti?Castro activist.52 The records indicate that Veciana was hired by the Agency even though his application was never signed. Ci 35'V??le supposedly employed as a banking adviser in Bolivia,Vbciana actually did very little such work, but instead was-engaged mostly in anti?Castro and anti?V Communist activities with?Bishop.54 Among the operations instigated by Bishop at the time was an attempt to assas? sinate Castro in Chile in l97l.55 According to Veciana, that aborted assassina? tion attempt eventually led to the dissolution of his 56 Although Bishop directed 'the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence information, Veciana himself recruited-anti-Castro Cuban associates in Caracas to take-part in the attempt. Without his knowledge, Veciana said, these associates introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to_ blame the asSassination on_certain Russian agents in DucId:?322T3595 Page Bl] Veciana - 10 59 . Caracas. The assoc1ates even produced phony documents and photographsv: When Bishop later_found out about this unauthorized part of the scheme, he was extremely upset-and accused Veciana of being a part of it.61 .Although Veciana told Bishop he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not believe him and eventually suggested that their rela? tionship be terminated. Cigvj On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flagler Track in Miami.63 When Veciana arrived, Bishop was waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile.64 At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitcase which, Veciana later ascertained, contained $253,000 in cash.65 Since, at the beginning of their relationship, Veciana had refused Bishop's offer to pay him for his work with. him, the lump sum payment was meant as compensation for his efforts over the years. Ci?if The Committee's interest in the rela- tionship between Antonio.Veciana and Maurice Bishop is, of COurse, predicated on Veciana's contention that he _saw_Bishop with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas a few months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Veciana cannot specifically pinpoint the date NH 53030 Page 31- NH 53030 Veciana - ll of that meeting with Bishop. He believes it was in 67 late.August, 1963. Over the years that he knew Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in Dallas.68 The meeting at which Oswald was present took . place in the lobby of a large office building in the ?downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an insurance building with a blue facade or lobby.69 When Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talk? ing with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he was introduced to Oswald by name, but said he did not have any conversation with him.70 OSwald remained with Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked towards a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed?and Bishop and Veciana continued their meetingalone.71 Veciana testified that he recognized the young man with Bishop as Lee Harvey OSwald after seeing photographs of him following the?ennedy aSsassination. There is absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him. Veciana pointed out that he had been trained to remember the physical characteriStics of peOple and that if it was not Oswald it was his ?exact" double.73 C6545) Veciana's next meeting with Bishop was in Miami about two months after the assassination of-President DunId:322T3595' Page 32 Veciana 12 Kennedy.74 Although they discussed the assassination in general, Veciana did not specifically ask him about Oswald. has not going to make the mistake of getting myself involved in something that did not concern me," he testified.75 Also, he said, was a very difficult situation because I was afraid. We both understood. I could guess that he knew that I was knowledgeable of that and I learned that the best way is not to know, not ?t get to know things that don't concern you, so I respected the rules and I didnlt mention that ever."76 Bishop himself, however, did suggest to Veciana the possibility of some involvement. At the time there were newspaper reports that Oswald had met with some Cubans during his visit to Mexico} Veciana said that Bishop was aware he had a relative, Guillermo Ruiz, who was a high-ranking officer in Castro's intelligence service stationed in Mexico City.77 Bishop told Veciana that if he could get in touch with Ruiz he would pay Ruiz ya large amount of money to it was him and his wife who had met with Oswald.78 Veciana agreed to make the attempt to -contact Ruiz because, as he testified, knew that Ruiz would be tempted with money; he likedmoney.?79 Veciana, however, was never successful in contacting Ruiz and when he mentioned it to Bishop a couple of months later, Bishop told him to forget it.80 That was, NH 53030 Page 33 Veciana 13 the last time Veciana ever spoke about the Kennedy assas- sination or-Lee Harvey Oswald to Bishop, and, he testified, he never told anyone about seeing Oswald until questioned by Senator Schweiker's investigator. Im.assessing Veciana's testimony, the Committee made an attempt to evaluate his general credibility and, concurrently, take the necessary steps to determine if there was a Maurice Bishop or someone using that name and, if there was, with whom he was associated. (f?ig?ln retrospect, the timing and circumstances of that initial interview with_Veciana by Senator Schweiker's investigator may be a factor in determining his credi- bility. Two weeks prior to the interview, Veciana had been released from the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta after serving 27 months on a narcotics conspiracy con? viction.82 Veciana, although having served his time, insisted he was innocent, but claimed that the case against him was so well fabricated that the Federal prosecutor actually believed he was guilty.83 Accord? ing to Senator Schweiker's investigator, Veciana appeared confused and frightened by the situation in which he found himself, but said he believed that in some way his legal problems were related to his previous association 85 with Bishop, although he did not know exactly how. The investigator speculated that Veciana-felt that by reveal? HH 53030 Page 34 NH 53030 Veciana - l4 ing his association with Bishop to an official repre? sentative of the U. 8. Government, he would be providing himself with an element of security.86 Much later, 'however, Veciana apparently changed his position and decided that Castro agents, not Bishop, were responsible for his drug arrest.87 This is inconsistent with in* formation provided to the Committee by one of Veciana'S' closest associates, who said that Veciana told him that he thought the CIA framed him because he wanted to go ahead with another plot to kill Castro.88 This associate, Professor Rufo Lopez?Fresquet, Castro's former Minister of Finance, said, however, he was not aware that Veciana had had any association with anyone like MauriCe BiShop and that he, himself, could not identifyBishop.89 "The Committee conducted numerous interviews of other key anti-Castro associates or former associates of Veciana, not only as part of its efforts to locate Bishop but also to further aid in assessing Veciana's credibility. Generally, Veciana's reputation-for honesty and integrity was excellent. A former associate, Who worked with him when Veciana was chief of sabotage for the MRP in Havana, said: "Veciana was the straightest, absolutely trustworthy, most honest person I ever met. 90 '7 I would trust him explicitly." not one of his associates neither those who worked With him in antiFCastro activity in Cuba nor those who were associated DucId:322T3595 Page 35 NH 53030 _Veciana - 15 with him in Alpha 66 said they were aware of any American directing Veciana or of anyone who had the characteristics of Maurice Bishop. Lr?foi'Nevertheless, there were many aspects of veciana' 5 story magma the Committee attemptedzto cor- ., -. is!? fi-miroborate. Veciana's claim, for instance, that he was the principal organizer of the attempt on Castro's life in Havana in October, 1961, was documented in a 91 VEarly in their Cuban newspaper report at the time. relationship in Miami, Bishop asked Veciana to monitor the activities of an anti-Castro operation called "92 Veciana said he attended a few "Cellula Fantasma. meetings of the group and described the operation as a leaflet-dropping mission over Cuba which involved known 93 Veciana soldier4of-fortune Frank Fiorini Sturgis. said he did not know why Bishop would have been interested in the operation, but the Committee reviewed files which confirmed the existence and mission of the group and the involvement of Frank Fiorini Sturgis at the time. 94 While Veciana was still in Cuba, among those at the American Embassy Bishop suggested he contact for aid in anti-Castro operations was a Colonel Sam Kail. The Committee ascertained that there was a Colonel Samuel C. Kail at the American Embassy in Havana in 1960 at the time Veciana said he contacted him. Kail, now retired, was located and interviewed in Dallas. DunId:322T3595 Page 36 NH 53030 Veciana l6 Kail served as the U. S. Army attache at the United States Embassy in Havana from June 3, 1958 until the day the Embassy closed, January 4, 1961.96 His primary mission as a military attache was that of? intelligence?7 Later, in February, 1962, he was transferred to Miami where he was in charge of the unit which debriefed newly?arrived Cuban refugees. Although sew-um- he reported directly to the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, Kail said he assumed his unit was actual? ly functioning for the CIA. suspect they paid our he said.98 Kail said that prior to the American Embassy closing in Havana, there was a "constant stream" of \Cubans coming through his office with anti?Castro schemes, including asSassination plans, asking for American assistance in the form of weapons or guarantees of escaping. _?We had hordes and hordes of people through there all the time," he said. For that reason, he said, he did not specifically rememher Veciana visit? ing him. think it would be a miracle if I could recall him,? he said, but does not discount the possi- bility that he did meet of the CIA would frequently use the names of other Embassy staff person? nel in their outside contacts withoUt notifying the DucId:322T3595 Page 3? NH 53030 Veciana 17 staff individual it was being done.100 It happened i ?a number of times?; he said that a Cuban would come a in and ask to see Colonel Kail and, when introduced to as" . him, tell him that he was not the Colonel Kail he had 23? 5 met outSide the Embassy.101 Kail said he would then a 3? 5 . "u2 a take the Cuban through the_Embassy to have him point a? Vs'? . 0 2 v? .5 out the CIA agent who had used his name. 3? Kail said he was not familiar with a Maurice if Bishop, nor had he ever heard of anyone using that name.103 Another aspect of Veciana?s story which the Committee at: agate was his claimed in- volvement in the assassination attempt on Castro in Chile in 1971. In a report given to Senator George McGovern in 1975, Castro provided information detailing the plot'and accused "counter?revolutionaries from Alpha 66" as co-conspirators.104 Veciana himself, however, was nOt specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, 1! Committee the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami?fOund that Veciana's involvement in the plot was known by many of the active exiles. Max Lesnik, editor and publisher of Replica, the most pr0* minent'Spanish-language weekly publication in the com- munity, said he was aware of Veciana?s involvement in 105 the assassination attempt at the time. He said, DunId:322T3595 Page 33 NH 53030 Veciana 18 however, that Veciana told him that it was "his own plan,? and did not mention the involvement of a Maurice Bishop.106 Lesnik could not identify Bishop but said he always did think that Veciana must have had "some high government contacts, probably The Committee also attempted to confirm Veciana's role in the Chile plot by locating two other anti+Castro Cubans allegedly involved with him. They were interviewed in Caracas, Venezuela, and, because they are not United States citizens, they could not be subpoenaed for sWorn statements. One of those named was Pucilo Pena. A Cuban: born graduate of Auburn University in Georgia, Pena is now a Venezuelan citizen and a sales manager for a large chemical firm. He has lived in Venezuela since l9?l.108 (2526) Although Pena denied any involvement in the Castro assassination plot in Chile, he admitted to know? ing Veciana since "1964 or 1965," when he was active in' Alpha 66's "Plan Omega," a plot to invade Cuba from a base in the Dominican Republic.l09 He said he first met Veciana through a friend, Secundino Alverez, who was the Caracas chapter leader of.Alpha 66.110 (Alvarez was among those named by Veciana as also being inVOlved Pena admitted he had been in in the Chile plot.) contact with Veciana during the period the Chile plot was being planned but, he said, their meetings were DucId:322T3595 Page 39 NH 53030 which 73 persons were killed. Veciana 19 only casual, usually at boxing matches which Veciana promoted.112 'Pena also admitted that Veciana may have dichssed the possibility of assassinating Castro with him during one of these encounters at the boxing matches. think he asked some help in raising money," Pena said, "but that?s all I know about that."113 Pena denied any knowledge or involvement in any plot to blame Russian agents for the planned Castro assassination in Chile. am not the type to do that kind of counter?intelligence work," he said. am too Open and honest.?114 . Pena, however, admitted to knowing, perhaps since 1963, Luis Posada, another anti-Castro Cuban in Caracas who Veciana claims was also involved in the 115 plot to kill Castro in Chile. Uii>committee i-J interviewed Luis Posada in the Venezuelan political prison, Cuartel San Carlos, in Caracas. Posada had been arrested in October, 1976, along with Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch, and indicted for being in- volved in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in 116 (9372i; Posada had earlier been linked with assassina~ tion plots against Cuban officials in Chile, including two who disappeared in August, 1976.117 DunId:322T3595 Page SD Veciana 20 x- ?265,119"; (ya 1; Posada's background as a military and intelli? gence operative is eclectic. He was a member of Brigade 2506 but did not take part in the Bay of Pigs landing.118 In 1963 he joined the U. 8. Army and was commissioned ll9 a first lieutenant. gHe reSigned his commiSSion in became an agent for the He Went to ?9??ewf Venezuela in 1967 and shortly afterwards joined the Venezuelan secret police, called DISIP, the Direccion 121 de los Servicios de Inteligencia Prevencion. From 1971 to l973 he was chief of operations of the General Division of Security for DISIP, which included counter? intelligence.122 He resigned from DISIP in 1973 and went to Washington, D. C. to take training from what he termed ?a private Company" in the field of lie detection.123 He then returned to Caracas to open his own private detective agnecy. Posada told Committee investigators that he was not involved in the Castro assassination attempt in Chile in 1971.124 He admitted that he knew Veciana but said he only met him twice, once in Miami and once in Caracas at the boxing matches.125 He said he did talk to Veciana about the time the Chile plot was being_ planned, but veciana never mentioned anything to him about it.126' NH 53030 Page 91 NH 53030 marriage, the husband of a first cousin to Veciana. Veciana - 21 Another aspect of Veciana's allegations wheehm were of seemenm interest to the Committee was Bishop's Asuggestion of developing a misinformation scheme involvCastro intelligence agent and Oswald. VeCiana said that Bishop knew that a relative of his was in the Cuban Intelligence service assigned to Mexico City at 128 According to the time of the Kennedy assassination. Veciana, a news story was circulating immediately after the assassination that Oswald had met a couple on the Mexican border while on his way to Mexico City prior to the assassination.129 Bishop, Veciana said, suggested he attempt to get in touch with his relative and offer him a bribe to say that it was he and his wife who met Oswald in Mexico.130 Veciana said he Was never able to get in touch with his relative about it and eventually l3l Bishop told.him to forget it. The name of Veciana's.relative is Orestes Guil- lermo Ruiz Perez and he is, in fact, a relative by 132 Veciana said he first learned of Ruiz's affiliation with Castro?s intelligence service shortly after Castro took .power. He and Ruiz were walking in a Havana park when they were stOpped and searched by Castro's police. Ruiz was found to be carrying a gun and was taken away. Con- cerned, Veciana immediately placed a call to a close friend inside Castro's government, Minister of FinanceL DucId:322T3595 Page 92 Veciana 22 Rufo Lopez-Fresquet. Lopez~Fresquet told Veciana not to worry about Ruiz because Ruiz was actually working for the intelligence service.133 Although Ruiz was a Castro?agent and Communist, he warned Veciana that he was being observed visiting the American EmbasSy in Havana and told him to be care? 134 I9 - ful Veciana later thought that he might be able to turn Ruiz into an anti?Castro agent. Sometime after the Kennedy assassination,'Veciana said he was ap? proached by another anti-Castro Cuban-named Robert Vale~ 135 Yihom he knew to be working for the C131 Vale asked Veciana to attempt to contact Ruiz about possibly be* i I '6 . I coming an asset for the CIA. Ru12,_at the time, was stationed in Spain and when Veciana found a friend, Roblejo Lorie, who was traveling to Spain, he asked him to Carry a letter to Ruiz. Lorie gave the letter to Ruiz but, according to Veciana, Ruiz tore the letter, up in front of Lorie and told him that he did not want to have any contact with Veciana because he knew VeCiana ll "137 was working for the CIA. . . . The Committee was able to interView Orestes 138 Ruiz acknowledged that he was related to Veciana through marriage.139 He said Guillermo Ruiz in Havana. that ?everyone in Cuba" knows that Veciana is associated NH 53030 Page 93 NH 53030 Veciana 23 with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts l4 . . on Castro. 0 He said, however, aSide from what he read in the American newspapers he has no knowledge of Veciana's association with Maurice Bishop or who . . 41 . Maurice Bishop could be.1 He said he was never con? tacted by Veciana about Oswald142 seen Veciana since 1959.143 and, in fact, has not (YQ?a)Ruiz expressed disdain for Veciana, said he con- 144 sidered him a coward and "a person you cannot believe." He said Veciana had personality problems and was under care from the time he was 16 years old until 45 he was 21. Ruiz said_that "another counter-revolu- ll' tionary,? a cousin of Veciana's who is a doctor in Miami dr Chicago" and whose name is Jose Veciana, could attest to Veciana's problems because he had advised the family about them.146 investigators located Dr. Jose Veciana in Martin, Tennessee, where he is chief of pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed? that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that he had known him when he was a child in Havana.147 Dr. Veciana said he has never known his cousin to have person? ality problems or to have ever been under care. He said he himself has never provided Veciana any 148 advice nor offered it to his family. He said he feels that Veciana must be of sound mental con? DucId:322T3595 Bags 94_ NH 53030 Veciana - 24 dition because he knows that Veciana had to undergo vigorous tests in his rise in the banking business}49 {(k?jg Veciana himself denied Ruiz's allegations that he had had problems as a young man. His mother confirmed his denial.150 The Search for Bishop One of the factors utilized in the Committee's? efforts to locate Maurice Bishop was the deScription of. him provided by Veciana. When he first met him inl960, Veciana said, Bishop was about 45 years old, about 6'2" tall, weighed over 200 pounds and was athletically built. He had grey-blue eyes, light brown hair and a light 151 - complexion. Esggwezer) Veciana said,ABishop-appeared Wu?t; A to spend time outdoors or in sunny climate be- cause he was usually well?tanned and there was some skin discoloration, like sun spots, under his eyes.152 He appeared to be meticulous about his dress and usually concerned about his weight and diet.153 In the latter 62%,94 . . . ref years that VeCiana knew him, Bishop uSing glasses forreading.154 Shortly after he revealed his Bishop relation- ship to Senator Schweiker?s investigator, Veciana aided a professional artist in developing a Composite sketch of Bishop. SChweiker's office provided the Committee with a copy of the sketch. Veciana told the COmmittee that? he considered the artist's composite sketch of Bishop a DucId:322T3595 Page 95 NH 5303i] Veciana 25 "pretty good" resemblance.155 Prior to the Committee's efforts, Senator Schweiker's office, as well as the Senate Select Sub" committee he headed, looked into certain aspects of Veciana's allegations. Schweiker, fOr instance, re? quested the Belgian Embassy to conduct a record check for information about a passport issued under the name of "Frigault." The Belgian Embassy said that, without additional identifying infOrmation, it could not help.156 in addition, Schweiker's investigator showed Veciana numerous photographs of individuals who may have used, the name of Bishop, among them Oswald's friend, George deMohrenschildt, who was then a teacher at Bishop College in Dallas. The results were negative.157 ?59 It was senator Schweiker who focused the Com? mittee's attention on David Atlee Phillips, former chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIAK?eputil ?If Directorate of Operations, as perhaps having knowledge of Maurice Bishop. Immediately after receiving the Bishop sketch, Schweiker concluded that Phillips, who had earlier testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, bears a strong resemblance to the sketch. Page 96 NH 53030 VECIANA m1 page 25- at When Veciana Was shown a photograph of David Phillips by Schweiker' investigator, he did not provide an an absolutely conclusive vwv?b [if For that reason, it was decided that VECiana be the Opp0rtunity to observe Phillips in Pef Son Schweiker arranged for Veciana to be present at a luncheon meeting of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers in Reston, Virginia, on September /5c 17, 1976. Phillips was one of the founders of the Association. ??aqu ?Veciana was introduced to Phillips prior to the luncheon. He was introduced by name but not by affiliation with Alpha 66 or involvement with anti?castro activity. According to Schweiker?s investigator, there was no indication of (5 3 recognition on PhillipWQ part. Following the luigheon, Veciana had the opportunity to speak with Phillips /6 '13. 17:7,; in Spanish. Veciana asked Phillips if he was in Havana in 1960 and if he knew Julio Lobo. Phillips anSwered both ,questions affirmatively and then asked Veciana to repeat _m his name. Veciana did and then asked, "Do you know my'name?" sigh-WI Phillips said he did not. Phillips asked if Veciana was /?a0 on Schweiker' staff. He was told that he was not but that Veciana was helping Schweiker in his investigation of the /57 gm Kennedy assassination. Phillips declined to be interviewed by Senator Schweiker's investigator, but said he would be happy to speak with any Congressman or Congressional representative "in Congress. Following the encounter of Veciana and Phillips, DucId:322T3595 Page 9? NH 53030 "2i asked Veciana if -.-. Ah'a .. - w. 4531;, 4- . SchWeiker's investigator David Phillips was Maurice Bishop. Veciana said he was ??6422 ch ker' investigator expressed some doubt about Veciana?s credibility on the pointkbecause of Veciana's renewed interest in continuing his anti?Castro operations and his expressed desire to re?contact Bishop 0} am) to help hiE?%?In addition, Schweiker' investigator expressed doubt that David Phillips, who was once in charge of Cuban operations for the CIA and whose career was deeply entwined in anti-Castro operations, could not recognize the name of Veciana as being the founder and vociferous public spokesman for one of the largest and most active ~?F?wwma?; anti?Castro Cuban groups, Alpha 66. (17%)The Committee considered other factors in exam~ ining Phillips. Until 1963, Phillips' principal area of expertise and operations with the CIA was propaganda and warfare. In 1960, when Veciana said DucId:322T3595 Page 93 NH 53030 9433-5, 3801?.) f-ftaf? . :ET-ozierr From September, 1960 until November, 1962, Veciana 26 he first met Bishop in Havana, Phillips was serving as a covert operative in Havana, running a public rela? ?fr . 17$ tions agency as a front. From 1961 to 1963, Phillips Was Chief of Covert Action in Mexico City. When Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in 1963, Phillips was in charge of Cuban Operations for the CIA in Mexico V77 Sociations in Chile. He had also served as Chief of 1 Station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela. :f17g ?The developed other information validated an interest in Phillips in relati to Bishop. In Miami, its investigators inter- .City. Phillips had earlier lived in and had numerous as~ 70? Lulu; [1945?? [Mfgs vie ed a former career agent for the the operational base which coordinated the Agency's? {7 activities with the anti?Castro Cuban exiles. He handled one of the largest and most active anti?Castro . At the time that ererrer was at the'Miami station, David Phillips was responsible for theip.syehe- 'lpg.ical.warfa-re aspects of the anti? Castro opera~ {11.055 - tions. d?masier coordinatedgthe propaganda\opera? tions with Phillips, who would occasionally visit the station from Wasington. Generally, howeVer, .403, -?reeier worked with Phillips' direct assistant at the DucId:322T3595 Page 99 ?Gresier was a case officer at the station, groups, E/he Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil. as; NH 53030 Veciana 27 station, who used the cover name of Doug Gupton. I his book about his role in the Bay of Pigs operation, former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt uses a psuedonym when referring to the chief of{??bpa- ganda'for the operation. The chief of propaganda . . . .was DaVid Phillips. Hunt called him "Knight ?fits? Cy?ag When asked berommittee it: was familiar with anyone using the cover name of td?oSS -Bishop at the station, ~?rezrer said he was ?almost positive" that Davidgihillips had used the cover - name of Maurice Bishop. He said he was "fairly sure? ire/ff that Hunt himself had used the cover name of Knight. {Tl/2.53 said7the reason he was certain that Phillips used the name of Bishop was because he recalled sometimes discussing field and agent problems?in the area of warfare with Phillips' assistant Doug Gupton and Gupton often saying, "Well,_I guess Mr. ?3.1.055 ?Bishop will have to talk with him." said: ."And, of course, I knew he was referring to his boss, David {(75 The Committee ascertained that the cover name of Doug Gupton was used at the station by 6L . x4 former CIA (INSERT CIA security room safe in FONZI - INSERTS file) ?37f Dunld:322?3595 Page . If'fu .. ?rm-h - mas? - "a 1' . . insert Veciana write up 1/3! (?lmma?p- O'?aThe Committee staff interviewed Doug Gupton on August - 22nd, 1978 at CIA headquarters. 6' Gupton said he worked for the CIA from December, 1951 until his retirement. in June, as?) 0/ Dawn? we,? e?aw?f? 1978, much of that time he the Covert Action Guidance 7.1.5 Staff i?aes$ Gupton confirmed that he was in charge ?P?Cta{ the Miami station Cf Tgk' .S Gupton acknowledged that was a Case officer who worked for him and that he saw 'on a daiiy 0 basis. tweed) Gupton said he does not recall whether E. Howard unt or David Phillips ever used- the name .of .. Mr 'and that his immediate superior- was navid Phillips. "Knight." He said he does not recall Phillips ever using the name of Maurice Bishop. 2. When (T335 . . told recollection of reierring to Phillips as "Mr. Bishop," Gupton said: "Well, maybe I . did. I don't remember." He also said, however,_ that he never heard the name of Bishop while he was (we re stationed in Miami. {.eer?f When shown the sketch of - J, I117 Bishop, he said it did not look li} (e anyone he knew. xxefm UKQEKplainlno his working relationship with David Phillips, Gupton said he was in contact with him regularly in flashington by telephone and cable and that Phillips visited Miami NH 53030 DunId:322?3595 Page 101 "quite Gupton said, however, that there were two His set of operations was run out of, sets of operations. Miami and he kept Phillips informed of them. Phillips rananother set of operations personally out of Washington and, Gupton said, Phillips did-not keep him briefed about Gupton also said he knew that Phillips used many of his o?d contacts from Havana in his perSonal operations; NH 53030 Page 9" NH 53000 435,2 Phillips also testified that he had never used the A. it. ?wra?z?Naa-t? Veciana - 28 David Atlee Phillips testified before the Committee in Executive Session on April 25th, 1978 ;j . ineExecutivesSeSSioneon ApriL 25, said he never - @197 used the name ea'Maurice Bishop. He said he d-id not kno.w . - of anyone in the CIA who used the name 65 Maurice Bishop- He said he had seen Antonio Veciana only twice in his life," the second time eg??fgg?y morning of his hearing before the Committee when Veciana,who had testified earlier, emerged from the hearing room while he, Phillips, was in the hallway. Phillips said the first time he met Veciana was at a meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in Reston.. 5 He said that Veciana was brought to that meeting by an investigator from Senator Schweiker' 5 office but, said Phillips, Veciana was not introduced to him by name but? W03 only_as "the driver." He said Veciana asked him some questions in Spanish but at the time, he know who Veciana was or why _Senator Schweiker' _s office had . sent him to the meeting. .LE8 name dd Frigault and had never used a Belgian passport. Phillips was shown the sketch of Maurice Bishop but Could not i dentify it as anyone he knew. He said, however, ?It looks like me.. (/g?pln sWorn testimony before the Committee in Executive Session on April 26th, 1978, Antonio VeCiana- said that David Atlee Phillips is not the person he L07 - knew as Maurice Bishop. V. He said, however, that .191 2009 there was a "physical similarity.' DucId:322?3595 Page 103 On March 2, 1978, the Committee requested tIHe CIA to check all its files and index references per? a . . . . asaLO? . ta1n1ng to Maurice Bishop. I On March 31, 1978, the CIA informed the Committee that its Office of the Inspector General, its Office of the General Counsel, ,its Office of Personnel and the Deputy Directorate of . iggulfa Operat1ons had no record of a Maurice Bishop. . 7- I. Committee in a special closed session. . from.l952 to 1970. Jeez?eeszz?sI Between l9_60 and waxCIIA agent Lia? - 1964 he was assigned to Cuban operations. -'As such, he testified, he Was involved_in "dayeto-day? operations with David Atlee Phillips. He characterized Phillips as "an excellent intelligence officer" and ?a {Le-yam! personal friend. t1?- When asked if he knew an individual named Maurice Bishop, B. H. said: "Again, Mr. BishOp was in the organization but I had no personal day? ?to? day open relationship with him. Phillips, yes; Bishop, no. I knew them 603%) Although he couldn' deseribe Bishop' 8 physical 'Characteristics, B. H. said he had seenI him "tWo or -three times" in the "hallways or cafeteria" F3398, CIA head uarters in Langley. B.H. said he thought a (Mae/,2 . I - BishOp worked in the Western Hemisphere "@1931. ii and that he had a position "higher than me. He could not be more specific. The two.or three times he saw BiShOp, he said, was between 1960 and 1964 when he himself was in Cuban operations, although, he aid, he didn know (@354) QDOQ ., . - . - I 1: Bishop worked in that area also. f, NH 53030 Page 104 NH 53030 g; 2, insert . . 59* . ?y?ASked how, if He didm personally know Bishop, _he knew the person he saw at CIA headquarters was Maurice Bishop, B.H, said: '?Someone might have said, 'That is ?Maurice Bishop,? and it was different from Dave Phillips 3 orfgalk guys that I know." "nhv: 3f2 1-, (QQ) of Maurice Bishop,3y? - .1111/ B.H. could not identify it as anyone he recognized. DuoId:322?3595 Page 105 On August 17, 1978, the.Committee deposed John A. McCone, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency . ?gg?y 515252. 