Department of Homeland Security 2IÀFH RI ,QVSHFWRU *HQHUDO Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight (Redacted) OIG-14-153 July 2015 05" OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security ?hr 50? Washington, DC 20528 July 6, 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Peter Neffenger Administrator Transportation Security Administration FROM: John Roth Inspector eral SUBJECT: Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight Redacted, 14- 153 OSC File No. Attached for your information is the redacted version of our Sensitive Security Information (881) final letter report: Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight. We issued the 881 version of this report to the Department on September 9, 2014, and closed Recommendation 2 because of the Transportation Security Administration?s (TSA) corrective actions to address the intent of this recommendation. After issuing the report, TSA has implemented additional plans and taken corrective actions to address the remaining report recommendations. Based on responses, Recommendations 1 and 3 are currently resolved and open. We coordinated a sensitivity review of the 881 final letter report with TSA and have reached agreement on the appropriate redactions. We are now making the redacted report public and will publish it on our website. Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254?4100. Attachment OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington. DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov SEP 0 9 2014 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John S. Pistole Administrator Transportation Security Administration FROM: John Roth ��<\.o� Inspector General SUBJECT: Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight - Sensitive Security Information OSC File No. Dl-14-2012 Attached for your information is our final letter report, Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight - Sensitive Security Information. This report is in accordance with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 1213(d). We incorporated formal comments from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the final report. The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving TSA Pre../™ Initiative security. Your office concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two. Based on information provided in your response, we consider Recommendation 1 resolved and open, Recommendation 2 resolved and closed, and Recommendation 3 unresolved and open. No further reporting is necessary for Recommendation 2. Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) corrective action plan and (2) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation. We are providing a copy of this report to the Department of Homeland Security's General Counsel. We are not releasing this report publicly because of its sensitivity. SENSITIVESECUIUTYINFORMATION A'ARNING:ThisrecorelcoAtaiA 1 SSensitiveSectirityIAformationthatiscontrellel e tineler49CFR19arts15 and1S20. Nopartofthisrecordmay13eeliscleseeltopersonswithetita "neeeltoknow, " aselefinedin49 e rmissionof theAelministraterof theTrans19ertatieA CFR parts15and1520, elEce19twiththewrittenp Secu r ityAelm inistrationortheSecretar t tion. Una1;1thorizeelreleasemayres1;1ltinci vil yofTranspora penaltyoretheraction. ForUS i elisclosureisgo\•erneel13y5USC. anel . .go'lernrnentagencies, puslc . . 552 49CFR parts15and1520. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL {wasth Department of Homeland Security Washington. DC 20523:? Major contributors to this report are Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector; Angela Garvin, Lead Inspector; Amy Tomlinson, Senior Inspector; LaDana Crowell, Senior Inspector; and Rahne Jones, Inspector. Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Deborah L. Gotten-Mills, Acting Assistant Inspector General, Office of Inspections, at (202) 245-4015 cc: The Honorable Steven E. Bunnell General Counsel Attachment SENSITIVESECURITYINFORMATION a ,�,,o5'" OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov Review Request The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure concerning the use of a risk-based rule by the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight program that may create a vulnerability in aviation security. The risk-based rule The disclosure also stated the Secure Flight program . On April 28, 2014, OSC referred this allegation to the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security. The Department subsequently requested our assistance with this allegation. Conduct of Review and Summary of Evidence Obtained We assigned our Office of Inspections team currently assessing Security Enhancements to the TSA Pre�™ Initiative to review this allegation. We interviewed the whistleblower and TSA senior officials involved in the risk-based rule decision-making process. We also analyzed documentation regarding these rules to determine whether an aviation security vulnerability exists. We analyzed the following documents: • Memoranda establishing the rule; • Memorandum suspending the rule; • TSA Office of Security Operations' evaluation of the rule; and • Secure Flight