Resolutions adopted
at the
110th Annual Conference
August, 2015
Quebec City, Quebec

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Safety and security for all Canadians through
innovative police leadership
Unit 100 – 300 Terry Fox Drive, Kanata Ontario K2K 0E3
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e: cacp@cacp.ca w: www.cacp.ca

 Table of Contents
2015-01
Development of a National Framework on Proactive Community-Policing Responses to
Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence……………………………………………………….….3
2015-02
Seizure of Cellular Telephone Services When Used in Drug Trafficking……………………...…7
2015-03
Reasonable Law to Address Impact of Supreme Court of Canada Decision
R. v Spencer, 2014, SCC 431……………………………………………………………………………..11
2015-04
Amendments to Section 183 of the Criminal Code……………………………………………....15
2015-05
Resolution for the Support of the Canadian Community Safety Information Management
Strategy (CCSIMS)……………………………………………………………………………....18
2015-06
Sustainable Funding of the Public Safety Canada Electronic Catalogue and Digital Portal for
Canadian Police Research……………………………………………………………………..…24
2015-07
Cyber Crime: Police Roles & Responsibilities within a Collaborative National Framework…..26
2015-08
Amendments to the Canada Post Corporation Act………………………………..……………..29

2

 Resolution #01 - 2015
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON PROACTIVE COMMUNITYPOLICING RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Submitted by the Crime Prevention, Community Safety and Wellbeing Committee
WHEREAS the Crime Prevention, Community Safety and Wellbeing Committee (CPCSW)
planned initiatives for 2014/2015 which include exploring "opportunities to
coordinate crime prevention and domestic and intimate partner violence
initiatives", and recognized that addressing police proaction and response to
domestic and intimate partner violence (D/IPV) requires multi-sectoral
collaboration due to the complex social and criminal elements that are rooted in
homes and relationships, and;
WHEREAS D/IVP is a complex social and criminal issue with indisputable human and
financial costs, (estimated at $7.4 billion per year in Canada), and accounts for
approximately one quarter of all police-reported violent crime and the
victimization of nearly 95,000 citizens annually, and;
WHEREAS D/IPV can be more effectively and efficiently addressed through the fundamental
principles of contemporary community policing; an approach that emphasizes
problem identification, root cause analysis, education, prevention, intervention,
response, support, evaluation and collaboration among police and non-police
sectors, and;
WHEREAS the CPCSW Committee is comprised of police leaders and strategic community
leaders from government and non-government organizations who possess
expertise in the areas of DIPV and gender-based analysis, and has worked in
partnership with the Canadian Observatory on Justice System Response to
Intimate Partner Violence, and in the creation of a 2014 "Think Tank" on D/IPV
that brought together 35 subject matter experts including police, academics and
practitioners to share best practices from their respective regions, and;
WHEREAS "D/IPV Think Tank" participants agreed that a unified police model for D/IVP in
Canada is critical to create shared understanding, consistent terminology and
common application of the law and police practice, and that this may be achieved
through a National Framework, and;
WHEREAS the "D/IPV Think Tank" led to the creation of an expert working group, designed
to establish a national community of practice on police proaction, intervention and
response, and;

3

 WHEREAS the CPCSW Committee endorses the development of a National Framework on
Proactive Community-Policing Responses to Domestic and Intimate Partner
Violence and has approved the creation of a subcommittee to explore the issue of
D/IPV as it relates to creating safer communities through police and partnership
action, and the establishment of a community of practice, and;
WHEREAS the CACP has previously endorsed national standards as a means of promoting
common principles.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
recognizes and endorses the development of a National Framework on Proactive
Community-Policing Responses to Domestic and Intimate Partner Violence, to be
led by the Crime Prevention Community Safety and Wellbeing subcommittee, in
partnership with the Canadian Observatory on the Justice System’s Response to
Intimate Partner Violence.

4

 Resolution #01 - 2015
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON PROACTIVE COMMUNITYPOLICING RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Background
D/IPV is a complex social and criminal issue that carries a high, indisputable human and
financial cost in our society, with a total economic impact in Canada estimated at $7.4 billion per
year. (Zhang, et al. 2012). In 2011, family violence accounted for 26% of all police-reported
violent (Statistics Canada, 2013), and about half (49%) of the nearly 95,000 victims of family
violence were in a current or previous spousal relationship.
Research continues to show that police intervention and response to D/IPV can be more effective
and efficient through the use of the principles of contemporary community policing, as evidenced
by initiatives like Crime Prevention Through Social Development, the Hub and Core and Prolific
Offender models.
In 2014, the CACP approved a name change to its Crime Prevention Committee, in order to
better reflect the mandate of CACP and the Committee itself. The Committee is now known as
the CACP Crime Prevention, Community Safety and Wellbeing Committee (CPCSWC).
At the 2014 CACP Annual General Meeting, the CPCSWC also introduced Resolution 2014-02,
to change the conversation from the “Economics of Policing” to the “Economics of Community
Safety and Wellbeing,” in its ongoing work to raise awareness that complex costs of public safety
are related not only to police, but to a variety of non-police sectors working to encourage
prosocial behaviour, prevent crime and social disorder, and address the needs of those who come
into contact with the criminal justice system (CACP Resolution #02 - 2014).
In May 2014, through a partnership between New Brunswick Police Forces (Fredericton, Saint
John and RCMP “J” Division) and the Canadian Observatory on the Justice System Response to
Intimate Partner Violence, a "National Think Tank" was held entitled “Community Police
Response to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV): Sharing Best Practices.” This meeting, sponsored
by the Canadian Observatory and the Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family Violence,
brought together 35 ranking police officers and academics, to discuss various best practices
developed and implemented by police forces across Canada, while also creating a “knowledge
building community.” Think Tank participants agreed that a unified police response to D/IVP in
Canada, including consistent terminology and common application of the law, is critical to
enhancing the national response to this issue.
The Canadian Observatory on the Justice System’s Response to Intimate Partner Violence is an
international network of researchers, practitioners and policy-makers from across many
disciplines focusing on identifying policies and strategies to resolve intimate partner violence and
exploring how the justice system functions across the country and abroad. It is housed at the
University of New Brunswick, under the leadership of Dr. Carmen Gill in the Department of
Sociology.
5

 Resolution #01 - 2015
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON PROACTIVE COMMUNITYPOLICING RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Action Plan
1. Expert working group meeting, June 1-2, 2015, and the identification of sub-working groups
to develop National Framework elements.
2. Interim progress report to the CACP Crime Prevention, Community Safety and Wellbeing
Committee - August 2015.
3. Submit draft National Framework to CACP Crime Prevention, Community Safety and
Wellbeing Committee – January 2016.
4. Completion of National Framework (visual model and accompanying narrative) by June 2016,
for presentation at the 2016 CACP AGM.

