COMMITTEES: RD WY OREGON COMMITTEE ON FINANCE COMMITTEE ON BUDGET CHAIRMAN OF ON a COMMITTEE ON ENERGY NATURAL RESOURCES FINANCE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLJGENCE WASHINGTON, DC 20510?3703 JOINT COMMWEEON 221 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON. DC 20510 August 12, 2015 (202) 224?5244 911 NE 11TH AVENUE SUITE 630 PORTLAND, OR 97232 (503) 326?7525 Director William Evanina National Counterintelligence Executive National Counterintelligence and Security Center Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511 Dear Director Evanina: The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) is tasked with a very important mission, which includes defending the nation?s classi?ed information and assets from exploitation by foreign adversaries. The importance of this mission has recently been underscored by compromises of sensitive US government personnel data. In April 2015, the Of?ce of Personnel Management (0PM) announced that that it had been the target in the ?rst of two security incidents. The ?rst security incident affected 4.2 million current federal employees and included personal information such as names, birth dates, home addresses and Social Security numbers. In June 2015, OPM announced a second security incident affecting 21.5 million individuals?including current, former, and prospective employees and their relatives and associates?had compromised sensitive background investigation information and, in some cases, ?ngerprints. This information could clearly be of signi?cant value to foreign intelligence services. There appear to have been signi?cant warning signals regarding the security of networks, including a report from the OPM Inspector General that speci?cally noted weaknesses in two of systems that support suitability and security clearance determinations. The fact that such sensitive information was not adequately protected raises real questions about how well the government can protect personnel information in the future, especially as the security clearance process moves toward conducting ongoing evaluations and incorporating publicly available electronic information. I would like to know what actions the NCSC took prior to these OPM security incidents and what the NCSC will be doing to prepare for future attacks that will similarly target personnel and background investigation information. Speci?cally, I ask that you answer the following questions: 1. Did the NCSC identify security clearance database as a counterintelligence vulnerability prior to these security incidents? 2. Did the NCSC provide 0PM with any recommendations about how to secure this information? 3. At least one of?cial has said that the background investigation information compromised 1n the second 0PM hack 1ncluded 1nformat10n on 1nd1v1duals as far back at 1985. Has the 405 EAST 8TH AVE SAC ANNEX BUILDING S. COURTHOUSE THE JAMISON BUILDING SUITE 2020 105 FIR ST 310 WEST 6TH ST 131 NW HAWTHORNE AVE EUGENE, OR 97401 SUITE 201 ROOM 118 SUITE 107 (541) 43170229 LA GRANDE, OR 97850 MEDFORD, OR 97501 BEND, OR 97701 (541) 962?7691 (541) 858?5122 (541) 330?9142 PRINTED 0N RECYCLED PAPER 707 13TH 51?, SE SUITE 285 SAIJEM, OR 97301 (503) 589?4555 NCSC evaluated whether the retention requirements for background investigation information should be reduced to mitigate the vulnerability of maintaining personal information for a signi?cant period of time? If not, please explain why existing retention periods are necessary. Strong cyberseeurity protections are obviously an essential part of effective counterintelligence, and thoughtful risk management is the best way to ensure both. I appreciate your attention to this important matter, and I look forward to your response. Sincerely, tmwvir?m Ron Wyden United States Senator