'from October, 1961 until April 30th, 1965. .1 . a testimony, 8/17/78, p. 4) During the course of the deposition, the :Eollowing questions and answers were recorded: XXEXHXXEEXEEXEEX Do yoqunow or did you know Maurice Bishop3' A: Yesagency employee? I believe so._ Q- Do you know what his duties were in 1963? A: No. - For instance, do you know whether maurice Bishop worked in the Western Hemisphere Division'or whether he worked' in some other division of the I do not know. I do not recall.? I knew at_that time _but I do not recall. Do you know whether Maurice Bishop used any pseudonymsnot know that. (Ibid, pp. 45:46) NH 5303i] Page 106 0 NH 53030 :t/ecwa/O 2?4 Ul?ok In?right of the information developed in the interviews with H. and former Director McCone, the Com- mittee asked the CIA to renew its file search for any lad-l files or index references pertaining to Bishop. It .also asked for a written statement from the CIA indicat- ing whether an individual using either the true name or pseudonym of Maurice Bishop has ever been associated . . . eeakaf in any capa91ty the CIA. A reply was received on September 1978, from the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel indicating that all true name files, alias files and pseudonym files were again checked and, again, proved negative. "No person with such a name has a connection with CIA, s1ad the reply. Added the Agency: "Quite frankly, it is our belief from our earlier check, reinforced by this one -- that such a man did not exist227/ connections are concerned. gtd??uiil??- efforts to locate Maurice Bishop; were made by the Committee in file requests to the Federal Eer Bureau of Investigation and to the Department of Defense. Both proved negative. {ffrg Ev} Although file reviews of Maurice Bishop proved Inegative, the Committee learned that Army intelligence had an operational interest in Antonio Veciana during one period. Veciana was registered in the Army Informa- tion Source Registry from November, 1962 until July, era: 3/ 1966. 2., Page NH 53030 ?gal? Footnote; page 29. *On October 19,-1978, the Committee?s Chief Counsel received [a letter from the Principal Coordinator in the CIAFs Office of Legislative Counsel. The letter said, in part: "This is to advise you that I have interviewed Mr. McCone and a retired employee concerning their. recolletions about an alleged CIA employee reportedly using the name of Maurice "We assembled photographs of the persons with the surname of Bishop who had employment relationships of some type with CIA during the l960s, to see if either Mr._McCone or the employee would recognize one. of them. "Mr. McCone did not feel it necessary to review those .photographs, stating that I should inform you that he had been in "The employee continues to recall a persOn of whom he knew- who was known as Maurice Bishop. He cannot state the organizational conneCtion or responsibilities of the individual, not knowing him personally, and feels that the person in question was pointed out to him by someone,?r perhaps a secretary. He unable, however, to recognize any of the photographs mentioned "In summary, Mr. McCone withdraws his statements on this point. The employee continues to recall such a name, but the nature of his recollection is not very clear or precise. We still believe that there is no evidence of the existence of such a person so far as there being a CIA Document No. 012722.) DunId:322?3595 Page 103 Veciana 7 30 (3,533} The nature of the Army's contact with Veciana appeared to be limited to attempting to use him as a source of intelligence information about Alpha 66 activities, with Veciana,-in turn, seeking to obtain g&5,213 92 weapons and funds. Veciana acknowledged and detailed to the Committee these contacts with Army Intelligencce and said that, aside from keeping Bishop informed of them, they had no relationship with his activities with ?23353 Bishop}:55 (iqcb<3iven the Army's acknowledgement of an interest in Veciana and Alpha 66, the Committee made the assumption that_the CIA khni - have had an interest in Veciana and his Alpha 66 activities as part of its pervasive role in anti~CaStro operations during the 19603. a review of its own files on March 15,-1978, the CIA noted that Veciana had contacted the Agency A three times in December, 1960; July, 1962; and April, l966_?? for assistance in plots' against a} According to the CIA: ?Cfficersi listened to Veciana, expressed no interest, offered no encouragement and never recontacted him on this matter;' There has been no Agency relationship with I - 1135', "i NH 53030 Page 109 . . files Committee 5 own rev1ew basically confirms-? the stated conclusions about r? t_e meetings Vec1ana in. Il960 an?d 1966. is: REM/tic $9 2420/ 0. wall ?3ng Ems WM 7% Dwain? {Malawi} o/emw?l CIA AME a?W . g/v 23C [9%wa v/Zvl 7&5. 0/ Mar ?alibi/$99142 wLem ?ne-u woAYIU?ng w?h?aa Cir-?29 (KW ?ue/eye? (nigh! A .04. 25.. {Ema} b32309 1hLJ:s ?(ac I chmif?vaQI ;9 5429.5 . W33 ?70 ,Aoy?iig4if? 39/ Lg? @4541. fie?MW}; $3 *7 1&1 VW k? Qmmwe\ K?vw\\mm Qan?waxa 3.3-2. .. .. . 090? In a final effort to locate or identii fv Maurice tr I Bishop, the Committee issued a press release on July 30, 1978 and made available the composite sketch of Bishop to the press. The Committee warned that it should-not be assumed that the release indicated the Committee be? lieves the person in the sketch was involved in the. Kennedy assassination, only that information resulting from possible citizen recognition of the sketch might "shed additional light on the assassination?" The Com- mittee asked that anyone who had information contact the Committee by mail, not by telephone. i .23! ?03) By November 1, 1978-, the Committee received from the general public a total of four written responses.2?E?- None of the responses was, upon analysis, deemed a valid ilead to the identity of Maurice Bishop. NH 53030 Page 110 NH 53030 . . Conclusions: 2 fixCauld b? feacka? .eeugumefjvac??whmc-i p- h. a? Mew conclusiondas to the credibility of Antonio Veciana's allegations re- garding his relationShip with a.Maurice Bishop or -Bishop' 5 alleged relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald. ?ddr?mw?? N0 Mature Cagjd dag-w? it? ?f7?i- identity or affiliations of Maurice Bishop, if such an paww,? evidence . +?um1 awe! to discredit Veciana's testimony, evidence to support it, although none of it was con? clusive. ?Me dealt/IL wits? (dog, a; 1h457? guide?; ?4 lie/l Keen! MHQ-cesrfki able?5?5"?q' Mei?; rim . .. All!? I 9?5 (4/17/41? 73; Wye. Tid- ng/M 4?4 ?My! g: 7'74: aways s5?: a 1? a . aduvql I . . Pf?? ?ggnof? affa?v?lmj 4?an #4ng z? (I 5 :22 gag-L. 3395? My! - fpa?hu?w?i' cot/Id! ?sq/1? cf eat/grw g?oc??kal; DucId:322?3595 Page 111 Clc'ssi?r'ico'i'ion: DRAFT ll/20/78 Betsy Palmer (This form is to be used for moferiol exfrocmd from CIA?controlled documents.) 312: CUBAN REVOLUTIONARX COUNCIL. A Concise History 6905) The forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionarv Council (CRC) was the Frente Revolucionario gormed in May, 1960..- -.. .--. 17-.-. ..wxn -- Lam-.- ?41:31. 1. ,3 .v fr h' npi?ir'At the head of it were the leaders of five major anti- Castro groups. The_proclaimed purpose of the FRD was to establish a democratic government in Cuba through the use_of military force. FRD .I'rup headquartersg/in Mexico, but recruited . 3- most of its proposed invasion force from Miami.' The military arm of the FRD was known as Brigade 2506(? The Brigadefeventually?was/ composed of 1,443 men who were trained by U.S. Army specialists at two sites on the south coast of Guatemala. leaders and their organizations which composed the PRU BXecutive Committee were: Aureliano Sanchez Arango of the Triple group; Justo Carrillo of Monteoristi; Antonio de Varona of Rescate; Manuel Artime of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement )9 and Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement j; sf?? (MDC). Antonio de Varona served as General Coordinator and the membership was soon expanded to include Dr. Antonio Maceo, a ?wing. noted Cuban surgeon; former Cuban President Carlos Hevia; and conservative leader Rafael Sardinas Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 112 DRAFT - CRC Page 2 (This form is to be used for mcfer-ici exirccfed from CiA?ronfroiied documents.) (Ezogpln March 1961, The State Department aessdnemonem FRD leaders to accept the Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo 9 i (MRP), headed by Manuel Ray Rivero, into the The in- clusicn of Ray's group into the alliance of Cuban exiles was reportedly also ?terribly important to the White House" which a/O wanted to broaden the political base of the PRU. In an effort to_attract Ray and his group into the FRD, Antonio de Varona oluntaril resigned and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was elected its new president.rz Dr. Miro'was a former Havana jurist who broke with CaStro after serVing him as his first a we 'prime minister. 7f" 7_ . Shortly before the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, I the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was formed to coordinate - 5? free-?u mew/L? 3 and direct FRD activities with ?suPPOrt. 2: . .J in. The new organization had direct access to President_Kennedy ?tr . 1 and top White House aides.?a All the groups within the CRC- _m maintained their separate identities,Jig the leaders publicly' wm?' expressing heir unity, especially during the period prior to the planned invasion. The regrouping included the following Cuban exile leaders: Chairman, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona; Board of Directors - Antonio de Varona; Justo Carillo, Carlos Hevia; ?Antonio Maceo, Manuel Ray; and Manuel Artime. CRC committees Man-?ag? Classification: I . Cicssified by derivation: 47357 laser annsr' 5551? newer .eear Jamar .?nmr =?mmr NH 53030 Page 113 1, ?1 'I?Iil Mud-ac" NH 53030 After the October, 1962 missile crisis, the policy of Classifico?on: ?a - cac . . 2:2: ?3 (This form is to be used for material extracted I from CIA?controlled documents.) were organized in key cities in the United States and dele? gations appointed in Latin American ?216) The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted in . Castro capturing and imprisioning over 1000 of the Brigade?s x3 members?gp The dejected leaders of the CRC, who had been sequestered for security reasons at the start of the invasion,2847 were later taken to the White House for_a personal visit with President Kennedy who expressed his regret andgtu?? responsi- bility for the invasion failurel??go leh) Shortly after the unsuccessful- invasion, Manuel Ray withdrew his organization, the MRP, from the Council,October 1961, the CRC had completely absorbed the Dr. Miro remained at the helm of the Council, which had been Venlarged to include_the Revolutionary Action and a faction of the 30th of November Movementgga2 -While some unification had been achieved through the FRD and CRC, the Cuban exile - groups were plagued by factionalism, personal rivalries for leadership roles and conflicting programs. ilz;vertheless, the CRC was still considered the rincipal unifying_organization of the Cuban exile communityzha although no anti- -Castro leader emerged who could command broad support of the community. the United States toward the Castro regime changed drastically; 53;) Cicssificoiion: i Cicssified by derivorion: :"3557' I 355557 M53557 ?3255' #555377 DunId:322?3595 Page 114 ltw-h 191?. 1 . 1 NH 53030 Clossi ?53 canon: CRC Page 4 (This form is To be used for material extrocfed . from ClAI?wconfrolled documents.) In his book; The bosers, Paul Bethel, former'Press Attache at the Havana Embassy, noted: "There is no doubt that President Kennedy and -his brother, the Attorney General consciously set about the business of stopping all-efforts to unhorSe _Fidel Castro #4 from outside exile attacks, and from Cuba's . . #13017 internal res1stance movement." When two Cuban exile groups made raids against Russian installations in Cuba and a Russian freighter in the Cuban port of Caribarien, the-Attorney General dispatched 600 Federal agents to Miami. in an effoiayto pre-' 19 . vent further actions against the Castro regime. A directive was issued which prohibited key anti? ?Castro leaderqs in Miami 132.9 from leaving the area without Federal approval. . . fa . 39,: 71m5) mum. A the effectiveness of the CRC as a unifying organization deteriorated. In April, 1963, Jose Miro Cardona resigned his position as president in a clash 363/ with the Kennedy Administration over Cuban policy. Miro chimed that Kennedy had promised another invasion would be launched and had instead chosen a course of peaceful coexistence :32/ wtih the Castro regime. The CRC was revamped and Dr. Antonio I a 0 Closs?acohon: Classified by derivcrion: DucId:322?3595 Page 115 CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. (CRC): Ween Q?td?m, .1 Nine days after the assassination of President Saba?P. Igun??bm the United States Secret Service began an investigation into.the activities of Lee Harvey_Oswald during his residency in New Orleans. I (Elf? Oswald had been arrested there in.August, 1963, while distributing Fair Play for Cuba literature. Some of his leaflets had the address 544 Camp Street stamped on them. iThe Secret dckuwuno Service endeavored to ?U?=if OsWald maintained an Office at this address. 2 During the course of its investigation, the Secret Service that the New Orleans chapter of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) had occupied an office at 544 Camp Street for about six months during 1961?62. At that time, Sergio Arcacha Smith was the official CRC delegate for the New Orleans area. The Secret Service also learned that Arcacha had been fired from his poSition by the Miami CRC headquarters_in early 1962, ?ago allegedly because he did not have the confidence of th?buban Lul .1 Qabemoved the CRC offices to his-home.3 At the time of the Secret Service investigation, another Cuban exile, Frank Bartes, headed the New Orleans CRC delegation and maintained offices in his home in Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. NH 53030 Page 116 NH 53030 Draft - New Orleans, CRC Page 2 After an extensive investigation by the FBI and the Secret Service regarding- the possibility that Oswald rented Office Space at 544 Camp Street, the Warren Report concluded there was no evidence that Oswald ever maintained an office xm-wu? wan/LUtreet ?@065 hth? mmittee dislove ed about he 54 Cam -. l/e: i ed els here - - Report per?auu *0 ?the Committeesattempd?b to ascertain if any activities of the CRC had any relationship to Oswald's activities in New Orleans. szwnadib i7?? AThe first New Orleans delegate to the CRC, Sergio G: Arcacha Smithg, mu Arcacha told the Committee that he arrived in Miami in August 1960 and, at the reque_st of Antonio Verona, a director of the CRC, agreed to establish a chapter of this group in New Orleans. Arcacha was?afforded free office space in the Balter Building and later rented space at 544 Camp Street. yi?d; During his tenure as head of the New Orleans delegation, arcacha endeavored to raise funds by selling CRC bonds, and was instrumental in organizing several rallies to promote the causexof the Cuban exiles." Arcachasaid he had never Seen Oswald in New Orleans and, from what he had read, Oswald was not even in that city at the same time Arcacha lived there.9 When he was relieved of his official position with the CRC in early 1962, Arcacha left New Orleans.10 DucId:322?3595 Page 11? NH 53030 DRAFT - New Orleans CRC Page 3 replacement, Luis Rabel, assumed the delegate duties in January, 1962, but, he told the Committee, found it neceSSary to resign by October-of that year because his job . . . 11 . . 'entailed extenSive traveling. During his short tenture, Rabel -said he organized several rallies and brought in prominent Miami. speakers to enthuse the New Orleans Cuban exile community}2 Other than going to the Camp Street address to remove office 'materials left there by Arcacha, Rabel said he had no connection with the building and never saw Oswald in New Orleans.13 3" ?7 . Frank Bartes, former President of Consolidated Railroads in Cuba,14 became the third designated delegate of the New Orleans CRC chapter. He reported the activities of the group regularly to theFBl15 and was primarily concerned with solicitation of pledges from Cubans for the purchase of arms for their actively engaged in the fight against Castro.l6i He reported that he had purchased an M-2 rifle with collections and displayed it at an October, 1963 meeting for_ f' Who?s reasons". Bartes said, ?p?the rate of collections at that time, the group was able to send only enough money to the Miami CRC headquarters to purchase one gun per month. 18 On November 15, 1963, a CRC meeting was held at Gallier Hall. Tony Varona was invited_ to come to New Orleans to speak to the Cuban exiles and bolster their morale. Varona stayed at the home of Agustin Guitart, uncle of Silvia Odio. k?gg) Bartes to1d the Committee he headed the New Orleans dele? 74 gation until the CRC was dissolved in 1964. During his tenure, he said, he maintained the CRC office in his home. He could not recall ever having visited the 544 Camp Street office fun?3 maintained by Arcacha in 1961? 62 DucId:322?3595 Page 113 DRAFT New Orleans CRC Page 4 Carlos Bringuier and Oswald had been arrested in a street.scuffle, (see detailed discussion in another 9~ section of the Report) Bartes appeared in Court with Bringuier, Although not a CRC member, Bringuier was respected by Bartes sad . and it was in a show of support that Bartes appeared at m? 35 Erin uier's hearin . .g the hearing, the news media surrounded Oswald for a statement, Bartes said. At this point, Bartes_got into an argument with the media and Oswald because the Cubans were not @310 being given an opportunity to present their views. He also spoke to an FBI agent that dav, warning that Oswald was a "m potentially dangerous man. Bartes declined to identify the agent to the Committee, saying only that he had frequent contact with him during this period of time. Bartes Said he had no other contact with Oswald.?Q? 3: my 1rd. -- ?2559 The Committee that the New Orleans chapter of the CRC had no relationship with Oswald other than the brief encounter with/Bartes, and in'no way was ?at Ra? officially involved in any activities which touched upon thoSe of Oswald. NH 53030 Page 119 Jun?w I puma: ?munv Annalr Azamr? a??m?v sauna? Classi?cohonz- (This form is to be used for material extrocted from GAP?controlled documem?s.) BRIGADEZSOE MANUEL ARTIME - "3 MOVIMIENTO de RSVOLUCIONARIA 3 ii (@1339 Neither anti-Castro Cuban group more naturally attract ed- the initial attention of the Committee than Brigade 2506, the the Bay of Pigs invasion I and the one which experienced the most dramatic relationship. ?7 with the Kennedy administration in terms of its hopes and failures. ELBEQ Following their release from Castro's prisons in December 3.44.1.4. of 1962, the members of the Brigade harbored deep-seated emotionai -conflicts in their attitude towards the Government. An.obServer who watched them arrive in Miami noted: "There were earnest, . ibewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation, .X still nursing a bitter sense of betrayal at the manner in which 1_ his they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust and cynicism, still in awe at the power of an American govern? 11.; 1;,2 2' . . fg?? ment that could, at w1ll 1t seemed, pluck them out of the 55% darkest dungeons in Havana and on the Isle of Pines and deposit ?3 ?rgthem back in Florida with their families by Christmas Eve.? 1 the perspective of an investigation of the Kennedy assassination, the members of Brigade 2506 had to be considered of primary inter est if only in terms of motivations and means. Cicssi?coiion: Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 120 Cicssii'icction: (This .form is To be used for moteriol exfrocfed Brigage 2506 - from CiA?controlled documents.) etc. Qage 2 Ikh?-? . As one member, who later became_involved in anti-Castro terrorist activity, explained: "We learned from them. we use .. Ibom the tactics that we learned from the CIA because we were trained to do everything. We were trained to set off a bomb, we were trained to kill ?335) The formation of what was to become Brigade 2506 can be traced to March, 1960 when President Dwight-Eisenhower authorised _a hug?'0 the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees for the purpose of eventually overthrowing Castro.;. To head the group, . -ooup-o-4?-o Wt?? [:he CIA chosj>a young physician fho had organized the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR), the first anti?Castro one i with the aid of the{CIA, he had been spirited out of. Cuba the- previous Decembergai Castro had appointed him a member of the action group ins1de Cuba.4 His name was Manuel Artimj, and, 4m .m National Agrarian Reform Institute but when, in October of 1959, he heard Castro outline a plan to communize Cuba, Art ime 54 publicly resigned his position and denounced.Castro. The group which eventually grew into Brigade 2506 originally consisted of only 28 menlgz The nucleus was 10 former Cuban military officers whom Artime had recruited.zr He told them that he himself was told by a group of Americans who claimed to have no association with the United States Government that-'? Clossificoi?ion: I ?y 3 13:3 . Jul-fit"; . .. {Tel-a . . otgtt' ?wig .. Classified by derivation: Page 121 Ciossificoi'ion: Brigade 2506, etc. Page 3 4 (This form is ?o be used for material extracted from ClA?tontroiled documents.) they would receive a huge amount of arms, equipment and funds g? The Americans .tried to give Artime and his men the impression that an anonymous Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, but the Cubans eventually began referring to their benefactor as "Uncle I I 6237 At secret camps in Florida, in Panama and eventually in Guatemala, the CIA trained the core of future Brigade leaders . in guerilla warfare. By September of 1960, this initial cadre lw- rwas part of a group of 160 men undergoing vigorous military: conditioning in the treacherouslyw denSe mountain jungles of the Sierra Madre in Guatemala. yaw That month one of the men, '"Carlos (Carlyle) Rodriguez Santana, was killed in training.k2_ _j in his honor, the members of the unit decided they would name the Brigade after-his serial designation, 2506. ?5 5 Although Manuel Artime, through his MRR organization transplanted in Miami, was the principal recruiting apparatus for Brigade personnel, chosen as military leader-of the was Jose (?Pepe") Perez San Roman, a graduate of Cuba's military academy who had also undergone United States army officer_s training at Fort Benning, Georgiatyt/ He had been freed by Castro from a Batista prison, then later re-imprisoned by 'Castro before escaping from Cuba. ;13?9 Nevertheless, it was Artime who remained the key figure in the U.S. Government' 5 relationship with the activist exiles Classification: . Ciossified by derivation: Amanr Emma! 2:55? AFGHV #3537 NH 53030 Page 122 - . 'Brigaae 2506, etc. Page 4.- (This form, is to be used for mofericl extracted . from CIAF?confroued documents.) .j and the Brigade. When, as the Cuban exile population in Miami grew and the political squabbling_among antiFCastro factions spread to Guatemala and sparked a camp mutiny that almost I'M-in-chd- stopped the training, it was Ar time the CIA called upon to help resolve the problem. Artime had.beenL?ade a director of a the Frente RevOlucionario Democratico HQEPpolitical and propagan- euz~~- mimi.:e anti?Castro groups aeaaha?ahg .g?l??iaLin May, The Brigade was_to be its military JO - A 19 But tn; political fighting among the -roups eventually. 54E . . h. ?31. -. 5 arnu lLdt?a .. ??er abroader- - based organization, the Cuban Regalutionary-Council (CBC), "before the Bay of Pigs invasion:as Artime-was made a director eel;? ?7 of that, also. 02)) 1961.2% @445} The Bay of Pigs invasion took'place in April, More than'lZOO Brigade members were taken prisoner Before they were released in December,-1962age: for $53 million in medical supplies, . Brigade suffered not only the ignomy of defeat and of false hOpe when, within a few months of their imprisonment, become inextricably bogged in the muck of partisan politics. As one historian noted: "The from'domestic politics than they did at' a: Cioss?icoiion: r. NH 53030 Page 123 the members ca?/ -by Castro.zztr- exchange of the the humilia?i tion of capture by Castro, they also were subject to the agony they saw Castro's offer to exchange them for 500 tractors United States *f prisoners suffered more- the hands of Castro Classified by derivation: . Clussi?cn?on: Brigade 2506, etc. Page 5. (This form is to be used for moferio! extruded [Had the political climate in the United States been less - The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the from CIA?confrolled documents.) inflammatory; it is not at all unlikely that Brigade 2506 could have been released in June of 1961 for $28 million in tractors; cash and credits. instead of freedom through- tractors, however, the men were doomed td the degradation of a dg?l? - .1 year and a half longer in prison." a a a Orange Bowl stadium in Miami on Dedember 29,1962. President Kennedy was there to welcome back the surviving members who 7- a - a; had spent almost 20 months in Castro' 3 prisons.%? The crOwd :of 40,000 friends, families and relatives cheered in tearful ?w?hwh xwh?+ xii?; m?w?w? a. joy as Brigade chief Pepe San Roman presented Kennedy with the Brigade flag which had flown over the Bay of Pigs beach for three days. The President accepted the flag and declared: can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana!" Mrs. Kennedy spoke in Spanish . and called the Brigade members "the bravest men in the world." It was a.dramatic and emotional scene but it may have been a Although the concordant rapport between the President and the Brigade; beneath the surface there ran a vein of bitter resentment among those who felt the. event was a dis lay of political hypocracy. E. Howard Hunt, once Cicssirico.? ion: . Classified by derivofion: NH 53030 Page 1247' m. a-I?nu- . 1 ?9 Mug?- -. l?qm NH 53030 . mainly of veterans of the Brigade. Classific "in ion: rigade 2506, etc. Page 5 (This form is to be used for material each-coed from CIA?comrolled documenfs. . with the that the Brigade feeling against Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly did not take ?z?aa Nevertheless, it is difficult to finalize an assessment- of the Brigade 3 collective attitude toward the U. 3. Government and the Kennedy administration following the Orange Bowl eVent. Kennedy' 5 resolution to the Cuban missle crisis, in which he promised Castro that raids against Cuba from the U. S. mainland would be halted, was considered an act Of betrayal.to their cause by many of the exiles in the anti?Castro communities. most of the members of the Brigade seemed to maintain a basic sn- .. . Yet .confidence in the U.S. Government?s resolve to topple the Castro regime, and, in fact, nearly half of them enlisted in the U.S. i armed forces through a special arrangement made by Bresident' Kennedy lhimse lf. $3 9'43) Although Brigade 2506 officially ceased to exist after 3? . December,_1962, Manuel Artime,Ywho had become known as the was soon scouting around Latin America for sites on which to establish guerilla training camps. By October, 1963, he had established four bases, two in Costa Rica and two in Nicaragua. . Artime' 300- -man force consisted 350.1.. Vii-J .. . ?PM-wt: . I Classified by derivation: .o?aur AQEBHV ?53357 DucId:322?3595 Page 125 ?ff??r 'gu? 1 ~11 o?on Ciossi ?.gade 2506, etc. Page 7 (This form is to be used for material exiroc?red from CIAe-controlled documents.) urtime would later admit that his .resources included two large ships, eight small vessels, two speed boats, three planes, and more than 200 tons of weapons . 3 ease; and armaments and about $250,000 in electronic equipment. During the year of his operation, Artime was able to conduct four major operations, three of which failed:, One was the mistaken shelling of a Spanish cargo ship (which caused an 5 international uproar); another an infiltration mission in which? all the participants were captured; the third an unsuccessful :f .L assassination at empt on Castro. . 33 did succeed. Although AI time ma1ned the question or whether Pre31dent Kennedy was knowledge? able of or approved Artime's anti-Castro operations after the Ef?ueno Cuban missile crisis. Following the assassination of both John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy, Artime publicl said that both the President and his brother were responsible-for - gee?e I. 45;) -9 . his establishing the Latin American bases?" he said that hf lup- after his return from prison in Cuba, he met President Kennedy in West Palm Beach, Florida, and that Kennedy referred him to 0 his brother. Artime said he met Robert Kennedy in Washington.? and that the then- ?Attorney General promised him military aid 3 4/,gm' if he, Artime, could get the bases. Cinssi?ca?on: 2 Classified by derivation: :3 NH 53030 Page 126 Brigade 2506, etc. Page 8 (This form is to be'used for meterioi extruded from ClA?confroiied documents.) 6:f+5 Amtime claimed that his anti-Castro operations from the bases ceased "when Bobby Kennedy separated from the Johnson Lfk, ?administration." However, in December of 1964, the Costa Rican police ordered the camps shut down when it uncovered a Artime's group.? The camps in Nicaragua were also-closed, al- though Artime kept close personal ties to that country by becoming a beef broker for Nicaraguan_ President- General Anastasio Somoza, the country' largest.beef producer., ?3 $50,000 contraband whiskey operation involving a plane from When Artime was first contacted by the Committee he Stated - that he had had direct contact with both_?resident Kennedy and VlivRobert Kennedy~and, through them, was given full support by the CIA for his anti?Castro operations; He Said he felt the death of President Kennedy marked the end of the U. S. Govern- agreed to be interviewed*- that was possible, he 1 45 IM-n-o-gqpa. Classified by derivation: NH 5303i] Page 12'? DRAFT. Cicssi?cc?on: 11/14 78 . Bats)" Palmer?'nis form is to be used for mc?rerioi extracted from ClA?confrolled documents.) - DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (mo) - .After'Castro's assumption of power in 1959, it became - evident to many_Cubans that political parties were being surpressed and the 26th of July Movement was being infil- trated by Communists. This political atmosphere gave rise the creation_of underground organizations such as the 1 9 I ?01-11 Christian Democratic Movement of Cuba (NBC). Proclaiming i the doctrine of Christianity as its foundation, the MDC published a mani?esto in March, 19692 denouncing Communism and strongly advocating the free enterprise Isystem.?3 One of the founders of the NBC, 35-year?old law professor, I Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was elected head o?_the organizationq and immediately criticized the violence prevalent in the - Castro regime.5 This public criticism produced pressure on- . 4 .vd. him to leave Cuba and. he arrived-in Miami on April 22, 196016" hm?w. By June, Rasco had allied himself and the MDC with the Frente. Revolucionario Democratico and_thus became one of the' five original exile Cuban leaders brought together by the ne;to form the nucleus of a Cuban- government-in?exile. A "u n-n-u-n ()Jia) After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the MDC split into factions. Rasco remained head of the largest faction and organized_ . . . . - . . 10 delegations in Miami, New York, Chicago, Venezuela and Cuba? "r . Classified by derivation: x-xzr rear I'lenmv .zner ,eeav near - ."ner eager NH 53030 Page 123 We?. .rl Hum I ?nu. ?Noam Ain?t?uh NH 5303i] DRAFT-9 1'3 Clossia?ic ni'ion: Pagel2 (This form Is ?0 be used for malaria! extracted The in Cuba was lead by ?Luna . - ll 14m. fofacl?-a. Who used the alias "Lucas?. When: - arrived-in.the 0.8. in October,-196l, he presented his credentials to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, (CRC), claiming he was the representative of the MDC movement in Cuba.12 Council president, Dr. Miro Cardona, accepted him into the CRC hierarchy.13 'The ?Lucas" faction remained with "i?hww the Council but its role was ineffectual because Etfn-s?ww. eventually failed to hold the group together.14 The "Rasco" faction of MDC had as its Military Chief an independently wealthy young Cuban, Laureano Batista Falla.15. Free-spirited and under no financial pressures, Batista Falla 7? organized and partially financed the infil ration attempts. of the MDC.16, It was one of the most active and effective' 17 underground groups in Cuba during'the early 196055. At that time, most underground groups worked together, Sharing supplies and information.2;L EduEu?yi the repressive measures of the Castro regime after the April 1961 invasion caused members of the Cuban underground to live in fear of Ciossi?cnfionClassified by derivation: x?35'u, _g3??7 DuoId:322?3595 Page 129 a an. 