6

 Resolution #02 - 2015
SEIZURE OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES WHEN USED IN
DRUG TRAFFICKING
Submitted by the British Columbia Chiefs of Police (BCACP)
WHEREAS a significant component of drug trafficking at the street level involves
communication between the customer (drug user) and the seller (drug trafficker)
via cellular telephone or other mobile devices (referred to “dial-a-dope”
operations), and;
WHEREAS through “dial-a-dope” operations, drug traffickers are able to make it widely
known within the drug-trafficking community that certain telephone numbers are a
means to quickly facilitate drug trafficking, and;
WHEREAS there are currently no lawful means by which law enforcement can "seize" or take
possession of a non-tangible item (such as a cellular phone line/number), or to
otherwise deactivate a cellular phone line/number pursuant to the Criminal Code
or Controlled Drug and Substances Act, either during investigation or post-arrest,
and;
WHEREAS without the ability to seize or terminate the cellular phone line/number, the
specific number continues to be available to facilitate the illicit trafficking of
drugs, and;
WHEREAS despite the significant efforts by law enforcement to disrupt drug trafficking
operations, “dial-a-dope” traffickers remain a significant problem for Canadian
communities. In particular, “dial-a-dope” operations are often associated with
violence against persons, and;
WHEREAS in 2015, the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police passed a resolution
requesting the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Law Amendments
Committee identify a means for law enforcement to seize or otherwise nullify
(deactivate) the phone lines/numbers associated with “Dial-a-Dope” operations, in
order to disrupt that criminal activity, and;
WHEREAS through study it has been determined that this matter can only be addressed
through amendments to legislation or through new legislation.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police urges
the Government of Canada to identify a legislative means for law enforcement to
seize or otherwise nullify phone lines/numbers used by drug traffickers in
“Dial-a-Dope” operations.

7

 Resolution #02 - 2015
SEIZURE OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICES WHEN USED IN
DRUG TRAFFICKING
Background
A significant component of drug trafficking at the street level involves communication between
the customer (drug user) and the seller (drug trafficker) via cellular telephone or other mobile
devices (referred to “dial-a-dope” operations).
A "dial-a-dope" transaction typically begins with the procurement of a telephone number by the
drug trafficker or part of his/her criminal network. This telephone number is then advertised
through a variety of means including business cards and word of mouth, through the existing
drug culture/network, with the intent of attracting potential customers. A potential customer then
calls the number, provides a predetermined code or other information to verify that they are a
customer (as opposed to a police officer), and then arranges for a drug purchase. The drug
trafficker t h en meets the customer at the specified location and the drug transaction occurs.
Once a person has been established as a “real” customer, some drug lines also use text
messaging functions to arrange future transactions, leveraging the voice and data capabilities
of the service providers. The use of cellular communications, coupled with vehicle delivery,
allows for these drug transactions to be completed very quickly with limited potential for
apprehension by law enforcement.
“Dial-a-dope” operations can be very lucrative for the trafficker. Once a telephone number or
"drug line" has been established, it can operate non-stop at all hours of the day and distribute
drugs to a broad base of customers across a significant geographical area. As a result, once
established, each drug line has an inherent value within the drug trafficking realm and can be
bought, traded or taken over by rival drug trafficking networks. Simply stated, the specific
phone line/number is a significant asset to the drug trafficker.
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:
Law enforcement has had limited success addressing these drug lines. Typically, intelligence is
obtained that a specific phone number is a drug line. Background investigation into that phone
number occurs, including the police obtaining the subscriber information. The investigators
look closely at the information to address case law decisions relating to issues such as
entrapment or random virtue testing. If appropriate grounds still exist, an undercover operator
posing as a drug user/purchaser calls the drug line. If successful in providing the appropriate
code phrase or other information, the drug transaction occurs and those persons involved in the
sale itself are arrested and charged. However, the specific phone line/number still exists and
most often continues to be used to facilitate the illicit drug trafficking operation.

8

 Where possible, the vehicles and devices themselves used to commit the offence are seized as
Offence Related Property. However, as stated above, the telephone l i n e / number itself remains
active. There are presently no lawful means by which law enforcement can "seize" or take
possession of the (non-tangible) phone line/number.
The drug trafficking network continues to exist (usually with a new code phrase), another
vehicle i s obt ai ne d, a nd a new cellular telephone is acquired and connected to the existing
phone number. The point-of-contact between the purchaser and trafficker continues virtually
unimpeded. In addition, the longer a drug line exists, the better known it becomes, resulting in
more “customer” use and greater risk to public safety.
EFFORTS TO SEVER COMMUNICATION NETWORKS OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS:
The Surrey RCMP Detachment has examined a variety of potential solutions to disrupt the
continued use of a telephone number or service by drug traffickers, including the following:
• Asking service providers to suspend service where the phone line/number has
been used to facilitate criminal activity. This has not been successful, as service
providers are reluctant to suspend service to a paying customer, often citing the potential
for civil liability and other associated costs. Some service providers may be willing to
engage in further discussion if the law enforcement a g e n c y accepts any civil liability
and associated litigation costs of the service provider, which is not viable. In short,
reliance on the corporate conscience of the phone line/number service providers is
neither a practical nor effective strategy.
•

Asking the regulatory agencies to suspend service. Although the CRTC and
specifically the Canadian Wireless Telecommunication Association (CWTA) engage
with service providers with regard to the telecommunication industry in Canada, their
framework is largely regulatory in nature, making their ability to impact the broader
criminal issue of drug trafficking limited. Though these regulatory agencies have
participated in recent law enforcement initiatives such as the online listing of stolen
cellular phone serial numbers in an effort to combat cellular phone theft, they have
expressed reservations in directing service providers to suspend service solely at the
request of law enforcement. It w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t t heir engagement in law
enforcement issues is largely in response to potential negative media pressure exerted
by outside interest groups.

