IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COUMBIA RAND PAUL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; P.O. Box 15643 Washington, D.C. 20003 and FREEDOMWORKS, INC., on behalf of itself, its members, Civil Action No. and all others similarly situated; 400 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 765 Washington, D.C. 20001 Plaintiffs, V. BARACK H. OBAMA, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Office of the President, The White House 1600 Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20500 JAMES R. CLAPPER, in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence; Office of the Director of National Intelligence Attn: James R. Clapper Washington, D.C. 2051 KEITH B. ALEXANDER, in his official capacity as Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service; National Security Agency Attn: General Keith B. Alexander 9800 Savage Rd. Fort Meade, MD 20755 -.lRTi-n- . . Investigation; FBI Headquarters 935 Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 Defendants. Additional service on behalf of Defendants President Obama, Director Clapper and Director Comey: Ronald C. Machen Jr. U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Judiciary Center Building 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 Additional service on behalf of Defendant General Alexander: Rod J. Rosenstein U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland 6406 Ivy Lane Suite 800 Greenbelt, MD 20770 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INIUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated United States citizens or permanent residents who are or have been customers, users, or subscribers of phone service in the United States since 2006, bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants' mass, suspicionless, non~particularized collection, storage, retention, and search of telephone Inetadata related to every domestic or international phone call made or received by Plaintiffs and class members (hereinafter "Mass Associational Tracking Program" or under the auspices of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. 1861, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution] Plaintiffs and class members seek a declaration that the Mass Associational Tracking Program is unconstitutional, an injunction forbidding the government from continuing the MATP, and an order to the Defendants to purge from its MATP databases all of the telephone rnetadata related to the communications of Plaintiffs and class members. Plaintiffs and class members aver as follows: 1 The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 1. SUBJECT MATTER IURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY TO GRANT RELIEF This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the claims of Plaintiffs and class members arise under the Constitution of the United States. This Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202. This Court has authority to award costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2412. PERSONAL JURISDICTION This Court possesses personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because their acts or omissions giving rise to the claims of Plaintiffs and class members occurred in this district or because of their regular or continuous presence or residence in this district. VENUE Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. l39l(e) because a substantial portion of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims of Plaintiffs and class members occurred in this district, and, upon information and belief, one or more of Defendants reside in this district. PARTIES PLAINTIFF Plaintiff and Class Representative Rand Paul is a citizen of the United States and a resident and citizen of Kentucky. Plaintiff Paul has standing to bring this suit because Defendants have, without legitimate legal basis, collected, stored, retained, and periodically searched telephone metadata concerning every domestic or international phone call he made or received since at least May 2006, and Defendants continue to do so. Plaintiff Paul uses and has used both cellular and/or landline telephones in the United States on a daily basis since May 2006, and he has been a subscriber of both cellular and landline telephone services since May 2006. Such telephone services have included, but not been limited to, Verizon Wireless and services. Plaintiff has a subjective expectation of privacy from Defendants about his telephone metadata that society views as reasonable. 5. Plaintiff and Class Representative Freedomworks, Inc. is a not for profit Washington, D.C. corporation ("Freedoniworks"), exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff FreedomWorl>. Such metadata and details taken by, and in the hands ofi Defendants and government violate the reasonable expectations of privacy of Plaintiffs and class members. 29. A search occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment each time the NSA violates Plaintiffs' and class members' reasonable expectations of privacy. Clapper, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180863, *63 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, ., concurring); Jones at 950 (2012); and Bond v. United States, 529 5 As of February 1 1, 2014, available at: 1 2_rg_fi11al_repo1't. 10 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)). At a minimum, Defendants violate Plaintiffs' and class members' Fourth Amendment rights each time they gather, store or search Plaintiffs' and class members' telephone metadata. 30. That Plaintiffs and class members necessarily reveal certain information to telecommunications companies with which they contract for their telephone service and which are provided to Defendants under the MATP -- does not reflect a willingness or expectation that they are surrendering the privacy of the information, but Simply reflects a necessary accommodation to modern life? 7 See generally Klayman Obama, 2013 US. Dist. LEXIS 176925, *81-90; but see Smith 12. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The differences between the present case and Smith in both nature and scope are stark. A listing of such differences includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) the fact that in Smith, the car owned by the target of the information-gathering had previously been spotted on the crime victim's street twice; whereas, in this case, there is no indication beforehand that a_ny information gathered is related to anyone that has anything to do with any crime whatsoever. (2) The crime perpetrator in Smith was known to have used a phone to call the victim; whereas, in this case there is no known or suspected crime at the time of data collection. (3) The pen register in Smith was only operational for 13 days; whereas, in this case the government is essentially in a permanent cycle of ongoing collection. Thus, the sheer volume of data is exponentially different than in Smith. (4) There was no expectation the data gathered in Smith would be kept after the robbery case was over; whereas, in this case data is being gathered, stored, kept and searched for five years with no relation to any case whatsoever. (5) In Smith, the data gathered could have shown nothing about the movements of the caller; whereas the gathering of trunk identifying information under FISC orders can provide a general personal location aside fiom a fixed location. (6) The relationship between the government and the phone company in Smith was significantly different, limited in scope and cooperation; whereas, the daily and systematic exchange of all telephone metadata in this case spanning over seven-and-a-half - years puts the telephone companies in a different posture than was the case in Smith. See US. Dep ofJusiice v. Reporters Comm. or Freedom ofihe Press, 439 U.S. 749, 764 (1989). (7) The ability of the government in Sntirfi to address much more than one or a few phone numbers in any coordinated fashion simply did not exist; whereas, the technical capability of the government today to gather, store and search every, single phone number used to call or be called in the entire country was inconceivable to the Court in 1979, much less the authors of our Fourth Amendment. (8) In Smith, nothing but the date, time and phone numbers involved in a phone call were captured; whereas, with the MATP, phone numbers, rough location (via trunk identifier), whether or not a call was cornpletedlconnected, the date, time and duration of call, and a variety of details about the specific phones used on both ends of each phone call are obtained by the government. (9) In Smith, there were only landlines. There was no notion of a "mobile" phone, as there were no cellular phone systems in the US. until the 19805; whereas, today the vast majority of American adults have a personal cell phone, and cellular telephone communication has reached a level of ubiquity such that our phone usage says much about us as individuals somethin that was not even contemplated in 1979. Roughly the same proportion of adults had cell phones in 2013 (approx. 91%) [Joanna Brenner, Pew Internet: Mobile (Sept. 18, 2013), Mobileaspx] as households had phone lines in 1979 (approx. 91%) Dep't of Commerce U.S. Dep't of Hous. Urban Dev., Annual Housing Survey: 1979, at 4 (1981) (Table A-1: Characteristics of the Housing Inventory: 1979 and 1970)]. 11 31. Plaintiffs and class members reasonably expect both the ability to use telecommunications services and to maintain their privacy when they make phone calls, and society views such privacy expectations as reasonable. 32. The PRG observed (at 111-112): "In modern society, individuals, for practical reasons, have to use banks, credit cards, email, telephones, the Internet, medical services, and the like. Their decisions to reveal otherwise private information to such third parties does not reflect a lack of concern for the privacy of the information, but a necessary accommodation to the realities of modern life. What they wantmand reasonably both the ability to use such services and the right to maintain their privacy when they do so." (underlining added, italics in original). 33. Since the was publicly disclosed, public opinion polls have shown widespread opposition to the dragnet collection, storage, retention, and search oftelephone metadata collected on every domestic or international phone call made or received by citizens or permanent resident aliens in the United States.3 Such polling results are one form of evidence showing that society views as reasonable the subjective collective expectation of Plaintiffs and class members that telephone metadata related to their domestic and international communications will remain off limits to government collection, storage, retention, and search absent at least some reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause to believe that at the time of collection, storage, or search that such rnetadata is relevant to the investigation of a particular international terrorism investigation or other criminal enterprise. 8 See, Associated Press, 9/1] Anniversary.' Pollfinds public doubts growing on federal surveillance, privacy, Hons. Chron., Sept. 11, 2013, at A6 ("Some 56 percent oppose the NSA's collection of telephone records for future investigations even though they do not include actual conversations"). 12 34. 35. 36. Additional evidence that society views Plaintiffs' asserted privacy expectations in their telephone metadata as reasonable is shown by the ongoing efforts of an unusual number of states to oppose the NSA's MATP surveillance in their 2014 legislative sessions. These include Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, and the State of Washington9 Additionally, other states, including Virginia, are advancing legislation demonstrating their opposition to various forms of electronic surveillance without a warrant. 10 The PRG underscored that abandoning the MATP would not disarm the United States in thwarting or punishing international terrorism, nor would it even stop the government fiom reasonable access to the same information: "[The government] would still be fi'ee under section 215 to obtain specfiic information relating to Specific individuals on Specific terrorist threats from banks, telephone companies, credit card companies, and the it can demonstrate to the FISC that it has reasonable grounds to access such information." Id at 115. The United States wields a formidable array of both traditional and relatively novel investigative powers, criminal prohibitions, and detention and killing authority to thwart or to punish international or domestic terrorism. On information and belief, the Mass Associational Tracking Program adds only speculatively - if at all -- to the Executive Branch's muscular counterterrorism arsenal as elaborated herein. The PRG noted that the NSA for several years used a metadata program for Internet communications similar to the MATP under the authority of FISA's pen register and track--and-trace provisions rather than 9 As of February 11, 2014, information on the referenced legislative efforts in all of the cited states is available at: "3 On February 11, 2014, HB17, a bill requiring a warrant prior to the use of any tracking device, including but not limited to ceiiular phones with GPS or other tracking capability, passed the Virginia House of Delegates unanimously. 