'e i mwi_q NH 53030 1 . - a. 1-3- 12:. 11v- .. Liar-in: ll/l4/7b Page 3 - 4? . - (This form is to be used for material extruded from CIA?controlled documents.) ?discovery and made inter-group liaison extremely risky. Despite the-inherent dangers, the underground movements of h- the NBC and Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo worked jointly for an all-out sabotage effort in the fall of 1961. The ?Batista" faction of the NBC (so named after the youthful military_chief rose to the position of_president 7 . in 1962) entered intO'similar cooperative allianCes with other exile groups for the purposes of propaganda, sabotage' and supplying the Cuban'underground.- Many MDCmembers joined the Cuba Committee in 1962 which was formed to counteract the propaganda of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro- ryL, Castro organization in the U.S. The MDC and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) work ed together to formulate plans for an underground organization to infiltrate Qriente .23 Province. The active operations between the MDC and other anti-Castro groups peaked in the year 1963. One involved the NBC, the Movimento Insurrecconial de Recupueracion Revolutionaria (MIRR) and. the' .Movimento Recuperacion_ Revolutionaria (MRR). In April, Frank Sturgis, Miami? based. soldier of fortune, supplied information that Batista Fella, _Orlando Bosch Avila, Manuel Artime and Alexander Rorke were pril 25.31? 9! jointly planning an air strike over Havana on A According to Sturgis, the strike was to originate from an $25, airstrip in enerto- Rico and the target use a sugar refinery. 36551750531011: 3Z6 The bombs were homemade, assembled by Batista. Rorke - .- Clossified by derivd?onDucId:322?3595 Page 130 w? .. Page 4 ?32153: Mcoiion a. - 2? - (This form is to be used for material extracted taken lace as scheduled, mbitwoLa than)? 2kg?? 33 2P7 which took the other planners by surprise. Sturgis claimed. the strike was still in the.plann::? stage and financial a a I - - backing had not been completed. This inCLdent created a stir and resulted in an intensive FBI investigation of Rorke's i allegation.; Since Radio Havana, contrary to usual policy, [if -made no immediate protest over the bombing, the FBI concludes. - - 53/ - -that Rorke?s story was probably untrue and, according Sturgis, merely a publiCity stunt. - . In early June, 1963, the MDC made a unity pact with Commandos in which the latter group was to provide traininc.rl and assistance in military intelligence and the NBC to prov; de 7 three small boats and a team oi men to infiltrate Cuba. The a; MDC also made a pact with Dr: Carlos Prio Socarras, former President of Cuba who donated $50 000 to the.group fer military. aid in return for its promise of politiCal support. ,5 5u53> Richard Rudolph Davis, a Cuban alien, had a preipheral _association with the MDC through his contact with Batista. Falls. :hwiiv?r?l? -. . . in the. summer of 1963. This association was noted in Book _3 Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- ?f m2; mental Operations. ?259 Davis was residing in New Orleans and, although not an. MDC member, claimed to have once been a "coordinatorgroup and the New York Police Department.? He was a friend Classification: {if i l5 Ciossified by derivation: Aim- 7 Jim . man-w r" m. .. . NEEDED Page 131 i I it .- t?Jauh. NH 53030 I Page 5 C. ossir izoiion: (This form is to be used for mo eriol extract ad of Batista Fallilahcggawgne?azbecause, he said, Batista Palm. Falla was_in a position to recommend men in the Miami area who needed work. Davis claimed he Could provide employment_* for a small group of Cuban emigres. he said he had entered into a business deal with geologist David L. Raggio and a wealthy, right-wing New Orleanian} Gus de LaBarre; forming . . .233? a the Guatemalan Lumber and Mineral Corporation. It was their intention to train the Cubans on Some land in Lacombe,?Louisiana' to which De LaBarre had access through his nephew, Prank . .1 ?swab de LaBarre. After a necessary training period, the group a was to be sent to Guatemala to cut mahogany trees, he claimed (.255) A group of about 18 Cubans did arrive in New Orleans in the summer of 1963. Leading them was a well-known Cuban 45 4/ . exile, Victor Paneque who used the military code name of you as "Commadante.Diego". Paneque was closely associated with . . . Batista Falla in_the military activities of'the.MDC. -Davis_ later admitte to the FBI that the men had arrived dressed #84% in khakis and thought that they were to receive military 531%5" training. In the latter part of July, l963, the conducted a raid on property near that of the "lumber company" training camp. The Bureau seized a cache of dynamite and other ex? w' - 9% plosives. This raidi~according to Davis, unnerved his 7 a; aw; trainees, and they elected to return to Miami. Classi?ed by derivation: ..1 I - 4? DuoId:322?3595 Page 132 .Page 6 Classi?co?on: (This form is to be used for mcferiol extracted (015,0 A somev?at @i?errai?E?em?xo-zajof this episode comes? - - from Gus.de LaBarre's nephew and attorney, Frank de LaBarre, who first related his story in 1965 to his former law school 354/ classmate, Jim Garrison. . ?s \l 1.. gig?) De LaBarre said his "Uncle Gus" had introduced him to Davis; ?hom De LaBarre described as a "floater.? fhey came to see De LaBarre about drawing up articles of incorporation for the Guatemalan.Lumber Company'and that is when he says he learned of their plans to bring unemployed Cubans fro? . '4 Miami to train as lumberjacksr Uncle Gus sent provisions to the'eXiles on a daily basis ahd solicited money for food and . ?554%? clothing from friends and relatives. 26256;) Although he suspected that military training was being conducted at the camp, Frank'de LaBarre said he di dn?t pay much'attention to the activities of the group. he heard on his car radio that the FBI had seized a cache oil_ 2 I .ammunition at a house in Lacombe,She immediately called his 0 uncle. Although receiving assurances that the lumber group h? nun-.- - -. was not involVed, De LaBarre called the officers of the -ucorporation together and insisted that the Cubans be taken out of there; Davisyb?b?Eykfb told him that the Cubans didj not want to leaue, whereupon De LaBarre said he had to do some real "brainstorming." He rented a Hertz ton?ahd-a-half a Ciossificc?On: Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 133 3 Ciossi?co?on: Page 7 - (This form is to be used. for material extracted truck and insumubse?maa?tscbomhehe it to the camp and tell the.Cubans "that the invasion is_on." Davis complied, and the Cubans loaded their gear, jumped in the truck and were? brought_to the Greyhound bus terminal in New Orleans. Each was given a one?way ticket to Miami plus a small amount of cash and told they would get their orders when they reached Miami. Looking as though ready for war, with knapsacks and . .V: . a - i. a guns bulging from under their .clothes,. they boarded the bus. That was the last,De LaBarre said, he saw of them. .1 . -1 (160) The last he heard of Davis, ,he said, was in 1964 when one of De LaBarre' 5 friends reported he had gone into busines.: 33:with Davis and was left with a lot of bills. 61.39:) Other than providing the :manpower for the training camp, Batista Fella was not involved in this episode or was the NBC as an organization. "i?r . I I Concurrent his involvement leaders of other -111 exile organizations, Batista Fella was-dealing with foreign governments in an effort to gain support for his faction of the NBC. After the World Congress of Christian Democrats in a. _Strasburg, France, two hristian . 55.57 FR ;;??cnnferred with the MDC in Miami. According f. to one of the officials,?Che west Germans: after months of study, had decided to help finance the MDC, not because they- av? were particularly fond of them, but felt once Cuba was liberated Ciossi?co?on: Classified by derivation: 5 33" .Acaer .f??gV AEEHF ?2337 NH 5303i] Page 134 - DRAFT-2T 2 Ciossmcohon. Page 8 - '(This form is to be used :for material extracted from ClA?contr'oHed documents.) the Cubans would have a.moral:superiority over the rest of . . -Latin America. Cie?a Another offer of help came from a?swumr, who provided the MDC a base for . gg' A Venezuelan o-HlxuoL operations in that country. Eneside suede .Betanconntmaallegedly also offered to make a base available an! 57? for the MDC and provide it with personnel and supplies. Recognizing that these Latin American bases of operation were important to the MEG, Batista Fella nonetheless pre- . 1e ferred to work out of the Miami area. -Its proximity to e-a-IA ?Cuba, good facilities for operating boats and the?availabilitgi of a large number of Cubans to serve as mechanics and do other necessary labor made Miami more desirable than the Latin American facilities. major drawback in Miami was the presence of government officials determined to strictly 2 enforce the Neutrality Act and other Federal statu es. ail (AU-90. S. Customs raided MDC headquarters in Miami on April 21,1964 and confiscated a large cache of arms and - 3'5 -ammunition. Undeterred, the MDC simply-relocated the military-section in separate headquarters, continued to store- - 1&57 materials for infiltration and attack missions against Cuba, . . - ?529 ?3 and conducted study courses in military training and theoryle? In July, Batista Fella and Victor Paneque infiltrated men 7 a 1 Classification: Cioisified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 135 7. in], i 'iuw cu-i-E-wv i? ins-r (a a" 3' Wit-Weave.- - NH 53030 .1 .- . - Clossifico?on: DRAFT-MUG Page 9 - - (This form is to be used for material exfrocfed from CIA?controlled documents.) and equipment into Cuba. to form a nucleus of guerrilla bands who, once they_got adequate arms and ammunition, planned go into the mountains of The MDC eventually suffered the fate of other anti ?Castr<; organizations -- finding it increasingly difficult to finance infiltration and sabotage missions, and experiencing in- creased surveillance by 0.8. authorities determined_to limit their activities. The organization's activities gradually- declined, Batista Fella eventually gave up his anti-Castro activities, moved to Washington, C. and received a doctorai degree in political sc1ence.asi?ln the spring of 1970, -he moved to Venezuela. I Cicssi?coi' ion: i Classified by derivation: n?ur? DucId:322?3595 Page 136 DRAFT 11/1/73 ,Ep' ?merE 8- tsy Ciossafzcohonz' JUNTA Rsvowczozmaro CUBANA (30111:) (T This form is to be used for moferiol extracted CM. ledd (516$) In a 23,1962, Manuel Ray Rivero announced the formation of JURE, an Eanti?Castro Cuban . exileE group -designedE to unite Eall the popular splintered - . Other leaders involved inE Ethe new organization EinEcludedE CFelipeE Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio CCisneros, Ramon CBarquin anEd Justo Carrillo.CC Although Ray felt the Ecuban Revolutionary Counci Cwas no longer effective, he attempted Cto receive 11nanc1al assistanEce from it until SURE gained momentum.3 factEions outside Cuba an effeEctive workingE organization.1 (ale-7) its opening promotional salvo;E JURE issued aE "Declaration of Pr1nc1ples. . It called for free elections,C?? the restoration of human Erights and social justice, new E) -economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking . relations Ewith the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate 'VmEproperty, proscr1pt1on of the CommuniSt Party andE release _of 5 Eonolitical pr1soners.4ECE RayE' 3 group was considered an "autonomous" anti-CEastro Cuban group by Ethe CIA.S The concept Eof autonomous operation. was conceived by WaClterE Rostow,E State Department counsel_.6CC 3 Rostow proposed a. "track two" approach to Cuban operations to parallel regular CIA?controlled Cuban teams.7- This approach would enable financial aid, advice and 1; Ciossified by deriva?on: NH 5303i] Page W??wv: NH 5303i] I JURE Dre PagejZ aguidance 'as Ray.8 in June, . 1,49?) The funct1Oned set forth the follow1ng A ?Ll4_' - 1- F'nationals _dedicated to the idea that the overthrow 'If the effort to overthrow?the Cuban regime" became ?of the United States.. - Ma- Clovssif'ics?on: (This form is to be used for material exfrocted to id?ep?n?e??VE$?5??eaa?rblled Cuban leaders such ?7 Autonomous operations were'approved 711._ 1_ 1963.9-o f"fli . _?Ii I??-iif5i ?R?Iezne mg gementk under which the Operat1on3' . . - .. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban of the Castro/Communist regime must'be accomplished by Cubans ins1de and utside Cuba working in concert.;% -.I- -.-..- -. -. too costly in human lives, the U. 8. would withdraw 'financial support and would not consider resumption at any future date. All operations had to be mounted outside the territorv . .- - . .- . . . . - ?u If ever charged with complicity, the U. 5. _government would publicly deny any participation in the group' act1u?t1es.m kept at an absolute minimum._ liaison officer would be assigned to each group to provide general advice; funds and material support. No fixed time schedule would be given to these . 10 operations. Clossi?co?dn: i Ciossified by derivation: Page 133 .- ?Junga Uhhyh- ?Page 3 - Gossifico?on: 1 Q70). Possibly Wage-?re i? ?ctyeisse?ogs control over in.? the toning aiumeg?tivities of the group wm . _mnis source Ffoyd-meeting withARobert P. Kennedy in September 1963-11 .Ray? negotiations on behalf of 'seoret _meetings;13 allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was-_: purpOSely SidetraCRing an FBI and INS investigation of illegai arms possessed by JURE animosity toward Manuel Artime i; and the and the location of JURB training baSes.16 3% (32719 Manuel Ray himself was personally critical of the CIA it if and told one JURE associate that he thoug_ht more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration." . He maintained; that, "The Kennedy Administration would end but always stayed, and their memory-was longer than the memory_of 'elephants and they never forgot or forgaveJURE meeting in Miami in August, l962, Ray claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training Q.- . in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the United States."18 According to an FBI report, was considered onec??sgh?c?;?ngajor exi 1e groups \-!ith clandestine if": ii: I a} - Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 139 I71 ?t was Draft Clossifico?on: Page 4 . - (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA?controlled documents.) 9 . assets 1 and the 1nterested 1n the group because of its potential for infiltration into Cuba.2o'I 5 I 617-3) Because of its size and Ray' 5 dynamic leadership, JURE: ?1 seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti- 2 Castro movement. 1The group set a target date of October 31, l962 to raise $100, 000.-sThe money would be used to recruit" new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and purchase arms and supplies.224 Within a year, JURB had membership delegations in 12 cities .in the United States, a a; '.chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries; i' mostly Latin American.23 (51740En August, 1963, JURE planned to.sabotage a power plant QE in Eavanaz4 and Ray requested that emsaeua' eta: - be. cached 25 high explosives and grenades inside Cuba or San Juan.- . 1, 1 1.11. ., i . ,1 if. 1-W- i - recommended?the request be granted in or derI to testI Ray' A?k??ufu?fof%ypaow* J-7 capabilities. 24, Ray acquired a 25- foot boat for infiltration i - and exfiltration Ipurposes and expressed a desire to purchaseI another vessel which would enable hi? to extend operations . 1? . along the south coast of CubaI. 175) Plans were made '1jw? ?an? 3'1. .- I I 14:21 _i The operation, originally Ciossifiod by derivation: NH 53030 Page 140 I Clossi fico'?on: JURE Draft - (This form is to be used for moieriol extruded. . Page 5 from CIA??onfrb?ed documents.) - 1 3 ;5 scheduled for November 23, 1963, was-moved up two days- The" 1 . the scheduled pick up a and Ray offered no sati ?sfactory 2?h3:3 j: explanation for this failure to perform. _7 Ray claimed the . 235.5 z? vessel was low on gas which was a ubtful explanation as we .. stew .sc?hedum 1 3: his activities during the latter part of . 3 1963 being political in nature. He was, at this time, con- I 5? i; ?s?nnda 5auwda 25l377 . 1 Z?gt jj- ferring with '.7abuut the Cuban Situation I and traveling extensively in Latin America seeking support for . .. . . - -- . (5:72)No documentatiOn has been found to substantiate the success wor failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations during .this period, but by January, 1964, the organization had gained. i i enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations 140 - i 3 to merge with it.z?O The largest of these groups were the LH I Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC) and Cuba Libreaal The - union; with JURE brought to the organization former veteran 1 rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving JURE the best military expertise and support in the entire Rea exile communitv Clossifico?on: i .vu- Ciossi?ed by derivation: NH 53030 Page 141 ll . 7 - Draft Page 6 (This form is to be used for mcferioi exirccied from CIA?confrbiie'd documents.) (J78) CarlosBI Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE Chief of support: and was responsible for acquiring most of the - .-- 3 arms and the large supply of'explosives which were stored in Miami and PuertO'Rico. 627%? Manual Ray again began formulating lens to infiltrate .. Cuba in March 1964. the planned to accompany two teams of commandos into Oriente Province and,I once succesSfully inside If 'i Cuba initiate Icontin?fus bombings of strategic and non- \'iiW strategic targets. Ray' 5 plans, however, were delayed and i a new target date of May. was set. (286) Ray' 5 seriousness of purpose was open to question at the. _time because he permitted persons from the media on his infil? tration attempt. Andrew St. George,gon assignment with 4 magazine, planned to accompany Ray: . as did Tom-Duncan,then a ?35. ILIFE photographer. Rogelio Cisner'osI received word on May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed motorItrouble.. Ray' 5 group was arrested by the . 15 British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.3? I i) Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibility within the anti-Castro community. -Some exiles felt his grand inf.iltration schemeIwas a publicity stunt and DQJ othersI considered it a joke.3? JURE members were confused I 31.53 - -- an; and undecided over how to defend Ray. Classification: i Ciassi?ed by derivation: ?re?1g NH 53030 Page 142 ?j '3 ?an? .uug NH 5303i] SURE 13:37"; I - . Page 97 Clossx?hcohcn: Another 411553331 isn 1*3451:, problems. orn ClA?controu?o' documents. Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50 000 of JUREI money to an ?_El Monte, California, arms eenufacturing company for- weapons_ :Li:q I . . :L?il: to be shipped to Florida.?g. .The Revenue division of the ffi - Di t?m th?uena ?u'ad - -- . 2 . reasury a: en Q. A a 1aid on_ arms compan (?rfxa?hr (Elg?D.At this point, there began a general. disin egratIion of . IJURB membership. Rogelio Cisneros August??y 11964 thIat heI was re31gn1ng from the organizatior He COnte nded Ray was. incapable of directing both politicelI and - - -n?7_I .. .n-w . - - military activities- Then another key leader,_ Carlos i; Vi- 1- -, zarraga, resigned in September. - If WH- .: econ/ed . (2'ng JURIE: -- OQO during the period A uvxku of October to December 3lst, 1964. 'The money was net Qaax.- - we;; meme?. activities outside ?officer noted at the time: Ray.is successful in Cuba will not need our help; if he is not,Iour help won't do much 5 I Ciossificc?c?n: I Classified by derivation: 7 DuoId:322?3595 Page 143? \1111 ?59+ Juno-4? I \an 45.4.? HF 53030 . JURE bra": Page 8 good. He is tatbaeia? fo?eh-ec??ae?ak?ci-? be largely from CIA?controlled documents.) spent for the purpose he wants to aChieve. Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be tree Led? rhave played the game in a manner beyond reproach.? ?35) We continued _in existenoe until August, 1968 4! but was relat1vely 1neffect1ve in its latter_ ye ars-. ga- i 3 Classaflcohon: Classi?ed by derivation: . A?zyh .eznr,m aggro ?Agar DuoId:322?3595 Page 144' - A Classi?cc?on: 3.1. (This form is to be used for moferic} exfrotfed from CIA?confrolled documents.) ?ff? . .157? DIRECTORIO (DRE) :3 (Elg?) The Directorio-Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE). 65*was-the outgrowth of an activist student 3? group in Cuba which.originally fought against Batista.2 In the late spring of 1960,3 three DRE leadersescaped 'from Cuba"4 and arrived in Miami.5 .They I iimmediately_offered their services to the Democratic Revolutionary )3 Front (FED) with the intent of organizing an .anti-Communist . . . 6 fb?~d?ru 15 student "organizat1on w1th1n this group. Hana?nsa it later was decided that the DRE would be an "affiliate" but not a member of the-Frente. 7 The leaders 0f the DRE were kept on a - Hp?a?) Vi? regular retainer members engaged in training for paramilitary operations and propaganda dis? . . ~11 also supplied the group with weapons and semination. ammunition on occasion. - . @37) The first DRE: infiltration team landed in I Cuba in November, 19601?9 with the objective of organizing anti-CaStro student pr paganda a.d conducting general har rassment \z op_erations. 1 .. u, Cluesi?ccrion: . Classified by derivchon. NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595 Page 145 . .-. w? DRE 031m; Ciossificoiion: 12/11/78 Page 2 4-15.- (This form is to be used' for material exfroded' from ClA-??con?roiled documents.) o'618?) By April, 1961, 400 guerillasl3 were operating Hb?? =1 effectively from the Sierra Maestra mountains.l4 Ho?fver, wag, Qeucoweuu w?l a 74 men capturedls Gad-He. Lo vecewe. 15 TVVS . as. air-dropped supplies. ehn??na?s capture was a severe set back for the DRE underground prior to the Ba of \Pigs.l7 I .- 3910 we Qaciexr i 2 was also arrested in April, 1961, but his true identity was unknown to the authorities and he was released. following an interrogationla Escaping again to Miami, he made mu. three daring attempts to res-infiltrate Cubain 1961. Although. :he failed, his exploits reportedly made him an-underground hero .2 to the students in Cuba. 19' also DRE Chief of Military infiltrated into Cuba prior to the-Bay of Pigs invasion and ?told the Committee that the Cuban underground felt it had the .21 Ey March, 1961/?oqe 1 the undergroun-grealized the invasion would be a failure, ,1 because the [1:7had.failed to perform even before the invasion. 22* "It never got us the supplies it promised and never did that 25 LAvxoLtm \eu?er - .2 $.?gmm?v 1aas 0J5t> thin it was supposed to do," he claimed. Classification: Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 146' . ?x I Cicssi?co?on: Dasroaasr - 12/11/78. 3 .Page 3 (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIAe-confroiled documents.) m1 Mmriud .33: ?T?ne; DEE. 0? (?1?31an it was onlyIconceived to relieve the pressure building in the @015 anti-Castro exile community. 15- DRE members had a deep- G1 Although 358 GLM21 lying opposition to 8. plans and policies} cong?gugircg?fgbp accept 05- Gutcwu?d dQS?fIte op ch'uf a7 had waters raca?nrzal i Yefow Mahat??ghe f?i: ?95 top officials of the DRE had by: 6?3? aO?iwc? to money from the U131 Guam kc?Qir?W'n? support . allowed the DRE to as *play an inordinately influential role in the exile community, 3 . 1m DRE Cki? cf. ?Ala-W1 i?z??ccording toXianga, by July, 1962, the DRE had taken to because of their er*1~ ?ii . . . u~ soliciting support for proposed prOpa- hganda operations but actually using the funding-for military ?gauze operations. t1:? baseman ?192) For_instance, in early Se tember,-1962, ?g?gy=sa1 he Amokh ex \ea av received a call from not1 ying him of an impending major I 313 TM. Vskkev - 2 military operation.: k?Ei??iixtald him the DRE had all the . weapons, ammunition and support it needed.a? The raid turned out to be the attack on the Blanquita Theater in Havana)which . - 33 i ..received a great deal of publicity.33 Castro even raged about 39' it, claiming it was an attempt on his life by the CIA. 25 In \h:Me_ fact, according to the raiders did not know that Castro I Cidssificc?on: i Classified by derivation: NH 5303i] Dunld:322?3595 Page . NH 53030 was scheduled to be at the theater the night of the shelling. . 0'17 I . .g . DRE DRAFT gi?il?-la (This form is to be Used for material extracted from CiA-?ontrolied documents.) 31357 In any event,'there was a tremendous'uproar when the raiders returned to the U. S. The DRE leaders were called to Washington A 5. \gi?aai?. main-M F, to confront U. S. Attorney General, RobertAKennedy and . 3% Operations Chief, Richard Helms, who gg?h'told them they were idoing a great job but wasting their time in such independent IV 37 actions. GQQED As a result of the Blanquita raid publiCity, the DRE was subsequently able to raise about $200,000 in private funds. That enabled the_group to establish an operating base on Catalina Island near the south coast of the Dominican Republic from which' a. . 'Mquddag 'it hoped to make a major strike against Cuba. wanna-lgs/after 39 GB - the October, 1962, missle crisis, the Dominican Republic government informed the DRE leaders that the U.S. was putting great pressure on it to shut down the DRE operations and it therefore could no longer permit the group to operate out of its the DRE was, of all the anti-Castro groups, one of he most bitter towards President Kennedy for his "deal" . an?? Russians. In a letter ,nws?hdated'February'Zl, 1963 and addressed simply to "Sirs," the DRE said it was grateul ful for the initial support of the U.S.?but could no longer' operate under restrictions of 3.8. policy. 'The DRE demanded that the U.S. government, understand that the Cubans cannot Classification: A Classified by derivation: DucId:322?3595 Page 143 NWT. Vow-Av ?uni-mum ?03! N?mt trim-r. ?'mriwm. . Classi?cation: I: Eglg?gtr (Thisform is' to be used for material exfrocfed Page 5 from CIA?convened documents.) continue-waiting for the international policies, because those dying of-hunger are Cubans, because it is our country that bodily suffers slavery, because it-is our blood that-runs in? 6141 Cuba." Despite such strong sentiment, the DRE continued to accept support . "1 :1 al though J?s? '1 KJeai 54?? its more militant membersXEo join Manuel Artime' Movimiento . -- "~21 4.: fist-'4 M, .F. ?aws?, . 5004511436 de _Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) forces, 34% Whether or not this ?mm-?nw suggestion ?es ever taken by any DRE members is not documented, but. the top leaders remained. a homoge group and, 1964 ,1 . KJ overnvmut were soliciting additiOnal financial support outside the e?ea?- They were successful in receiving some funds from the Bacardi 43.45 . ?fp-v'l-v 4'1" Rum famil in Miami. KU Cz'ovevuuegb, @169) Although the DRE continued .its relationship with the?? \u until the end of 1966, the group?s activities, like those of other anti-Castro organizations, declined in intensity and effectiveness. 0 Av?? the DRE was. a very militant "action" group, the Committee was especially interested in DRE operations prior to reSId the assassination of John:3: Kennedy on November 22,1963.' 1f"; As noted, one of the effects- of the. Blanquita raid in September, 1962, was to garner the DRE a blast of.national Classification: ClosSified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 149? - Clossi?co?on: . DRE DRAFT . 12 ll 78' a x) Page . (This form is to be used for material extruded from CIA?controlled documents.) in turn, gave the leaders of the group the opportunity to solicit additional funding from wealthy indi- .. - . . . .4547 Viduals who_were sympathetic to their anti-Castro cause. I A . --. ?Among-those who wound up supporting the DRE was Miami multi- millionaire William Pawley, a strong right-wing conservative,? CL 4?me former owner of the Havana bus system and of former CIA director Allen Dulles. Another.supporter the DRE got was a friend of Pawley' s, former Ambassador to Italy 49 .Clare Boothe Luce,Q? then the wife Of Time?Life publishing empire boss Henry Luce and a later Nixon appointee to the Foreign- Intelligence Advisory Board. (g?qa) In its review of DRE activities, the Committee took special interest in a relatively recent series of events involving Clare BoothegLuce. In October, 1975, Luce was being interviewed by. . Vera Glaser, a reporter and columnist for the Knight chain of newspapers, when she told Glaser of an alleged incident involving - gge?O . members of the DRE and Lee Harvey Oswald. At the time, Nauru. . Senator Richard Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart were in the y, midst of their subcommittee investigation of the Kennedy nv~ assassination as part of the Senate Select Committee inquiry into intelligence activity. i *'135) According to Glaser's report Of the interview, this basically what Luce told her: . Classi?cation: i a Classified by derivu?om? NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595 Page 150? DRE DRAFT (This form?is to be used for moferiol? exfrocied 12/11/78 from CIA?confrolled documents.) Page 7 . Luce said that after t..e failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, her friend, William Pawley, persuaded her to help I sponsor a fleet of motor boats for a group of anti-Castro - Cubans who, awley envisioned, would be Cuban "Flying Tigers," It ?mnq shooting in and out of Cuba on intelligencefgathering missions. Pawley had helped start General Claire Chennault's original 1 1 Flying Tigers in WOrld war II. 'Luce said she agreed to sponsor a one boat and itS'three-man crew. She said she met with this .1 'Cuban boat crew about three times in New York and, in 1962, "published a story about them in LIFE magazine. (2364) Following the missle crisis in October, 1962, Luge said 5 that the Kennedy administration clamped down on exile activities against Cuba and the Pawley?sponsored boat raids were dis- . continued. 'Luce said she never saw her "young Cubans," as she called them, . . ?i Then, on the night of Kennedy' 5 assassination, Luce said he received a call from New Orleans from one of the boat crew Cubans. Luce told Glaser she would call_him "Julio Fernandez?. She said the Cuban told her he called-because he wanted to tell her about some information he had concerning the Presidentfs killer, Lee Harvey gig - . iizbg)lmce told Glaser that, according to "Julio Fernandez,? Oswald had approached the anti?Castro_group to which Fernandez Classification: . -1: . i Classified by derivation: water?s vm?e?e?y, NH 5303i] Page 151' Ciossi?co?on: . .In DRE (This form is to be used for material 12/11" 8 from ClA-?ontrolled documents.) Page 8, belonged and offered his services as a potential Castro assassin. The Cubans, however, didn't trust Oswald, suspected he was really a-Communist, and decided to keep tabs on him. They eventually penetrated Oswald's Communist "cell" and tape recorded his talks, including his bragging that he could Shoot anyone, even the QM Secretary Of the Navy. suddenly, Luce said Fernandez told her, Oswald came into 1 some money, went to Mexico City and finally to Dallas. Luce said -Fernandez told her he still had the tape recordings of Oswald, as well as photographs of Oswald and samples of handbills Oswald had distributed on the streets of New Orleans. Fernandez, she said, asked her what he should do. (309 Luce said she advised him to contact the FBI immediately. She i then told Glaser that she did not think abdut the story again until the Garrison investigation hit the headlines in 1967. Luce said she then contacted the Cuban who had called her. He told her his group had followed her instructions and turned their material over to the 331. But, he said, they were advised to ?keep 9 their mouths shut? until further contact. .Further contact was never_made, he said.35.d?$ (ji)Luce said that Fernandez then told her that one of the members of his group had since been and that another had been murdered. He himself, he said, wanted nothing further to do %5 57 with the Kennedy assassination. Ciossifico?CIossified by derivation: NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595 Page 152' -. . 