•

Denial of Service Technology. Recently, significant effort has been expended to
explore the use of automated telephone dialing technologies, similar to those used by
telemarketers, to interrupt “dial-a-dope” communications networks. This can be
accomplished through the use of auto-dialing computers t hat call the drug traffickers
phone number with sufficient frequency to render the phone number unusable.
However, this technique is essentially a "denial of service" attack and contravenes
Section 430 of the Criminal Code. Although Section 25.1 of the Criminal Code
provides some potential for the use of a Law Enforcement exemption for this
9

 technique, current legal opinions do not support the use of s. 25.1 to justify such a
technique, as such a use is not believed to be consistent with the legislative intent
behind s. 25.1.
•

Seeking civil forfeiture of the telecommunication service. Currently there is no
ability for a service such as a telecommunication service (phone line/number) to be
seized. For this reason, civil forfeiture is not a viable means of resolving this problem.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGE PROPOSED AND IMPACTS ON DRUG TRAFFICKING:
Drug traffickers have demonstrated the ability to continually adapt to law enforcement efforts
to disrupt their criminal activity. They regularly identify gaps in current legislation that work in
favour of their criminal operations. The Offence Related Property (ORP) provisions in the
Criminal Code and Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) have proven to be highly
effective at immediately impacting an offender’s ability to conduct illicit activities. The seizure
of vehicles, cash, dwelling houses, and telephone hardware has an immediate impact on
criminal operations. Th is is due t o the fact t hat the ORP provisions allow for the
immediate seizure of the very tools that criminals use to facilitate their activities. However, the
ORP provisions of the CCC and CDSA are directly linked to the definition of "property" within
those acts, which does not include non-tangible items such as communications services or a
specific phone line/number.
It may be possible to draft amendments that would either expand the definition of “property” or
create specific provisions within the ORP framework that would allow for the “seizure” or some
other form of deactivation of phone lines/numbers used for “dial-a-dope” operations. However, it
is likely that attempts to legislate in this area would be very complex as essentially, the legal
underpinnings of both the ORP and restraint provisions of the CC and CDSA relate to actual
things that can be seized.
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police that
legislation be enacted for law enforcement to seize or otherwise nullify a phone number that has
been or being used in a “dial-a-dope” operation.

10

 Resolution #03 - 2015
REASONABLE LAW TO ADDRESS IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
DECISION R. v SPENCER, 2014, SCC 43
Submitted by the E-Crimes Committee
WHEREAS law enforcement requires real-time, or near real-time access to basic subscriber
(customer name and address) information (BSI) as it relates to
telecommunications’ customers for investigative reasons, and;
WHEREAS the Supreme Court of Canada, in their majority decision in R. v Spencer, 2014
SCC 43, did state that:


a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the identity of an internet
subscriber where there is an ability to link that identity to specific online
activity;



the identity of a person linked to their use of the Internet must be recognized
as giving rise to a privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s name
address and telephone number found in the subscriber information;



absent an exigent circumstance, or authority from a reasonable law, such as
authority from a judicial warrant or order, police do not have the power to
conduct a search for basic subscriber information (BSI) when there exists a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, and;

WHEREAS since the Spencer decision, the telecommunications companies refuse to provide
any basic subscriber information (BSI) in the absence of an exigent circumstance,
or a judicial warrant or order, even where there exists no reasonable expectation of
privacy, and;
WHEREAS there exists no lawful authority designed specifically to require the provision of
basic subscriber information, and the problems posed by this gap in the law are
particularly acute where there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
supports the creation of a reasonable law designed to specifically provide law
enforcement the ability to obtain, in real-time or near real-time, basic subscriber
information (BSI) from telecommunications providers.

11

 Resolution #03 - 2015
REASONABLE LAW TO ADDRESS IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
DECISION R. v SPENCER, 2014, SCC 43
Background
In June 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a decision in the case of R v. Spencer identifying that subscriber information that allows for the linking of the identity of a person with
specific online activity in the context of a criminal investigation engages a high level of
informational privacy. However, telecommunications and other service providers (e.g. financial
institutions, rental companies) have interpreted the court's findings more broadly, and now
demand judicial authorization (based on a reasonable grounds to believe threshold) for nearly all
types of government requests for basic identifying information, extending beyond instances
involving a person's substantive Internet activity.
The impact of the Spencer ruling and the broader response by telecommunications and other
service providers is having a significant impact on law enforcement and criminal investigations.
Basic identifying information is often required at the onset of an investigation where technology
plays a role, but the judicial threshold required to obtain warrants and general production orders
to access basic identifying information is difficult, and often impossible, to satisfy when an
investigation is in its early stages.
Moreover, the impact of the Spencer ruling has caused substantial resource and workload
challenges for law enforcement. For example, prior to the Spencer ruling, law enforcement
agencies would generally complete a voluntary request to telecommunications service providers
for basic identifying information in under an hour, and receive a response from service providers
within the same day. Following the Spencer ruling, accessing the same information now often
requires ten to twenty times the amount of administrative work and documentation, days of
preparation to seek judicial authorization, and responses from service providers can take upwards
of one month - sometimes exceeding a service provider's data retention schedule for the same
information (meaning the information is no longer available).
Criminal investigations impacted by the Spencer ruling are now often delayed and in some cases,
not pursued, due to judicial authorization or resource challenges. This impact applies to a range
of investigative work, such as cases involving suspected online child sexual exploitation and
abuse, fraud and other financially-motivated crimes, organized crime, requests for international
law enforcement assistance, and national security matters involving suspected extremism and
other threats to Canada - all of which may require basic identifying information from a
telecommunications or other service provider to identify potential evidence for criminal
investigations and prosecutions.
Transparency Guidelines
Transparency Reporting Guidelines were prepared by Industry Canada, in consultation with
RCMP and other relevant Government of Canada partners, to help private organizations be open
with their customers, regarding the management and sharing of their personal information with
12