program documentation evidencing rule status. Summary of Results We determined that using risk-based analysis by TSA's Secure Flight Program _ However, TSA mitigated the risk on March 7, 2014, by suspending the rule's use in the Secure Flight program. We recommend TSA discontinue using the rule until TSA 2 SENSITIVESEC URITYINFORMATION NG:Tl'lisreEordEeAtai nsSensiti veSernrityIAo f rmationtl'latisEOAtrole l d1:1nder49CFR13arts15 WARNI and1520. No13artoftl'lisrecordmaybedisdosedto13ers on s witl'lo1:1ta "neeeltoknow," asel e fi neel in49 ci;Rparts15and1520, el.'t Washington. DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov Secure Flight Screening TSA's Secure Flight program screens individuals prior to granting them access to an airport's sterile area. The program allows TSA to determine the level of security screening passengers should receive at the airport checkpoint. The program compares self-reported traveler information provided to TSA from air carrier reservations, such as name, date of birth, and gender, to lists of low-risk travelers, the Terrorist Screening Database No Fly and Selectee lists, as well as to other intelligence-based data systems maintained by TSA and other Federal agencies. Risk Assessment Rule 1 TSA Pre..!™ screening generally involves the use of a walkthrough metal detector. Passengers are not required to remove shoes, belts, laptops, liquids, or gels. The equipment used to screen carry-on baggage contains threat-recognition software that aids the Transportation Security Officer's review of this baggage. As a result, the carry-on baggage belt runs continuously rather than stopping at each bag. However, the Transportation Security Officer has the ability to stop the belt when needed. - 3 SENSITIVESECURITYINFORMATION SensitiveSee1:1r i WARNING:nilsreeordeontains tylnfermationtl=tatiseontrolled1:1nder49CFRparts15 anel1520. Nopartof tl'fisreeorl e maybeeliselosel e toper sonswitl'fowta "neeeltoknow," asel e fineelin49 CFR parts15anel1520, elEceptwiththewrite t npermissionof theAdministratorof theTransportation Secl;lrity AelministrationortheSeeretaryofTransportation. Una1:1thorizeelrel e asemayres1:1ltineivil penaltyorotheraction. ForUS . . governmentagencies, pl;lblie €1isclos1:1rei sgoverneelby5USC. . . 552anel 49 CFRparts15anel1520. ' fV'ESECUJU'fYINFORMATION SENSIf �#<-<"o OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ,�� Department of Homeland Security Washington. DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov We evaluated TSA's written comments and made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of TSA's written response to the report recommendations and our analysis of the response follows. A copy ofTSA's response, in its entirety, is included as appendix A. In addition, we received technical comments from TSA and incorporated these comments into the report where appropriate. TSA concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two. We appreciate TSA's comments and contributions. Management Response to Recommendation #1:TSA officials did not concur with Recommendation 1. In its response, TSA said in 2012 it explored the cost and feasibility of encrypting commercial aircraft carrier boarding passes Im· After engaging industry stakeholders, TSA decided not to adopt this approach because of limited data fields in some air carrier systems and encrypting boarding pass barcodes is cost prohibitive. TSA said it decided to pursue a more practical and affordable solution using a digital signature. OIG Analysis: Although TSA did not concur with this recommendation, we consider TSA's actions responsive to the intent of Recommendation 1, which is resolved and open. We acknowledge TSA's previous efforts to encrypt boarding passes . This recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of CAT Phase I and II timeframes, milestones, and implementation dates. Management Response to Recommendation #2: TSA officials concurred with Recommendation 2. TSA said it is pursuing CAT and awarded a contract in April 2014 to begin operational testing and evaluation of this technology. OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's actions responsive to the intent of Recommendation 2, which is resolved and closed. No further reporting fromTSA regarding this recommendation is necessary. Management Response to Recommendation #3: TSA officials did not concur with Recommendation 3. TSA said it mitigates the current level of risk by a range of security procedures and technologies currently available and/or deployed by TSA. 7 SENST I l'lrESECURl'fYINFORMATION e coAtainsSeAsitiveSec1:1rit'(IAforrnatioAthatiscoAtrolleel1:1Aele W ARNING:Thisrecorl r49CFRparts15 aAel1520. Nopartof tl:iisr e corel rnaybeEliscloseel topersoAs witl:io1:1ta "neeEltoknow," asEl efineElifl49 CFRpartslSaAEl1520, e>Eceptwithtl:lewritteflperrnissioAoftl:ieAElmiAistratoroftheT raAsportatiofl raAsportatiofl. UF1a1:1tt=iorizeElrele f civil Sec1:1ri T asemayr e sultil tyAElrniAistrationortt=leSecret aryof . goveFArneAtageAcies,p1:1bi l cEl peAaltyorotheractiofl. ForUS. isdos1:1reis goveFAeelby5U.SC . .552aF1El 49CFRparts15anEl1520. S:ENSl'fl"it:S:ECURI'fYINFOIUtlA'fION <.i,..o s'C>"' \ OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Secw-ity Washington. DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's actions nonresponsive to the intent of Recommendation 3, which is unresolved and open. Although TSA has developed tools and processes as security layers, these measures are not available at all airports. For example, as of June 2014 . In addition, TSA Pre/™ lanes use walkthrough metal detectors for passenger screening, but this technology does not detect non-metallic items. Advanced Imaging Technology machines identify and display metallic and non-metallic items and potential anomalies concealed on a passenger, affording Transportation Security Officers enhanced capabilities to screen passengers and identify threat items. Using walkthrough metal detectors in TSA Pre"™lanes limits TSA's security threat detection capabilities. Further, -· Recommendation 3 will remain unresolved and open pending our receipt of documentation that until CAT - Implementation. 8 S ENSITltgf SECURITYINfOftMA'flON WARNING:Tl'lis reco relcontainsSensitiveSecl::l rityIno f rmationtl'latiscontrolle elunder49CFRparts15 ' and1520. Nopartof tl'lisrecordmayeedisclosedtopersonsNitl'lo1;1ta "needtol mew , " asdefinedin49 CFR parts15and1520, exceptwitRtl'lewritten13ermissionoftheAdministratoroftheTrans13ertatien Sec1;1rity Administrationor the Secretary ofTrans13ertatien. Una1;1therizedrel e aseFAayr e s1;1ltiAeivi l . . 552aAd 13enaltyorotheraction. ForUS . . governmentagencies , 131;1elicdisclosureisgovernedeySUSC. 49CFR13arts15and1520. Washington, DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov Appendix A Management Comments to the Draft Report SENSITIVE SECt:JR:lTYINFOR:M:ATIONU.S.l> rot ll ll• l ohU penollj ••-aelioa.Fer \l .S.10'"'"''"'"*"""'""'"bHodlel let01eilc• •• re •db) 51l.S.C.5!hd '9 CRI ,_ou 15 oad IUO illrater IO SENSITIVESECURITYINFORMATION \Vl\Rf>llNG:This recerEIcontainsSensiti· «eSernrityInformationthatiscontrollcEIl:lnelcr49CFRparts15 EItopersonswithol:lta "Aceatel mow ," asdcfiAcdiA49 anI E 1520. Nopartof thisrccorEImayecelisdosc CFR parts15an El1520, e*ccptwiththewrittenpermissionofthelEl \ min i stra toref theTranspera t tieA SecwrityAl E ministrationor theSecretaryofTransportation. UnawthorizcelreleaseA'tayrcsl:lltinei' ' t il . gov ernme ntageAcics,pl:leliediselesl:lrci sgevcrricelb'f5U5 . .E.552 and penaltyorotheraction. ForUS. 49CFRparts15anet1520. SENSl'fPlESECURl'PlINFO�IATION ��- 9 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov SENSITIVE SECtJlt 'i' tT INFORMATION 3 In October 2013, TSA implemented criteria for identifying lower-risk passengers under the Secure Flight risk-based analysis initiative.3 This policy oflower-cisk decision followed significant analysis o travelers. In addition to TSA's internal was assessed independently by Metron, Inc.4 Following he Secure Flight prescreeniog system, additional independent analysis conducted by the Civil Aviation Threat Working Group (CATWG)5 and the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAl)6 which separately and in conjunction with the two other risk assessment elements planned for implementation as part of Secure Fli ht risk-based analysis. During their assessment, CATWG analysts determined The HSSAI assessment concluded that the approach TSA bad taken in developing and implementing. based risk assessments was defensible. Prior to implementing Secure Flight risk-based analysis, TSA used SFPD infonnation to conduct automated checks against terrorist watch lists and as part of intelligence-based rules used to l See TSA ·s discussion of this initiative in its Privacy Act system ofrecords notice (SORN). Privacy Act of1974; Department ofHomeland Security Transportation Security Administration-DHSITSA·0/9 Secure Flight Records . .SS270 (Sept. 10, 2013). System ofRecords, 78 Fed. Reg ' Metron, Inc. is a scientific consulting company under contract to the OHS Office of Science and Technology that develops and applies mathematical methods for solving challenging problems in national defense and homeland security. ) The CATWG is comprised ofintelligence analysts from OHS and I 0 other Intelligence Community agencies with expertise in civil aviation, and is chaired by a senior analyst from the National Counte:rterrorism Center (NCTC). Directly contributing to the results of the analysis were analysts from lhe Cenb'al Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, NCTC, Federal Aviation Administration, and National Security Agency. 6 HSSA I is a Federally Funded Research and Development Cent.er (FFRDC) created to provide independent analysis of homeland security issues for the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security, its components and agencies, and its partner organizations, as authorized in the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Pub. Law 107·296, § 30.S as codified in 6 u.s.c. § 18.S). 1 Merit scores reflect 1he accuracy ofclassification on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, where 1.0 refle<:IS perfect classification, O.S reflects the expected results from random classification, and a value ofO.O indicating misclassification of passengers by high or low risk. S«••l l)l H '>4 11/W'l6. l'bb ncord