2' Cicssifitoiion: DRE, DRAFT - 12/11/73. (This form is To be used for moferiol extracted Page 9 from CIA?controlled documents.) (33%)After Luce told her this story, Vera Glazer immediately went (3 5.5.5; to Senator Schweiker and told him about the alleged Oswald encounter. Intrigued, Schweiker contacted.Luce directly and asked her for information about the Cuban who had called her. As a result, Schweiker sent a staff investigator in 60 search of "Julio Fernandez". No such individual was ever found. {jj>0uring the course of its own investigation into the Luce allegations, the Committee reviewed the Task Force VReport, which dealt with the newspaper reports of the incident. According to the Task Force Report, Luce called then CIA Director. William Colby on October 25, 1975 and told him that Schweiker Thad called her to ask her for details about the allegations. She said she had given Schweiker the name of Justin McCarthy who, along with Pawley, had initially aroused her interest in helping the anti-Castro Cubans. W'sshe saidg she did . ?2 6 not tell Schweiker how to locate him. 623) Luce told Colby that after-shetalked to Schweiker, she had NH 53030 contacted McCarthy. He told-her that he doubted that anything? would come of a Congressional probe and suggested instead that she contact Colby. Luce then told Colby that McCarthy gave; her the names of three Cubans with whom he had been associated in DRE activities. They were: Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose? Antonio Lanusa and someone he remembered only by his code name,? 3278. Classi?cca?ion: "Chile". I Ciossi?ed by derivation: .eear Anna? 5559' .annr' Ages? .ener' Page 153? SE Hum. wmrr-w. win-wen 0 A 5 Classificc?on: DRE DRAFT . 12/11/78 (This form is to be used for material extruded Page 10 from CIA?controlled documents.) hdco?rding to the 1977 Task Force Report, as a result of 1 Luce's call to him, Colby contacted Justin McCarthyand lattempted to perSuade him to call Senator Schweiker and provide. him With any information or evidence he might have. McCarthy 1 said he didn't want to get involved because there'were-too many "political opportunists? in Washington.qg 47! gig?) With this background of information, the "Committee decided I . than? 0 conduct its own investigation into the Luce allegations. Luce told the Committee basically the same story given to Vera Glazer?zaiuce was Specifically asked if she Was certain ?ue-Q's the late night call on November 22, 1963 came from New Orleans. -She was definite in her answer that it did. -The Warren Report account of the Bringuier/Oswald association was outlined for her. She responded that it sounded much the same as the type activity in which her "boys" Were-engaged. 'Luce als_o told the Committee she did not recognize the name Jose Antonio Lanusa, mentioned in her conversation with Colby in 1975. ?33 Cubans who were among the leaders of the DRE in 1963. One of IIEM {he Committee lodated in Miami three anti-Castro them, Juan Manuel Salvat Rogue, was a founder of_the group. He was interviewed by Committee investigators on February 7, 1978:Ga Although Salvat did not recall Luce's involvement with the DRE, he said he "heard" William Pawley had provided the group eg? as far as he remembers, the group t.6 a we this?: igcii'onL-v. I i Classified by derivation: NH 53030 Page 154 DRE DRAFT 12/ 11/ 7-8 - (This form is io be used for' moierio! extracted Page 11 from CIA?controlled documents.) never received a large amount of money from any single individual, received_small contributions from a great - - . . . I many people. . He said that, according to his knowledge, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate of the DRE, was the Zn .only member of the group who eVer had any contact with Oswald. . (Committee records indicate that Carlos Bringuier be- came the New Orleans delegate to the DRE in the summer g7/ of 1962. As detailed elsewhere in the Committee '3 Report, Bringuier and Oswald had a confrontation on '1 I VCanal Street in New Orleans in August, 1963, when Oswald was distributing -?Fair Play for Cuba" leaflets. 3 . Both Bringuier and'OSwald were arrested, but were later i i 7?31 brought together to engage in a radio debate. ?Brrom? Preonusi - howemeng Bringuier hadAarranged for a friend of-his, Carlos Quiroga, to approach Oswald and talk to him on the pretense of being interested in pro?Castro . . . 29:23 act1v1t1es.: I 7" 9" Cyan Isidro "Chilo" Borja, another leader of the was inter- viewed by the Committee on February 21, 1978?i7y Borja said he .i knew Luce was supportive of the DRE but sard he did not know I the extent of her financial inVolvement. ~jHe also recalled . Bringuier's contact with Oswald_and the fact that the DRE 1 . 7K relayed that information to the CIA at the time.%& Borja said Classification: Classified by derivation: .rzzr .s?ar' asmar NH 5303i] Page 155' .l I. - i. DRE DRAFT . 7 - 12/11/78 (This form is to be used for moferiol extracted Page 12 from CIA?controlled decumenfs.) his responsibilities with the DRE involved only military 77 operationsaiand he suggested that Jose Antonio Lanusa, who 1 I handled press and public relations for the group, knew Luce and had been in _contact with her.13?7g ?xqups Jose Antonio Lanusa was interviewed by the Committee on April 22, l978. Lanusa said that on November 22, 1963, he and a small group of DRE members were at a Miami Beach hotel when ?5.77 '31-?w they heard the news of the assassination of the President. When Oswald's name was broadcast, Lanusa recalled the name as 1 that of someone who had had something to_do with one of the DRE delegates, so Lanusa and those who were with him went to the :Miami DRE office tO'search the files to determine if Lanusa's .80 A suspicion was rightuag By late afternoon, they had found .1 delegate Bringuier's report from New Orleans detailing his I encounter with Oswald. Along with it was a sample Fair Play ?for Cuba (FPCC) lea-f let and a tape recording of the radio 8/ debate.7a With this discovery, someone immediately called c3119: whack, V. TM 'ivwhtold them_not to do anything or contact anyone else for_ at least'an hour. He said he needed that time to contact . . $693: awn-FM? Washington headquarters for instructions. Bowever, Lanusa said, he was so anxious to release the information that Oswald' was associated with a pro-Castro group that he contacted the :37 Clossi?cc?on: unlu- i Classified by derivation: i NH 53030 Page 156 '49- In? NH 5303i] '5 Ciossi?coa?ion: . DRE DRAFT - . 12/ ll/ 78 (This form is to be used for material exfrocfed Page _13 from ClA?controiled documents.) .9 9&3 3 major news media before the hour. was up. mutacL When the CIA a?HE?33?Easa called back, he told them the FBI would contact the group. ?The next day, Lanusa said, Miami .FBI agent James J. O'Conner showed up at DRE headquarters. He was given Bringuier's report, the FPCC leaflet and the tape 'recor ding of the radio debate. Lanusa said O'Conner told. Ithem they would get a receipt for the material but, Lanusa? said, they never did- Neither, he said, was the material as?! ever returned. Q18) Lanusa also told the Committee that soon after the DRE . shelling of the Blanquita Hotel in 1962, he was introduced to TiClare Boothe Luce by Justin McCarthy, whom Lanusa said was the 85' DRE's public relations contact with the New York major media. Lanusa said Luce told them she wanted to publish the Blanguita raid story magazine and that she would give the DRE the $600 she would receive from the magazine as payment for 8% that story. As far as he knows.Lanusa said, that was the #37? only contact any member of the DRE ever had with Luce?. Lanusa also said he strongly doubted Luce or William Pawley ever paid . for motor boats for the DRE because, he.said, he knew how all _of the boats.were acquired. ?Lanusa said he had no knowledge of Dan any DRE member having been deported or murdered. ?Lanusa said, think Clare Boothe Luce shoots from the hip without having 'eii 29?? her brain engaged."' Ciossi?cc?on: Classified by derivofion: In;32213595 page 15? MM-v??f ?Erma-9w!- an?. NH 53030 QCL SIONS - - - I i i Classification: DRE DRAFT (This form is to be used for material exirocfed 12/11/78 'from CIA?controlled documents.) Page 14 - :3?4)In investigating her allegations, the Committee considered ?the_possibility that Luce incorrectly identified the source of her information. The source of the documentation of Oswaldfs contact with the DRE was New Orleans-based Carlos Bringuier. blames} Bringuier told the Committee he never engaged in any 70 paramilitary DRE activities - and therefore could not have ?been-one of_the crew members of the alleged Luce~5ponsored motorboata' Bringuier? New Orleans associate, Celso Hernandez, 33"" the secretary of the.chapter, also said he never received any paramilitary training and did not know OsWald prior to encountering him passing out pro-Castro literature on Canal an Street in New Orleans.39 Bringuier also told the Committee he. knew Luce by reputation only, had_never contacted her and had neVer given her any information about his experience 93 3Q He further said he was not aware of the ??Ct 9 that Luce was involved in any Cuban exile activities. Bringuier with Oswald. maintained that no member of his DRE group in New Orleans had any contact with Luce during this period of timeeel; omnu. tee on sass ations (HS f/Xfeels ff I ?if! i if. it ha?ada-nAFelvf H?est gs anallegat one of Clare~?30the ?j LuFe the Lee ?gyyey Oswald was agent 5f Sayernment of 1' my?. w-v- . "an - Sign up.? mu- . 0pm viz/- assifico?on: - Classified by deriva?om s3??7 sf??r 52%57 mean? #3557 1&32' .sensr unId;322?3595 Page 153 Cicasi?cc?on: I 12/11/78 (This form is to be used .for material extracted . - Page 15 from CIA?controlied documem?s. IJII (I320) The investigation of the Warren Commission documented that . Oswald was interested in establishing a chapter of in New Orleans andhad contact with the New York headquartersof- ?{rI thistro-Castro_organization during the summer of 1963;9ch??- Luce raised questions as to the nature and extent of involvement? /1 the New Orleans chapter of DRE had in monitoring_Oswaldis I activities, and its association with the FBI regarding Oswaldfs 1 J) I communist activities. (320' Tint -1 r~3germenedathat the official DRE delegate in New Orleans was Carlos Bringuier, and that he was aided by two Cubans, Celso Hernandez and Miguel Aguado. In an attempt IIto monitor Oswald, Bringuier approved.the efforts of his' friend,ICarlosQuiroga, to call on Oswald to c?licit add- itional infOrmation about FPCC activities in New Orleans.I C3 22 individuals aSSOciated in these events had any involvement in . ??kone of the New Orleans the paramilitary activities of The New orleans chapter 1 . Mam?Lula. - engagedIsolely in proPaganda and fund raising activiteis;I - Ho New Orleans DRE member had any ?association with Luce.I 3 (3 contact with the DRE in New Orleans came from the group' 5 =gl?Ehe first report of Oswald's headquarters in Miami. Thiinnformation was released to national go: I Classification: Classified by derivc?on: NH 53030 159 Ciossifico?on: (This form' is to be used for moieriol extracted- DRAFT from CiA?-controued documents.) . 12/11/78 3 a Page 16 news media, the CIA and the FBI shortly after the :?enti? - 7 - am A fication of Oswald as Kennedy's assassin. The-,ezmeeauf? . . . - qgnoiuded that the Luce allegations, although related to certain facts, cannot be substantiated, due to the reluctance? - of key individuals to corroborate her Story. Classification: Classified by derivation: "2?137' laser ?557 . 43557 . . NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595 Page l?lfl mil I _i I Ii.? Inn??A- .-- .. A HH 53030 - Classi?rc?on: - - Betsy Palmer . (This form Is to be used for material extracted from CIA?controlled documents.) de a . . . RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA - (MIRR) - and ammo BOSCH When four of Castro's army officers and 100 men deserted and left for the Las Villas mountains in August, 1960, they formed the nuCleus of the Movimento Insurrecc? ional de Recuperacion the groundwork for this organization -was the former Chief of 'the 26th of July Movement in Las Villas ProVince, Dr. Orlando 2 Bosch had left Cuba one month previously and, 3 Bosch Avila. ?frOm Miami, issued a call for rebel army men to desert. Promoting the defection of army personnel and Carrying out sabotage Operations throughout Cuba were the early primary activities of the In both, it was very effective. (:335> Former rebel army officer Victor Paneque assumed - military leadership of the group5 and, within a few months of his escape from Cuba, organized a team of infiltrators . to re-enter the country to continue MIRR operations.6 (3&9 Orlando Bosch became general coordinator of MIRR, working with individuals and other groups involved in operations against Cuba and securing necessary financial backing.7 Classifico?i'lunClassified by derivation: .1 qua?Inu? 1..- DucId:322?3595 Page 161 ayue1 nil? \Cah-r ?Oh-n41 --. NH 53030 DRAFT-E aua?y' . Jean?- -.3 . Eadssi icoho . Page. 2 (This form is to be used for n-gneriol extracted (397) A Bosch became totally immersed in his political movement and for 18 years. has carried out a crusade to overthrow-Castro. His efforts at?* times have been characterized as "bumbling", but he has also been termed .?single-mindedly" and "morally committed."9 Widely viewed in the 8. press as a Cuban patriot when he first began his anti-Castro activities, Bosch's increased "acts of v1olence gradually changed his image to that of a terrorist;10 The intensity and violence of his activities,? which have always been widely publicized, were a major 0 7factor in the Committee's decision to examine Beach and the MIRR'among those Cuban eXile-organizations considered capable of involvement in an asSassination'conspiraCy. Bosch was interviewed by the Committee in Cuartel San Carlos prison in Venezuela. He is charged with acmplicity in the October 6, 1975 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane which resulted in the deaths of 73 people.11 Although deny- ing inVOlvement in the airplane bombing, Bosch said be approved_of it.12 Claiming terrorism a neceSSary evil in fighting Castro, Bosch has_Stated, "You have to ?ight violence with violence. At times you cannot avoid hurting innocent people."13 . I The activities of the MIRR inethe early '60's were carried out by a small.group of individuals.. There were Classificoiion: Rossified by derivation: . 1111;213:32213595 Page 152 ?i . I . i \n?qn .. - 53030 . CIA caulk-a ek- DRAFT :siion: 7- Page 3 . . (This form is Tobe used? for material reportedly n?wetChioreanh-hiiodcfacdoqem members In- 1966, Bosch claimed to have only 20 men outside Miami, located in _various seaport cities in the U. 5415 One of'th?i major interests of the MIRR was to blow up vessels trading with Cuba.I?aIn this it was effective, but the MIRR successes in the early 1960' was a result of its association with a number of other anti-Castro organizations and individuals. (3339 Bosch said that in late 1961 he was contacted. by Evelio Duque, leader of Ejercito Cubano Anticommunista (RCA) who indicated he might be getting CIA support for his group and wanted Bosch to join him116f7Together they submitted a plan, to the Agency outlining their-conditions for CIA support and were informed about a month later the plan had been approved-x"a :Acting.as the political leader in this.alliance, Bosch joined Duque, the military leader, at a camp in Homestead, Florida,.' k? BS ha - with a CIA liaison officer. Bosch soon came to the conclusion that the camp was an 'exercise in futility._ He felt the CIA had no intention of.? mounting another invasion or initiating attacks-_against Cuba, He felt the U. S.-spo nsored camps were mere1y a means of keeping the exiles busy and, privately and unofficially, .confirmed his suspicions, Bosch said. b9?culifter nine months of frustrated inactivity, he published a pamphlet, :1 . Classification: i Classified By derivation: 45:37 grzr' mar snarl. Jean? agar? ,raar Jamar DuoId:322?3595 Page 163 113R oscH page 4 cssaricoiion: . I z: I . (This form is .o be used forI material exfrocted The Tragedy the U. S. of mis- Ileading the Cuban exiles.r He sent a copy to President 2&34 Kennedy and_then closed down.the?camp.. ?s?ue After this, Boschi said he had no more dealings With the CIA. maintained an ongoing relationship, beginnininn late 1960, with Frank'Sturgis, I .3293 - . . of fortune;Alexander1Rorke; former clerk at the FBI and? . . 9H .ran informant-for that agency;23 and William.Johnson, an - . . rout'ded American pilot who,I along with Sturgis, wassamsourcer?fa - +0 - 9.5 . information the CIA on Cuban exile activities-I3}4 Johnsonv . '9 - 3.9 . 4* - had full control over all MIRR operations.35_ Bosch was .3 . concerned with financing raids against ICuba and did not :7 know the nature of th.e missions until their completion.2?? I (EEuDAccording to Johnson, American pilots were placed under contract to fly three air strikes over Cuba?for the 4.. a i They were to receive $2000per ImiSsionIe; Johnson admitted his own motive was purely mercenary. relatively inactive in1962,za the MIBR engaged 1 .JI inva series of bombing raids over Cuba in 1963 primarily. the production of sugar effort J, to disrupt the eCOnomy. It also Irepor?edly conducted air strikes against a MIG base in and various other strikes aimed at strategic targets.3z$ The raids -were 33 hthe raiders' planes were shot down and pilots?killed.3? effective but not withOut risk, In several.instances, Ciossifico?on: . I I Classi?ed by derivation: NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595 Pag? .1 . cm: .- DRAFT - ?tokion: Page 5 .I \n-c (This- form is to be used for material ex?rocted <}35 soassaoeasion with American ad- venturers, the MIRR also had associations with other exile organiZations. It planned raids against Cuba in cooperation . . . 39 . - a with Commandos L34.and discussed unity raids.with members 37 . . . Iof Bosch, at this time, was interested in establish-? ing a base of operations in the Dominican Republic Ito ?facilitate long-range planning.36 3 Cg3?QTne documentation the Committee has examined fails to .1 is explain how the MIRR was able to finance its extensive I?Miy/h - Jau% ak?hv??ymcy?y reamce =;g?Lth7 operations; Bosch told the Committee that his association 793,? 1? ?g w1th Frank Sturgis alone culminated in ll air strikes over 3 igfi Cuba.3Q ?th that time, he said, they usually rented a plane 40 for $400 plusI$60 anIhour.38 Bill Johnson charged for on I rF pilot fees for each mission.39 Bosch_said heIknew the pilots Honly $2000 and Johnson pocketed the rest, his' purpose was to fight Castro whatever it cost..}gBosch' 43 commitment to fight Castro extends to the present. ilq {mi-i C537 ?a?tigg?gl funds werenfurn1shed MIRR from a Chicago- 5?4? based Cuban exile, Paulino A- Sierrf,who allegedly collected 1 I4 I . - 4\2 Ihy,?b Imonies from gambling interests. Some money came from anti-Castro supporters in Puerto Rico.?3 -It is known that Ithe FBI was long interested in the Source of finances ?xi? eff, .I. the MIRR and .in March, 1964 authorized a 30 day mail check I44. 14 on it and Bosch in an effortIto identify possible sources. Classifico??tamed by daemon53030 PageI155 I ?Ilr' . in.? E-?I-nw ?an. r, I ?a :i . Pl?; I a a I Ii" Vannm._ VN . . . . ?cu- NH 53030 'threatening letters demanding large contributions for the . . . 'k DRAFT . . Page 6 (This form is to be used for moteriol extroc?ed from CIA-?ontrolled documents.) During this time, several wealthy Cuban exiles received A _fight against Castro.Ari Bosch was implicated in these extortion attempts, brought to trial and acquitted. He .told the Committee that in 1967 he once used the funds he had collected in settlement for a personal gnjury automobile accident to buy explosives and weapons}ab Whatever Bosch's . methods of raising money, there is no indication he ever used it to enrich himself. Well financed and totally dedicated, Bosch managed to- run afoul 0? the U. S. government authorities at least seven times in over a four-year period. Several.of these- 5&1 encounters resul ed. in his arrest,s??but he was always M53 - acqu1tted.? (335 In July, 1967, Bosch and the MIRR became assimilated . 54 into a new movement, known as Cuban Powers; and the tempo of violent activities increased. On September 16, 1968,- Bosch was arrested for firing a bazooka into the hull of a ?73 a .Polish ship anchored in Miami harbor. - He was subsequently 54. tried and sentenced to 10 years in a Federal priSOn.sg From his prison cell in Atlanta, Georgia, Bosch allegedly was making plans to resume bombing Japanese and spanish ships -trading with Cuba as soon as he was released.* .He was granted parole on November 1,1972 and immediately began ?travelin tb h. America, in Violation_of that parole" C?ogsa?cc zon: - Classified by derivc?cn: DucId:322?3595 Page 166 Anamvu' Adair imam, .- DRAFT - Page 7 "as. (This form is to be used for material extracted - fr CIA trolled doc menfs. He said his das to forge alliances 59' so with countries which had powerful Cuban exile communities. So effective was he in making sclid political alliances, that in the ensuing years he was able to travel freely, with forged passports,.throughout Latin. America. 60 (345) Whether cr.not Bosch was the principal conspirator in I .1- . the bombing of the. Cubana airliner, it is known that his? Cuban Power movement, which merged with other Cuban activists EU tag log-l to form a Cuban Secret Governmen has engaged 0:3 in acts of terrorism:as This latter grdupb has been linked in 1976 a with numerous?recent.bombing incidents, an assassination attempt against Henr1y Kissinger, the assassination of . 56 Orlando Letelier in WaShington, D. and the bombing of - gun-ht? the Cubana Airlines plane. 1 Bosch is a-zealot. In retrospect, he turns out. to be the most aggressiVe and volitile of the anti-Castro leaders. That alone would validly raise the question of possible association with the assassination cf President a i . - Kennedy. In addition, the Committee was presented with ?7r aha - in?ermatrcn that specifica lly connectp\him to a conspirach?amx. H- ug-uA-?I- Investigation o??ahe?a??egatren failed to support the claim that Bosch had been in Dallas in November_1963 in.the company of Lee Harvey Oswald. When asked, Bosch told the Committee he was at his home in Miami when he heard President. en eta Kennedy had bi ossi icodon: l7 deemed by derivc?on: -u?uv tuna-r .msuur 4 A??llr nannir I - NH 53030 Page 16? NH 53030 JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO In April, 1963 the spirit of the exiled Cubans who hoped to reunzz to a liberated Cuba reached a new low. Gm vemmew?t mCuban anti??stro . organization, the r?Cuban Revolutionary Council, dropped its eXtensive- backing of this most visible example of American assistance to the CUban movement.1 The move came on the heels of an announcement of a tough new pelicy?l of the Justice and State Departments. They planned VI 010% (unknown? . . - .menforcemthe laws breached by anti-Castro Cuban raiders, who-were operating hit?and?run guerilla attacks fnmithe U.S. on Cuban and.Russian targets. These events.resulted in another shuffling of alliances between various Cuban groups, but no bright new hopes. Despite a common desire to overthrow Castro and 'return to Cuba, the exiles differed in many ways. They, represented the extremes of the political left and right and everything in between. Many had carried arms against Batista; others were former Batistianos. They differed h'shcd as to how the counter-reVolution could be Carrie weuuw They differed as-to what type of gouernment and which leaders would take the place of the ousted government.- Unification _of these diuerse stances seemed doubtful. Dr. Paulino Sierra Martinez, a Cuban exile and. lawyer 4654ch from Chicago, hoped to changeralhathate DucId:322?3595 Page 163 uwu?e??, which had.beenssubsidizing' EH 53030 (BHGD But Sierra came with some big ideas and big promises. . page kg: - - '3 (BLVD Arriving in Miami_in May of 1963, Sierra scheduled a series of meetings at a local hotel and invited Cuban exile leaders of all political persuasion to discuss unification for the purpose of military invasion ?5 Cuba.3 645> To. many Cubans the idea seemed ridiculously naive.4 Sierra was hoping to unify elements which had remained ?splintered?throughout most previous efforts, attempting to draw well?known exile leaders when he himself was virtually unknown in the anti- -Castro movement. He claimed to represent a group of Americans in Chicago interested in combining their efforts with those of the Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime with or without-U.S- government approval.5 Sierra told them that- American financial interests would participate on con- -dition there was a true unity of the majority of Cubans_ in exile.6 For military planning he claimed he had.theii ui_f~ assistance of several high-ranking U.S. Navy and Army officers, who would also help arrange for arms and the establishment of training bases in a Latin American country.7 Most surprisingly, Sierra claimed the Chicago backerS', were Willing? lend aSSiS-tance to the extent of $30millioma 9 gg??no small sum even for_ a large-scale government? l. gl'zg' backed Operation. For a private group it was unheard of. . :3 Jo)? .: (3HZ)While many Cubans did not immediately j:m ?nontg;Sierra,s% by July 1963 Sierra had built a coalition of predominantly right?wing anti-Castro groups and attracted. some impressive-names from among the exiles to form an DucId:322?3595_ Page 169 organization called the Junta de Gobierno de Cubu en el exilio,(JGCE Junta of the Government of.Cuba in Exile).9 6343)Among-the groups to join Sierra's junta were the Unidad Revolucionaria faction headed by Juan Medina Vega10 and the ma?or faction of_the 30th of NoVember group headed by Carlos_Rodriguez QuesadalEl Sierra could also boast the participation of Jose "Pepint'Bosch, President or Barcardi_Rum, and Alberto Garrido, a.much?admired Cuban entertainer.12. ?34?)In the selection process by which the Committee chose those anti?Castro groups to be_further investigated, certain factors about the Junta discovered in preliminary research-indicated a need to look more carefully into the purpose_and activities Of this group. 636)The Junta was active during the critical period of- interest.to the Committee. Sierra_surfaced in March the organization abruptly ceasedactivity by' January 1964.14The Committee hoped to discover vhat Sparked the group?s genesis and what contributed to its final demise. I (351)1ts financial backing appeared to be remarkably Vimpressive, and although Sierra claimed the grouo was to received funds.from American companies whose financial -assets in Cuba had been nationalized,-it was widely rumored that the money was actually from "gambling 15 interests" of organized crime.? There were other-rumors that wealthy individuals-from Texas were behind the' NH 5303i] Page, 17?] E??ge group.16The Committee hoped to determine exactly what means were available to the group and from what source. 635%)Preliminary research also indicated that he Secret Service in Chicago was investigating a ?Threat to the President"-case at the time of President Kennedy's -assassination, in which Paulino Sierra was of interest.;7 fhe-Committee wished to explore the nature of the allegation.and-the.extent of Sierra's involvement in. the case.. 1 6353)The Committee was able to obtain considerable information from the contemporaneous investigative reports of the (antral Intelligence Agency, the FBI and Immigration and V?aturalization Service regarding the structure, membership and activities of the Junta. Field interviews V.and research into reports of the Secret Service probed those questions raised by the alleged threats against the PresidentPaulino Sierra Martinez was a talli?g and dapper lawyeraemployed in the Legal Counsel-'5 office of the Union 19 Tank Car Company in Chicago.' Before his immigration to the United States, he had reportedly been employed by Carlos Saladrigas, a minister under Batisti? He had also worked with Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, former senator, during Batista's regime?; Sierra left Havana in 1960 and settled for a time in Miami where he worked as a NH 53030 Page 111 a Judo instructor-and translator (Sierra speaks, reads and writes English, Italian, French and Spanish).221n l962 he moVed to_Chicago and was admitted to the Illinois Bar sponsored by William Browder, general counsel of Union is Tank.Car Company, for whom Sierra soon beganwork.23 1? (SE99 _By early 1963 Sierra had organized a Cuban Lawyer's. Association in Chicago_ and gained somewhat of a reputation as "coordinator" of Cunan activities in the Chicago areaz.4 In March 1963, he was mentioned in an article in the - Chicago Tribune for his active role in Cuban exile affairs 25 in Chicago. Howevg?? he still had not made a national . 'name in Cuban exile affairs. . (.356) Yet. as noted previously, Sierra's meetings with anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami in the spring of 1963, produced the official structure of a Cuban government _in exile by July.268ierra was named Secretary'General, Felipe Rivero Diaz was named Vice Secretary General, Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was appointed head of Internal Affairs;i Juan Medina was to head up finances; Manuel lozano Pino. Was named heads of External Relations; Alberto Garrido was put in charge of Propaganda; Reinaldo Pico was given a position in charge of Labor issues; and Gilberto Rodriguez was asked to run Military Operations.27 .i (35goThe Junta was formed after an organizational meeting in Chicago in June 1963 with Union Tank Car Exannive??ce; 'Preskkn?ggjy. Van Gorkum and General Counsel William Browder. Information regarding the meeting is scant. One source who attended said that Van Gorkum and Browder NH 53030 Page 11;? i-page_6 discussed the unity plan only insofar as suggesting that if the group could successfully establish a government . in erile, it then might be able to obtain U.S. government. support and financing from other sources?az? But evidence exists to suggest that Union Tank Car had a greater role in the Junta. The company.was reportedly paying for Sigrra's personal and travel expenses plush his.salary?lerowder also told FBI agents in October, l963 that although he did not know the identity_of Sierra's backers, he (Browder) kept the group?s funds?under hisf lcontrol to avoid any possible criticism of misappropriation or miSmanagement of funds by Sierragbg?rowder would'not indicate the exact amount under his control other-to say- 38532 _it was ?considerable." (3519 There have been several contradictory reports to the CIA and FBI regarding the source of Sierra?s funds. I Early indicated Sierra's backers here Chicago gamblers. The Miami News headline for an article reporting 52 on Sierra's meetings read "Gamblers Pop Out of.Exile Grab Bag."an The source of such reports is unclear although there are indications it may have been Sierra himself. (5601K Sierra's initial. meetings withh Cubangrgu 5, he was A accompanied by an American.named William Trull, who may have - been responsible for circulation of rumors of the involvermu of gambling interests in Sierra's proposals, but whose ultimate relationship to Sierra is obscure. an interview with the FBI in June 1963, Sierra said Trull had called him after seeing the March.lo article NH 53030 Page 1T3 Page - 35 as labout Sierra in the Chicago Tribune. Sierra said Trull talked about sponsorship of a unified group of Cuban exiles and vaguely mentioned the owner of the King Ranch and a Mr. "Jarvis: who Trull identified as a . we millionaire.in Texas. Sierra said he was concerned abouf Trull being involved with "impure" financial sources, and would lhave nothing further to do with him?B37 (3E3) Trull' 3 story is different. A former entertainer from Dallas, Trull said Sierra had first contacted him? in March 1963 and proposed that he-help Sierra explain . 5 Sierra's plan to the Cuban exiles in Miami?8 Trull said Sierra had wired tickets so that he could join 639? 'Sierra in Miami for the series of meetings with the exiles.- Sierra carefully outlined the proposal Trull was to explain to such Cuban leaders as former Cuban Prime Minister 40 Carlos Prio and Eusebio Mujal, a forme Cuban labor leader. Trull reiterated the plan to the Cubans, telling them he represented wealthy American interests who had a business proposition for the Cuban peeple if they would unify with Carlos Prio as Presidjht and Sierra as Secretary of a provisional government.. (364) Reports by Cubans who heard Trull lend credence to his tale. Trull Was found to be "contradictory" and. @401/ . "vague"-about his plan, asamight.be'expected of a person who was just repeating what he had been told, -: C3 {)Trull later told FBI agents that he had dropped names to Sierra such as Clebryg of the King Ranch} but Sierra . . 