 government, while respecting the work of law enforcement, national security agencies, and
regulatory authorities. Specifically, the Guidelines cover categories of disclosures for reporting
purposes and limitations to consider when reporting statistics. Of note, the Guidelines specify
that there should be a six month delay in reporting timeframe to ensure that most active
investigations have no possibility of being compromised. On June 30, 2015, the Transparency
Reporting Guidelines were published on Industry Canada’s website:
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf11057.html
Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials
Recently, a discussion paper, led by Justice, was presented to the Federal, Provincial and
Territorial Coordinating Committee of Senior Officials, Cybercrime Working Group. The paper
focuses on the impact of Spencer and legislative reform considerations.
•

Option 1: Create an administrative (non-judicial) scheme for access to Basic Subscriber
Information (BSI).
• Option 2: Create a new judicial order (production order) for basic subscriber information
and/or add BSI to existing production orders.
• Option 3: Create a specific production order for some types of basic subscriber information
with a greater expectation of privacy, and create a specific administrative (non-judicial)
authority for access to other types of basic subscriber information.
Recent Case Law
• Since the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Spencer in June 2014, case
law has started to emerge that applies the analysis in Spencer to other cases involving police
requests for BSI.
• The majority of relevant cases thus far are from Ontario and involve requests for BSI
associated to a phone number. The cases have generally found that the privacy interests in
BSI associated to a phone number are not the same as the privacy interests in BSI linked to an
IP address, and distinguish Spencer on that basis. As such, the Ontario decisions have upheld
warrantless requests for BSI associated to phone numbers as they found in the circumstances
of each case that there was no expectation of privacy in such information. See: R. v.
Morrison (unreported, Ontario Court of Justice, Reasons released on December 17, 2014); R.
v. Khan (2014 ONSC 5664); R. v. Latiff (2015 ONSC 1580); R. v. Nurse and Plummer (2014
ONSC 6004).
• The issue of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in BSI associated to a phone
number has also emerged in the context of transmission data recorders warrants (TDRW).
These warrants provide judicial authorization to record incoming and outgoing dialed phone
numbers. In Ontario, police/Crowns have argued before the Superior Court of Justice that an
assistance order is the proper authorization to obtain in conjunction with a TDRW to compel
a service provider to provide the BSI associated with the dialed numbers. However, Telus has
argued that due to the privacy interests in BSI, as found in Spencer, a general warrant is the
proper authorization. Nordheimer J. agreed with the police/Crown and held that Spencer was
a decision dealing with the Internet and it did not find that there is always a reasonable
expectation of privacy in BSI, but rather it will depend on the circumstances of each case.
This is a very recent decision (June 19, 2015), and it will be interesting to see if other
jurisdictions follow this reasoning. See H.M.Q. v. TELUS Communications Company, 2015
ONSC 3964.
13

 Resolution #03 - 2015
REASONABLE LAW TO ADDRESS IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
DECISION R. v SPENCER, 2014, SCC 43
Action Plan
The CACP Law Amendments Committee will work with the E Crime Committee to develop new
legislation that supports the creation of a reasonable law designed to specifically provide law
enforcement the ability to obtain, in real-time or near real-time, BSI from telecommunications
providers.
The Committee will keep abreast of the ongoing work of the F/P/T Coordinating Committee of
Senior Officials, Cyber crime Working Group who is leading the policy development of
legislative reform considerations; next meeting schedule in November, 2015.
Requirement to develop an overall government-wide approach to ensure law does not run counter
to government objectives or would require major modifications in the future.

14

 Resolution #04 – 2015
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 183 of the CRIMINAL CODE
Submitted by the Law Amendments Committee
WHEREAS Canadian Police Leaders are concerned with a number of criminal offences for
which the interception of private communications is not a legal investigative
option, and;
WHEREAS there are instances when police need to gather additional evidence after traditional
investigative means have failed to resolve an investigation, and the use of a
judicial authorization to intercept private communication may assist in holding
those responsible for causing serious injury or death to someone accountable, and;
WHEREAS there is an ongoing need to increase the number of criminal offences that are
included in section 183 of the Criminal Code as offences for which the
interception of private communications is lawful through judicial authorization,
and;
WHEREAS the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, as the national voice of
Canadian police leadership, is committed to raising issues where the Criminal
Code should be amended.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of
Police requests the Government of Canada to amend section 183 of the Criminal
Code to include additional designated offences such as: Criminal Negligence
Causing Death; Criminal Negligence Causing Bodily Harm; Manslaughter;
Criminal Harassment ; Removal of a Child from Canada; Torture; Insider Trading;
Possession of a firearm knowing it’s possession is unauthorized; Possession of a
prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition; and, all driving related offences
involving death or bodily harm.

15

 Resolution #04 – 2015
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 183 of the CRIMINAL CODE
Background
Canadian police leaders, through their personnel and CACP committee membership have
researched the deficiencies in s. 183 of the Criminal Code as it relates to offences for which an
application for an authorization to intercept private communications may be made and an
authorization issued, pursuant to s. 185/186. It is interesting to note that, should the suggested rewriting of Part VI actually occur, the manner in which offences under section 183 are identified
may change from an itemized list to a more comprehensive, yet simple process of identifying
criteria offences based on minimum sentencing. Perhaps any offence punishable by 5 years or
more would automatically designated for the purpose of Part VI.
Section 183 does contain an extensive list of “offences” and it has expanded over the years in an
effort to reflect new offences added to the Criminal Code and other Acts of Parliament. That said,
there are still several offences that are conspicuously absent, and result in limitations to gather
evidence in these investigations.
Below is the primary list of suggested criminal offences that should be included by the
membership of the CACP Law Amendments Committee:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Criminal Negligence Causing Death s. 220 Criminal Code
Criminal Negligence Causing Bodily Harm s. 221 Criminal Code
Manslaughter s. 236 Criminal Code
Criminal Harassment s. 264 Criminal Code
Torture s. 269.1 Criminal Code
Insider Trading s. 382.1 Criminal Code (Fraudulent Manipulation of the Stock exchange
s. 380 is a designated offence. Insider Trading was later added to the Criminal Code but
has been omitted in Part VI.)
7) All driving related offences involving death or bodily harm
8) Removal of a Child from Canada s. 273.3 of the Criminal Code.