13 37. 38. Section 215. NSA suspended the program in 2009 for compliance reasons, re-started the program in 2010, and terminated the program According to Defendant Alexander, the Internet metadata program was terminated because it "was insufficiently productive to justify the cost." Id. But according to Senator Wyden and Senator Mark Udall, the program was abandoned because Defendants were unable to demonstrate its effectiveness. Press Release, Wyderi, Udall Statement on the Disclosure of Bulk Email Records Collection Program (July 2, 2013)." On March 12, 2013, during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, Defendant Clapper falsely stated in response to a question fiom Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) that the NSA did not collect "any type of data at all on millions, or hundreds of millions, of Americans." Hearing before Senate Intelligence Committee, March 12, 2013, transcript at 66.12 During a July 17, 2013, House Judiciary Committee hearing, Robert Litt, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, answered the question of Chairman Robert Goodlatte "Do you think a program of this magnitude, gathering information involving a large number of people involved with telephone companies and so 011, could be indefinitely keptsecret fi'om the American people?" by responding, "Well, we tried." Hearing before House Judiciary Committee, July 17, 2013, transcript at 14.13 A3 of February 7, 2Ol4, available at: 12 As of February 11, 2014, available at: 13 As of February 11, 2014, available at: 14 39. 40. 41. 42. CLASS ACTION AVERMENTS Plaintiffs bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs Paul and Freedornworks seek to represent a class of persons to be defined as follows: All persons afforded protections under the Fourth Amendment who made or received a cellular/Wireless or terrestrial/landline telephone call that originated and/or terminated in the United States after May 2006. Numerosity. The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. As described above, there are over 300 million cellular subscribers and 100 million landline subscribers in the United States. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. The exact size of the class and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant's records. Members of the class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice or electronic media or by other methods deemed appropriate by this Court. Ccmmonality. There is a well--defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class. Common questions of fact include the extent of telephone metadata of all class members that has been and continues to be collected, stored, retained, and searched by Defendants under the Mass Associational Tracking Program. Common questions of law include whether such collection, storage, retention, and 15 43. 44. 45. search of the telephone rnetadata of class members violates the Fourth Amendment; and, whether declaratory and injunctive relief, including the purging of the telephone metadata concerning Plaintiffs and class members from Defendants' database, is appropriate. Typicality. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of class members because they are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same conduct. Plaintiffs and class members were and are subscribers, users, and/or consumers of telephone service in the United States whose telephone metadata has been and continues to be collected, stored, retained, and searched by Defendants under the MATP as alleged herein. Adequacy. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their interests and the interests of class members they seek to represent do not conflict. The interests are virtually identical in seeking to prevent Defendants from collecting, storing, retaining, and searching telephone metadata related to Plaintiffs' and class members' domestic or international communications. Plaintiffs will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class, and Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. This suit may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class, and final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Defendants' actions under the MATP do not differ with respect to the class members, and declaratory or injunctive relief is proper. 16 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 46. Plaintiffs and class members re--allege each of the foregoing paragraphs 47. Defendants' Mass Associational Tracking Program violates the Fourth Amendment rights of Plaintiffs and class members. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE Plaintiffs and class members respectfiilly request that the Court: 1. Declare that the Mass Associational Tracking Program violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution; Permanently enjoin Defendants fiom conducting or operating the Order Defendants to purge fiorn their possession, custody, and control all of the telephone metadata collected, stored, retained, and searched about Plaintiffs and class members pursuant to the MATP, regardless where held or by whom; Certify the suit as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Issue an order establishing procedures enabling Plaintiffs' counsel to obtain required security clearances to adequately conduct discovery or otherwise litigate the case properly; Award Plaintiffs' fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2412; and Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 17 Respectfully Submitted, I Earl "Treii/" Mayfie1d7D.C. Bar 459998 Michael P. Lewis D.C. Bar. 503311 The Lewis Firm, PLLC 901 New York Ave, Ste. 450E Washington, D.C. 20001 Tel: 202-630-6006 Fax: 888-430-6695 Kenneth T. "Ken" Cuccinelli, I1 Cuccinelli Associates, LLC 10560 Main Street, Ste. 218 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 pro hac vice pending 18