1 43 had told him he did not need Trull's financial influence. NH 5303i] Pattie 1T4 NH 53030 page 8 Sierra-claimed, according to Trull, that representatives of Las Vegas or Cleveland gambling interests had contacted him and of ?ered up to $14 million in exchange for 50% interest in gambling concessions in Cuba, provided Sierra was able- to organize a successful ouster. of (ELL) Trull told the FBI that because he had frequently p??iormed befbre Cuban audiences, he felt he had been- chosen by Sierra and used as an "actor5 to sell the cubans mixi- had other assistance at his early meetings on Sierra? .5 plans. as quickly as Trull had. According to a CIA report, one of the promoters for a meeting in May with exiles was George Franci, a Haitian national who had previously been involved in gambling.interestsiinll Havana. Franci' 5 name does not show up as involved 'Jn'cwcur in any later activities of Sierra fm,netab after the stories of gambler' backing hit the newssta nds.' (313)2513 late as July, 1963, Sierra himself was the source- of another report that gamblers were backing him. Miguel A. "Cuco" Lech, a colleague of Manuel Artime Buesa, reported that-when Sierra visited-Nicaraguathat month, he told him he represented U.S. gambling concessions in (3659 Another possible basis for the. stories about Sierra's "gambleris backing" are separate reports Of an actual offer to Chicago Cubans in March 1963. Dr. Cesar Blanco of the Chicago-based Cuban Bar DucId:322?3595 Page 1T5 .HH 53030 Page 9 Association of Illinois reported a meeting of Cuban exiles on March 11, l963f9?2e said that a fBurt Mold. of the 7 American Education League of Los Angeles had asked Bla nco how much money the Cubans needed to work out a program to s? .free Cuba. Mold, according to Blanco, stated that the "Nevada group" would help since the S. government could do nothing. Blanco said that Mold.even offered Blanco. the job of head of police in cuba when the country had- _3357 - . been freedreport of March 1963 reported that Blanco and-l i Sierra had been apptoadhed by gamblers from the west wOrk with them. reported that Sierra'spokei about an offeriof I '510 million in backing fer guarantees of gambling concessions in cuba after Castro was overthrown.f? (357?)1n his public meetings in Miami in May, Sierra; had publicly named the American Educational League i; of Los Angeles as being in support of his group Ehallenged Sierra's claims, Sierra backed -off, u??om?ng he had received assurances of assistance: from other sources.. ngrit is not known whether Mold had made the offer at the beset of the American Educational . 7? League or for some other party. His affiliation with _a - saiegF7K73 - s2 ?3 the League was just as a member. - 632%)If an offer'from gambling interests was ever made; it appears that Sierra either backed away from such an, offer or began to dress it in legitimate clothing after DucId:322?3595 'Page 1T6 page the adverse publicity. (30.3)The backers were identified in public in only the most nebulous terms. Sierra claimed seVeral U. S. companies were behind his plans and these at first were -only iigg??fied as the Lawyer? s- Corporation and the American Bankers. Later, he frequently named such large corporations as_ I United Fruit, ESSO, Standard Oil, DuPont and U.S. Steel, 58 among others. of the FBI closed its investigation ?of Sierra's activites in June 1963, concluding that he was involved in a "con. job" rather than any real activities, hoodlum or otherwise. . (gnu'mS The question'??% who was conning whom? . (?7?5)The 3 decision to close the investigation may have been justifiable at the time, since there was no indication either through money spent or by actual group- sponsoiid operations that Sierra had a viable organization. The activities, however, Were just beginning. . I soon as the organization was formally set up, Sierra and Felipe Rivero left on_a trip to Nicaragua and Colombia plans for a miltary base of operations outside the U. S. The reportedly spoke with Luis Somoza in Nica-- 'ragua and also to obtain the use of the Isle of off of Colombia. It was also reported that Sierra and Rivero traveled to New York, Chicago, St. Louis-and Washington, D.C. to i?vie? meet with hackers and make further arrangements. Later it was 53030 Page sage ll:Ta learned that Sierra alone had spent a little over $11 000 on travel expenses by October 1963. (37? The group was also spending money on arms and equipment by late summer 1963. Rich Lauchli, a well-known arms dealer from Collinsville, 111., was contacted by Sierra in August to purchaSe a quantity of guns.. Soldier-of?fortune and Gerry Patrick Hamming associate, Steve Wilson, was W96 asked by Sierra to deliver the arms to Miami. Sierra 3 Q7 1- ordered a two-man submarine from California in October 1963, which was transported to Miami for storage in the garage . of Cuban exile Manuel Aguilar. (3'73 The FBI received information that Sierra had been on -.an arms shopping spree in Detroit accompanied by Jose Cardoso, and purchased $6000to $7000 worth.of weapons to be transported to Miami. Oginis Harber, another Hamming associate, asSisted Sierra in the transport military equipment. - 79/ Sierra was also holding discussions with several "action" groups for assistance in a military operation against Cuba. ?Amlhg those contacted who reportedly signed "pledges" of support were Aldo Vera Seraf in of the militant MAPA group (American Patriotic Action Movementl;n -Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Antonio Veciana Blanch of the SNFE- Alpha 66 al?iance;, Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez of 1, 13?: . 7 . 1-. Comandos L: Eduardo Idor Ruiz, an independent anti-Castro aha??7f 1 137;, Cuban fighter; and Orlando Bosch of MIRR. 6350' Reports of funds given to those groups indicate Sierra NH 5303i] Page 1TB Saennaswas advancing modest sums from the alleged $650 000 at his disposal. Aldo Vera Serafin reportedly received #97! . . . a7? $3500 an Tony Cuesta.of Comandos received $1000. Members-of the Junta's board of officers also received. 0: =contributions from Sierra. ACarlos Rodriguez Quesada? recieved $2800; Felipe Rivero Diaz received $1890; and Gilberto Rodriguez got SISOOQM. I .623; There are various_descriptions_of the miltary operations: allegedly being prepared by the Junta. On October-30, 1963, information was received that the Second National Front of Escambray had plag: for an operation from a base in the Dominican Republic?1 The arrangements were allegedly being made by Eloy Gutierree Me noyo, head of SNFE, ,a and Abel Camacho in Key West. The plan called for action against a bridge in Oriente Province and had been master- minded by Antonio Veciana and one of the engineers who I had designed the-bridge. Consistent with this information, it was also reported to the FBI that the Junta offered soldier-of?fortune Joe German Sll, 000 to lead a raid. on G83 Oriente Province. (33%9 There were Other reports that an attack on a Havana oil refinery_was planneg5 P(Etill other reports simply indicated that although all-out war against Castro was the objective, a hit-and-run raid for publicity purposes @3187 . would be attempted first. -While all these activites were getting underway, Sierra had some conflict with other officers in the NH 53030 Page 1T9 AHH 53030 page 13a junta- Gilbeto Rodriguez Hernandez was replaced as military 'coordinator in the summer of 1963 because, accordigg to Sierra, Hernandez was feared to be a Castro agenE? turn, Hernandez, who had returned from Cuban prison in April 1963 in the prisoner exchange, called Van Gorkum and Browder at- Union Tank Car Company and comggained' bitterly about Sierra' 3 lack of leadership.an (3 31? After Sierra had signed a pact with Alpha 66- -.SFNE, another member of the Junta, Manuel-Lozano Pino, resigned from his position as head of External objected to the inclusion of such a "left-wing" oifaniza- tion, but also protested Sierra?s expenditures. complaints may have had something to do with Sierra' 5 summons to Chicago in early November l963 for a stormy Session with Browderg.0 Sierra was blasted for wasting funds, reportedly totaling up to $50,000?1 According to sources of .the CIA and FBI, Sierra was accompanied to the-Chicago meeting Wl 'th Armando: leites of SNFE and Browder allegedly ordered Sierra to turn over all monies ,and supplies to the 66 allianc:?' But although several of the-Junta officers had asked for Sierra's replace- ment and had specifically named Jose "Pepin" Bosch as an attractive alternative338ierra remained in place as the . "guiding spirit" for the next two remainder Of the group's existenc A CIA memo reported on November 20,1963 of the strange activities of Sierra and_the Junta:- DucId:322?3595 Page 130 'page Lego" . . - "Although he (Sierra) has been some what ubiquitous among Cuban exile leaders in Miami since March 1963, he still remains somewhat of a mystery-man in terms of his means of and indeed his long?range- 43 a: 7) obj actives . - ?The report also raised the question of how Sierra managed to remain in the exile political scene So long. '?Perhaps his mysterious backers are providing him with sufficient funds to keep the pot boiling for the present, the memo conjectured. 96 I I (588) Indeed, Sierra' 5 activities were not only continuing,. but he also soon found himself subject of interest in a Secret Service investigation into a threat against the President. this (Zif?u0?- ??Afhh?v?bmx? .?kAda??q Hub Fwa? Keyed, ?53 an comrw??lb C?mit? rag/Qrpwep6ton cz?aa96 ~?424 t%k?auf. Page 131 DAVID FERRIE (-3 33%3/ On Monday afternoon, November 25,1963 David ?William Ferrie voluntarily presented himself for ques- tioning to the New Orleans police who were looking for - I: 7 him in connection with the assassination of President' Kennedy. (F?a The New Orleans District Attorneyfs Bfficer'had earlier received information regarding a relationship betwgen Ferrie and accused assassin Lee. Harvey Oswald. {End Among the allegations: Ferrie haa'FWV have. beenacguainted with Oswald since Oswald's days in the? Civil Air Patrol youth organization in 1954-55; Ferrie n?y? 21! had given Oswald instruction in the use of a rifle and 1% - may have hypnotized Oswald to shoot the President; and - that Ferrie was. Texas on the day of the assassination . 3 - ??-have been Oswald's get-away pilot. tEna- (990/ Ferrie denied a1? (15522151145!) at the time of the President's - v-w 'be.ba?d that had been in New_- Orleans, busy with court matters for organized Carlos Marcello, who had been. acguitbd of immigration- related charges that same day. 63a; _Other individuals,' including Marcello, Marcello's_lawyer; the lawyer's secretarysand FBI agent Regis Kennedy.backed up Ferrieis alibi, (reg). an? . r; Ferrie also gave a detailed account of his where?? abouts for the period from the evening of.the assassinatiOn 53030 DucId:322?3595 Page 132 [j NH 53030 informed authorities he had no specific information to support David Ferris - 2 until his'appearance at.the New Orleans police stations (Fn) Interviews of Ferrie's.associates and the results of a field investigation - n1t-Qr;_ Ferrie?s' . i 7 I I statements. (En) . . -1-.H Ferrie? assertion that his Stinson Voyager 0 airplane was unflyable at the time of the assassination 7" . 8 was later verified by the FBI. (Fn) a Jack Martin, .a New Orleans private dete ctive and colleague of am Ferrie) .who had-originally voiced hgagconcerns about Ferrie to New Orleans officials, subsequentl; 7.30.1; views ?3r Vxhari? (- {in 3w 13135.: imam.- FBI and the Warren Oommission concluded th at the stories relating to an Oswald- Ferris relationship were unfounded. F?nnachad. shortly after New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison announced he was reopening the 'Kennedy probe and was interested in Ferrie' 5 activities in l963. While there was much speculation that his death may have been suicide, the New Orleans ?coroner determined the death was a result of natural Mam? 4446 law #145 causes. Hewuuem?=it further fueled suspicion~abm?zkus ajjyities. The Committee determined that-Ferrie's activities during the months prior to the assassination of President DuoId:322?3595 Page 133 David Ferrie 3 Kennedy warranted examination. The Committee-paid particularly close attention to a possible relationship between Oswald and Ferrie. IWhat emerged were several parallels in the life?oftthe two: a complexity of personality and political. belief; a difficulty in attaining normal social adjustment; and a indiden?es of being_in the same locality at the same tim?%involved in similar activities. I m, #9 detailed record of Ferrie' 3 life and associates is available. The Com? mitee examined FBI and Secret Service investigative re? ports generated immediately after the assassination and FBI and INS reports ante? ?dating or post- dating the as- sassination; it received information developed during 'the 1967- -1968 Garrison investigation; andV/ramined the- files of the extensive investigation of Ferrie con-. ?IduCted by the Federal Aviation Administration, Eastern Airlines and the New Or leans police from 1961 to 1963, an investigation whack was the result of criminal charges against Ferris filed in 1961.- inna??ih?ga, the Committee conducted its own field investigation. Ferrie was born in 1918 in Cleveland, Ohiof??l - 11 son of James Howard Ferrie, a police captain angcattorney. (En) 'Ferrie attended parochial grammar and high ~12 here no indicatio?ggis childhood was any~ thing but normal) numerou? NH 53030 Page 1.34 . ?_David Ferriel~ 4? acquaintances and associates of Ferrie reveal that bed grew to be a complex, even bizarre individual. Em ?One aptly stated, "Not inigpropriately, he (Ferris) was described as a paradox." gm I - I His unusual perSOnal- appearanceiwas partially a result of the loss of his body hair a rare dis- 14 ease. (as) and exaggerated fake eyebrows crudely affixed with glued!) 15 whokmv wm Hamm- - conSideredvsloppy and 16 In)? aka"? - unkempt} foul language. .Ferrie was often described as "very aggressive" 1717? .18 and ?highly obnoXious". He resented authority) ?23 was' .- 19 . ,3 opinionated?and often difficult to get along with. 53g} ,6Qwore a makeshift-toupee Yet he was able_to exert a tremendous influence over his/ Close associates, including many young men in his Civil 20 Air Patrol squadron. 1? several Of Ferrie' asiiciates indicate he was. a homosexual and a mysoginist. Silk Hi.s sexual ex- plOitation of younger ?muld eventually cause him numerous problems. i - Although his formal education was not exten? -sive, Ferrie ?35 considered highly intelligent, even. brilliant. QEIF He had originally studied theology in the hope of becoming an ordained priest, but he left seminary schoolzbefore graduation because of "emotional. instability". is?? Later, in 1941, he received a . . . . 24. bachelor of arts degree from Baldwin-Wallace Cellege, NH 53030 Page 135 David Ferrie-? 5 moving 25 . i ii in philosophy. He also received, through a-correspondence course, a doctorate degree in? from an unaccredited school, Phoenix] Uni? I veristy if. Bari, Italy, Wei)! the final board exams. m1 Ferrie spent c0nsiderable time studying A 28 medicine especially the techniques A of hypnosis ng?ch he frequently practiced on his young associates} E630 Ferrie had even set up a laboratory whergf.? 1?4de over his garage a 1 he lost his hair, alternately attributing it to a radiation experiment, chemical explosion and 31 ,3 cancer research experiments. He listed his name . 32 in the telephone book as David Ferrie'w 1. I many friends did erroneouslbeielieve .he was a medical II doctor and a . This Veneer of re-'-I spectability and achievement could be why Ferrie refe3r4'red to his degree as his "most a ?ag) Ferrie was also philosophically and pol?j?tically II complex. He-considered himself a devout Catholic, and. made several attempts to become a priest, he described himself as a "theological liberal". 3% He also toII be liberal in his civil rights 3at-? titude. (I) was rabidl-y anti- Cormunist/ rand frequently critical of each Presidential administration . . . 4 for what he perceived to be sell-outs to Communism- 5 NH 53030 Page 136 NH 5303i] David Ferrie 6 f" .. . . A Qg?g) Ferrie often spoke to business and civic . . 4 groups about politics. Ferrie associates told agents in 1961 -that Ferrie had. been "critical of the Roosevelt it) was trying to .. 1mm am: said drive us into Communism." ?I??YFerrie "was _also critical of4ghe Truman administration for the same- reason. a - - '5%9?9 A Ferrie was asked to discontinue his remarks 6 at a speaking engagement in July 1961 before the New 44 Orleans chapter of the Military Order of World Wars- His topic was the4presidential administration and thei . . Bay of Pigs fiasco.j The organization put a stop. to Ferrie' remarks when he became too critical of Presi- .- dent Kennedy. a He apparently expressed his views to anyone who would listen. During an interview with an IRS _auditor in 1960, Ferrie was "outspoken"- in his derogatory cements about the United States._ He complained bitterly about his alleged tax persecution to such an extent that the agent reported hiathought Ferrie was actually deranged, a ??ii Ferrie' 5 major avocation and occupation, however, was flying. -Even aSSociates who were critica?gof Ferrie' 5 character considered him an excellent pilot. '?lli _An 'early acquaintance believes that Ferrie first started to fly at his father's suggestion? to take his mind off of DunIa:32213595 Page 13? David Ferris his failures at the-Seminary. :55; ?He took lessons- at Sky Tech Airway Service in Cleveland, Ohio between 51 1942 and 19$5; He then worked as a.pilot for an oil drilling firm.which had jobs in South America. When the company went out or teaching at Rocky River High but he was fired in l948for psgihoanalyzing_his stndents instead- of teaching them. '1533 I . (?ga In .1949, Ferrie left the Cleveland area after-' rumors that he had taken several young boys to a house . arena-ltd 55 - of prostitution nul?aand through his neighborhood. pegs Although Ferrie' exaot movements are not known, he' appears to have gone to Tampa, Florida, where he _received - 56 his instrument rating at Sunnyside Flying School-. fags} In 1950, Ferrie returned to Cleveland. He 57 worked as an insurance inspector, and joined the Army Reserve for a three?year stint, leaving with an honorable . 53 - rdischarge in 1953. Life started going well for Ferrie. 'In l9Sl.hei 3. if} submitted an application to Eastern Airlines, omitting details of his past emotional and occupationsl difficulties- 1153 Eastern Airlines hired him imagiami, and soon transferred him to New Orleans. Internal memos for Eastern Airlines indicate Ferrie was accepted for employment, but consideration 'was given to firing him almost immediately for falsify- HH 53030 Page 133 59 DaVid'Ferrie 8 . 61 ing parts of his application. ill? The New Orleans branch was advised to keep Ferrie only until a replace?- ment could be found and a "close watch" on Ferrie' - 62 'progress was gang Initial reports, how-- ever, were favorable. Ferrie was considered by his fellow pilots to b24doing a good job, although he was "odd" at times. Eastern decided tohfhim 0%?W7Xfrd hyg? Ferrie his job enthusiastically, devoting his own time to talking at schools and clubs to promote ingirest in aviation and travel in the South? west area. In 1953, the president of Eastern: .5: wrote him a letter personally commegging Ferrie's - liefforts on behalf of the company.' This early- record of dedication and competence_may have accounted- for Ferrie's longevity as an Eastern Airlines captain, despite" complaints whe years. Ultimately, ?the .infractions became too serious,.and, after a long? rinVestigation and a hearing process which lasted from 1951 until 1963, Ferrie lost his job.j Ferrie had always been deeply engrossed in nother activities related to flying, including the Ciggl Air Patrol, which he had first joined in Cleveland. Over the years his difficulties with the hierarchy and authorities of the Civil Air Patrol would increase, but NH 53030 Page 139 NH 53030 _David Ferrie 9 Ferrie remained intensely popular with many of the -members and enjoyed a reputation as a first rate in? 69 structor and organizer. Ella Jean Naatz, an aviatrix 94-44121 of'national renown, "He had dOne more for the Civil Air Patrol than anyone else and built up 'the squadron to one of the biggest squadrons in the 70 state of tho."p ??ib . fgyg; Ferrie also built the same reputation with - many CAP cadets in the New Orleans area. One CAP com?' mander said, "David-Ferrie is-a good made the CAP at the New Orleans Airport everything it is today. He has a large following among the cadets of the . 71 . CAP, and is an excellent flying instructor." By 1953, there were pabOut 80 cadets assigned_ to his . 72 . squadron. gaag Ferrie spent about six hours a week in official CAP activity and much more of his own time 73 associating with his_cadets. Ferrie became known for his enthusiastic approach to cadet training, emphasi2~ 'ing tutoring in science and mathematics and putting 74 cadets in charge of their own discipline. The squadron, 75 had an award?winning drill team. a??k we w} His appeal to several young men may have been related to his taking an extraordinary interest in them: haggave them flying instruction and flight time in his 76 own airplane; iaat'he often gave parties at his residence 77 where liquor flowed he offered his home as 1a place for the boys to stay when they were.unhappy at Dunld:322?3595 Page 150 He 53030 ?David Ferrie - 10 78 . - home. Gill He urged several boys to- join the armed - 79 - 80 .forces, ill: take careers in aviation ?ll! or en- 81 -=couraged them to join seminaries. Many of Ferrie' cadets became involved in Ferrie' 5 wide spectrum of 82 activities. tw?g/S) Ferrie' 'tremendous influence and close association with these young men eventually became a controversial 83 - th act with many parents. a} Ferrie did not bother to renew his CAP commander 84 charter when it ran out in 1954, IIEB although he con- tinned to wear the insignia of the CAP on his fatigues. 85 .1IIB He did renew his commander charter in 1959, _when i he augmented his cadet' 5 standard CAP rifle training- by instituting an association with the New Orleans Cadet Rifle Club. E, Ferrie also started a group called the. "Falcon Squadron," composed of Ferrie' closest CAP 87 associates. IBIS A group within this group, the "Omni? potents," was allegedly Started to train cadets in what to do in the event of% attack on the United 88 abound. 0.;th States. #erwne, WW him ?ii-lh?e to travel around the country with relative ease. he tOlG OfIlCialS??ll?l ne-frequently traveled to Texas 89 . and other parts Smith, including Miami) visited 90 1 A . New York on occasion. DuoId:322?3595 Page l91 . David Perrie - ll is unknownrhow mu time Fe'rrie was spending .4 in these other-cities. ',31 August 1959, while in Miami, Ferrie was put under a 26- hour surveillance by Customs agents who believed Ferrie was involved. in gun smuggling- Following a brief investigation, in? i pcluding a tapping of his telephone conversations, it was determined that Ferrie was not involved in any illegal, but merely planning an outing for his "scouts". a, lhe_investigation was dropped. I @g?gj Ferrie also became involved in Other activities- In 1959, he had found? an outlet for?is political fanati_. icism in the anti-Castromovement. By early 1961, Ferrie and a young man whom Ferrie had first met in the - CAP, Layton Martens, were working with Sergio Arcacha Smith, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Front delegation in New Orleans. ..-. . - (HM) Ferrie gm became Smith's eager partner in counter? Revolutionary activities. ?e We built two miniature submarines which he planned to use for an attack on Havana Harbor); Wobta?ined several rifles and mortars for the proposed invasion) was reportedly teaching. Cubans how to fly. ?everal of Ferrie?s cadets claigd to have taken. trips to. Cuba in Ferrie's'airplane. a NEEDED Page .7192 David Ferrie - 12 - 1 010) F?rrie was also involved with Arcacha?'smith, adventurer Gordon Novel and LaYton Martens i ?a-raid 1? wM/a? _on a munitionsdump. in Houma, Louisiana.- September~l961, the Border Patrol received informa- tion that Ferrie was attempting to purchase a a, 1 plane for $30,000 and r?%grtedly had a cache of arms in the_New_OrleanS area} Elli 'fhe report was never-I - verified. There were also unverified rePOrts that Ferrie provided Arcacha Smith with perSOnalffinancial_ . ?was . -. assistance.?.ElH - ,ry _Arca?ha ??iEh-wrote Eastern Airlines then? ipresident Eddie Riokenbacker on Ferrie's behalf reqUeste. - myforYQO?davJ pay for . I a I ,?Iri?rk?? 'Myfmaw ?Su? ti: ?rst: . 4:3} .1 if If . s" '35: . @431 ?m ?32:4 1" Peg? my 1E?hg "E?Eit??kr', 3 . "?3qu . ?31.1? 1; 1.39 .. . term-rt, if. H: HS ?Figs/5: Axel?t. . . 1! $335573); Li ?ame?! ?giw wi?g?vih 4? a? we am? :f if" .Vfwf?l'fi. a; 5535?.- . .. 7 .3..- . . we?my? J. - 1' 53'5?? 4 A 8"qu 2 .r .. .7- '23. wt - v?@193. {+325 71;? . . .49. it.? .mxr We?himum?vh?! ?ggt?g?w? 4 ccinc1-ed with the Bay I :Ferrie'sfyacgtio? igo?gril 1961 of Pigs, invasicn. Ferrie' role,? ifany, is. not {he CRC in New Orleans .. was affiliated with the main branch in Miami, which had been receiving funds from the Some of these funds may have been_disseminated to the New Of? ff? leans branch to cover-operating costs. dl?l?llh?ihere is_no evidence errie received funds from either the_CRC or ?Ferrie's assistance and interest appears to have been completely vdluntary. NEEDED Dunld:322?3595 Page-I194 NH 53030 ?David?Ferrie 13_' 64 3?3 Perrie had continued to have 'personal problems.- In 1960 he had provoked the ireIof 108 ?other CAP commander_s while on a cadet campout.j The incident ended with Ferrie withdrawing his cadets '1 - frOm the outing and eventually led to his permanent 109 resignation from the CAP in 1960. ?551 cjlu)"Ferrie' troubles intensified when charges-- wer-e brought against him by parents of boys who had run away from home.0-In one instance, Ferrie had gained entrance to the New Orleans Youth Detention Center to visit one runaway rboy by signing himself in as 111 doctor. ITRB merer?ls (3f ia??r?ne1:I 2 Awas with Ferris. .As a result, alleliih Ferrie was arreSted on August 8,1961 for contributing 113 - to the delinquency of a juvenile. - {gar 62.6) Cuban exile leader Arcacha Smith?* intervened on Ferrie' behalf by telling police that the boy would be returned to his parents if they did not press chargeS' 114 against Ferrie. But Ferrie was arrested'again on ?1 . August 21,1961 for crime against nature on gaunt-r 15- 115 Vyear-old boy and indecent behavior with three others. Smith was having problems of his own. He had moved the office of the CRC to the New-? man Building at 544 Camp Street in 1962, but lack of funds caused him to leave town in mid? 1962, his reputation among anti-Castro Cubans tarnished by his association with Ferrie.- He. was also accused by several Cuban exiles of misappropriation of funds. 116 IDunId:32213595 Page 195 David Ferrie 14 .999] An intensive INew Orleans police investigation of the charges -againSt Ferrie p.roduced statements from 'several Rays that Ferrie had committed indecent acts 5 with them. The boys also told investigators Ferrie had toLd them he had had homosexual relations with a married 118 man.in HouSton. On August 26, Eastern Airlines 119 - removed him from the payroll for an- indefinite period 1- and the Federal Aviation Administration then opened its: 120 own investigation into the charges_. With his problems mounting Ferrie sought-'3 legal aid from New Orleans attorney G. Wray Ferrie later IteStified that he and Gill had entered into an agreement in March,,1962 that Gill would represent .Ferrie in his legal difficulties in return for Ferrie' 122' research and investigative wo rk on other cases for Gill- (q 50) Ferrie also testified that he also entered into - 123 - a Similar arrangement in with Guy Banister,? 124 a former FBI agent who ran a private IinveStigativeI firm.. 'By the terms of the agreement; Ferrie' sI wOrk for Banister included analyzing autopsy reports in payment for Banister' investigative service:?5 Banister stated 'he handled Ferrie' 5 case "personally"?26I Ferrie may have first met Banister late Iin 1960 ?or early 1961 when Banister, also a strong anti?Communist, was helping to establish the "Friends of DemocIratic Cuba; 7 organizationI as a adjunct to Sergio Arcacha Smith's CRC- At the.time, Banister's investigative business and the NH 53030 Page :196 NH 53030 David_FerrierCRC were both located in the Balter Building; -In Febru? 'ary, 1961,.Banister was conducting background inVesti? ?gation-s of the ngbers of the CRC from a list provided by Arcacha Smith.. In early, 1962, both moVed their offices to the Newman Building?owhich carried the two. addre.sses for the it faced: 3 31 Lafayette" and 544 Camp Street. ?(591 Jac?3?artin, a private investigator asSociated With Banister, may also have been cOnt acted by Ferrie ?1 for assistance on-his case. Ferrie testified in August 1963 that he had helped Martin on a case involving a- phoney religioE?30rder in Louisville, Kentucky in November, 1961. Later, Martin wrote letters to the FAA-- and Eastern Airlines on Ferrie' behalf.s (i1433;}? eussiJstaxnze, :FEI??ie-??afiLaha?i?tC?IEEFJ- 'solve many of his difficulties.l At the end of February-A 1962, Ferrie3?as tried and acquitted of the charges of extortion. Egg other charge 5 were nolle proseguied in November 1962. Ferrie Wmanaged to stay afloat financially despite his loss of income from Eastern Airlines in_ 1961. .Although he was categori-zed as a "poor" credit risk in 137 October 1962 by the New Orleans Retail Credit Bureau,? .Maab 138 . Ferrie.??gmow. ?1 payments on his Garland moat liVing expenses. Meanwhile he was also attempting to be reinstated as an Eastern pilot.? Attorney G. Wray G111 notified Eastern when the last of the charges DuoId:322T3595 Page 19? NH 53030 Dayid Ferrie - 16Tl 139 .1 against Ferrie had been nol1e prosequiedj Eastern re? sponded with a letter inviting Ferrie to discuss the 140 141 ?charges at a meeting in Miami. Ferrie did not go. Instead, severa} individuals, including one ef the boys4?ho?had'heen named inra sex offense charge against him, {gate to Eastern to plead that Ferrie be rein?_ statedi?4Ferrie also filed a fgrievance" against. Eastern. Then, in February, 1963, he went to Miami with attorney Gill for the hearigg regarding his dis? missal..IEasti?% ruled against_hin; -Ferrie filed anf other grievance.148 64535). Hearing dates Were scheduled and rescheduled. During this period, ?Ferrii4gas often seen at Banister's of.fices in 544 Camp Street as he prepared his case 613%; Ferrie' final 15grievance hearing was set for July 15, 1963, in Miami. -Ferrie, Gill and Banister- were in Miami on July 15, 16, and 11_ whi1e Eastern Air- 5 Alines presented its case against Ferrie. The record of these.hearings reveal that the company's charges were - based on Ferrie's deliberate omissions and inaccuracies? in his original app_1ication to the company; charges of Ferrie' moral turptitude; and his having miggep reSented himself as a medical dOctor and 7153 33) The hearings were resumed on August 5th. _Testi~ 'fying in Ferrie' 5 defense were former CAP-cadet John DucId: 32213595 Page 1793 David Ferrie 17? Irion, Ferrie's long-time friend 154_. Ferrie' investigator Guy Banister and Ferrie himself. - Layton Martens provided a sworn deposition in defense . 55 of Ferrie' 5 character. Banister testified to Ferrie' good charaCter supposedly based on his oWn investigation of Ferrie. En cross?examination Banis ter could not rationalize to the satisfaction .of_ the hearing board the reasons for Ferrie? vituperative remarks in., 157 1961 against President Kennedy? nor could headquuaItelyI? lexplain Ferrie?isgnvolvementhith a'questionablyIlegiti?I mate church group. . I szg) OnISeptember 30, Ferrie rec??xdethe final . . decision from the, Ela'GsItern appeal board: IQ unanimously upheld his dischargethe Fall of 1963, Ferrie had become actively involved in the defense investigation of Federal I charges of a fraudulent birthICertificate-against Carlos 6 Marceagi, an alleged organized crime leader in heoni? . leans. . I - . ?gu),Ferr1e ties to the Marcello organized crime family apparently continued at least until July 1966. As of that time, Ferrie was involved with Jacob Nastasiy a known associate of the Marcello family who had been the subject-of an FBI probe of racketeering in the New Ofleans area, in a commercial cargo airline venture, Space Airfreight Lines, Inc.leQPreviously he had been involved in the United Aiiggaxi Service with - other suspected Mdrcello associates. .. (414;) Ferrie' involvement with lair-cello may have begun as early as the Spring of 1961. An unconfirme.d 144:!? 15.1 Immirir? and hamrauzm'm fer: . Border Patrol report of *February 1962V alleges that Ferrie was the pilot who flewI Carlos Marcello back into the . United States from Guatemala after he had been deported in April 1961 as part of the U. S. Attorney General 165? Robert Kennedy' 5 crackdown on organized crime. This- HH 53030 Page 199 David Ferrie 5 18 may have helped Ferrie establish an enduring relation- ship with the Marcello organized crime family. {4&5 The return of Harcello to the United States-? chronologically coincided with r1e 5 activities with the Cuban-Revolutionary Counseggz?According Quiroga, a Cuban who had been involved with the i - Ferrie often provided Arcacha Smith with fund} 5%?iWhj, _"Ferrie lent him (Arcacha Smith)_ money when he needed it for his (Ferrie) had -hundred dollar bills around all the time," even after- he had lost his job with the airline?!l!i _i 6%qgo 4An FBI report of April, 1961 indicates Mar?