There are also some firearms offences that are absent from s. 183:
9) Possession of a firearm knowing it’s possession is unauthorized s. 92 Criminal Code
10) Possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition s. 95 Criminal Code

16

 Resolution #04 – 2015
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 183 of the CRIMINAL CODE
Action Plan
•

Tim Smith to draft a letter for President of CACP to inform the GOC of the resolution and
invite them to work with the CACP (LAC) to bring about the requested amendment.

•

LAC members to work with their FPT representative(s) to have this issue placed on their
agenda for review and support.

•

Plan to be actioned / complete by year end 2015

.

17

 Resolution #05 - 2015
RESOLUTION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY SAFETY
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (CCSIMS)
Submitted by the Information and Communications Technology Committee
WHEREAS the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and its members have been
sharing information since 1972 with the creation of the Canadian Police
Information Centre (CPIC) and many other systems that followed, and;
WHEREAS the safety, security and prosperity of Canadians including law enforcement
officers and their partners are reliant on the effective sharing of timely
information, and;
WHEREAS numerous Canadian inquests, inquiries and studies have consistently identified the
lack of information sharing and interoperability, both in relation to sharing
between police organizations, and elements of the Justice system and other
government and non –governmental organizations working toward public safety,
as key barriers to successful and efficient investigative, operational and
intelligence performance, and;
WHEREAS the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Information and Communications
Technology Committee (previously known as the Informatics Committee) has
been encouraging information sharing between law enforcement agencies and
other public safety stakeholders since 1998 by hosting national conferences and
leading advances such as the Police Information Portal, or PIP, which is managed
by the National Police Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and;
WHEREAS in 2014 the ICT Committee, with funding from the Government of Canada’s
Centre for Security Science, completed a National Law Enforcement Information
Management Study that clearly outlined the lack of interoperability between law
enforcement information management systems in Canada and recommended the
creation of a national strategy to improve information sharing, and;
WHEREAS the ICT Committee held a three day workshop in Ottawa in November 2014 with
representatives from across Canada which resulted in the development of a draft
Canadian Community Safety Information Management Strategy, and;
WHEREAS the Canadian Community Safety Information Management Strategy (CCSIMS)
will benefit all Canadians by enhancing community safety and increasing
efficiencies at the national level.

18

 THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
supports the ongoing development of the Canadian Community Safety
Information Management Strategy (CCSIMS) and its vision of getting the right
information to the right people at the right time, and directs its Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) Committee to continue to spearhead CCSIMS
development, and;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Canadian Safety and Security Program be requested
to provide science and technology advice and resources in the continued
development of CCSIMS.

19

 Resolution #05 - 2015
RESOLUTION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY SAFETY
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (CCSIMS)
Background
The current law enforcement environment in Canada lacks a national governance or coordination
body with federal, provincial, territorial, regional and municipal representation focused on
information management. Information vital to a proper decision may exist in one system or may
be fragmented over many silos of information. Funding for information management initiatives
is fragmented, with no sustainable funding model in place.
There is limited sharing of information between police agencies and other community safety
partners. The Hub Model, piloted in Saskatchewan has proven to be an excellent community
safety practice with the potential to be a national model. However, attitudes toward sharing vary
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and many times other members of public safety are
fearful of sharing and do not fully recognize the value of such an approach 1. At times this is due
to privacy legislation that varies across jurisdictions and hampers efforts to improve information
sharing. Today there is limited legislation in place that reflects a multijurisdictional approach to
information sharing in support of community safety
Current data systems do not easily share information. To compound this, information retention
and archiving practices vary across Canada. Major and national systems are in place but are not
optimized for sharing. Although the US based National Information Exchange (NIEM) Model
has been adopted within Canada, virtually no Requests for Proposal demand that this standard be
used for data exchanges. It would make sense that basic NIEM functionality be requested in
every RFP within public safety to move along the adoption process.
To make matters more complex, the full impacts of 700 MHz Broadband/LTE and Next
Generation 9-1-1 are not clearly understood. For example, broadband technologies could supply
an officer with all of the relevant information that could assist in a given situation, but in so doing
there is a risk of information overload for the officers and other community safety partners.
Defining what is important and relevant to an officer will require much work.
The purpose of the CCSIMS is to establish the framework and supporting Action Plan required to
achieve the CCSIM Vision: “Responsible Information Management for Community Safety”.
The sustainability of the cost of public safety is being debated and crime continues to evolve. In
the evolution of policing and community safety strategies, information management is a key
component. An enhanced Canadian Community Safety Information Management Strategy will
allow all key community safety partners and services to work smarter and safer. If police
1

As an example, in one case a person fell and struck his head coming out of a establishment where alcohol was
served. He was taken to hospital, assessed and released into police custody for other reasons. The hospital would
not supply any information on his condition citing privacy concerns. The person later died in cells. While it cannot
be said that information sharing would have saved his life, it may have contributed to a better understanding of how
to identify a deteriorating condition.