- cello offered Arcacha Smith a deal whereby Marcello would-make a substantial.dOnation to the moVement in return forcessions in Cuba after Castro's over?' throw. One explanation of Ferrie's ability to provide.? funds to Arcacha Smith may be that he acted_as MarcellO's financial conduit.' I A i I. I Another indication of an early Ferrie relationu ship with the Marcello organized crime family may be the legal assistance Marcello lawyer, Jack Wasserman, - to Ferrie associates, Layton Martens, who idw himself to 1? - police as :gcacha Smith?s second?in-command, and Andrew Blackmon- th had been arrested shortly after Ferrie's NH 5303i] Page NH 53030 'he refused to press charges against David Ferrie -?19 arrest for indecent behaviO'y? ?)Ferrie' ties to the Marcello organized crime family continued through his associat_ion . .ms. With wray Gi_ll. Sr., who was also attorney of re? I 174 A cord for Carlos Marcello. ?5c4?> Ferrie told the FBI that he had begun work. - on Marcello' 3 case after his last Eastern grievance 175 hearing. auaguums:lh telling- the Bureau about his (8 work for Marcello he mentioned only activities in 176 October and November. @347) He said he went to Guatemala on business for Marcello from October 11th 18th and from. October 30th to NoYember lst. The day after Marcello's? trial stagged, ?November 5th, Ferrie'purchased a .38 revolver. On the. weekends of November 9th and 16th,; Ferrielsgayed at Churchill Downs, Marcello' estate. He said highad gone there to map out strategy for Marcello' 5 trial. THE DAY THE PRESIDENT WAS SHOT 6?13) New Orleans Polic_e -reeords for November 22,1963 indicateijmt Guy Banister pistol-whipped Jack Martin on the evening of the assassination in a heated 181 - argument over?long? ?distance telephone calls." Although Martin reported the assault to the police., ?lmmaker 182 Within 48 hours, hovever, Martin had the entire New Orleans DucId:322?3595 Page 201 NH 53030 David Ferrie 20' ?56 police department out hunting for David Ferrie.. He~' MQVR told the policeighat Ferri??hudib?en involved in the a ca d?ci Kennedy assassination. hat Ferrie was in -. Texas on the day of the asSassination; that he was supposed .to have been the getaway pilot in the assas~? sination; and that Ferrie had known Oswald from their - 'days together in the Civil Air Patrol, when Ferrie had. 185; given Oswald instructions in the use of a rifle. In an attempt to locate Ferrie for questioni-ng, police arrested two Ferrie associates, Layton Martens s?residence and charged them with vagiggcy. Beauboeuf was uncooperative during he the queStioning) Martens was more talkative. EB said ."Gill had come by to relay a message to Ferrie that his 189 library card was found among Oswald's effects 1?59 9 Ferri?e returir?ejd to New Orleans on the after? noon of November 25th. He_and ig?orney Gill appeared at the DA's office around 4:30 p.ml He was questioned" by the New Orleans police, the U. S. Secret Service 192 . 193 and the FBI. He denied ever seeing Oswald b?fOre. 1&2 Ferrie said that he had been in New Orleans until.at least 9 p.m. on November 22nd, celeggiting Marcello's trial victory at the Royal Orleans. He'said? he then left Egg city with two friends for a little rest and.relaxation. Ducld:32213595 Page 202 l' -. David Ferrie 4 2l G}?ag Ferrie's account of his travels between Novem- 3 . a ber 22nd and November-25th contains some conta?ictions.' .Ferrie said he left New Orleans by automobile, bound for Houigen and?accompanied by Melvin Coffev and Alb-I Beauboeuf. ThelggoupI checked in at the Alamotel early' on ?November 23rd. That date on the motel registration 1 198 card was written over a NOvember 22nd notation. Juggl?an, 4~15? motel employee said that was because of the however morning hour 0? the check-iE?Yand that he is certain. of. 99 the correct date as the 23rd. I . On the afternoon of the 23rd, IFerrie- said, he, . IBeauboeuf and Coffey went figure skating at the Winter- 200 ?m land Skating Rink. 11-. -- The three then went to the Belair Skating Rink befo re driving One hour to Galveston, Texas, where Ithey arrived at9p.210.2 and. shortly after, checked into the Driftwood: Motel. I I I . Ii?f?3?)I times for the Houston and GalveSton hotels conflict. IAlamotel records in Houston indicate-that Ferrie and his friends CheckedIinto 'the hotel early ogoghe 23rd-and did not leave until 8 or 9 p. m..on the 24th. Yet the registration records and witnesses at the Driftwood in Galveston show- the three registering2%2te on the 23rd and checkingIout at 10 a.m. on the 24th. I - (fi?ftf Records frongge motels indicate the group made' a number 0f phone calls. Two calls made from the Ala- HH 53030 NH 53030 DaVid Ferrie 22 . - . . motel went to radio stations WSHO and WDSH leans. A collect call went'to the Town.and Country ?Motel, marcello's-New Orleans headquarters: (46(3) Evidence indicates that Ferrie' conducted his. own investigation into the Kennedy assassination. Oswald's former landlady in New Orleans, Mrs- Jesse Garner, told the Committee that? as she recalls, Ferrie visited her home on the night of the assaSsination and i . . 208 .-- . asked about Oswald's-library card. Mrs. Garner would. . - - 9 vnot talk to Fe 7 .43 - . 45?s .9 a 2?1??ng ,2 . t?,re?w 1 a several former I i ?if? a . of the_Civil Air Patrol to find out if any" former cadets recalled Lee Harvey OsWald in Ferrie's squadron.? Among thoSe contacted was former cadet Roy.; McCoy, who told the FBI that Ferrie had come by looking for photographs of the cadets.to see if Oswald wash; - - 2m DucId:322?3595 Page_?04 1r - $3 pictured in any photos of Ferrie?s squadron- . 15p: I NH 53030 544 CAMP STREET . August 9, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald was.arrested on Canal Street in New Orleans and charged with disturbing A the peace. The arrest was the result of a confrontation with anti-Castro Cuban exile Carlos Bringuier and two of his associates, Miguel Crus and Celso Hernandez.2 IOswald was handing out projCastro leaflets3when Bringuier,' Hernandez and Cruz approached him.4 When Hernandez tried to take the leaflets from Oswald, a shouting match beganisffhe New Orleags police then intervened, arresting 'all four individuals. Samples of the literature were confiscated by the I police.7 One of the pamphlets bore the hand? ?stamped bimprint of an address for the Fair Play for Cuba' Committee-a?EWhiCh Oswald was the-president and only member: in New Orleansu-as"544 Camp Street, New Orleans, La."8 (AbifThis pamphlet was among the materials turned over by the New Orleans police department to the Secret Service following the assassination.9 The Secret ServiCe and the FBI then set out to investigate the 544 Camp Street address.lo These agencies established several facts: egg} The address had been stamped with a home printing kit in the same manner Oswald had stamped other literature with his alias J. Hidell? or H. Oswald,"llindicating ?it was bleswald's own hand that the 544 Camp Street address was printed on the pamphlet.' (lib?) It was learned also that Oswald had written to the national president of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, DucId:322?3595 Page 205 NH 53030 544 Camp page 2 Vincent T. Lee, on August 1, 1963, eight days before his . 12 I arrest. In the letter, Oswald mentioned he had rented an office for his local FPCC chapter, but was told to vacate after three days because the building was to be 13 remodeled. FBI and the Secret Service investigation apparently focused on whether or not Oswald actually 14 had rented an office at the 544 Camp Street address. In interviews with the FBI and the Secret Service, the building owner, Sam Newman, denied renting an office 15 to Oswald. I Others renting office space at 544 Camp' Street were qUestioned and none recalled seeing OswaldI l6 at the Newman building or elsewhere. in New Orleans.'~ #Mgg the course of that investigation?the Secret Service received information that an office in the Newman Building had been rented to the Cuban Revolutionary 17 Council fromI October 1961 through February 1962. Leaders ?of the CRC were contacted and asked if they had any associa-- tion with or knowledge of Oswald or the Fair Play for Cuba . 18 Committee. The Cubans said they-had none because they had vacated the building fifteen months prior to Oswald's 19 . ?znj The investigation of a possible connection between -20 . Oswald and the 544 Camp Street address was closed. The Warren Commission finding? concurred with the SecretI Dunld:322?3595 Page 544Camp page 3 Service report that no additional evidence had been found to indicate_ Oswald ever maintained an office at the 544 Camp Street address.21 (46? The Committee investigated the possibility off a connection between Oswald and 544 Camp Street with results. 97? The Committee learned?ggfits research that the Newman building occupied the corner lot facing Lafayette Square. On one side its address was 544 Its other entrance was addressed 53l Lafayette-Street?3 It was a three-story granite structure owned and operated by Sam Newman as a rental income property for commercial - offices.24 Committee interviewed Sam Newman and other witnesses ?to?obtain a complete list of the occupants of the building for the period from May, 1963, when Oswald arrived in New gOrleans, to September, 1963, when he departed.? {fa?Newman told th:e Committee he had great difficulty 'renting space in- the buidling?5 Consequently, there were few tenantsyin the_ summer of 1963; The Camp Street address I was the main entrance to offices for two worker' associations: the Hotel, Mo tel and Restaurant Worker's Union and the Amalgamated of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America?? It was also the entrance - which led to the guarters of the the building's janitor, 27 James Arthus. There was only one Office at the Lafayette NH 53030 Page ill]? NH 53030 544 camp page 4 Street address, that of Guy Banister Associates, a private investigative-firm.28 The offices once rented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council at 544 Camp still lay empty.29 "Mancuso'S", a small coffee shop, was located on the ground floor with its own entrance onto the corner of Camp and Lafayette. streets.3O 691%)The Committee located and interviewed individuals associated with these organizations. Whenever possible, the Committee obtained relevant records from -the organizations.to-check for any link to Oswald or persons implicated in the assassination investigation. The Cdmittee investigation produced no evidence of any connection between Oswald and any person or organizations occUpying the Newman Building in 1963, except for that involving Guy Banister's private detective agency. (QnyBefore launchaag-EHEe-a discussion of the investigation nu??bbua? SEES fan of the Banister office, Mavens-Wthe results of the investigation into the other occupants of 544 Camp Street. I (ufl? The Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employees Union is _known today as the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartender's Union (International)?L Although the Committee was unable to locate personnel who had worked in the office at 544 Camp Street'and had been interviewed by the Secret Service following the assassination, tg: Committee did obtain a "master" membership list "the union. The lists contained names'of members for th years 1962 through 1964 and were studied for names of associates DucId:322?3595 Page BUB HE 53030 544 Camp Street page 5 of OSwald or others of interest in the investigation. Among the names appearing on.the list as a member from .. 33 October 30. l962,"through April 1963" was Kerry Thornley, who had been an acquaintance of Oswald' for three or )1nF4? four months when both were stationed at the El Toro Marine . 34 Corps base in Santa A?h. California.- Laterj Thornley iwhx? learned' ?ggm newspaper accounts?of Oswald' defection 35 to the Soviet Union. Thornley found the story so interesting - 36 that he set out to write a novel based on Oswald's defection. (LFKV Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation of Kerry Thornley uncovered nothing of significance in the appearance xof Thornley's name on the list of members of the union; As reflected in the union's records, Thornley dropped his 37 membership after April 1963. Thornley had left New Orleans to travel to.California and Mexico and did not return to 38 New Orleans until August 1963, leaving little overlap of time in which Oswald and Thornley could have possibly come in contact (973 Ihcn?eylu? ?um?yckmiai? contact with Oswald at 544 Camp Street in New Orleans or 39 . at any time since his Marine Corps days. ?His statements Mum-w? lave} . zu~rw~" w?w=sw and no evidence have been has been found to contradict him. (?6235Committee Inuashigatars located and interviewed George S. Gay, present president of the Amalgamated Association of 49 Street Electric Railway and Motor Employees of America. Gay 32213595 Page 20-9 544 Camp Street page 6 - 4l - has been president of the union since 1960 and confirmed for the Committee that the union's office was located in the I 42 . Newman Building in 1963. While Gay reiterated what he had told Secret Service agents, that he did net recall ever 43 seeing Oswald in the building, he told the Committee he was not in the office very much due to frequent business 44 trips. He said he did not mingle with the other tenants . 45 a in the building. Gay believed the unionis secretary at the time, Mrs.-Eugenia Donnelly, would have more information 46 about others in the Newman Building. Subsequent attempts to locate Donnelly proved futile and she is believed to be deceased.47 Unfortunately, she was not questioned by investi-' 'gating officials following the assassination of President Kennedy. I (2/77) Jack Mancuso, owner of Mancuso's Coffee Shop located ?n the ground floor of the Newman Building, was interviewed by Committee investigators and queStioned about his customerg? Mancuso recalled that Guy Banister and_his associates Jack Martin and David Ferrie were "steady" customers, but Mancuso Pemcnany 7 49 c0uld not?recall ever having seen Oswald.r Mancuso was not interviewed by FBI or Secret Service agents following the assassination?0 - I James Arthus was interviewed by Secret Service agents immediately following the assassination.51He told the agents that an unknown man had attempted to rent an office 52 at 544 Camp Street, but that he had discouraged him. Arthus could not describe the awn and recommended the agents WESUBD Pag3721? 544 camp Street page 7 speak with "Mrs. Downing", presumed to be Mrs. Donnelly, since she had also seen the man and could possibly provide a description of him.53 As pointed out above, Mrs. Donnelly was notinterviewed by either the secret Service of~the FBI on this matter. Arthus could not be interviewed by the Committee because he died in 1967.54 The FBI andije Secret Service apparently failed to question all the occupants of 544 Camp Street, including a witness who may have had information about a man who had attempted to rent space there. While the FBI did speak to Guy Banister, there is no indication from the report of tm?zinterview that Banister was asked any questions about Oswald.. Instead, he was asked about 55 Sergio Arcacha Smith and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The overall investigation of the_544 Camp Street issue at the time of the assassination was not thorough. It is not surprising, then, that significant links Were never discovered during the original investigation. The Committee concentrated on an investigation of the activities and individuals in and around the office of Guy Banister, ?since this was the area of the least investigation in .the days following the assassination. Various resources cwduV were tepped.by the Committee for information regarding see original" Banister and his colleagues - documents from Banister's office collected during the 1967?69 investigation into the Kennedy assassination by the New Orleans District Attorney; investigative reports OL- HH 5303i] Page 211 NH 5303i] 544 Camp Street page 8 the District Attorney's office dating from that investigation; materails amassed during the 1961-63 investigation of David Ferrie by Federal Aviation Administration officials 'including transcripts of Ferrie's grievance hearings; information obtained from Aaron Kohn of the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans; and information obtained from reviews of relevant files of the FBI, Secret Service, DOD and CIA. In addition, the Committee interviewed mag? surv1v1ng witnesses?many of whom had worked for or with Guy Banister. egg?i According to one of Banister's own biographical sketches dated March 1964, he was born in a log cabin in Egral Louisiana in 1901, the eldest of seven children. l' g; started his career in criminal justice with theAMonroe, :1 5. 5 71? Louisianaipel?ee??epertmen:. In 1934 he became a Special Agent for the agency of the Department of Justice Wh$Gh?~ 58 was soon to be named the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Banister served in the FBI for 20 years, 17 of those years as Special Agent in Charge?9 He retired in 1954 to become an assistant superintendent for the New Orleans police department and was assigned the task of investigating police corruption.6OAfter a falling out with the Mayor- of New Orleans, allegedly over Banister's attempt to have the Mayor* indicted on charges of "malfeasance, etc.?, Banister quit public service and formed his own private DucId:322?3595 Page 212 544 Camp Street page 9 - - 61 detective agency, Guy Banister Associates, Inc._ a .3, . . RHEQEAccording to FBI files reviewed by Committee staff, Banister also became very active in anti?Communist activities after his seperation from the FBI and testified before various investigatin bodies about the 62 dangers of Communism. The CIA file on Guy Banister indicates the Agency utilizing Guy Banister AssociatesE?s a cover mechanism Scr?m?cm Bar; Inc. 63 for collecting foreign intelligence? 'The idea was dropped.when "derogatory"\data about Banister was 7L. discovered during the Agency's security investigation i into Banister's background the files indicate there if 64 was some concern over Banister's clash with the Mayor. 5 Early in 1961, Banister helped draw up a charter for_ the Friends of Democratic Cuba, an organization set up as the_fund-raising arm of Sergio Arcacha Smith's branch - 65 of the Cuban'Revolutionary Council.Z ??ay?hn??e?ugmm?F Banister described his work for the Council: "Our work was primarily to gather food and clothing for the refugees. However because of my being known in connection with that, A ang7 my background being known with Arcacha sm?ih and others, I have had high?ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking_me how to go underground, and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have ,slipped out and slipped back."66 {{?riThe FBI files also indicate Banister wasvforming 'x another service for the Cuban exile group. He ran backround investigations o? those Cuban students on the\ NH 53030 Page 213 '544?Camp Street page 10 campus of Louisiana State University who wished to be members of Arcacha Smt?h's anti?Castro group, ferreting . 67 Er; ?55,17 out an'y pro? Castro sympathizers who might be amongathem. 31.1134 f'r? 1-5-13 {:53 55? riJ g; .r?J?l i133: E: ?5 52.4.; .rk'l. h, ., It _was probably a result. of such anti?Castro activities with David an Eastern Airlines pilot, was also very active with Sergio Arcacha Smith's anti?Castro group. Ferrie shared ,s-e-jm Banister' anti- Communist and anti? Castro fervor. Both Ferrie and Banister mam um?ia?edin a raid in late 1961 against a munitions depot in Houma, Louisiana, in which W7) various weapons, grenades and ammunition were stolen. Banister's role may have been limited to storing the materiel which was reportedly seen stacked in Banister's $i?72r back robm by several witnesses. . Others who actually participated in the raid, include Andrew Blackmon, a Ferrie associate and former_Civil Air Patrol cadet, and Sergio a Arcacha Smt?h. 1? 'vfk?; Jr {[1153 InFebruary 1962, Ferrie camem?emaskaanister assistance .. .- 4371? in fighting his recent dismissal from Eastern Airlines.. Si; ,2 u: Banister investigated the case for Ferrie's defense to charges brought by the airline and local Orleans police of crimes against nature and extortion. In exchange, Ferrie provided Banisg?r research serviceslsuch as analysis of autopsy reportsJ?5.Banister worked with Ferrie' lawyer, -G. Wray Gill, on this matter until its culmination in Ferrie's hearing before the Airlinepilot' gr?ammce board in the 160? summer Of 1963. Banister testified on Ferrie' behalf NH 53030 Page 2-14 544 Camp Street page ll during those hearings. According toAstatements of witnesses; in the fall of 1963, Ferrie and Banister worked together again with G. Wray Gill for the defense of New Orleans 17 organized crime head Carlos Marcello on adeportation case:%a Little is known of Banister's exact contribution to that investigation which ended in acquittal on the very day. &3 T9 and almost the very hour that President Kennedy was shot. The long?standing relationship of Ferrie and BaniSter is significant since Ferrie became a susgz?t in the Kennedy 'assassination soon after it had occurred. IThe information to the District Attorneyfs office that had put thespotlighgd on Ferrie had emanated from Banister associate, Jack Martin. As detailed elsewhere in the report, although Ferrie was ~cleared of suspicion in the assassination during the _original investigation, the Committee found persuasive evidence of an association between Ferrie and Oswald. was questioned by the FBI following the assassination in regard to the activities of the CRC at 544 Camp Street, the FBI and the Secret Service failed to discover the significance of Banister's connectibn to 544 Camp 7 Banister's close association with a suspect in the assassination, David Ferrie; and Banister's close association with Ferrie's accuser, Jack Martin -- all of Which begged the.question of what; if?anything,? was Banister's relationship to Lee Harvey Oswald. <641)Witnesses interviewed by the Committee indicate NH EBDBEL Paglau?l? -544 Camp StreEt page 12 Banister was aware of Oswald and his Fair Play for Cuba Committee before the assassination. Banister's brother, Ross Banister, who is employed by the Louisiana 'State Police, told the Committee that his brother had mentioned seeing Oswald hand out Fair Play for Cuba literature on one occasion. 'Ross Banister theorized Osywald had used the 544 Camp Street address on his literature to embarass Gui; Ross.Banister did confirm Guyfs interest in the assassination and OSwald, but knew of no direct association between Oswald and Banisteg? {U?Z)Iwan E. "Bill" a friend and business assOciate and former FBI agennq corroborates that Banister was' cognizant of Oswald's leaflte distributing. was deposed by the Committee in July 1978. He testified that he had known Banister when they were both in the FBI and for a short time worked for Banister in the office in the Newman Buildingi? said he never saw Lee Harvey Oswald at 544 Cam Street and does not know if Banister ever met Oswaldi recalls that Banister became "interested in Oswald" during the summe of 1963 when Oswald had been distributing handbills. recalls Banister had some of these handbills in his office or made reference to them?) From the context of the conversation, however, he was not pleased.9i (LJQEODelphine Roberts, Banister' 5 long? time friend and secretary, stated to the Committee that Banister had gotten NH 53030 Page. 216 544 Camp Street page_13 very angry with James Arthus and Sam Newman over Oswald?s 91 use of the 544 Camp Street address on his handbills. (LHS) The Committee questioned Sam Newman regarding Robertsf allegation. Newman could not recall ever seeing . . . Oswald or renting space to him. He did recall, however, asking a young man who was in the office once used by the Cuban Revolutionary Council to leave. Newman did not think this person was Oswald Newman theorized that if Oswald was using the 544 Camp Street address and had any link to the building, it would have been through a connection to the Cuban Revolutionary Council or Banister's office? The Committee questioned other individuals once afi?giated with Guy Banister, including: Joseph Negprough7D?kun r; aa investigator?who had worked with Banister in 1963; Mary Helen Brengel, one of two secretaries in Banister' 5 office fu' . .1 from approximately June 1963 to December 1963; Louise Decker, a secretary in Banister's office for the period from October 1961 to January 196;: Joseph Oster, one time partner of Banister' 5 who set up his own private detective i agency, Southern Research, in {232; and Carlos Quiroga, the Cuban exile who-visited Oswald at his home on approximately August 16,1963, endeavoring to learn more about the Quiroga told the Committee he frequently visited Banister's office and Mancuso's coffee shop in the company of Sergio Arcacha Smith and David Ferrie when all were heavily involved in Cuban exile activitieg?. However, 103 this would have been in 1961 and 1962. None of these NH 53030 Page '21? 544 Camp Street page 14 individuals recalled seeing Oswald at 544 Camp Street. Several witnesses recommended the Committee speak with Jack Martin or Delphine Roberts since the were in most contact with Banistegg; and Roberts have both been interviewed by 'the Committee on several occaSions. Roberts, who initially refused to speak with the Committee staff, told the Committee she was very active.in anti-Communist activities' in the early 1960's?p She said she worked with Banister as a volunteer typing correspondenCe, making files and clipping newspapers becauSe Banister was working for what Roberts believed in: Roberts claimed Banister had an extensive file on Communists and fellow travelers, including one on Lee Harvey Oswald, which was kept out of the original files because B3;;ster "never got aaround to' assigning.a number to it? Roberts does not remember what was in the file other than that it contained general information on Oswald such as newspaper clippinggi Roberts also related the incident described previously in this section in which_Banister became angry over Oswaldls use 25?" undueCamp.Street address.?? Roberts ?u?mher?m?na??dwher.version of an incident that took place late in the evening on the day of the assassination. She said Jack Martin came into the office and approached the area of the office where the' files were kept, when Banister walked i{??lBanister accusedl Martin of stealing several files-and hiding them in his coa?z/ When Martin protested, Banister pulled out his gun and NH 53030 Page :13 NH 53030 544 Camp Street page 15 Mr - struck Martin on the head, causing him to bleed.- Both men then went into Banister' 5 private office and continued jfb$s\\? their discussion beyond Roberts' earshot. Wan? quDuring another 1nterv1ew, Roberts told the Committee that Oswald came into the office seeking employment and sometime later brought Marina in with him. Contrary to her statements in the inital interview, that she had never seen Oswald, she stated that she saw Oswald come inito Bansiter' office on several occasions.. BeCause of such contradictions in Roberts statements to the Committee and lack of independent corroboration of many of her statements, the Gemmittee reliability of her 1w? New Orleans Pelice Complaianiled by Jack Martin gm November 22, 1963 corroborates Roberts' story insofar as it established Banister' assault against Jack Martin with the pistol. g?tording to the report, Martin andeanister had been drinking at alxm neighboring the Newman Building, then visited the Banister's office and, became involved in various discussions about "personal and as? politicai then began to argue about unauthorized long? ?distance telephone calls which Banister - 2.9 m? accused Martin of making from the office. The discussion ?became more heated and Banister pulled out a .357 magnum revolver and hit Martin on the head four or five times with the ?d?hi?7 butt of the gun. When Martin began to bleed, Banister stopped hit-ting him and Martin went to the restroom to clean up Banister told Martin to watch himself and be DucId:322?3595 Page 219 NH 53030 544 Camp Street page 16 I24 careful.? Martin then went to Charity Hespital for trea 14s? returned home and called the police to file the report Martin refused to press charges as Banister was "like a [2,3 father" to him. was questioned by the Committee regarding the incident and fOr information about Banister's office. Martin told the Committee he is a part- time investigator 13v? and writer, as he was in the early 1960' s. Martin was one of the members of Banister' investigative "pool" 323 i2.? and was frequently in and out of Banister's offce. Martin told the Committee that on Novagber 22, 1963, he was having ?249?Ehr drinks with Banister at a local bar and they got into an argument. 1?ey went to Banister's office and, in the heat of the quarrel, Banister said something to which Martin replied, "What are you going to do -- kill me like you all did Kennedy?" aw, Banister drew his pistol and beat Martin in the head. Martin beleives Banister would have killed him but for the intervention of Banister' secretary, who pleaded with Banister not lea-a; to shoot Martin. (Sfl) It was the day after this incident that Martin related his suspicions about David Fe??fe to the New Orleans District Attorney' office. Martin had at one time been a close associate of Ferrie. Ferrie told the FBI he met Martin in the fall of 1961, probably not long after Ferrie had met Banister. Martin apparently shared. Ferrie' interest_in obtaining a?position.with an ecclesiastical order, although Ferrie insisted he became involved with HE 53030 labout having seen Oswald, 544 Camp Street page 17 these religious orders only to assist Martin in an ?i (I?m ?41,1 HEW investigation into the sale of phony certificates 51:33 of ordination and consecration. Ferrie said he and Martin had a falling out when he put Martin out of attorney G. Wray Gill's office in June, 1963Ibecause Gill did not want Martin "hanging around the office." Gill said Ferrie and Martin had been "close friends" until they got involved in an "eCClesiastical deal wherein Martin was supposed to represent a large territory of the Holy Apostolic.Catholic Church of North America? Martin held Ferrie responsible.for not getting the job and has "slandered - mil-35' Ferrie at every opportunity." ?0%9 Martin haS?"told the Commitee he saw Lee Harvey Oswald $35-2J?u?WKai?ata with Ferrie in Guy Banister' 3 office in 1963. light of Martin' previous statements to authorities shortly after the assassination in which m?frtin made no such allegation yum. '14: arqu?dm Qineu?d W5 fie-?360 credencebin Martin' statements to the Committee. (51);)The Committee sought to trace Banister' 5 Office files that had been reportedly scattered to various individuals or agencies soon after Banister' 5 death in June 1964. ??04 :7 Mary Bnaister Wils Guy Bnhister' widow, told the a} Committee she had not retained any of the files but had =(1iC. ?3(35'1? ng? given many away to various statemagene1es Mrs. Wilson said she sold some of Banister's files fa==??ee to the Louisiana State Police in a transaction involving Russell 11nlY? Willie of the State Police? She said .DucId:322?3595 Page 221 53030 544 Camp-Street page 18? another portion of the file was given to Aaron Kohn of the a. Pane-1 as: New Ohreans Metropolitan Crime Commission. i Several books from Banister' collection went to Banister' associate, mil?la. - Kent Courtney. The rest of Banister's "extensiVe" library of books was Ngonated to the Louisiana State University r?1\N Library. (5?05) Russell Willie and Joseph Cambre of the Louisiana State police confirmed for the Committee that they purchased from Mary Banister in late 1964 a five-drawer file cabinet containing file folders belonging to the late Guy $481? Banister. Thei?half? filled" file cabinet contained tee- . a) large manila folders, each.subject titled and numbered. One of the folders contained a group of 3" by 5" index 14.4% cards. The index cards contained numbers and subject .headings corresponding to the file folders in the cabinet.r Not all the files listed in the index were among those files given to the Louisiana State Police; most Of the files obtained by the State Police dealt with Communist groups and subversiv $461? . organizations, according to State Police Officer Cambre. Cambre recalled that althOugh Lee Harvey Oswald's name was not inclded among the main subjects of the files, Oswald's name among the main sub ects of the file raaxs ?on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Cambre had read the FPCC file and found news clippings and a transcript of a Af?zt rim ?la? a; rent: radio program wald wasnanv presumably a transcript of the August-21, 1963 debate between Oswald and Carlos Bringuier on WDSU .radio. Unfortunately this file was routinely I DunId:32213595 Page,222 544 Camp Street page 19 destroyed in keeping with the requirements of the Privacy D?iJff Act. SEW) Aaron Kohn, Managing Director of the New Orleans a. . . Matropolitan Crime Comm1351on, acknowledged that he received files from Mary Banister Wilson after Guy Banister's death. The files received by Kohn dealt with an investigation of corruption within the New Orleans Police Banister had conducted while he was Assistant Auperintendent of Police in New Orleans in the 1:591:33: ?mid?l950's. While the Committee was unable to trace or recover all of Banister's files, a partial index of the files was made available by Jim Garrison, former District Attorney mini of Orleans Parish, Louisiana. Garrison had sent investigators to the Louisiana State Police intelligence Section in 1967 during his investigation into the assassination of President 15.3.1.5Y Kennedy. The index did not include the name of Lee Harvey ??duLf; Oswald or the __Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Thus, the Committee could find no documentary proof that Banister had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald nor could the Committee find credible witnesses who ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald and Guy Banister together. There are indications, however, that Banister at least knew of Oswald's leafletting activities and probably . . . maintained a file on him. As for Jack Martin 5 reasons for calling attention to Ferrie as a suspect in the assassination, they may not have been based on personal knowledge Martin neVer claimed such information but his action seems to have been based on sincere concerns and some legitimate A is 121+ posed/g . suspicions.r to definitiyaL -mw?r-m- ?Mm?,?wm determin?Vthe reasons for Banister' assault on Martin . - - . . ?J?Jflh 1?34; the night of the assa551nat10n, ?seenwas whether it had .