20

 services manage their information effectively at a national level, the opportunities for increased
efficiency, increased public safety, and officer safety will be fully realized.
By connecting the dots, the CCSIMS will lead to the development of the required components to
support greater collaboration between services, which contribute to community safety. CCSIMS
will allow for greater information management and sharing which in turn will enhance police
service delivery in Canada. The result will be greater localized public safety knowledge and
broader community partnerships.
The Canadian Community Safety Information Management Strategy (CCSIMS) aligns with the
Communications Interoperability Strategy for Canada 2 and will be enabled by the following key
elements:
• effective governance;
• a responsible sharing culture among public safety organizations;
• supporting and balanced legislation for sharing information;
• established and implemented National Data Standards and supporting standards-based
approaches, procedures and processes; and
• technology enablers for responsible information management for community safety.
In simple terms, the CCSIM Strategy is designed to leverage people, processes and technology
to get the right information to the right people at the right time in support of a broad
community safety information sharing environment.

2

The Communications Interoperability Strategy for Canada (CISC) is a strategic document that sets goals
and identifies key national priorities to enhance governance, planning, technology, training and exercises
to promote interoperable voice and data communications. The CISC, through its Action Plan, provides a
series of action items, including milestones, to help emergency responders and relevant government
officials make measurable improvements in day-to-day operations, as well as emergency communications,
on an annual basis.

21

 Resolution #05 - 2015
RESOLUTION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY SAFETY
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (CCSIMS)
Action Plan
Item
Draft Funding
Request

General Description
Draft a Funding Request to
support the continued
development of the CCSIMS,
including the developmental
meetings.
Request Funding
Request funding from CSSP to
host the developmental
meetings for CCSIMS Request
to CSSP
On-Going
The Co-Chairs of the CACP
Implementation
ICT Committee will
coordinate the on-going
development and
implementation of the
CCSIMS
To Inform and Garner Awareness of the strategy
Broad Support
remains low. Specific
objectives are needed to
change this:
Formalize CACP support of
the strategy by CACP
resolution

Responsibility
Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee

To Inform and Garner Create awareness of the
Broad Support
CCSIMS within at least 75%
of the CACP Membership by
end of 2015

Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee –
with assistance from
the CACP Board of
Directors
CACP Board of
Directors

To Inform and Garner Inform each territorial or
Broad Support
provincial police association
of the plan’s existence by end
of 2015
To Inform and Garner Identify and inform key public
Broad Support
safety partners that can help
move the strategy forward by
end of 2015

CACP Board of
Directors

Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee

CACP Board of
Directors

Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee
with assistance from
the CACP Board of
Directors
22

 Item
Plan next CCSIMS
development meeting

General Description
Planning of the next CCSIMS
meeting is needed to continue
the development of this
important product. Much
work is needed to ensure it
describes the needs and action
plans in detail.
Inform Territorial and Inform each territorial or
Provincial Ministries provincial ministry that
touches upon law enforcement
of the plan’s existence by end
of 2015
Persuade the M/F/P/T Work is needed to persuade
community to
the M/F/P/T community to
formally
formally support/endorse the
support/endorse the
CCSIMS. Specific objectives
CCSIMS
are:
Identify key stakeholders in
each province by September
2015
Persuade the M/F/P/T Identify any mechanisms that
community to
could help each
formally
province/territory more
support/endorse the
formally show support for the
CCSIMS
CCSIMS by end of 2015 (i.e.,
work toward hub model,
legislation, working groups,
etc.)

Responsibility
Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee

Persuade the M/F/P/T
community to
formally
support/endorse the
CCSIMS
Persuade the M/F/P/T
community to
formally
support/endorse the
CCSIMS

CACP Board of
Directors

Engage each provincial
privacy commissioner’s office
in the process by end of 2015

CACP Board of
Directors

Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee

Co-Chairs – CACP
ICT Committee
with assistance from
the CACP Board of
Directors

Ensure representation from
Co-Chairs – CACP
each province at the ICT
ICT Committee
Conference in 2016 which will
feature many elements of the
CCSIMS

23

 Resolution #06 - 2015
SUSTAINABLE FUNDING OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA ELECTRONIC
CATALOGUE AND DIGITAL PORTAL FOR CANADIAN POLICE RESEARCH
Submitted by the CACP Research Foundation
WHEREAS the goal of the CACP Research Foundation is to create and develop the highest
standards of effectiveness in law enforcement by fostering and encouraging
research, and;
WHEREAS Public Safety Canada has made a valuable contribution to this goal by initiating
work on two important research tools for police leaders – an electronic catalogue
of Canadian police research and a digital portal through which research activities
can be shared, and;
WHEREAS Canadian police leaders are expected to rely on research to make informed,
evidence-based decisions, and;
WHEREAS police, researchers, academics, government at all levels, and others need access to
Canadian police research in order to ensure police leaders are able to make
evidence-based decisions, and;
WHEREAS the Public Safety Canada electronic catalogue and digital portal provide
unprecedented access to Canadian police research and research activities, and;
WHEREAS funding and support for these tools has been confirmed through to February 2016,
but not beyond, and;
WHEREAS further funding commitments are required beyond February of 2016 to ensure
these tools are available, and sufficient staff are in place, to sustain the ongoing
operations of the services provided by this important Public Safety Canada
initiative.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Minister of Public Safety Canada be called upon
to allocate sustainable funding to the electronic catalogue and digital portal in
order to ensure police leaders are able to make evidence-based decisions that will
improve public safety for Canadians.

24

 Resolution #06 - 2015
SUSTAINABLE FUNDING OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA ELECTRONIC
CATALOGUE AND DIGITAL PORTAL FOR CANADIAN POLICE RESEARCH
Action Plan
•

The Executive Director will draft a letter for the President of the CACP to request the
Minister of Public Safety Canada to allocate sustainable funding to the electronic
catalogue and digital portal in order to ensure police leaders are able to make evidencebased decisions that will improve public safety for Canadians.

•

The President of the CACP will send the letter to the Minister of Public Safety Canada

•

The President of the CACP will call on the Chair of the CACP Research Foundation to
meet with the Minister should this be required to achieve the desired outcome.

•

Plan to be actioned / complete by year end 2015.