-.-1-.11.- anything to do with Martin's su5picions of Ferrie. NH 53030 Page 223 IMPLICATIONS i Shf?iThe primary import of the 544 Camp Street address \must be analyzed within the context of evidence of a Ferrie- Osald link. Unfortunately, the precise nature of aneh their relationship may never be known. Ferrie could have become familiar with Oswald and his background, habits and motivating factors, and groomed Oswald for use in clandestine activity, perhaps( in 'tially along the model of private investigator .qrAis can be- seen by the Committee investigation into Ferrie's associations and activities throughout his life and especially during the summer of 1963, there are several factors which expla??why Ferrie and Oswald could have become closely associated, as improbable as this may seem. Ii) Both men spent considerable time in the same locale: Ferrie_frequently visited the office of Guy Banister in the building at 544 Camp Street; Oswald worked only tone block away and had used 544 Camp Street as the address of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Additionally, the 0.?on ?k ea $19.55 53?:ch testimony of the??Clinton W?fneseeg? placing Oswald and . 3 at; V??pvw Ferrie together in early September, 1963, ie'credible. Evidence also exists to support the belief that Ferrie's closest colleague, Guy Banister, was knowledgeable of Oswald' pro-Castro leafletting. gy?zA?:Z?f? a 1r" (Elli) Both men hadsimilar, fervent interest in political topics, especially the Cuban question. Although Ferrie stood firmly on the anti?Castro side of the issue and HHESIJBD Strangely, although Ferrie seemed to be Straightforward during his interviews with FBI agents in discussing his opposition to Kennedy, his conflict with Jack Martin, his involvement in the Marcello case, etc., Ferrie denied outright that he had ever known "of the Cuban Revolutionary Front maintaining an office at 544 Camp Street, nor does he have any knowledge of Sergio Arcacha Smith maintaining an office at that address during the time he,was head of the organization and later after he was replacedn??S7This is clearly in contra- disction to the accounts of the Witnesses on this subject. NH 53030 Page 225 Oswald was involved in pro-castro activities, this alone would not rule out the possibility of an Oswald?Ferrie association. Oswald, on at least one occasion, made a_ 'friendly overture to'a known anti-Castro activitist, Carlos Bringuier, the New Orleans delegate to the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and even offered Bringuier? assistance in military training of Cuban exiles. The Oswald-Ferrie'association may have begun in the same Mmanner. - I ?1 'Significant to the argument that Oswald and Ferrie -. were associated in 1963 is evidence of prior association have greatly facilitated their reacquaintance and Ferrie's noted ability to influence others could have been Hutilized with Oswald. 515) A) Ferrie's experience with the underground activities hof the Cuban exile movement and as a private investigator for Carlos Marcello and Guy Banister might have made him la good candidate to participate in a conspiracy plot. He may not have been knowledgeable of what was to be the outcome of his actions, but once the assaSsination had been successfully completed and his own name cleared, Ferrie would have had.no reason to reveal his knowledge of the plot. Further, fear for his life may have prevented him from doing so. While great gaps_exist in discovering whether Ferrie NH 53030 had any contact with Oswald after Oswald left New Orleans on September 24, 1963 Until the day of the assasSination only two months later, the Oswald?Ferrie relationship is the most siginificant of the Oswald associations in thoerizing an assassination conspiracy; 7d or. gar-L1- I I. NH 53030 ,DunId:32213595 _Page'221 ANT17CASTRO CUBAN A ?Footnotes 1. ?The Investi ation of the Assassination of Pre31 Book V, Final Report, q?i?h? Select Committee To Study - Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, sun?s-rs ZMA 5535/0") 4/23/76, 6045/2/45/3? ?f ?f%fmm?/ M74, la. @4 ??fwe ?tpaow? 94- 2. Memorandum of William T. Coleman Jr. and W. David Slawson to Warren Commission, pp. 110.- -111, Document No. 1313105?- 43. "The Longest Night," Miami Herald Tropic, 12/28/75, p. 7. Ibid. - 5. Haynes Johnson,'The Bay 2: Pigs. Norton, 1964. p. 17. 6. Ibid. .7. Ibidq p. 13. 8. S. Seizes Batista Backer in Miami," New York Times, 4/9/61, p. 4. - 9. 23. 10. Paul Bethel, The Losers. Arlington House, 1969, p. 102. 11. Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," March 10,1952 Octo- Her 22/ egislative Reference Se ice, Library of Congress, p. 6. JFK Document No. 0:310 33 12. Ibid. 13. Mario Lazo, Dagger In the Heart, Funk Wagnalls, 1968, p. 186. 14. Ibid. fad?nob Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," 7. ?16. lbid. NH 53030 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. .DucId:322?3595 Pags_?23 footnotes Anti-Castro 20. Ibi p. 24. 21. Ibid. e11 . . /e . Sec @1406; I (3 :22. Selected?Chronology_on Cuba and Castro," P-.9- ?23; Ibid.7 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid, p. 28. 27. Ibid? 28. Ibid. .29. "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis," Congressional Research No. 011478) We 1 30. pp. 23-31. 31- Ibid?, P- 27. 32. 33. Ibid, p. 222. Ezd-qok it - Selected Chronology on Cuba and p.26. oi? Whud ?(ml?mm dc Uexovxa. MW 1349 I dot. Elva-1L .35, Executive Session Testimony, 3/16/78/?p. 23. szgdimok.??b 36. Selected Chronology on Cuba and Castro," p.29. S?ihzimOHf*5rz v? . 37. p. 213. .?uzgijaa?w&?3 . 38- . 39. Ibid, p. 299. 40- Taylor Branch and George "The Kennedy Vendetta," p.49. .2: &x9nckr?a?i 41. "U.S.-Cuba p. 39. 42. Ibid. p. 40.. 43. Ibid. p. 41. 44. Ibid. RH ?auau .Dunrd:32213595 Page 229 footnotes - Anti-Castro 45. Ibid, p. 42.1 m?Eboi'?ok 46. fthhe Investi ation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedya Book V, p. 11, footnote 4. 47- Ibi p. 99. 48. Ibid; See Also: "Our Heritage--The Exile Cuban Terrorists," Washington_ Post, 11/7/76, p. C3. 58: *40 49. Branch and p. 49. 50. Andrew St. George, "The cold War Comes Home," Harper's, 11/73, p. 70. 51. '"How the CIA Operated in Dade," Miami Herald, 3/9/75, p. l. 52. Ibid. EE$1jcf401 53.5:Branch and 51. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. See ?315' 56. A "How the CIA Operated in Dade," 1 55 1 0 57. Ibid. 1 58. See @1505 staff memorandumg Crozier Mew, 1/16/78 Document No. 0094712!) 5.3: 951% 4140 7#ou.re J?s/rd Can/2mm 0N wasp/W974? 59.4 Branch and Crile, 11111111 pp. 52,56. 60. Ibid, p. 58- 61. Ibid p. 62. gnu/J 62. .-Cuba Relations," p. 48. 63. Ibid" p. 49. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid" p. 53. 67- Merie?EaseT?epT?e?t7-p. 364. NH 53030 Page 230 4. footnotes - Anti?Castro 69. selected Chronology on Cuba, April 1, 1963 - April 30, 1963." Legislative Reference Service, p. Document No. 01310:) 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid..' 720' Ibid?f pl 20 73. lgigJ 74. Ibidq p. 4. 75. Nabs Anti-Castro Fighters," ,Miami Herald, 12/5/62, p. 21A. 76. New Orleans Times-Picayune, 8/1/63, p. 1. 77. "U.S.-Cuba Relations, 1960-1963: Neutrality Enforcement and the Cuban Exiles During_The Kennedy Administration," Congressional Research Service, p. 12, JFK Document 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80.? Ibid. Seegwknok?g . 81. Selected Chrondogy on Cuba," 4/6/63, p. 4. 82. Ibid, 4/7/63, p. 5. 83. Ibid, 4/20/63, p. 18. 84. Ibid, 4/10/63, p. 7. 85. 'Ibid, 4/15/63, p. 10. 86. Ibid, 4/18/63, p. 12. 87. _Ibid, 4/15/63, p. 10. . - 88. Selected Chron010gy on Cuba,? 10/10/62, p. 24. S?fgaiwm*e*r77; NH 53030 89. Relations, 1960?1963," pa 8. 91." DucId:322?3595 Page/231 up, D. rOOtnotes - Anti-Castro. u. 86.6 *kbq; . Selected Chronology on Cuba," p. 24.? 93. Ibid, 5/21/63, p. 10. .94. Ibid, 6/12/63, p. 5. See-?bs?wohb 4k75? . . 95. Relations, 1960-1963, Neutrality Enforcement,q??b . 96. Relations, 1959-1964: An Analysis," p.69- ?97. Ibid. p. 71., -98. Ray Volume XVf23Memo to Director Erom Chief/WH Divisio?Zl 7/9 4.xgubject: ChrOnology of Concept of Autonymous Operations Summary of Financial SUpport'to Manuel Airtime?) .932r%o+nDHf? bq 99. Selected Chronology on Cuba,". r"a 4/19/63, p. 16. 100._ Paris Flammonde, President Kennedy Was Killed." Document No. 013106 101. Ibid. 102. Ibidl??E?Associate Press dis atch, 5/10/63. pp. 75-76. (In a.footnote in later editions, Johnson notes that after initial publication of his book "the CIA let it be known that Frank Bender denied in writing making such statements.") Soc . . of the AssaSSination of PreSident John F. Kennedy, Book p. 14. .105. "Our HeritageeThe Exile Cuban Terrorists," Washington Post, 11/7/76, p. C3. NH 5303i] Page/232 Footnotes Odio 1. Report of the President's CommissiOn on the Assassination of President Kennedy -- herein after, Warren Report -- 1964, pp. 322-324. 2- ?944- 3. FBI report LA 105-15823, 9/23/64, Warren Commission Document 1553, p. 4. . 4. FBI report DL 100-10461, 9/10/64, pp. 2,3, Warren Commission Exhibit 3147. a?yki? ?fth}. Chumuparw mxwu '1 6. 0?29"? (W04), [9-333 I 7. Commission_Exhibit 2134; Commission EXhibit-2962. 8. Commission Exhibit 3045. 1 9. Warren Report,p. 730. 10. Commission Exhibit 3045. 11. Warren Report, p. 324. . 12. FBI report PX 105?1529, 9/18/64, Commission Document 1553. 13. FBI memorandum, Miami 9/26/64, Commission Document 1553. 14. FBI report LA 105-1582, 9/20/64, Commission Document 1553.- 15. 8. 16. FBI memorandum, Miami, 10/2/64, Commission Document 1553. 17. - 18- midi . . . 19. Igid; - I I 20. IE 21. Warren Report, p. 324. 22. Nabs AntirCastro Fighters," Miami Herald, 12/5/62, p. 212 NH 53030 Pa?g 233 7 350?}? mlremhcw 09,. 0M0 . 39. 1 NH 5303i] .1 . .. . 9 footnotes Ole _23. Ibid. 24. Selected Chronology on Cuba," Congressional Research _Service, p. 54, (JFK Document No. 25. Statement of the chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, Selected Chronology on Cuba, D. 4.. zmmquwkn-?m o4. ?an iolsm ELMO 11M Cami 26 0"me ?l tln. 5.5Mpin-in- 'l 1'1: 413;: 676i :99 5.0 0L1 msesslruanmr . i 5/23/78, Vp 5, (DFK Document No. 008962) 546% omit/(Vim 0+ LCLLAJFWC l?ngm 59ka 799: an ?drags/41191703111 . ?3 -3, (QFK Document No. 003537) Seymmr 5d? on gssMUQ-ncw 29. memorandum, 1/8/76 ,erFK Document No. ol3336) S-hnbb 30. Ibid. 31. Ibig. 32.' "Exiles Fear Parents Shot By Cuban Red Firing Squad, Dallas ngs, 5/5/620/76 l, (JFK Document No. 013337,) L. ?Hm Fonz: 13.. . 34. . 1/16/76, - g6: Whol?C 351?: . . 35. A Dallas News 5/5/62, m. jec?olmofch; . .I - . 36. ?Fonzi interview 4/30/76, eg-Ilit. . 37., Ibid38.? Ibid. - A am ASSAssm-en 4. .p115M Document 40. .Ibid. Sce 35: 41. Fonzi interview, 4/30/76. '42. Ibid. 43. See section of report dealing with alleged relationship 1; with Maurice Bishop andC Lee Harvey Oswald. Mann . 9'18 . -, 44.? ;g ,2Vol.? 370(luueunrlk1 111 \Q?iwg) 1 45. Ibid. 46-_ f?g3report N0 100- -l6601, Commission Document .DncId:322?3595 . 47. 311d. 48. 1.131; . 568 Wed 34; 5241a} awr?f 49. A Dallas Ms, 5/5/62, m. 7 0% Lawn. 50. m? Connell m, . Document No. '9 3 3 . 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. .53. Ibid. - - ?14:0 54 . Ibid. - . Hob!? 55. Deposition of Silvia Odio,_ 5/2/78 6, Document NO. 009088). Wsolmarm-JW?" - /k2mcw LuaHo 56. Ipid, p. alson?i m? Connell, and FBI report DL Commission Document 205, p. 641, (JFK Document No. 000200) Sande 4* 5.7 4 Odio deposition, . lam. 0:110 . Interview" 1/16/76 p. l. gewtuws?? 0C Annie Odio, 9/20/78, Document 60. bid. 9 61. mg; Odio deposition,? PP. 8, 15, 21. SJme- SM (imam a? 62. bid also memorandum and photographs, (JFK Document No. . 6-3.- Ibid. Bce 3?55 64. AOdio deposition, p. 8. B?zt?? .. 0 Annie Odio,' 68. Ibi p. 2. 69. Ibid,.p. 1. 1m 5303:] rudimass??g? 1.1913135 NH 5303i] f4. 70-, 112m. 71. p. 2. Ibig. 73. Ibid. 75. 121;; 76. 121310. 79. 13. so. Ib?i? 31. Ibid, p. 16, 37. $6 Abbl 82.1., w? of Annie Odio p. 2. Br-Sodvok?35: 83. Odio deposition, Mme?w?w? p. 15. 84. Ibid, p. 20. I 85. Ihii- 33. kw?: 255' 86. Warren Commission Hearings, Vol. XI, p. 370; -?Odio deposition, pp. 11 16, 35. 87. Ibid. 5a: . 88. I\0dio rpp- 11: 704 89-? IbidI p. 70. 90. Ibid? pp. 15, 21, 24. 91. Ibid. p.-6o. 92. Warren Report, p. 324. . 3c: W?Sgr I 7 93. Odio deposition, .wwmw?a: 53. 94. Ibid. (key? ngdeA 95. of_ Annie mum-M 2. nonmazz??g? Page?_235 ?62 go?d'C?f" 96. Odio deposition, p. 53. 97. 'Ibid, p. 12. 98. Enid? p. 28. 99. 100. 1b1d1_ 101.' ?214. p. 30. 102. laid. - 103. Ibi@,jp. 31. 104. Ibid, p. 32, 50. 105. Warren Report, p. 324. . $57) 106. Odio deposition, m, p. 44. 107. 108. 62. 109. 521g. . . 110. ggigu 111. ?335g1? . 112. 5239. p. 64. 1 I 113. 114. pp. 65- 66. 366' bwamrq) bf-?wdnuW 115 . an. of Annie Odio? pp. 2-4. 116. Ibid, p. 117. Contact Report with Lucille ?Connell, 5/15/78, LJFK Document No. 0/3340) $9 020W Wm Shgq??wim ob Lug; 118 . Connell interview, 959 also jalnok an), #56? Mining? a" Luv/h 119. 4 4 -.-4- 2. 120 Ibid. 121.- NH 53030 Page. :23? NH 53030 122. 123. 124., 125. 126. laid? p- 3- . . Ibid; Also FBI report DL 44- ?1639, 11/29/63. N. B.: The Committee is puzzled by and cannot resolve the inconsistency of the substance of this and certain related FBI reports. DL 44- 1639 states only that Connell said that Odio told her that she knew Oswald and that he had spoken to groups of refugees in Dallas. Nothing is noted about a visit of three men. Connell told a Committee investigator (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit. p. 3) that she doesn-' recall ever telling the - that. Neither does the FBI report of the Bureau's initial interview with Odio on 12/19/63 (report DL 100- -10461) mention that she had knowledge of Oswald speaking to refugee groups. ?i?il?zt?fhe FBI interview with Connellkawm~( ail?.does not note Connell' 3 report of her conversation with her friend, Mrs. Sanford Pick, regarding Ruby' st visiting the law firm where Pick Worked. Connell said she is positive she told that to the FBI. The Committee has found that neither Pick nor the attorney who handled Ruby' 3- case at the law firm were questioned by the FBI. (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit. pp. 4? 6) But because neither Pick nor the attorney, Graham R. E. I Koch, could specifically recall Ruby requesting power of attorney for his sister and because, according to Koch, his firm' 5 records on the case were later routinely destroyed (Fonzi memorandum, op. cit), the Committee was unable to further pursue the possibility. baz?nhdc*5?1 127. '\Odio deposition, p. 43. See some?: .128. -129. 130. 131.* 132. 133. 134. 135.= interview, P. 2. Warren Commission Odio Exhibit No. 1, Vol. XX, p.690. Ibid. Contact Report, Document No. Ibidbid. Contact Report with Lucille Connell, F1 _DunId:322?3595 Page 233 NH 5303i] 136. Ibid- 137. 121d. 138$?c A Odio deposition, P- 139. Griffin memorandum. to Slawson, 5/16/64, Document No. 002969) MOHM 3" ml?. C. El Affllud? - 140. - 7/11/78, p. 5, (JFK Document No. 010069} 5. I $62 Wk9'3?/ 142. FBI report DL also Griffin memorandum. 143." FBI report DL.100-10461 op. cit. 5095051 *135 144.? 'Griffin memorandum. m. c. aim??! 146. - - p. 4. 147. Ibid, p- 5? 148. Ibig, p. 13. 149. bi p. 150. Ibid, p. 10, 151. Ibid, -152. Ibig. 153. Ibid, p. 17. 154. Ibid, pp. 14- S?zsodn?cl'3a' 155. Dallas News,- 5/5/62, 156. 1211. 1251.02 we Lela-v4 a5 157. . Annie Odie. . Sc: Ebthk-?k 35? 54*? at? Mon? 33 7 . 158. interview: Fonzi interview. Sim?! mkxucw . exam-we 2:2: r- re Tomas and Alentado, Document No. 01333? 3% Sdcol- CamhnH-pc an 159. HH . 1 um.? Hut 160 . Ibid. L55 u-A?n?m; W5 \nWUmoL Munch Rag.) . 161 . ?i 6/28/78 (JFK Document Nd.? 0/ 333 3) 162. Ibidw p. 8.- 163.7 Ibid. 164. ggid? 165. gg?g: 166. .2g2g; 1675': m??gpigtion, pp 91_ 10 3 I 51?? 7 a? Aimsw?w 168?. memorandum, 8/30, 78, (JFK Document No. Ol33352). 169; Ibid. 17o,? Ibid. Du?Id:32213595 .Paggr?4? VECIANA FOOTNOTES ?do; UM Q41, . - . 3/2/76, p. Document No. 01.19.27) 2. 'The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence V, Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities. 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No. 94- 755. ?43! FOHQJ) 4' 3. Memorandum to Marston, 33/76 Document Nb. 051.Docmnent No. 01179-7). 55:- 5. Ibid,? also pp. 1,2, 5,6. f- 7 6. Han/u! gotta/F 66*me 0o Ibid, p. 37. hugtkev'ia TM .S?rwm Samba 8 AssassiNeWoA/J, 8. Ma, Document No. 0005.21) 9' tel-l. 366 10. "i /2 "Sugar King a Many?Sided Man," 11. Executive Session??aia??g?ii?i?d?; . . Cb Am-K-uwo Wk f+lz?l7 12-. Ehl?a P- 6- hint Schu?- C?hwh 13. Ibi ., 7, 1 4Hazu4 Je/ca?m mW 1?3. Ibigo' at' l; l? :5_3 Staff Summary of .DucId:322?3595 Page 230 NH 53030 JGCE, FOOtnotes, p. Q?n? 14.. .?-qw5IHandbOO?, in 3 JFK ecurity 5 '0 2 ,pJ 6, (Ref. VFBI Report February 25,.1964, 18. 19. ,.'ofwdeoarture, January 8,1963)- _20. ?21. 22. 23.- ,24. 25. .963 new in. ms 597) from Miami, Re:Paulino Sierra Martinez) (31% Bom? 047.. 4?37) (@666 Staff Summary of 'ctIomwon?- JGCE (Secret-:3 (JFK Security #020) W) ., (Ref. FBI Memo from Chicago, June 26, l963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez) . w.t.a; i'g, U. S. Secret Service Report, November 27,1963., to Chief from SAIS Martineau, Chicago, Re: Homer 8. Echevarria, 2 3. (313" MW 00769!) . a .See also 7 Secret Service Report #1266, File 12?19-63, From Tucker and Noonan, p. 4 .- 19E Mil?ll?mm (rough notes) (Ref. (Ref. FBI Report #105-121010- -, (may 7 I l9 6 3 I ?Ibid ., at (Ref. FBI Memo, June 3,1963, Re: Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez) . Ibig,p at 4 (Ref. FBI Memo,_June 26,1963, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez) - 7 Ibid. Ibid., at 8 '(Ref. FBI Memo November 2, 1953 from Miami. article, Chicago Tribune,.March 10, on: 7 WM - aria: Staff'Summary Of nandbook (JFK Security Number #020) (Ref. FBI Report, February 25,1964 from- Miami, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez, information from I Gilberto Rodriguez-Fernandez) DucId:32213595 Page 231 HH JGCE 23 as. _3019. all:. Ibid. fun-? for Carlos Rodriguez Quesaoa, 1210-31, January 28, ,VYijtnotes, - p. 3 1964, from Chicago, Re: Sierra Martinez. 4624.4 We 624.4 Ibid. Miami News, Miami 131111.. Re: Ibig(Ref. Paulino'sierra p' 2 Teleytpe to Director from SAC, Chicago, Re: Paulino Sierra Martinez) bid Iaid. II P- 3. (Ref. FBI Report (Ref. FBI Memo, June 3, Alvarez Rodriguez) Ibid., p. 4 (Ref. FBI Memo, Sierra Martinez) Ibid. Ihid. Ibid 0 also p. 2. (Ref. Staff summary of FBI file (Ref. FBI Report #105? Paulino (Ref. News article, May 19, -verzn/L (Ref usmanwvmua A. . o- . (-11.1..- 1- ?mg: - J. .. . I +713. FBI Memo from Chicago, June 26,11963, Martinez) FBI report June129, 1963, 1963, IA 1.7 . 11,31,112.? 17.31,. . K?S?Baufina?saeff?SMartxneaa Iag?a Staff Summary of a-ww': .g?ai a ?ak4fc?muM44Q?154 page*232 7. (Ref. FBI Memo, 14, #105-121010- 3, May 25 1963, May 7, 1963, 1963) Re: Santiago? _Re: Paulino May 7, 1963; 5a: ?5 Handbook, l963,_Re: September 23, JGCE;-Fi3tnotes, p. 4 #945. 50%. 'Ibid..- . . - 5? a; Ibid. Ibid., p. 3,r -ea??238m3 p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo to Director from SAC ?Miami, December AmeriCanism Educational -.1. 'League) 7 . A Ibid. ?hid; *Note: Mold was also listed as a member of Americans for Freedom" at the same address as the American Educational League. There is no evidence that this group was ever investigated by the FBI (See HSCA Staff Summary of CIA file ehr~w~- pr6 3' VL.9ft p. 1 (Ref. CIA. age l963, confidential) ?L?ida p. 11 (Ref. CIA Secremwe Also, p. 2 (Ref April 30, July 5r 1963?**? May 7 1 9 63 - 21:4 Aunymw _rof CIA 5' ?b May 9 1963 E. . p. 3 (Ref. Memo to Director from SAC, Chicago, June 26,1963,Re:' Paulino Sierra Martinez) all dDCumeub Mv?gf?w'p. 10 (Ref' CIA and p. 11 (Raf- 1963) _3 (afar: .1 p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo,_November 2; 1963' - from Miami, Re: JGCE53030, DneId:322?3595V Page 233 JGCE,Eft?tnotes, o.'5 5 November 14, M. 9 (Ref. CIA 1.96 3 . p. 7 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 14,1963 from Miami Re: INTERPEN), p. 8 (FBI Memo, November 2,1963, - from Miami, Re. JGCE, pp. 29- ?30) Also, a . Gerry Patrick Hamming Chronology from FBI filesy?? main 9:53) 7 ex p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963, from Miami, Re: JGCE, PP- 29- 30 . *Note: The use of soldiers?of-fortune types such as Wilson and German may have been a result of prior contact with Hemmings? men by_garlos Rodriguez, Quesada and the MILTN. See FBI notes - Quesada; . Hamming Chronology) - - - - .- ww,?0ctober 16; (e p. 10 (Ref. CIA 1963- qu@?tym *Note: Aquilar' 5 group affiliation is unknown. However, he was known to be acquainted with Loran Hall, Lawrence Howard, and William who spent much time . at Aquilar's house. See Memo 6/5/68 of conversation with 6.x Aguilar. See also 11/1/63 Memo Re: Hamming ., 6fg?$ complaint that Hall stole rifle. .Notes that Hall staying' with Aguilar at that time; If p. 6 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 1,1963 from Miami, Re: SNFE) 'Ibid., 7 (Ref CIA ?jwwavr?r?mh 70- 1953, Also, BSGB Staff Bummer? Novembe 14 Tamm?? p. 9 (Ref. FBI Memo November 2,1963.from Miami, I 7/ JGCE, 43) and p. 5 (Ref. Bi e??m vinovb May 17:1953) Aim/u Ado/Wm?um Also, HSEB Staff Summary of CIA file/J (Ref. Dispatch.ammll12627 November 1963 withp attachment - I?e- "1963) pp. In 2 (Ref. November 20, 1963 with attachment 5 (Ref. CIA Memo April 18,1963) RH 53030, DucId;322?3595 Page 234 41 NH 53030 . JGCE(Ref. 1spatchm12627Nor-20, 1963, with attachment WM 1mg? also JFK #0127887, Report, September 27,1963, 7? I??l BEER Staff Summary of CIA file, p. 9 (Ref. 12 _September.14, 1963) ta mumary 0 C. IA 3. ?77.-.. 2. -- November 19?s Cm (-11 a . 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 1963 - from Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30) 77?%31 Staff Summary of CIA file w?fgfam vember4 1963) ?agza?? Z?igw, 7 p. 8 (Ref. FBI Memo, November p-Miami, Re: JGCE, pp. 29-30) - 2 2 4 - ft-0v?_ . 8 IbidOctober 15 1963, -.2.22.2 2wu. - Also: WStaff Summary of CIA file. dim 25cc 4a-3 - 7' 2 2 . ?ww?w- Res 9 (Ref. FBI Memo, November 2, 1963 ?from Miami, Re: JGCE, p. 37). {6,939 Ibid., pp. 10-11 (Ref. CIA 1963, Staff Summary ??wgy?wx?g?i November 14 Also, JFK #012887, p. 9 (Ref. CIA November 14,1963, -uu?a -?mmr 7 4 7 ZARStaff_ Summarylof CIA file idl?i?i?lh, p. 2 (Ref. ~uh, November 4,.1963) . Izc2w~wxe-DeCember2llj DncId:322?3595? Rage 235 . .. .. . v, . .. -., 5-. . JGCE, '?otnotes, p. 7 mt 91 . Ihid . Also, Staff Summary MOE CIA file, - p. .2 (Ref. Dispatch .?yht 12627, November 20,1963 with H63 1549 ?was?? . . December 11 92. .3 I :1 94. an! Staff Summary of CIA file, p. 2 (Ref. .. Dispatch 12627. November 20, 1963, with attachment) - . 93. September 13 i953, 95 . Ibid. 96. Ibid. a? - 5?7 1m 5303:] .Dunld?z?a?ga Page? 236 37' FERRIE - FOOTNOTES 1.H Memo from Sedgebeer to Giarmusso, New Orleans 5. office, ?5/22/64, #003840) New OrIeans Police Report of Francis Martello, 11/25/63 2. FBI Report, #627109060,"Interview of Jerry-P. Stein, 11/25/63; (P-3001j .. - FBI report, #62- -109060, Interview of Jack 8. Martin, 11/25/63, 309% .- Note: All FBI reports were obtained from File #62?109060 unless otherwise specifi?ally noted. - new?) PM i artin 1etter _to Robert RObey of 11/25/63* FBI report, Interview of Jack Martin, 11/25/63, 309); New Orleans Police Report, Interview of Edward'Voebel, 11/27/63 1 4.: FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63 . we r?awf .W 12 ?m9 agentyr z/u/?r8 4* 5. a?EEr arlos Marcello, Report, Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63o - -FBI Memo, #62?109060- ~5255, Regis Kennedy, p. 2, 5/18/67 . . Note: There are discepanCies as to whether Ferrie was in the courthouse or in Gill's office on the day of the 'aSsassination. Marcello and Kennedy sa?lFerrie was in the courtrobm. '(Both Statements taken some years after the - event) Gill said he knew Ferrie was in Gill's office at 12: 15 m. on 11/22/63, because Gill had Called his secretary at that time to tell her the Federal Grand Jury had returned a verdict in favor of Marcello. Gill's secretary told Gill Ferrie had left Gill' 5 office.at that? time (l2:15p.m.) stating he Would return at 1:30 p. m- which he failed to do. Gill' secreta ry, Ala?e Guidroz, was not questioned as to Ferrie' whereabouts. Ferrie told the FBI he was in New Orleans "all day? on November 11, 1963.? The date, November 11, may have _been a typographical error meant to have been 11/22/63, . NH 53030 Dunld:322?3595_ Page 23?. FERRIE, Footnotes, p.2. Since there i? no Significance to 11/11/63. (See FBI report 6. FBI report, interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63- Report, Interview of Melvin Coffey, 11/20/73. f1 Coffey told of plan for trip since November 20,_although he did?not know the destination. He said Ferrie and .1f Beauboeuf particularly interested in ice skating so they: i went to HoustonFBI Report Interview of M. Coffey, Plane' 'not.airworthy for some time. Last heard-it used Feb. '63; EBI'?eport, Interview of James p. 214? 55 Report #co-2-34, 030, 12/13/63, p.5.5' 1. mp?g'y's?. 4m. - - . HH 5303a. DnoId:322?3595? Page 233 FERRIE, Footnotes, p.3 E?rfki p. 10 Meister interview: "wears a toupee, possibly selfnmade" Re 9/22/61, p. 5. Mrs. Nichols who knew of aid he wears a wig." Robey Report, p. 9, Interview of E. W. ChristiansenJ-p. 10 Interview Col Joseph G. Ehr11cheK l!!3 was?. "1/912, exhibal?l, Cadet-J: A 16. FBI report". Interview of Mrs. Dumand Mrs. Nichols 9/22/61(353K Dominant ?17, 224, 11/19/62, p. 10, Interview of A1 Meister - . ?arvl?i 18. L74%"vm. Exhibit xx. /mne file from St. Charles Seminary 12/1/61- 5.4 described as "critical of authority", "careless about observing rules", ignored authority", "indulge: freely in criticism of his superiors"; FAA Vol. 4. Robey Report, p. 10 Interview of Col. Joseph G. BhrliCher -- "resided authority". 5 mvon. .3 19. 11/19/62 tervie of George Piazza who told investigat??h, is the type of individual Who fancies himself an expert in and, hence, A cgu?frvj believes himself infalligbleffo this end Rene would 734 my express his philosphical ideas in no uncertain terms. FAA Vol. Exhibit XX Ferris file from St. Charles Seminary. FAA Vol. 4, Report of Robey, p. 7. Rev. Francis B. Sullivan, professor of Theology at St. Charles Seminary Feels Ferrie to be a "pre? - impresses people by pretending . to be an expert on everything, definitely has a talent ?5 for character assassination"- p. 11 Douyear McGray called Ferrie "Eccentric and dictatorial" p. 12 - Al Meister -'?0fficious and dictatorial." 1:91:14; (-33 ?gall-?le, Vol Exhibit Statement of Cadet 1 .- . . ,11w) 12/1/61 Ferrie seemed to hold the caets in the palm of his hand", p. 4. 8.12. 224, 11/19/62, p.10, Intervie of A ster, Ferrie, very rm - influential. Interview of Pi mFei-rie, - ?seemed to have a certain talent and background in the use of and would use this as well as his philosophical ideas to influence some of the youths in the CAP Squadron?'; it: 71 am :5 I may, Mimi-:5 Interview of Bob Boyleston, miwmifbs/ FBI Report 10/30/61, "David William Ferrie" Interview of - 1m 5303:] Dunldiseen?g?-?f Page-.239 Tl Footnotes, p.4. John Harris - "Ferrie has a group of young boys whom he su orts and controls c0mp1etelyz? 1 (F?iagm?o% AA VO1, 4, Robey Report, p. 9. Interview of Col. Harry A. Webb I had ability to get affe tion of- the cadets and that they would do almost anything?him? 21: fua?1?N-24I4, 11/19/62, p.10 Meister advised that he had heard through cadet sources. ..That subject is pos_sibly a homosexual.?- Also, Ferrie "hated*women.1j . . g} Interview of tuna Gifford, 11/25/63) 4 Robey Report, p.11, Joseph Howard - Ferrie told him girls and women were no good and intellectually I - inferior to men. John Johnsd?iydferrie thought women dense. (Sac 1W 0016101) . . - I .. 1/25/63 p. 16I, Mrs. Jean FBI Report, 9/22/61, #105??104?340-3, p.4, Interview of Joseph Lisman, and Interview of Mrs. .I Ruby Nichols p. 5. p.19) . . 105? 23. I- I V- . ?lI?Et K12f331 Ferrie was treated for emotional problems Ferris to St. Charles Seminary gm, - FAA, Vol exhibit A .1125- 25.? 7g'm 661 exhibit. Transcript of grades from Baldwin Wallace College,_ 6/9/41, Lists all courses -- BA Hearing, timony of Ronald Hubner, Iinvestigator,? p. OBEV file SBA, D. W. Ferrie, 15- 63, 29? ?63, 48? 63 EAL EXH Letter of 12/17/62 from Berea, Ohio, 27. ng, Eerrie Testimony, Synopsis, p.4, Ferris claims he also wrote a.doctor' thesis for his degree on an aspect of the of vision - the use of hypnotherapy in tEtinitis. NH 53030 . Page 25?] I Footnotes, p-5 28. MW . . cbert Robey Report, p.11, John Johnson,? Ferrie he had taken a pre?medical course} p. 12, Al Laundmd him he was . ng at Tulane University) Robert Morrel (FAA Vol 4, Robey eport, p.11) Ferrie led people to believe he was stuinng medicine atI Tulane Universitg . . . ?15 Karl Kostm him he studied medicine. We'akb a? 231 OF . . HD degree in ogy on HIS wall.- .. ?Testimony of John Vol. 4, Robey Report, p. 8 Edward W. Strubo, advised tried hypnosis on the. students. Farr-3e. 29. ?5 10 Robert E. Morrell, "he had seen David Ferrie use hypn031s(1&1th AJSwa/y?rt?jl 30. Staff Interview of John I'rion, 3 . .11RoheyReport, p. 10 Rohert Morrell- ??lFerrie claims he lost hisd hair in an experiment with Cancer p. 12) Al Land Ferrie told him loss. due to chemical explosion; Landry's father was --told it was due to radiation, p. 13 Larry C. Adams ost in a Chemical experimen 1" Sy?l?5:50 SBA HearingDr. I.) - Ferrie admitted using 2 . but I legitimate reasons?g?mws?eie) from IPhoenixUpu raked . I I /b .62 I File ALPA SBA, DW FerrieEAL Exhibit 4a photocopy of telephone with Ferrie listing. NH 53030 Page 291 . . . . ?Egg! _33. Vel. 2, Exhibit Statement Of Cadet (anl?ilnu-IEHY "he was believed to be a medical doctor of philosPhy;} - - BA Hearing, testimony of Dr. Isadore Yaget; Synopsis, p. 2- a 9. . _34. SBA Hearing, Ferrie Testimony Synopsis, p- 4. Exhibit p.4, Statement of Cadet rm 35. Ferrie constantly preached to us on the subject of religion. . . . insisted we attend church . - . and remember. to' pray . 36. Although Ferrie denies applying for ordainment_to any: church, (SBA hearing, Ferrie testimony) he has shown 5 a desire since is youth SR?ll?B?224e 12/l9/62, oq 3 See FBI Report #52- 109060- 4595, 3/2/67, p. 1 [Wail Carl John Stanley "Archbishop of the Metropolitan Eastern Province, American Orthodox Catholic Church, . told the FBI he consecrated Ferrie as bishop in July 1961 7? but deposed him in January 1962 when it was learned he had been discharged from hi . jrlines position because of homosexual activit in FAA Vol.2 Exhibit p. 4, Statement of Cadet (i=lihnlaaihy .M Se jral times he (Ferrie) consider-ed becOming a priest. A. ?q?P?r :?re 4' 144 If ?O'Haor 7 - . 3 .1 . ear1ngs, Testimony of Ferrie Synopsis, p. 4. 38. FBI report of SA's E. Wall and T. Viatel, Interview 'of Ferris, 11/27/63 62- 109060 (Supported Ken_nedy 39. "h . 