25

 Resolution #07 - 2015
CYBER CRIME: POLICE ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN A
COLLABORATIVE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Submitted by Norm Taylor, Program Director, CACP Executive Global Studies Program
WHEREAS as proposed in Resolution #03 – 2012, and through the continuing work of the eCrimes Committee, the CACP has called on the Government of Canada, together
with its public and private sector partners to develop a National Cybercrime
Strategy to disrupt cybercrime, and;
WHEREAS in August 2014, the CACP Board of Directors further recognized cyber crime as
an emerging concern stating, it is “a topic that challenges the traditional skills,
capacities, roles and response patterns of policing … the need for a coherent
national response is an emerging priority for police leaders”, and;
WHEREAS current empirical evidence suggests that solutions to cyber-based victimization
demand effective collaboration among multiple actors, and that all levels of
policing share unique responsibilities to protect citizens and to uphold the rule of
law, and;
WHEREAS the CACP Global Executive Studies Program 2015 was directed by the CACP
Board to research and illuminate a way forward for Canada on cyber crime by
studying approaches in selected key countries to identify the most effective roles
for police within such a collaborative framework, and;
WHEREAS in May 2015, after research and field interviews with almost 100 experts in nine
countries representative of policing, government, academia, and private industry,
the Global Studies cohort concluded that the most promising law enforcement
responses to cyber crime are characterized by:
(1) Addressing cyber crime as a core policing matter
(2) Identifying cyber crime as a current community safety priority
(3) Recognizing that despite its complexity, cyber crime is actionable to
some degree at all levels of policing, and;
WHEREAS the experience of other countries, combined with emerging domestic analysis,
confirmed that the patterns of victimization, growing harm to communities, and
threats to the rule of law, all fueled further by continued and rapid technological
advances, argue urgently for a deliberate, coherent and sustained response by
police services at all levels in Canada, and;

26

 WHEREAS the CACP and its members, through adoption of this resolution, acknowledge that
all “cyber crime”, regardless of its underlying motivations, sources or forms, is in
fact a crime; and, like all crime, it creates victims who merit our support.
Notwithstanding the complexity and the need for broad collaborative strategies
that must extend national capacity well beyond policing alone, all levels of police
agencies continue to bear an obligation, to the extent of their capacity, to prevent
cyber crime, to pursue cyber criminals and to protect their communities.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police calls on
its partners, their associations, and FPT stakeholders to work with the CACP to
accelerate the advancement and adoption of a consolidated National Cyber Crime
Strategy, as envisioned in Resolution #03-2012, including frameworks,
mechanisms and a structure to achieve better national coordination within law
enforcement, and among law enforcement, government, academia and the private
sector, and;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police calls on the
Federal Government to increase the focus on cyber crime, in line with the
principles above, when it next updates “Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy
(2010)”, and;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police calls on its
partners, their associations, and FPT stakeholders to collectively advocate for
legislative, regulatory and policy change that will increase investigative efficiency
and effectiveness, create greater risk and consequences for offenders, and more
effectively facilitate the work of police in several areas, including but not limited
to: reporting requirements; data preservation standards; MLAT reforms; domestic
production orders for foreign data; modernized lawful access; and, extraterritoriality for certain vital cyber systems.

27

 Resolution #07 - 2015
CYBER CRIME: POLICE ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN A
COLLABORATIVE NATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Background
The CACP Executive Global Studies 2015 cohort was assigned the research theme of cyber
crime, by the CACP Board of Directors. After completing a nine-country comparative study,
preceded by domestic research and the development of a comprehensive baseline for Canada, the
CACP Global team has made several notable observations and findings on the comparative state
of current police roles in this important and growing issue in Canada. These findings will form
the basis of a presentation to members at the Annual Conference in August, 2015, a report to the
Board, and a number of other communication products currently being produced by the team.
Generally speaking, Canada is currently behind the curve in almost all aspects of cyber resilience
and response. There are several examples where this is being addressed with increasing priority,
and a growing number of partners are becoming engaged. However, to date, much of this work
has been focused on threats to national security, threats to the broader economy, threats to critical
infrastructure, and threats to the private sector, including the financial sector. All of this work is
important and CACP Global is calling attention to the need to accelerate the adoption of the
“Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy (2010)” as outlined in this resolution.
What is most notably lacking in Canada, by comparison to other jurisdictions, is any kind of
comprehensive appreciation, focus or broadly based response to cyber crime across the policing
system, and especially its associated threats to community safety. Under reporting of cyber
incidents is in the extreme. In fact, several of our police services have been victims of cyber
attacks, and even some of these incidents have not been reported or documented as ‘crimes’.
CACP Global believes that much of this is due to several factors, notably a lack of knowledge
among police, a lack of recognition of the strategic importance of linking cyber activity to
community safety priorities, and an under-appreciation of the patterns and impacts of
victimization of our citizens.
Among the wide array of actors who must play various roles in a collaborative response to
malicious cyber activity in all its forms, our police system holds some very unique
responsibilities when it comes to cyber crime, among them ensuring the protection of citizens at
the local level, building greater resilience in our communities, providing adequate support to
victims, deterring criminal behaviour by raising the risks and consequences for offenders, and
ensuring proper applications of the criminal justice system to uphold the rule of law.
All cyber crime is crime. And all crime creates victims. While recognizing the continuing
importance of broad, collaborative responses that will extend well beyond the capacities of the
average police service, CACP Global believes it is nonetheless vital and urgent that Canadian
policing must get into this game.

28

 Resolution #08 - 2015
AMENDMENTS TO THE CANADA POST CORPORATION ACT
Submitted by the Law Amendments Committee
WHEREAS the Canada Post Corporation Act currently provides that “nothing in the course of
post is liable to demand, seizure, detention or retention”, 3 and;
WHEREAS Canadian Police Leaders are concerned that contraband is being sent through the
mail system with impunity from judicially authorized search or seizure. By way
of example, based on information contained in a censored version of the RCMP’s
November 2012 “Postal Assessment 2012” prepared for the Canadian Association
of Chiefs of Police’s Organized Crime Committee, these reports exposed cases in
which guns, grenades, a rocket launcher, stun guns, dangerous chemicals, and
drugs such as cocaine, heroin and marihuana were shipped through the postal
system. 4 These items represent a significant threat to postal workers and
Canadians, and;
WHEREAS this represents a significant challenge for Canadian law enforcement, as reliable
intelligence and information that points to contraband being moved through the
mail system may not be acted upon by police until it is successfully delivered.
This forces law enforcement to find alternative ways to work within or around the
Canada Post system and legislative framework in order to apprehend criminals
who use the postal system as a way to move various forms of contraband
including weapons, illicit drugs and counterfeit items across Canada, and;
WHEREAS there is an ongoing need to amend the Canada Post Corporation Act in order that
Canada Post and the Canadian law enforcement community develop ways to
effectively work together to stop the transmittal of contraband through the postal
system, and;
WHEREAS the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, as the national voice of
Canadian police leadership, is committed to raising issues where federal
legislation, such as the Canada Post Corporation Act, should be amended.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian Association of Chiefs of
Police requests the Government of Canada to amend the Canada Post
Corporation Act to provide police, for the purpose of intercepting contraband,
with the ability to obtain judicial authorization to seize, detain or retain parcels or
letters while they are in the course of mail and under Canada Post’s control.

3

Section 40 (3) - Subject to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Customs Act and the Proceeds of
Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act
4
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/09/18/criminals-using-canada-post-to-transport-illicit-goods-including-a-rocketlauncher-rcmp-report-says/
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/09/17/guns_grenades_drugs_counterfeit_goods_arrive_by_canada_post.h
tml

29

 Resolution #08 - 2015
AMENDMENTS TO THE CANADA POST CORPORATION ACT
Background
Canadian police leaders, through their personnel and CACP committee membership have
identified the deficiencies in the Canada Post Corporation Act as it relates to seizure powers of
law enforcement while items are in transit in the postal system, also referred to as “during the
course of post”.
By way of example, on an annual basis, the RCMP and CBSA partner together in a week long
INTERPOL operation to disrupt the online sale of counterfeit and unlicensed medicine. The
2013 enforcement initiative netted some 238,820 illicit and fake medicines including antibiotics,
hormone replacement, muscle relaxants, erectile dysfunction pills, weight loss pills, beta blockers
and bronchodilators. These medicines were worth $1,032,514 and came from 3,223 packages
originating in 19 countries, while raids across the globe resulted in the seizure of 9,800,000 illicit
medicines worth 41,000,000 USD. This highlights a global trend in which postal and courier
systems are used to move contraband across international borders. 5
The issue of contraband being sent through the mail has also become known in Canadian society.
In September 2013, it was reported by the media that the Canadian postal system is being used to
transmit various forms of contraband, including illicit drugs, weapons and counterfeit items.
Based on information contained in a censored version of the RCMP’s November 2012 “Postal
Assessment 2012” prepared for the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police’s Organized Crime
Committee, these reports exposed cases in which guns, grenades, a rocket launcher, stun guns,
dangerous chemicals, and drugs such as cocaine, heroin and marihuana were shipped through the
postal system. 6 These items represent a significant threat to postal workers and Canadians.
The Canada Post Corporation Act (CPCA) is the legislative basis for the Canada Post
Corporation and was passed in 1981. Subject to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
Act, the Customs Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing
Act, the Canada Post Corporation Act currently exempts items in the course of post from search
or seizure by law enforcement, pursuant to the Criminal Code, Controlled Drugs and Substances
Act, Copyright Act or Trade-marks Act 7, and potentially others. This exclusion may perhaps be
due to domestic trafficking not being seen as a priority when section 40(3) of the CPCA was last
updated in 2005. This means that search and seizure authorities granted to law enforcement
personnel under the Criminal Code of Canada or other criminal law authorities are overridden by
the CPCA, giving law enforcement no authority to seize, detain or retain parcels or letters while
they are in the course of mail and under Canada Post’s control. That said, the CPCA is
augmented by the Non-mailable Matter Regulations which specify that Canada Post inspectors
5

http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/2013/06-27-pangea-eng.htm
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/PR077
6
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/09/18/criminals-using-canada-post-to-transport-illicit-goods-including-a-rocketlauncher-rcmp-report-says/
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/09/17/guns_grenades_drugs_counterfeit_goods_arrive_by_canada_post.h
tml
7
Canada Post Corporation Act, Section 40(3)

30

 shall turn over any illegal material found in the course of mail to law enforcement. Recent court
rulings have determined that postal inspectors cannot act as agents of the state where police
convey information received to postal inspectors in order to intercept the contraband during the
postal delivery process.
This represents a significant challenge for Canadian law enforcement, as reliable intelligence and
information that points to contraband being moved through the mail system may not be acted
upon by police until it is successfully delivered. This forces law enforcement to find alternative
ways to work within or around the Canada Post system and legislative framework in order to
apprehend criminals who use the postal system as a way to move various forms of contraband
including weapons, illicit drugs and counterfeit items across Canada.
It is imperative that Canada Post and the law enforcement community develop ways to
effectively work together to stop the transmittal of contraband through the postal system.
The CACP Drug Committee and the CACP Law Amendments Committee have jointly discussed
the issue and concluded that the Canada Post Corporation Act requires legislative amendments
in order to fully address law enforcement’s concerns.

31

 Resolution #08 – 2015
AMENDMENTS TO THE CANADA POST CORPORATION ACT
Action Plan
•

Law Amendments Committee (LAC) to draft a letter for President of CACP to inform the
Minister of Public Safety of the resolution and invite identified stakeholders to work with
the CACP (LAC and Drug Committee) to bring about the requested legislative
amendment.

•

LAC and/or Drug Committee member(s) will accompany President of CACP to meeting
with Minister of Public Safety to further discuss this issue.

•

Drug Committee to consult and discuss further with Canada Post Corporation
representatives in order to further develop strategy for legislative amendments and report
back to LAC and President of CACP.

•

LAC members to work with their FPT representative(s) to have this requested legislative
amendment placed on their agenda for review and support.

•

Plan to be actioned / completed by December 31, 2015.

32