11-..- -- (Barrie letter to Capt. G. E. Greiner 10/30/61 suggesting persecution of himself by Communists. 40. 4 FBI Repor :Interview-of Joseph Lisma 41. Ibid- 42. Ibid, RH 5303a, Rage 292 FERRIE, Footnotes, p.7 43.' Ibid.?7 ?5cnw40 - 01. K. AA file, ALPA, SBA EAL D. W. Ferris, 15?63, 44. 29- 63, 48? 63 Title of talk - "Cuba" April 1961 Present, Future 451? ~3233- i . i 11-:111 45. -Ibid.- I '47. report 11/27/63 p. 199 Ferrie later admitted that after the Bay of Pg?? invasion he severely criticized President John F. Kennedy, 0th in public and in private. ?i?h-He said he had also been critical of any President riding in an open car and had made the statement that anyone could hide- 'n the bushes and shoot a president. However, he denied ev making a state- ment that Kennedy should be killed with the intentention that this be done. - -. 47(41ijAA, Vol.4, p. 17 Robey Report, Interview of Charles Williams 48.7 Ibid. ,s?aF56A Heaue?l 49. Akestimony of Cornelius Michael Kramer :53? V01 2 Exhibit p. 1/ . 51. IFAA V01. 4, Attachment J. Ferrie application for employment - for Eastern Airlines 4/16/51. - - 113$? mubiz. 52. ll-N- -224, 1/25/63Exhibit 12/19/62 p.20 NH 53030 Page 193 FERRIE, Footnotes, p.8 '57. FAA, Vol 2, Exhibit SR 1/25/63, p. 13?14 FAA Vol. 3, Exlubit- SS 58. Civil Service Commission, report of Record Search, 9/29/61 for David Ferrie, gives military record ?25 . - . .59. V01.K, FAA file?ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, #1563, 29?63, Brief grievance of David W. Ferrie, p. 2 7 bJ??Easfevnkr?hea - - ledEAL file, Ferrie, D. W. Personnel Records. 6/15/51 - Transferred to N. 0. "due to domicile preference.? '61. Vol 4, Attachment Memo from J. H. Halliburton to EAL received derogatory info. from Retail Credit Bureau. 5/21/51 '7 62. Ibid. Memo from J. F. Gill to Capt. G. E. Thomas, 6/26/51 Attachment M) Memo from F. A. Stone to G. E. Thomas 7/5/51 Attachment 0 63.? EM Vol. 4 Attachment (Memo 7/13/51 from G. E. Thomas to Capt. F. A. Stone. have had him with a couple of Captains here and their reports are nothing but the best." They say he has eXCellent possibilities- 64. Attachment - - A 7 - Handwritten note from "George" to Capt. John on Memo frOm J. H. Halliburton to Capt. G. E. Greiner, 7/61/59 . . 1 V. 65. r?gk Vol. 4, Attachment T. Memo 3/19/59 A. T. Thornhill to Capt- E. V. Rickenbacher. I . 55, FAA, Vol 4, Attachment - Letter E. V. Rickenbacker to D. W. Ferrie 3/23/5 3, ?Rickenbacker had noted to the file ?This man' ef_forts bear watching and his qualifications justify his being used and helped whenever possible in line of duty and even beyond." - . . .. NH 53030_ DucId:322?3595 Page 294 Footnotes p. 9 67-. Among the complaints W?mbi - ha FAA exhibit 9/7/60 letter to Ferrie from R.W. Tyler. Acting regional'counsel for Eastern. Re; use of Ferrie's plane by ?Student pilot carrying a passenger; Plane not - propertly certificated'or registered.) 7 - 11/19/52,,. ?dig: Allowing use of rider pass to-George Piazza who errie claimed was his -- ?5 Also Vol. 37 Exhibit i . FAA, Vol.3, exhibit II, Memo to a near-wuma "Ia/53 -. -- - -- 68.' ASR- 14N-224, 12/19/62 Exhibit p.21 59. as? ?qu?ov-l- ?9.03-9404, vii/6W4 70.' 1/25/63, p.1?iq' 70a. ??ggii Vol. 3, Ex yy, Letter to Col. from Robert E. Morrell .. .1 - . 71. I FBI Report #105-104-340-1; AA 661. 3, Ekhibit XX, letter 10/21/58} Robert Morrell to Col. D. Haas - - 73; Report 105, p.?ygg Vol. 4, Robey Repert, p.9 Attach :heVDriII Team once went to Dallas, according- to Bob Bayleston; . HSCA Interview, 10/18/78.' Ferrie made all the arrangements and' appeared to have had contacts there. (gate ?lial, Md?pbh?hom - . . if 9 . Robey Report - Interview of Ted Abernathyulm -instructions and flight time forbidden to CAP cadets- r. NH EBUBEL I FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 10 I Testimony of Ronald Hubnel? 3 .) . FAA, Vol. 2, Exhibit Statement of Cadet-My protect-il??iiEy) p. 2 MA 78. 2, Exhibit Statement of Cadet p. 2 Ferrie' 5 house "center of operations . for his group." ?r 79.' thAA,Vol.I4, Robey Report; p. 10, Interview of Robert Morre11.2 80. A veering 8/8/63)Testimony of James R. Lewallen, --.. . 11/19/62, p. 21, Interview of Spontane11i:) FAA Vol. 2, Exhibit Statement of Cadet p. 6 Ferris "encouraged the boys to :=Qgpome priests if the felt inclined in that direction. FAA Vol. 4, Robey Report p. 11, Father Ward, Priest, .Ferrie- cal-led him up and started sending him CAP members expressed a desire to go into the priest? ?hood. I p. 13, A1 Meister - Ferrie was instrumentaI in persuading - '*him to go into seminary. . I (mg new 0080qu 82. -- Edeetf'y': cf; Na/?i?h119/ZI5/71nj? I . fr?j'wa inii gif?'jz'fv?? om 30 Imp-07535 0f- SBB Henri-?5, Tes?monyof- . 83. ?-J'ohn Estan father of Cade??jx 11/19/62 ex. BEE, ptg;5? . . V01, 4, Robey Repart, p. 10 Interview of Col. J. Ehr1icher c.9535?: I Wk 84. BA aring, testimony of John- R. Espenan, synapgah, p. 2?3; Testimony of David Ferrie, synopsis, p. 6- 11/19/62, Exhibit Wmu?sy 85?. MOIK FAA file, ALBA SBA, 11w. Ferrie, 15-63, 29-433, 48?63 Brief of grievance of Ferrie, p.-l3' Vol 2, Exhibit SR ll-N- -224, 12/19/62, p. 6 n3, zestimony of Ferrie, Testimony of John Ernest ?33 "4,?Robev Report p. 14 NH 53030_ DunId:32233595, Eag?I?s? Footno tes, p. 1.1 1 88.45? V. 4, Attachment . 0? 30? ?61, FBI Repor SR 12/19/62While would- be members c1_aimed approaches were made to them to join the group, Bathuster testified there never was such a group by that name, SBA Christ1,HBrownsv1lle Exhibit FF. Memo to C. J. Simons from.S-J. \\?innisale, 91L 121dLetter to Capt. G. E. Greicher,I from Ferrie cquGd 7 i AA, 0 . Robey report, Attachment I FBI Report 10- 30? 61I Interviewed 2:55:8/22/61, p. 45I 4&7 . FAA file, ALPA SBA D.W. Fer?rie, 15?63, 29-63, 48-63;" BAIL . Juvenile Bureau Report 8/18/61, Item 61, pg. 2 19. $813.41 FBII 8/22/61 Report N?f? It was also reported that Ferrie had applied for'Visa to Venezuela On 11/15/61, which request was _denied.Ferrie had also applied for a passport. His purpos?vunknown. 5, Attachment QQ submarines were found in a 9/22/61 search of Ferrie' 5 house. \1so discovered among Ferrie' 3 effects: a Morse code key, four, HH page 29? Footnotes, p. 13 BA Hearing,- Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Re: Ferriei '110. involvement in Alexander Landry and Albert Cheramie oaSesy? #11 a . i 111. ulz??SBA Hearings Testimony of Roland P. Fournier, Sergeant, New Juveni1e_ Bureau}. . <7 ?Liz-? I ?vol. K. FAA file,- ALPA SBA D. W. Ferris, #15- 63, 29 63, 48-63, EAL Exhibrt, Insert Juvenile Bureau Report, 8/18/61 1tem.?ng H- 8507 01 P. 112. -FAA Vol. Vol. 4, Attach Investigative results - Jefferson Parish Pd Juvenile Division 8/29/61, Ferrie "suspected of harboring the juvenile and also encouraging him to run away from home.) Alpa #48? ?63 - Letter from William G. Bell to Capt. V. 0. Rowland, 5/2/63; . Vol. K. FAA file ALPA, SBA, . D. W. Ferrie 15- 63, 29* ?63, 48- 63 EAL Exhibit, Insert #1 Juveni1e Bureau Report 8/1 8/61 Item H- -8507?6l [bftiy I I I. I @wsam I 113. ?VsR-ll-n?224, 11/19/62, ER: p. 3 frd?JirrSEEte Police Criminal Record for David N. Ferrie Alpa #48?63, Letter Be11 to Rowland 5/2/63 2" 113 . - . 114. ?"Alpa file #48? 63, Letter from Wil1iam Bell to Capt- - -f V. G. Rowland (D. W. Ferrie, 15- 63, 63, 48- (EAL Exhibit, Insert Juvenile Bureau Report, 8/18/61, Item 61, p. 4 NH 53030, Dunld:322?3595 Page,193 1.1, . .- ,5 FERRIE, Footnotes1903 model springfield rifles, two .22 Calibre rifles, one. . rifle, a flare gun, .38 calibre revolver, a sword Eha?ih Va quanity of ammunition 3 maps (of Havana Harbor, the coast of Cuba, west Indies, Cuba and Nora? .goast) plus the twosubmw?h?s. FAA Vol. 4 - Attachments thru I said he purchased. the? 'guns at the Crescent Gun Shop, N.O. - 143.44 A 93 arlos ?Qui'roga W9 MW W?lv Jag?gi?b 172' {10;220 ma ?aw/In em ammr_ ?My - Robey Report, p. 12, Michael Finney said Ferrie . had been training Cuban pilots in the New Orleans areg?gr - - Imp/wiriwak 31951;: [we 17/" 115,?. >1 . i - (99w f. . MRS-way - RM 1.1.5: now 11/: .A 7 . . 10?. FBI Teletype 5/7/67, to Director from New Orleans, 62 -109060- 523 - . . ritumjmm'f FAA vor. 1: 102, BI R?port- ~10/30/61 New Orleans, Los Angeles, for David William Ferrie. .4 . ..-. . Bee JFK 00834, Statment of Herbert Wagner of Herb Wagner Finance Service, 12/6/67) indicM-tnt? undated n?muiw 65L4ruv,m..g .Qccu . . . Exhibit BB, 7/18/61 Letter from Arcacha Smith to Capt. Eddie V. a - . AA Vol.' 5, Exhibit CC. Letter to Arcacha Smith from. J. P. Halliburton, 8/1/61 . mama-x {Ls-far moot/?WW? ?aueak far. f? 1 a SR ll-N- 224, 11/19/63, p. 14) SBA Hearing,F?rrie Testimony,? P- 7 . i NH 53030_ Du?ldiazzia?g? Page 299 FERRIE, Footnotes, p. 14 bid? . . 115. ll-N~224, 11/19/62. Exhibit p. 3 from La. State Police records for David W.'Ferrie.j News article "Times Picayaune, New Orleans, La., 8/22/61, AttachB; FAA, Vol. 43 FAA Vol.4 Attach C, - Jefferson Parish Police Department Investigative . Report.. - 7 [bfdy I 116., ll?N-224, 12/19/62 EFF, p. 10 Lt. Martello, P. 9- 10- 15 ?(macaw Male Rodi/1414511; 3 - ecre Service interviewVE? 744/63 - - . ivK?rOi -.SBA Hearing, testimony of Sgt. Roland P. Fournier 5 New Orleans Police - Juvenile Bureagzg r/353301909 AA Vol. 4, Attachment C, Investigative Report of 1 Jefferson Parish, P01ice Department, New Orleans, 8/22/61, Statement of 'Avemle-_ 117. 118. WFAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit HH, 8/26/61 Eastern Airlines to FAA, informing t?hem Fe_rrie removed from payroll) A Exhibit_ 8/ 29/61, Greiner to Ferrie.v 120. Vol. 4, Exhibit A, Case 0? "Good Moral -Character? opened 9/8/61 by Richard E. Robey. Summary o_f Report:; a m5 FAA, Vol. 3, Exhibit KK East??hvop?hed investigation gag? 314141573950 wenmony 0F .zamd. L: . OH ?We va?bl .- 12:. SR 11/19/62, 6.) lbidy 7 125? ?i EAL File. Grievances Of David W. Ferrie, 8/5/63, Vol. 3, Testimony 0f Banister, p. 840. i . .12825. . .3 12$ Ibid 855 . Ibid-p. 855 . p. 840} Haw?e: 1,1,,1 at Summary of FBI file for Guy BaniSte (JFK: 031363033 NH 53030. DnnId:32213595. Page Sun NH 53030 Fodtnotes, p.15 -. 128 1216 [jan?i?bw Payer; /N?r?7 I91- 129. . HSCA Staff Summary of FBI file for Guy Banister, Note: BaniSter explained before the Airline Pilots. oard about his work with "AerchI? Smith and others".vI high?ranking Cuban refugees in my office . asking me how to go undergound and I gave them diagrams for that-?VI have talked to military and - political leaders from the various provinces of ?as-sq cm 11.12.111.de out and slipped back I. . 01.. File - Grievances of David W. Ferrie, I 8/5/63, Vol. 3 ,Testimony of IBanister.) .130. . r215 .4 V?a, ia1=Pk 131. Staff Interview of Jack Martin ,9ch I . 12/5- 6/77 obSZl?) .s?V MStaff Interview. of Sam Newman ?55/2/43?! 05? . .132. .353A Staff Interview of Jack interviews - 006217?? 2' .-. Staff interview 0 Jack 0053/23 .gi?j 5 of 3? 133 gearing, Ferrie Testimony 7 649 I?kn,vmm. I FAA-W1, . .. 135. l?N?224, p. 14. Ii 4. 136. . . .137. . I A138. 139.- Alpa #48- 63. - - a Letter from G. Wray GillI to Capt. IGeorge Greiner. 1/8/63. . . Vol. 3, Exhibit KK letter from Capt. Greiner to Ferrie, 9/1/61. . - egA?, Vol. 3, Exhibit LL, letter from Ferrie to Capt. Greiner, 9/5/61. 142. Vol 2, Exhibit letter of Eric Michael - Crouchet to FAA, 10/22/62 7' 91d,- - item we. - I nu?Id:32213595' page 301 a FBRRIE, Footnotes. p. 16. 0443 1331? Among those who intervened en Ferrie' behalf were Congressmen Morrison and Long, old friends of ?Alp 48 63, Le??er frOm William G. Bell to Mr. J. 0. Jarvard, 5/2/633?7lkd?01?l?q . . . . . 144. W?iggpa #48? ?63, Letter from EAL 4/11/63 to Ferrie. Grievance #15- -63 filed 1/21/63145o'c?gzgf- K-. FAA fife, ALPA SBA D. w. Ferrie, #1563 29?631-48-63 ?33" Minutes of meeting 2/18/63,; Miami 1 - 146. Ibi 147- "jgruiw Grievance #29? ?63 filed 2/18/63 Grievance #48- ~63 filed 2/13/63' Alpa #29- 63, 6/4/63 to J. B. Charles H. Ruby, Airline Pilots Assoc, . Letter from Ferrie to EAL 1n ALPA 29? ?63 148. ?756-2); Alpa files for correspondence; Alpa ?3314+; Alpa file #48? 63?} Letter to Capt. T. Robertson from J. B. Railsba?k3 Alpa 45? ?62 . Letter to D. W. Fe.rrie from R. W. Rive?bark . I . 7 WW. 66:46-51. ba?f?kfdiw? (flagg: if! 149. ?ea-Staff Interview of 01113 Decker 1/15 /75 81:5 :27 Af . 6mmtooc259 . . p, Interview of Carlos Quiroga 005/959 HSCA Staff Interview of Jack Martin, 12/15/77, Ci?xeoesil T) man/mow) 150. Vol Miscellaneongy) ELI. (15;;ter to Capt. George W. YoUngeL Lan et al, from EAL Pilots System Board of Adjustment, 7/8/63 151. Mil EAL File, Qrivevances of David W. Ferrie, Miami, 1 'Transd1_ipt of Hearing 7/15, 16,17, 63 Vol.1 . . - 152. K. FAA file, ALPA SBA, D. W. Ferrie, #15? 63, 29? 63,? 48463 - Brief of EAL on grievance of David W. Ferrie, p. 9 10 NH 53030. DucId;322?3595 Page 302 FERRIE, 'Footnotes'p. 16 153. 154. 155. 156. 01. EAL file Grievances of David W. Ferrie 8/5/63, Vo1.. 157.' 158. 159. 160.; 151. i I VleL, 1? EAL file - Grievances of David W. of Hearing, Vol. II .44 ex.424) 3 Testimony p. 856- 857. Ibi 842. 858 Ibid. w. Vol. 4, Robey Report p. 17 7/30/63, Attachment Letter from William.G. 3911;; fvel file. D. w. Ferrie ALPA #15- 63 filed 1/21/63 Decision of the Board 9/25/63 I I t?gg1.M EAL file, D. W. Ferrie, ALPA #14?63?, filed 1/21/63 Decision of the board 9/25/63 Vol. V, EAL file, Grievances of David W. Ferrie, transcript of hearing, 8/5/63 Vol.3 p. 461- 743 Ferrie, Miami Transcript K, FAA file, ALPA SBA D. W. Ferrie, 15? 63, 29? 63 48:63 Brief of EAL on grievances for David Ferrie, p. 1 0 (ALPA. . Note:- Ferrie was awarded $1635. 90 in full settlement of all iclaims. See memo fromT. J. Kennedy to Capt. F. Hamher,1 310/11/6 3, Ferrie, D. W. file :44 ?it/mew 4CDaw~d 444,4 lsz.? 1, Attachment L. errie was/reportedly fired from the job with Space Airfreight foiiowing 1_ complaints by FAA officials that operation9 under Ferrie' 5 direction were not being carried out according to FAA regulatinnsisw 4 NH 53030 Dun14132213595 ?Page'SDa 163. .. FBI Report 92-10976-2, 11/27/68, 1.. 1.: - e? .rf-?ij i I :5 I I . a - ?twins-rm" - . . 7?;th it": n; . a, St 1.. 164.- #012305 'assn Staff Summary of ImmigratiOn ?$91 and Naturalization Service file for David Ferrie E?a?ii-Jn a 165. Ibid. . . gh?? 354 \rgl? Ky.- 166 Ibid; g? . u? ?Ha-m . I #0109011 FAA Vol. 4, Robey Ra_port Attachment BI Report, 822/61, Interview of David 167. I FBI Report, Interview of Carlos Quiroga by New Orleans District Attorney's Office, 1968. 168." Ibid.? 1697 w3&Qka-Staff Summary of FBI file for Sergio Arcacha Smith, JFK 3004110 . g-,4e JERQ .170_ Outside Contact Report,/g/13/79, 014933. .171. Ibid. 172. Ibid. 173. Ibid.. . . . . 174. 1 FBI Report, InterView of G. Wray Gill, Sr., p. 2 175.? FBI Report, Interview Of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3 176. 'Ibid: 1 7 7 . Ibid 141??,?c4 ?egg-4.1, 178. (EFK of Purchase, Ewing materials, 10/16/78. 179. FBI Report, Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, p. 3 180. Ibid. mm" 1' ?1 181. JFK #00198 Guy Banister File, 'arriSOn papers, N11 New Orleans Fohce report, 11/22/63. Note: There are conflicting reports as to why Banister attacked Martin.- Martin has told the Committee that it was over.a remark ?he (Martin) had made in jest ha about the Kennedy assassination. Banister's secretary, Delphine Roberts, who was also present, told the Committee the two men came to blows when- Martin tried to remove certain files from the officeqj?gg HSCA {kW/mad; 05? H: H61: 01:314th E: Ef?e 1: l/ I jpkf? E. {3:9 n?nw?if 32535;? Il'lf?iffiik :1 ?dunks 171-2-1sz 1112615. 6w 11:2! g-h?mi 511321669523 HH 5303a _DucId:322?3595 Page 304 Footnotes, p- 18 [5?24 183. 187. 188. 1891 190. 191.- 192. 193. ?u?f LC) 611- FBI interview of G. Wray Gill p. 219e??-. SA J. Smith- a . . FBI Teletype - 11/26/63 to SAC Dallas, and Director from- ISAC, New Orleans p. 2?3, 7,15. Ibid~51 IbidAmemuf?m page?" {43,131.36 hwy? Emma 444512: FAA mmrm. bf - zx/ya/gg. ?391,135 I I FBI report, 11/25/63 Interview of Layton- Martens, St.- Horerson, p. 2 302). - 2 ?caLF FBI Report; 11/25/63 InterView of Alv1n SA Scheffer I(p. FBI Report, I-nterview 0? Layton Martens,3Ill/27/63I HoversonI p. 2 303) Ibia. - FBI Teletype,. 11/26/63, to Director from SAC, New IOrleans p. 16. Ibid, . SS Report, 12/13/63, 2 3I4, 030, p.4 in JFK #003840 . 3 FBI Teletype 11/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans, p. 11-12; -SS Report, 12/13/63, C0 2? 34? 030, 3 in JFK #003840 FBI Teletype, ll-/26/63 to Director from SAC New Orleans, p. 12 13 - . Statement by Daind W. Ferrie in FBI File, p. 58I0, Ho..;a44- 2064, 12/10/63 . FBI Teletype 11/26/63, to Director from SAC NewI Orleans, 13' I I 7 FBI Interview of G. Wray-Gill, 11/27/63? RH 53030_ Eagg'?u? 195._ 7196.: 197. 198. .199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. Foothotes, p._19 8 FBI Intervr?l ??kgaVido Ferrie, 11/26/63Ferrie' or the period 11/22 25/63 are described in most detail in this report. .FBI interview of-Melvin Coffey, 11/30/63 New Orleans SA E. Wall- FBI 12/18/63 FBI Report #62?109060- 2143, 12/18/63, p. 1 Interview or _Lee Fletcher. ?Ibid. Ibid. FBI Report #62? 109060 2143, 12/18/63, p. 1 Interview of Chuch Rolland-Ferrie called ahead on 11/22/63. Arrived 11/23/63 between 3: 30 and 5:30. Did not discuss . operating rink as Ferrie had 0 FBI Teletype, 11/26/63 to Director from SAC, New orleans, p. 14. . - . IFBI Report 862?10906042143; 12/18/63, p.2. F81 12/18/63; p.1 FBI Report #62? 109060- 2143 12/18/63p . 2 Hotel registration 1 card #38063 Checked in 11p. m. 11/23/63; checked out 11/24/63 Mrs. Shirley Dial, Clerk Driftwood recalled 3 individuals checked out at around 10 a. m. on 11/24/63. . . FBI Repear #62'109060- 2143 12/18/63 Five calls made from glamotel HoustoncimsJ_ One call meae from Drift wood, Motor Hotel, Glaveston. FBI Report #62-109060?2143, FBI Report #62? ?109060- 2143,? 12/18/63, p. 1 indicates Ferrie called 947~ 6435 in New Orleans collect 51: ??35391? Deposition of Mrs. Jesse Garnelfp Note: -While Mrs. Garner believes it was the night of HE 53030_ DpcId;322?3595 'Page 305 Foot?otes"of the assassination it would appear given that Ferri?: left New Orleans that evening, that Ferrie may have come -by her house on a later daten?.H?1vL bF-? 219. FBI Report, 11/27/63, interview of Roy p. 212 MCCOY - 105- 82 5551-10, S?.Callendel RH Page 544 Camp Street Footnotes 1. Report of the President's Commission On the Assassination of President Kennedy (1964), p. 728 (Hereinafter cited as Warren Report) . f" . Ma 1:33.? Cummunm oxen-Lee H9 ?Tia-?91 7, 2' 13??in (4.31 ?wummw; pnw?s 06"! Pg . .g . Jam-r.? Ir.- 3. Vol. XXVI, CE 2966 A ammsm 4- I Pr?lg?ijb Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, 5/12/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.126?129 (JFK Document 009084) 5. Ibid. 6.. Warren ReportVol XXVI, CE 3120, Pamphlet "The Crime Against Cuba," Corliss Lamont, p. 39 7. Ibid. 9. 'Ibid., Vol. XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report, ll/30/53r, - co-2-34,o3o,-FBI_Te1etype, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3 Cemmess'n? ~62 11. Warren Ragazr, Vol. XXVI, CE 2966 A IQid,, 7 13 IbigLt?4l wa-?m? 1? 3a \lak 14 I p. .408; ?.101?ch m; FBI Teletype, FOIA Materials, 62-109060-1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3 15. Ibid?.; (Rae-M334; Vol. XXII, CE 1414 16- 17. Ibid. '18. Ibid. 19. 'Ipid. 20. Ibid.;- - FBI.Te1etype, FOIA Materials, 62?109060w1668, 11/26/63, pp. 1-3 HH 53030" BucId;322?35957 Page.sus . NH 5303!], Footnotes, page-2 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26._ 27. 28. 29. 30. -31. ?32. 33. 34. 35. '36. 37; 38. 39; ?Ibid.3 Warren Report,-p. 292 and 408 Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 21 (JFK_Document 014020) . . . ,ew Ibid., p. 5 Mp 22 - Warren XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report, 4?5 Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, HOuse Select Committee' on Assassinations, p. 12 - Ibid., p. 9, 21' Ibid., 1big,, p.-I3 Outside Contact Report (with Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78, House select Committee on Assassinations, with Attachment' (JFK Document 007364) - ?Ibid., Attachments: ROsters through October 1962, April 1963, and March 1964 Ibid., Roster thrOUgh October 1962, p. 14 (FirSt List); Roster through April 1963, p. 16 (Second LIst) FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 9 Kerry Thornley Affadavit, 1/8/76, p.'1 (JFK DoCument 012740) Note: This statement, while rambling and confusing, ?remains'consistent on the major point;_that Thornley had no contact with OsWald after service_in the Marines. Ibid. . Testimony of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren Commission, 5/18/64, pp. 96- 97, Vol. XI Outside Contact Report (With Mrs. Anna Stewart), 4/11/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 007364), Attachment Roster through March 1964 FBI TEletype, FOIA MAterial, 62?10906041668, 11/26/63, p. 9 ?Ibid. Secret Service Report, 12/2/63, (JFK-Document 003675)? TestimOny of Kerry Thornley, Hearings Before the Warren' Commission, 5/18/64, p. 110, Vol. XI DscId;322?35957 Rage 309 Footnotes, page 3' 40.? Outside COntact Report (with George 5. Gay), 1/13/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 005191) - r. . ?aunsn?a . 41. Warren Rep?bb,?Vol XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report, 12/9/63, p. 5- i - . 42. Outside COntact Report (with George S. Gay), 1/13/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005191). 4 3 . Egg?gu- 'Warren Report, Vol. XXII, CE 1414, Secret Service Report 12/9/63, p. 5 44. Outside Contact Report '(with George 1/13/78, House Select Committee on AssassinatiOns (JFK Document 005191)t 45. Ibid.. 46. Ibid. 47. OutSide COntact Report (with George S. Gay re: Eugenia Donnelly), 6/6/78, HOuse Select Committee on Assassinations," (JFK Document 009115)_ 48. Outside Contact REport (with Jack MancusO), 1/26/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 014120) 49. Ibia. . I I s??QgF 50. Ibid, ijw??MVmey} 51. Warren Regent" Vol. XXVI, CE 3119, Secret Service Report 11/30/63, p. 15 -r -52. .Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54.. Outside Contact Report (RE: 'James.Arthus), 6/1/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009047) 55. Teletype, FOIA Material, 62?109060?2668, 11/26/63, p..2 56. _Materia1'received"fr0m files of New Orleans District Attorney's office pertaining to INvestigation and trial of Clay Shaw, 196741969, Attachment D, Section 5, Regarding Guy Banister, "Biographical Sketch" (JFK-Document 007271)? .57. ghid. 58? 3.123s?. HH 53030 DpnId:32213595_ page 310 Footnotes, page 4 59. Ibid. 50- 121$?: FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63, p. 828 (JFK Document 014904) 61. Material recieved from filed of New Orleans District Attorney's office pertaining to.Investigation and trial of Clay Shaw, 1967?-l969, Attachment D, Section 5, Regarding Guy Banister, "Biographical Sketch" (JFK Document 007271) 62. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78, pp. 1- 2 63. CIA Document Guy Baniste:] 64. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy Banister, 10/28/78, p. 1-2 Note: Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner of Gerard F. Tujague,.Inc. Forwarding Company, who had employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice? president) of Friends of Democratic Cuba (See FBI Teletype, 62-109060?l668, 1/26/63, p. 5) 65.? Ibid. I . 66. FAA Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance 'Hearing of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63, p. 828 (JFK Document 014904) 67. Staff Review of FBI files for Guy -Banister, 10/28/78, PP - r; a/ qgur. Ipx?m :4 nQ?k ?rmfa?d- 95?; ?33 333533 3? ,58? Staff Report oIf Anti? Castro organizations, anti- Castro 5 Activities anf Lee Harvey Oswald' activitiies in NewIOrleans. House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, Para. 419ff (hereinafter the- Anti?Castro Cuban Staff Report) - Ibid., para. 402 418 ?maag FBI Teletype, FOIA Material, 62-109060-5237, 5/7/67, pp. 1?2 ?if/IL '413L'Outside Contact Report fwith Vernon 3, (JFK Document 005208 ?aha armament/1* {+53 4,53%? enri??m 539? Cave ?35:]er 5hr? 7239 FBCI TeIetype, FOIAA ateflal 62?109060 5337 577/67, pp. 1? 2 Materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing of David Ferrie, Testimony of Guy Banister, 8/5/63, p. 825 NH 53030_ DucId:322?3595 Page 311 NH 5303]] Footnotes, page 5 p. 841 $578-Ibid;, 76;??nggr 78(77Outside contact Report (with Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78, House Select Committee on'Assassinations (JFK Document 008861); Anti?Castro Cuban Staff Report, para 439 ff 7.2.35) IbidL, para 390 88.35 Ibicl? para 390ff 81EL Ibiqi, para 392 82$3?Outside Contact Report (with Ross Banister), 2/20/78, House Select COmmittee on Assasinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 005967) 3335?? {his . 84%? Ibid:; 953% Deposition of I. E. "Bill" 7/31/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. Document 012308) Epig., p.12?14 8939 Ibid. a?s?o Ibid., p. 38-41 9&3? Ibid ?ginutside Contact Report, (with Delphine prerts), 7/6/78, House select .Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK . Document 009979) ??gg Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 27 (JFK Document ,014020) p. 35-36- 9453.25 Ibid, p. 30 QQHE Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Newbrough), 4/10/64, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. (JFK Footnotes, page 6 - Document 009113) Newbrough was associated with Banister's ?agency from approximately 1958 to 1964; Outside Contact Report (with Vernon Gerdes), 1/10/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005208) Gerdes was assoCiated with Banister for period 1960? 1963. 97fhg0utside Cont?act Report (With Mary Helen Brengel), 4/6/78, House Select Committee on'Assassinations. p. (JFK Document 008861Louise House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 0:504!) 338$ Outside Contact Report (with_Joseph Oster), 1/27/78, House ?Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005207) 103$?' Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, 5/23/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 21-27 (JFK Document 009394) p. 50, 51, 57~ 112185? IIbid. 1Q?t??Deposition of Sam Newman, 11/6/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 31, 38GFK Document 014020) Newman recommended the Committee speak with Martin because he was in Banister' 3 office "90 percent of the time; every day almost" and he "kept up with all that stuff" related to the Cubans. Deposition of I.E. "Bill" 7/31/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 59? 60 (JFK Document 012308) told the you were trying to explore this to the fullest extent, I would say that Delphine (Roberts) would be number one. 10?1?;0utside Contact Report (iwth Delphine Roberts), 7/6/78, House select Commi.ttee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document 009979) lj?gwbibid-, p. 3 061071b1d 191185115111. imaging. rem?) m\\1'1bid. NH 53030_ Dun1a132233595- Pagc.313 Footnotes, page 7 Contact Report (with Delphine Roberts), 8/27/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 011196) - I 131.5 Ibid. rb$. Guy Banister File Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item 31% Report of Offense Against PersOns, 11/22/63, New Orleans Police Department (JFK Document 002066) The report indicates the incident took place at 5:15 PM and was classified as "Aggravated Battery"; the motive "sudden anger" 7 ?13 . 115.? Ibld. - - 136.1555 Ibid. 1141?} Ibid. P18110Ib:d. l?lsg?bxlbid, Ibid'. - 121913 ?911., -Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. (JFK Document 005212) . 1289 Deposition of I. E. "Bill" 7/31/78, House Select Committee on AsSassinations, p. 9-16 (JFK Document 012308) A 12%? Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/5/77, House 1?v~?Select Committee on Assassinations-, p. 3 (JFK Document- 005212) 1261911311, p. 4 1 . Ib'd'. 3w A law?s-21?- - 2+ . IESYEaFBI-Interviewsof Jack Martin, 11/25/63, ureau file NO 89-69 129.31FB1'Interview of G. Wrainill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO.89-69, 138u3}fB1 Interview oquavid Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89?69, NH 53030 Dubld:322?359?' Page 314 Footnotes, page 8 'la?n Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), 12/6/77, (33 House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 . (JFK Document 005213); FBI Interview of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69, p. 2; FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89?69, p. 9 See-also - FAA Systems Board of Adjustment Grievance Hearings for David Ferrie, July 15-17 and August 5, 1963 for more_discussion of Ferrie's and Martin's involvement in unusual religious orders. FBI Interview of David Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89?69, 1 9 J??i?fFBI.Interv1ew of G. Wray Gill, 11/27/63, Bureau file NO 89-69, 19-h 6W Ibid. 155* Outside Contact Report (with Jack Martin), _12/5/77, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document 005212) 136.? Ibid.; - e.b?see also - FBI Interviews of Jack Martin, 11/25/63 11/27/63; Secret Service Interview of Jack Martin, 11/29/63 reported in Report of 12/13/63, p. 5 - Martin makes no mention of the alleged sighting of Oswald and Ferrie together. Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson), 4/7/78, '15? HOuse Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 012448)_ 138:; Uglbid: 1&0? OutSide Contact Report (with Kent Courtney), 3/19/78, tquHouse Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 9 006676) 139-. 13:1. l?ixQ?Outside Contact Report (with Mary Banister Wilson), 4/7/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations- (JFK Dxnment(H2448) Outside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78, v?iHouse?Select Committee on Assassinations' (JFK Document 009252) Outside Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, (JFK Document 009263) {Outside Contact Report (with Russell R. Willie), 6/8/78, 14 House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009262) l??ww Ibid. HW 5303a, Dqud?32213595, Page 315 Footnotes, page 9 1463j?Outside.Contact Report (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009263) l?dfg?bid: 7 133:3: 149%- Ibid. ?19 1595319utside Contact Report (with AarOn Kohn), 1/20/78, House iu Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 005121) laws/Lag 152fy?Guy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item GBml, im'Index of Banister file- Document.002066) &5?t?fOutside,ContactReport (with Joseph Cambre), 6/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document 009263) -154?j?Guy Banister file - Garrison Papers, 8/14/77, Item Index of Banister file (JFK Document 002066) 7,57 . . . . spies 155. FBI InterViewgof DaVid Ferrie, 11/26/63, Bureau file NO 89-693 1p. 10 - -nunId:32?13595' Page 315 JFK Assassination System Date: Identi?cation Form 4/2 8/201 AGENCY: Agency Information HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10147-10245 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER 63-05-02 A Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROMR TO Eleased under the John TITLE KE nne :15: ssassinatiun Records nllectiun Act of 1992 [44 USC 210? Note]. DATE: 09n5n97g 53080 Date: PAGES: 169. - 5-05-2017 SUBJECTS BAGLEY, TENNENT - CIA, FILES OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD KGB CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed nmis CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Box 36 WI NH 53030 Page 1 NH 53030 25a Avenue de l?Or?e Ste. 10 1050 Brussels, Belgium Telephone: 649-7221 October 11, 1978 ?Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director Select Committee on Assassinations House of Representatives Washington, D. C. Dear Er. Blakey, I have read the transcript of the testimony of the CIA's representative, Mr. John L. Hart, before your Committee on September 15, 1978. As the former deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, so prominently and so disparagingly _featured in that testimony, I may be able to help the Committe to judge CIA's .investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, as report ed by Yuri Nosenko. Specifically, I can correct certain misleading impressions left by Mr. tart. I would call to your attention at least twenty errors, fifteen isles in statements, and ten impotent omissions in his test mony, many of them pertinent to your task and,' together, distorting the entire picture. Having been publicly dishonored by unfounded statements before your Committee, I ask for the courtesy of an opportunity to come before the 'Committee, publicly if you are to hold more pub hearings, to answer not only for myself but also; for the Central Intelligence Agency, which has misrepresented its own performance._ I mention below a few of the points of error and distortion, leaving many others to be discussed in person with the Committee ?My comments refer to the line numbers in th draft transcript of Mr. Hart's testimony, and are I